Judgment.-The question for consideration in these two petitions is whether an order passed by the District Judge, Tiruchirapalli, under Order 44, rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, rejecting two petitions to entertain pauper appeals, against the judgments and decrees in O.S.Nos. 37 and 40 of 1949 on the file of the Additional District Magistrate, Tiruchirapalli, after hearing the counsel for the petitioner, can be interfered with and set aside in revision simply because the points urged by the learned counsel who appeared for this petitioner in the two Original Petitions are not set out and discussed, and the order simply runs as follows: “I see no reason for thinking that the decision of the lower Court is contrary to law or is otherwise erroneous. Petition rejected.” Mr. Vaidyanatha Aiyar, for the petitioner in both the Civil Revision Petitions, relied on the ruling in Chennamma, In re1. There, it was held by a Bench of this Court, consisting of Venkatasubba Rao and Madhavan Nair, JJ., that it was not enough if the order rejecting the petition to file the pauper appeal simply quoted the words of the proviso to Order 44, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code and that an applicant should be granted leave to file a pauper appeal in case he showed that he had prima facie a good case. But, here, the fact remains that the learned District Judge heard the counsel for the petitioner, and came to the conclusion that the petitions should be rejected, thereby showing that in his opinion the petitioner had prima facie no good case in either of the proposed appeals. It has been held by a later Bench of this Court, in Narayana Rao v. Veerayya2, that the proviso to Order 44, rule 1 is mandatory and that it only contemplates a perusal of the application, the judgment and the decree by the appellate Judge and nothing else, and that unless in the opinion of the appellate Judge the decree is contrary to law or otherwise erroneous or unjust he is bound to dismiss the application; and that Order 44, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code does not say that the Court shall not reject the application if the appeal raises a substantial question of law or if the appellant has prima facie a good case. The ruling in Chennamma, In re 1, was considered and not followed, as being in conflict with the ruling in Sakubai v. Ganpat3, Rajendra Prasad Bose v. Gopal Prasad Bose 4 and Maung Tha Din v. Daw Paw 5. With very great respect, I prefer to follow the later Bench ruling in Narayana Rao v. Veerayya1 in preference to the earlier Bench ruling in Chennamma In re2, especially as a still later Bench of this Court has held in Subba Rao v. Tata Reddi3, that it is not even necessary for the appellate Court to hear the petitioner in a pauper appeal before rejecting the appeal under Order 44, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, and Wadsworth, J. has held in Kanthimathi Ammal v. Ganesa Aiyar4, that the Court does not act illegally if it disposes of an application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis in a summary manner without hearing the applicant, and even in Chambers, and without giving him time for payment of the deficient court-fee after rejection of the petition. I am satisfied that the mandatory provisions of the proviso of Order 44, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code will allow only of the interpretation put upon it in the case in Narayana Rao v. Veerayya1, Kanthimathi Ammal v. Ganesa Aiyar4 and Subba Rao v. Tata Reddi 3 ,and that the over-liberal interpretation put on it in Chennamma In re2, is not to be preferred to the stricter interpretation in these rulings. Even considering the matter solely and purely in the light of the proviso to Order 44, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code and without reference to any rulings, I am satisfied that a Court is bound to reject an application to file an appeal in forma pauperis if upon a perusal thereof, and of the judgment and decree appealed from, it sees no reason to think that the decree is contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law or is otherwise erroneous or unjust. When it hears the counsel for the petitioner and rejects the petition, it must be presumed to have applied its mind to the arguments of the learned counsel and the facts of the case before rejecting the petition. When it hears the counsel for the petitioner and rejects the petition, it must be presumed to have applied its mind to the arguments of the learned counsel and the facts of the case before rejecting the petition. So any interference in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure with such an order appears to me to be not justified, especially in the light of the Privy Council ruling in Venkatagiri Aiyangar v. Hindu Religious Endowment Board, Madras 5, laying very strict limits within which alone powers of revision can be exercised, none of which conditions are satisfied here. The mere fact that the learned District Judge gave no detailed reasons for his rejection is no prof that he did not apply his mind to the facts of the case or the arguments the learned counsel had urged. The mind of a highly trained judicial officer, like a District Judge, cannot be taken to be a vacuum to which arguments are addressed without leaving any effect behind. No ruling has been shown to me by Mr. Vaidydianatha Aiyar which requires the District Judge to give detailed reasons for rejecting a pauper application under the proviso to Order 44, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. Indeed, in most cases, it will be a sheer waste of time, money and energy to write long orders when rejecting such pauper petitions under that proviso. It is enough if the Judge is proved to have applied his mind to the judgment and decree and the pauper application. Though he was not bound under the rulings cited above even to hear the counsel for the petitioner before rejecting the application, the learned District Judge did hear the counsel for the petitioners. Though he was not bound, under the above rulings, to give time for payment of the court-fee, after rejecting the applications, he ‘gave time for paying the court-fee. So the learned District Judge has really granted more indulgence to the petitioner than he was entitled to, and there is nothing for the petitioner to complain. Paupers are entitled only to the privileges granted to them. They shall not be allowed more privileges, much less to take up an undue part of the Court’s time, crowding out the litigants who pay the stipulated court-fee. Paupers are entitled only to the privileges granted to them. They shall not be allowed more privileges, much less to take up an undue part of the Court’s time, crowding out the litigants who pay the stipulated court-fee. These petitions deserve to be and are hereby dismissed, but, in the peculiar circumstances, without costs, as these petitions seem to have been filed relying on the ruling in Chennamma, In re2 . Time granted for payment of court-fee in both these appeals till 3 p.m. on the 22nd February, in the District Court Tiruchirapalh. In no circumstances will this time be extended. V.P.S. ----- Petition dismissed.