Venkatarama Ayyar, J.- This is an appeal against the Judgment and Decree of Mr. Justice Bell dismissing C.S.No. 100 of 1946 on the Original Side of this Court. The plaintiffs are merchants carrying on business at Alandur near St. Thomas Mount and the suit was to recover damages for breach of warranty in respect of goods sold to them by the defendants under a contract entered into on 19th September, 1945. During this period, there was a great demand for chillies in Madras. The defendants had purchased 250 maunds of chillies from a firm of Calcutta merchants called Ganjee-Sajun &38; Company and the same had been shipped per S.S. Dhruva on 16th September, 1945. While the shipment was on its way the plaintiffs agreed to purchase this consignment of 250 maunds from the defendants at Rs. 37-12-0 per maunds C.I.F. Cuddalore. The steamer arrived at Cuddalore on 2nd October, 1945. The bills of lading had been sent by the Calcutta Merchants to the defendants along with their invoice dated 21st September, 1945. The original arrangement was that the defendants should clear the goods at the port through Messrs. Parry &38; Co., and consign them by rail to the plaintiffs at St. Thomas Mount. On 4th October, 1945, the plaintiff wrote to the defendants that the bills of lading may be sent immediately the object of the plaintiffs being to make their own arrangements for promptly taking delivery of the goods. The defendants having agreed, the plaintiffs paid Rs. 9,437-8-0 to them being the price of the goods as per invoice and took delivery of the bill of lading on 9th October, 1945 and entrusted the same to one Kuppuswami Mudaliar who was doing business as clearing and forwarding agent at Calcutta. The said Kuppuswami Mudaliar in turn engaged Messrs. Parry &38; Co., for clearing the goods and handed over to them the bills of lading on nth October, 1945. The goods were in due course cleared and sent to the plaintiffs at St. Thomas Mount in two consignments. The first consignment of 160 bundles made up of 479 bags was despatched on 20th October, 1945. at Cuddalore and they reached St. Thomas Mount on 26th October, 1945. The second consignment consisting of 7 bundles made up of 21 bags was despatched at Cuddalore on 30th October, 1945, and it reached St. Thomas Mount on 1st November, 1945. The first consignment of 160 bundles made up of 479 bags was despatched on 20th October, 1945. at Cuddalore and they reached St. Thomas Mount on 26th October, 1945. The second consignment consisting of 7 bundles made up of 21 bags was despatched at Cuddalore on 30th October, 1945, and it reached St. Thomas Mount on 1st November, 1945. The plaintiffs stocked all these 167 bundles in their godown at Alandur. The case of the plaintiffs is that when they then inspected the goods they found them to be in a very damaged condition and that they complained about this to the defendants who sent one Kesavalal working in their office to inspect the goods, that the latter was satisfied that the goods were worthless and that it was agreed that the defendants would refund the amount and take back the goods. On 12th November, 1945, the plaintiffs sent a lawyer’s notice with the above allegations, Exhibit P-6. The defendants replied on 19th November, 1945, repudiating their liability and stating that the bills of lading having been handed over to them on 19th October, 1945, they were under no further liability to the plaintiffs and that the complaint could not be entertained. After some further correspondence the plaintiffs arranged with E.R. Prudhomme & Co., to have the goods surveyed. That was done on 27th December, 1945, after notice to the defendants. The surveyor reported that the goods were bleached in colour with no appearance or vitality that the stalks of a greater portion of the goods had come off that the seeds were pouring out and that the supply must have been from old stock. Thereafter the plaintiffs had the goods sold in public auction through Messrs. Murray &38; Co., after giving notice to the defendants. At the sale held on 26th January, 1946, the plaintiffs realised net Rs. 5,934-14-0. The suit is laid for recovery of Rs.5,446-10-4 as damages as per particulars mentioned in the plaint. In Exhibit P-6 the plaintiffs took up the position that under the contract the goods must be “chillies of new best quality and red colour” and that as the goods actually sent were not in accordance with this description they had a right to reject them. In Exhibit P-6 the plaintiffs took up the position that under the contract the goods must be “chillies of new best quality and red colour” and that as the goods actually sent were not in accordance with this description they had a right to reject them. In the plaint the claim was also made on the footing that there was a breach of the warranty as to the quality of the goods and that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages therefor. The defendants pleaded that they agreed to deliver only chillies and not ‘best new red chillies’, that the plaintiffs having taken delivery of the bills of lading on 9th October, 1945 and treated the goods as their own, had lost the right to reject them and that the damage to the goods was due to exposure to rain and sun at Cuddalore and that the defendants were not liable therefor. The