The Chief Justice:-The petitioner filed a petition to set aside the election of the respondent to the Vellampalli Firka in the District Board of Guntur. The petition came up for hearing before the Election Commissioner on 21st March, 1950, when the respondent’s counsel prayed for time. His application for adjournment was, however, refused and the Election Commissioner went on with the enquiry and examined the witnesses tendered by the petitioner. On the evidence before him he passed an order setting aside the election of the respondent. Subsequently the respondent filed an application purporting to be under Order 9, rule 7 and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure; praying the Election Commissioner to set aside the order by which his election was set aside. The Election Commissioner found that the respondent had sufficient cause for not attending the hearing and allowed the application. The petitioner seeks to have this order quashed on the ground that the Election Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain an application under Order 9, rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question is whether this provision of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to the case of an election petition. Under Rule 1, sub-rule (3) of the rules with respect to the decision of disputes as to validity of election, an Election Commissioner exercising jurisdiction, under these rules shall be deemed to exercise such jurisdiction as a persona designata and not in his capacity as a Judge or other officer of Government as the case may be. It has been held time and again by this Court that the order of the Election Commissioner is not subject to interference by this Court under its revisional powers under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision in Mahabaleswarappa v. Gopalaswami Mudaliar1, on which reliance was placed by the respondent is not inconsistent with the position that the Election Commissioner is not a Civil Court within the meaning of the Civil Courts Act or the Code of Civil Procedure. It is evidently because the Election Commissioner cannot be deemed to be an ordinary Civil Court governed by the Civil Procedure Code that a special rule had to be framed in regard to the procedure to be followed by him in the enquiry of an election petition. It is evidently because the Election Commissioner cannot be deemed to be an ordinary Civil Court governed by the Civil Procedure Code that a special rule had to be framed in regard to the procedure to be followed by him in the enquiry of an election petition. Rule 6 provides that “Every election petition shall be enquired into by the Election Commissioner as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the trial of suits; provided that it shall only be necessary for the Election Commissioner to make a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of any witness examined by him” The Explanation to this rule specially vests the Election Commissioner with powers which are generally vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of certain matters like discovery and inspection, enforcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling the production of documents, etc. It is clear from this rule that the Civil Procedure Code in its entirety is not applicable to an election petition. Nor has the Election Commissioner all the powers and jurisdiction vested in an ordinary Civil Court governed by the Civil Procedure Code. If the Election Commissioner were such a Civil Court, then section 115 could also have been applicable. The provisions of rule 6 no doubt render the procedure applicable under the Civil Procedure Code to the trial of suits applicable also to the enquiry of election petitions. But we are not prepared to hold that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code which deal with matters arising after the final disposal of a suit would also apply to an election petition. To give an instance, we have no hesitation in holding that the jurisdiction to review a final order which is conferred on an ordinary Civil Court under Order 47, rule 1, of the Code is not vested in an Election Commissioner. Logically it must follow that the power to set aside a final order on the ground that one of the parties was prevented by sufficient cause from taking part in the trial of the suit must also be deemed not to have been conferred on the Election Commissioner. Mr. Logically it must follow that the power to set aside a final order on the ground that one of the parties was prevented by sufficient cause from taking part in the trial of the suit must also be deemed not to have been conferred on the Election Commissioner. Mr. Munikanniah, the learned counsel for the respondent was unable to cite any authority in support of the position, that procedure applicable to a trial would also comprise proceedings to set aside final orders. In the absence of an express provision empowering him to set aside his own orders either by way of review or by way of applications under Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Election Commissioner will have no jurisdiction to do so. The order in question must therefore be quashed. There will be no order as to costs. K.C. ----- Order quashed.