RAM LABHAYA, J.: This appeal arises out of a suit for a declaration that the mortgage on the ; basis of which defts. 1 & 2 are in possession of the lands in suit has been extinguished and also for khas possession of the property mortgaged. The suit was dismissed by the Sadar Munsiff. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the order of dismissal was affirmed on the ground that the suit was barred under Art. 11-A of the Limitation Act. At this stage the only question that arises for our deter­mination is whether the suit is so barred. (2) The facts bearing on the question of limita­tion are as follows: The lands in suit belonged to Radha Krishna Pandey and Baidya Nath Pandey. They borrowed money from the father of plaintiffs (deft. 4) and mortgaged the lands in question with other lands to him. After this mortgage, the mortgagors borrowed Rs. 500/- on the security of the lands in suit from deft. No. 1 and the father «f deft. 2 on the 21st April 1923. The mortgage fas with possession and for a period of 3 years. Defendant 4, to whom the lands in suit had also ten mortgaged with other lands, obtained a mort­gage decree against the mortgagors. He did not implead the subsequent mortgagees and in execu­tion of his decree purchased the lands in dispute along with other lands. He also got possession through Court. Defendants 1 and 2 applied to the Executing Court under O. 21, R. 100, C. P. C. com­plaining of unauthorised dispossession on the ground that they were not bound by the decree or the sale in pursuance thereof and were entitled to remain in possession on the basis of their mort­gage which was then subsisting. The objection prevailed and possession was re-delivered to defts. 1 and 2 by order of the Court passed under O. 21, R. 101, on the 30th March 1940. Deft. 4, it is alleged has gifted his rights as auction-purchaser of the lands to his sons, the plaintiffs, who are now the appellants. (3) Plaintiffs' case is that they are the represen­tatives of the auction-purchaser and as such are en­titled to recover possession of the property from defts. Deft. 4, it is alleged has gifted his rights as auction-purchaser of the lands to his sons, the plaintiffs, who are now the appellants. (3) Plaintiffs' case is that they are the represen­tatives of the auction-purchaser and as such are en­titled to recover possession of the property from defts. 1 and 2, whose mortgage has been extinguish­ed by virtue of the provisions contained in S. 6 of the Assam Money Lenders' Act of 1941 their posses­sion of the lands as mortgagees having remained for over 12 years from the date of the mortgage. (4) The plaintiffs have sued in their capacity as auction-purchasers. They claim to have derived title from deft. 4, who was the auction-purchaser of the property. They being the representatives of the auction-purchaser, the Courts below have held that their suit is essentially hit by Art. 11-A of the Limi­tation Act. This view is wholly untenable. It is true that the plaintiffs have sued in their capacity as auction-purchasers. But this is not all that is required for the application of Art. 11-A of the Limitation Act. This article applies when a plain­tiff feels aggrieved by an order passed under the Civil Procedure Code and the suit aims at esta­blishing the right which he claims to the present possession of the property. An order passed under O. 21, R. 101, becomes conclusive between the parties if no suit is instituted under O. 21, R. 103 by the party against whom the order has been passed. A suit under R. 103 would be obviously covered by Art. 11-A of the Limitation Act and must be instituted within one year from the date of the order. The person aggrieved by such an order may not institute a suit, which he is allowed to Institute by R. 103. In that contingency the order would become conclusive against him. In the present case, the order passed under R. 101 against the plaintiff's predecessors in interest was now challenged by a suit within one year. The order thus became conclusive and is not open to chal­lenge. But plaintiffs have nowhere challenged that order. They do not assail its correctness or validity. In the present case, the order passed under R. 101 against the plaintiff's predecessors in interest was now challenged by a suit within one year. The order thus became conclusive and is not open to chal­lenge. But plaintiffs have nowhere challenged that order. They do not assail its correctness or validity. On the contrary, they by necessary impli­cation accept the finality that attaches to the order and have sued for a declaration of title and for recovery of possession of the property in suit not on the basis that the order passed under R. 101 is not sustainable and they were entitled to possession of the property on the date the order was passed but expressly on the ground that the mort­gage on the basis of which defts. could remain in possession when the order under R. 101 was passed has now been extinguished by operation of law and defts. are thus now not entitled to possession. The suit involves absolutely no chal­lenge to the order passed under R. 101. This fact is conceded by the learned counsel for the res­pondents. In these circumstances, all that can be said is that plaintiffs are suing as auction-pur­chasers. But the mere fact that they are suing as auction-purchasers would not bring the case within the mischief of Art. 11-A. It has further to be established that the suit is in form or in substance to establish the right which was claimed by the plaintiffs at the time when the order under R. 103 was passed against them. At that stage plaintiffs predecessors in office claimed present right to the possession of the property as an auction purchaser. He could claim that right only against the judgment debtors only. Defendants were not the judgment-debtors and the right to the possession of the property that he claimed against the pre­sent defendants was denied to him. In the pre­sent case the plaintiffs come as representatives of the auction-purchaser, but do not claim the possession of the property on that basis alone. Their claim now rests on the ground that they are auction-purchasers and the defendants have lost the title to remain in possession by reason of the extinction of the mortgage. In so framing their suit, they have no need to, and they have not challenged the validity of the order under B. 101. Their claim now rests on the ground that they are auction-purchasers and the defendants have lost the title to remain in possession by reason of the extinction of the mortgage. In so framing their suit, they have no need to, and they have not challenged the validity of the order under B. 101. Such a suit, we have no manner of doubt, would not be covered by Art. 11-A of the Limitation Act. (5) The learned counsel for the respondents has tried to support the order of the Court below upon the strength of 'Baijulal v. Thakur Prasad' AIR (26) 1939 Pat 7. He has drawn our attention to the last para, in the judgment at p. 12. We find that the authority relied on is clearly distinguishable. In this case the basis of the decision was that the suit fell under O. 21, R. 103 and the right which was asserted in pro­ceedings under O. 21 was also claimed in the suit. In substance, therefore, the suit was for obtaining relief against an order passed under R.101, C. P. C. Art. 11-A was not applied on the mere ground that an auction-purchaser was instituting the suit. It was applied on the basis that the suit in effect was one covered by O. 21, B. 103. In the present case it is clear and in fact it is conceded that the suit is not with a view to obtaining reversal of the order passed against the father of the plaintiffs under O. 21, R. 101. That being the case, the Patna case is of no assistance to the learned coun­sel. He has not cited any other authority bearing on the point. (6) For reasons given above, we have no hesita­tion in holding that Art. 11-A did not apply to the case and the suit was not barred by Limita­tion. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The order of the learned Additional District Judge, U.A.D., dismissing the suit as time barred is rever­sed and the case is remanded to him under O. 41, IR. 23, C. P. C. for the trial of the remaining issues and for disposal of the appeal according to law. Costs shall abide the result. (7) THADANI, C. J.: I agree. V.S.B, Appeal allowed.