suit was tried by Mr. Justice Bell. He held that by taking delivery of the bills of lading and exercising other acts of ownership over the goods the plaintiffs had lost the right to reject them. Dealing next with the claim for damages for breach of warranty he held that the defendants did not agree to supply “best new red chillies”, that the goods were not wholly unmerchantable and that they had suffered by exposure to rain at the seaport that the defendants were not liable for the damage and that in any event only a sum of Rs. 400 and odd could be claimed as damages. In the result he dismissed the suit with costs. The plaintiffs have preferred this appeal against this decision. On the question whether the plaintiffs are entitled to reject the goods there has not been much of an argument before us. There is authority for the position that in a C.I.F. contract the purchaser is entitled to reject the goods as not being in accordance with the terms of the contract notwithstanding that the property in the goods has passed to him by delivery of the bills of lading if he had no opportunity to inspect the goods before. It is only when he does any act which is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller that he loses his right of rejection under section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act. In Hardy & Co. It is only when he does any act which is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller that he loses his right of rejection under section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act. In Hardy & Co. v. Hillers & Fowler1, the purchasers under a C.I.F. contract had sold the goods even before they took delivery of them from their sellers, and the goods having been found not to be in accordance with the contract, the question arose whether the purchasers had the right to reject them under section 35 of the English Sale of Goods Act corresponding to section 42 of the Indian Act. In discussing the scope of that section Bankers, L.J., observed:- “I understand the section to refer to an act which is inconsistent with the seller being the owner at the material date; and the material date for the purposes of this case is not the date of the re-sale but the date of notice of rejection, upon receipt of which the ownership revested in the sellers. It is with that revested ownership that in my opinion that the act of re-sale was inconsistent. And it was inconsistent with it for this reason: Where under a contract of sale as goods are delivered to the buyer which are not in accordance with the contract, so that the buyer has a right to reject them the seller upon receipt of notice of rejection is entitled to have the goods placed at his disposal so as to allow of his resuming possession forthwith and if the buyer has done any act which prevents him from so resuming possession that act is necessarily inconsistent with his right.” Vide also the decision in Ruben, Ltd. v. Faire Bros., Ltd.2, where the decision in Hardy &38; Co. v. Hillers and Fowler3was followed. On this reasoning it is possible to argue that the plaintiffs had not lost the right to reject the goods merely by transporting them from Cuddalore to St. Thomas Mount, because they were in a position to return the goods to the defendants. That appears to have been the attitude taken up by them in Exhibit P-6. But on that basis the title to the goods would have revested in the sellers and the plaintiffs would have had no right to sell the goods by public auction as they did on 26th January, 1946, through Messrs. Murray &38; Co. That appears to have been the attitude taken up by them in Exhibit P-6. But on that basis the title to the goods would have revested in the sellers and the plaintiffs would have had no right to sell the goods by public auction as they did on 26th January, 1946, through Messrs. Murray &38; Co. In J.L. Lyons &38; Company v. May &38; Baker, Limited4, quoted by Mr. V.C. Gopalaratnam, the learned advocate for the respondents it was held that when a purchaser rejects the goods, he has no lien on them nor has he a title to retain possession of them until the price paid is returned. A fortiori he has no right to have the goods sold at the risk of the seller. In our opinion whatever be the rights of the plaintiffs in respect of the goods prior to 26th January, 1946, when the goods were auctioned, thereafter their right is only to damages for breach of warranty. The next question for consideration is whether there has been any breach of warranty on the part of the defendants. There has been some dispute as to whether the defendants warranted that the goods would be “best new red chillies”. They denied having given any such warranty. The transaction was brought about through a broker Pyarilal Malhotra. He certainly assured the plaintiffs that the goods would be best new red chillies. Vide Exhibit P-1. The only question is whether he had authority of the defendants to give this assurance. He has stated in his deposition that he had such authority. D.W. 2 the Managing Director of the defendant company has denied it. The invoice, Exhibit P-2 merely mentions chillies. The learned Judge was not prepared to find that any such authority was given. He was of opinion that the plaintiffs must have been misled by their own broker. That, however, does not conclude the matter because even if there was no express warranty, under section 16(2) of the Sale of Goods Act there would be an implied condition that the goods shall be of merchantable quality. D.W. 2 admits that though he did not give an express warranty he would have replied if he had been asked that the chillies were red and new. That the goods were in a very damaged condition at the time when they were inspected at Alandur is amply established. D.W. 2 admits that though he did not give an express warranty he would have replied if he had been asked that the chillies were red and new. That the goods were in a very damaged condition at the time when they were inspected at Alandur is amply established. P.W. 4 speaks to the condition of the goods when they arrived at St. Thomas Mount. He complained about their quality both to the defendants and also to the broker, Pyarilal Malhotra. He says that the defendants sent their man, Kesavalal who on inspection found the goods to be very damaged. P.W. 3 corroborates P.W. 4 and states that Kesavalal informed him after inspection that the goods were inferior. D.W. 2 admits that in the beginning of November the plaintiffs complained about the quality, that he sent Kesavalal to inspect the goods who reported that they were damaged, that he also brought samples of the goods, that the seeds and other things had come out, that the colour was dim and that the goods were in damaged condition. Then there is the evidence of Prudomme who examined the goods on 27th December, 1945 and his report is Exhibit P-14. They fully corroborate the case of the plaintiffs. Indeed the defendants did not dispute that the goods were in a damaged condition at the time of their receipt in St. Thomas Mount. Their contention is that they became damaged owing to exposure to rain at Cuddalore in October. The evidence on this point consists of the depositions of P.W. 5 and D.W. 1. P.W. 5 is Kuppuswami Mudaliar, the clearing and forwarding agent employed by the plaintiffs and D.W. 1 is the representative of Parry &38; Company who deposed to his having been present at Cuddalore during this period. As appears from their evidence the course of business adopted in the landing of goods was as follows. When the steamer is at anchor it is the duty of the steamer agent to transport the goods from the steamer to the land. He engages boats, goods are unloaded from the steamer into the boats and they are carried to the shore. The steamer agent has got godowns and the goods are warehoused there. Then the papers have to be filed in the port office for removing the goods and after permission is obtained the goods are removed. He engages boats, goods are unloaded from the steamer into the boats and they are carried to the shore. The steamer agent has got godowns and the goods are warehoused there. Then the papers have to be filed in the port office for removing the goods and after permission is obtained the goods are removed. Sadutullah Marcair steamer agent transported the goods now in question and P.W. 5 deposed that he owned godowns near the wharf and that these goods were stocked by him in those covered godowns and that on the 19th they were transported from these godowns to the railway wagons. Exhibit P-7, dated 16th November, 1945, is the bill of P.W. 5 for the charges incurred by him in clearing and forwarding the present goods. As per Exhibit P-7 a sum of Rs. 63-14-11 represents the charges paid to the steamer agent, Sadutullah for which there is also the receipt Exhibit B-5. Certain landing duties had to be paid. For that there is a charge of Rs. 8-1-11. D.W. 1 admits that both these payments were in fact made. There are two other charges mentioned in Exhibit P-7 which are very material to the point now under discussion. A sum of Rs. 30 is paid towards cart hire for 160 bundles from the steamer agent’s godown to the railway siding at three annas per bundle. There is another item of Rs. 2-10-0 being “cart hire on seven bundles from the steamer agent’s to our godown and then to the railway junction at six annas” Rs. 2-10-0. These entries clearly show that at the time when the goods were removed from the wharf to the railway station they were lying in the godowns of the steamer agent. This document is inconsistent with the case put forward by the defendants that the goods were stocked on the wharf uncovered and exposed to rain. D.W. 1 stated that he was at Cuddalore during this period, that large consignments of chillies were then unloaded, that they were either stored in godowns or in open spaces whichever were available, that there were rains during this period and that the goods were exposed to rain for two weeks before they were removed. D.W. 1 stated that he was at Cuddalore during this period, that large consignments of chillies were then unloaded, that they were either stored in godowns or in open spaces whichever were available, that there were rains during this period and that the goods were exposed to rain for two weeks before they were removed. In cross-examination he admits that the steamer agent has godowns within 200 feet of the landing place but he adds that they were not sufficient to warehouse all the goods, that some portions were covered and others were not and that he could not say whether this particular consignment was covered or not. He also adds that tarpaulins were used for covering some of the goods which were exposed. This evidence is inconclusive and cannot in our opinion outweigh the positive evidence given by P.W. 5. The learned Judge merely remarks that Kuppuswami Mudaliar was a “most inefficient person” an observation for which we are unable to find any more basis than that he noted the particulars in loose papers and not in a bound note book. Exhibit P-7 furnishes strong support to his evidence and we accept his evidence as probable. In this connection it must be noted that the defendants did not put forward in their notices, Exhibits P-8 and P-10 that the goods had been exposed to rain and the damage was attributable to that cause. It is only in the written statement that this plea is for the first time put forward. It is again a matter for comment that Kesavalal who, the defendants admit, was sent to inspect the goods in the be ginning of November and who is still in the service of the defendants has not been examined. The managing director of the defendant’s firm as D.W. 2, deposed in his evidence that Kesavalal reported to him that the goods had become wet and that they could not do anything in the matter. If so he would have been the best person to speak about the matter. No satisfactory reason has been given as to why he has been withheld from the box. It must also be noted that the defendant has not produced the correspondence which there must have been between him and the Calcutta firm about this matter. If so he would have been the best person to speak about the matter. No satisfactory reason has been given as to why he has been withheld from the box. It must also be noted that the defendant has not produced the correspondence which there must have been between him and the Calcutta firm about this matter. D.W. 2, no doubt, denies the existence of any such correspondence but we find it difficult to accept this evidence. In the result we hold that the goods which were supplied to the plaintiffs were damaged articles and that they are entitled to damages for breach of warranty. It is next contended by Mr. V.C. Gopalaratnam that the alleged defects in the quality of the goods could have easily been discovered by examining them that the plaintiffs had the opportunity to inspect them at Cuddalore and having failed to do so they are not entitled to damages on account of patent as distinguished from latent defects of quality. This argument proceeds on a misapprehension of the true scope of section 16(2) of the Sale of Goods Act which runs as follows:- “Where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he is the manufacturer or producer or not) there is an implied condition that the goods shall be of merchantable quality: Provided that, if the buyer has examined the goods, there shall be no implied condition as regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed.” Under this section there is an implied condition that the goods bought by description shall be of merchantable quality. This is subject to the proviso, which enacts that if the buyer has examined the goods, then no such condition could be implied with reference to patent defects. Now this section is relevant only when a question arises as to the existence of a warranty in any given contract. It is not contended that the proviso to section 16(2) operates in this case so as to deprive the plaintiffs of the benefit of a warranty. It applies only to cases where the goods were actually examined by a buyer. Vide Thornet and Fehr v. Beers and Son1and Peer Mahomed Rowther v. Dalooram Jayanarayan2. It is not contended that the proviso to section 16(2) operates in this case so as to deprive the plaintiffs of the benefit of a warranty. It applies only to cases where the goods were actually examined by a buyer. Vide Thornet and Fehr v. Beers and Son1and Peer Mahomed Rowther v. Dalooram Jayanarayan2. But where, as here, the goods were not examined at the time of the sale on 19th September, 1945 and indeed could not be as the goods were in the course of carriage on the high seas, the proviso does not apply and the plaintiffs would be entitled to the benefit of the warranty as per the terms of sub-section (2). This was established by a decision of the Court of appeal in the leading case of Jones v. Just1, where the plaintiffs purchased manilla hemp which was to arrive from Singapore by ship. On arrival the goods were delivered to the plaintiffs and the price was paid. On examining the goods the plaintiffs found that they were damaged and claimed damages for breach of warranty. It was held that they were entitled. The head note is in these terms:- "Under a contract to supply goods of a specified description, which the buyer has no opportunity of inspecting the goods must not only, in fact, answer the specific description, but must be saleable or merchantable under that description. The maxim, caveat emptor, does not apply to a sale of goods where the buyer has no opportunity of inspection." This decision was quoted with approval in Drummond v. Van Ingen2Lord Herschell observing: - "It is equally well settled that upon a sale of goods of a specified description, which the purchaser has no opportunity of examining before the sale, the goods must not only answer that specific description but must be merchantable under that description. This doctrine was laid down in Jones v. Just1, where all the previous authorities on the point were reviewed. The noble Lord agreed with the law as laid down in that case. The provisions of section 16 of the Sale of Goods Act and the corresponding provisions in section 14 of the English Sale of Goods Act are in accordance with these authorities. It must, therefore, be held that the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of warranty as provided in section 16(2). The provisions of section 16 of the Sale of Goods Act and the corresponding provisions in section 14 of the English Sale of Goods Act are in accordance with these authorities. It must, therefore, be held that the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of warranty as provided in section 16(2). When once that conclusion is reached and it is found that the warranty has been broken, then the rights of the parties are thereafter determined by section 59 of the Sale of Goods Act. Under that section the only point for determination is what damages should be awarded for breach of warranty. The question of inspection has no relevance to the determination of that question. The learned advocate for the respondent relied on a decision in Mithan Lal v. Swraj Parshad3as supporting his position. There the purchaser claimed the right to reject the goods on the ground that they were not in accordance with the contract and it was held that as he had sold the goods to a third person he was not entitled to reject them. The case would be covered by section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act. Then dealing with the claim for damages the Court proceeded to decide the same on the merits. It was not held that the plaintiffs were disentitled to damages by reason of their having had an opportunity of inspecting the goods and not availing themselves of that opportunity. We are, therefore, of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to damages notwithstanding that they did not inspect the goods on 9th October, 1945. It now remains to determine what damages the plaintiffs are entitled to. There has been some discussion before us about the basis on which damages should be assessed. We are, therefore, of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to damages notwithstanding that they did not inspect the goods on 9th October, 1945. It now remains to determine what damages the plaintiffs are entitled to. There has been some discussion before us about the basis on which damages should be assessed. In Jones v. Just1already referred to, the facts were very similar to those in the present case and with reference to the measure of damages it was held "that the plaintiffs were entitled as damages to the difference between what the hemp was worth when it arrived and what the same hemp would have realised had it been shipped in a state in which it ought to have been shipped." Again in Champanhac Ltd. v. Waller Ltd.4the plaintiffs having accepted unmerchantable goods were held entitled to damages for breach of warranty and it was observed:- "The measure of damages is in the first place, the difference in value between the goods as they were and the value which they would have had had they complied with the warranty." In Bunting v. Tory5it was held that in case of breach of warranty of quality such loss is prima facie the difference between the value of the goods at the time of the delivery to the buyer and the value they would have had if they answered to the warranty. The principles applicable to the case are thus well settled and applying them to the present case, we have to ascertain what the value of good chillies was on 9th October, 1945 which is the date of delivery; what the value of the damaged chillies was; and award the difference as damages to the plaintiffs. Simple as is the statement of the position in law, its practical application, however, presents difficult problems. It is contended for the respondent that as the contract was C.I.F. Cuddalore, the valuation of the goods must be on the basis of the market rate at Cuddalore and not at Madras. It was argued by Mr. V. Thyagarajan, the learned advocate for the appellants, that the agreement between the parties was that the goods should be delivered at St. Thomas Mount and that, therefore, the market rate in Madras could properly be taken as the basis for valuation. For this he relies apart from oral evidence on the words “in transit, St. V. Thyagarajan, the learned advocate for the appellants, that the agreement between the parties was that the goods should be delivered at St. Thomas Mount and that, therefore, the market rate in Madras could properly be taken as the basis for valuation. For this he relies apart from oral evidence on the words “in transit, St. Thomas Mount” occurring in the invoice Exhibit P-2. But the evidence discloses that during this period there were restrictions on the movement of goods from one district to another and that these words were introduced for purposes of facilitating prompt transport of goods from Cuddalore to St. Thomas Mount. We accept this evidence and hold that the place of delivery under the contract is Cuddalore and that the damages must be assessed on the basis of the market rate at that place. The more difficult question is to find out what the damaged chillies were worth on 9th October, 1945. As they were not sold on that date, the ascertainment of their value as on 9th October, 1945, must to some extent be a matter of speculation. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that as there was no allegation or proof that the goods had deteriorated between November, 1945, and January, 1946, the price realised at the auction on 26th January, 1946, might be taken as a basis for determining the value of the damaged goods. On this aspect of the case the decision in Loder v. Kekule1is of considerable assistance. There the contract was for the delivery of Russian tallow which was to be shipped from the Port of Danzig. The price was paid. The goods arrived on 12th January, 1856, and were cleared by 25th January, 1856. The plaintiff then inspected the goods and on 28th January, 1856; he complained to the defendant that the quality was inferior. Then there was correspondence between the parties and ultimately the plaintiff had the goods resold on 12th March, 1856. The action was to recover the difference between the price paid and the amount realised on the resale on 12th March, 1856. Then there was correspondence between the parties and ultimately the plaintiff had the goods resold on 12th March, 1856. The action was to recover the difference between the price paid and the amount realised on the resale on 12th March, 1856. After holding that the action was in substance one to recover damages for defect in quality and not to recover the return of the price paid, the Court observed as follows:- “Looking at the case in this aspect we think that the pre-payment cannot be taken into consideration in apportioning the damages; and that the true measure of damages would have been, if there had been nothing else in the case, the difference between the value of tallow of the quality contracted for, at the time of the delivery and the value of the tallow actually delivered. This however, is on the assumption that the tallow delivered could be immediately resold in the market. But as in the present case it appears clearly from the correspondence that the defendant by his conduct delayed the re-sale: and, as the jury have found, we think, correctly that the re-sale on the 12th of March was in a reasonable time, we are of opinion that the proper measure of damages is, the difference between the value in the market of tallow of the quality contracted for on the 25th of January, and the amount made by the re-sale of the tallow actually delivered.” The facts of the above case bear a strong resemblance to those in the present. There as here there was delay caused by disputes and correspondence between the parties and ultimately a re-sale by the purchaser. It was held that the price realised at the re-sale might be taken as the true value of the damaged goods as there was no unreasonable delay on the part of the purchaser in selling the goods. In the present case, though there was constructive delivery of the goods to the plaintiffs on 9th October, 1945, when the bills of lading were handed over to them, the understanding of both the parties clearly was that the goods were to be consigned to St. Thomas Mount and it cannot be said that there has been any delay on the part of the plaintiffs in transporting the goods from Cuddalore to St. Thomas Mount. They inspected the goods immediately after their arrival at St. Thomas Mount and it cannot be said that there has been any delay on the part of the plaintiffs in transporting the goods from Cuddalore to St. Thomas Mount. They inspected the goods immediately after their arrival at St. Thomas Mount in the beginning of November, 1945, and reported to the defendants that the goods were in a damaged condition and had them inspected by Kesavalal the representative of the defendants. In Exhibit P-6 they exercised the right to reject the goods within a reasonable time and the further delay was due to the attitude taken up by the defendants in disclaiming all liability. We are unable to find that there was unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiffs in bringing the goods to sale and we think that the price realised at the auction may fairly be taken as the basis for determining the value of the goods. But it is argued by Mr. V.C. Gopalaratnam that there was practically no market for the goods at Alandur where the auction was held and that further the notice of sale by Messrs. Murray &38; Co. (Exhibit P-18) marked the goods as sold at the risk of the defendant and that that was a depreciatory condition which must have brought down the price and that, therefore, the amount realised at the auction could not be taken as the proper value of the goods. This argument is not without force. The question of damages does not appear to have received adequate attention during the trial. No evidence was adduced about the market rate for chillies at Cuddalore on 9th October, 1945. Nor was any attempt made to establish how far the price realised on 26th January, 1946, could be taken as the true value of the damaged goods. The difference between the market rate for good chillies on 26th January, 1946, and the amount realised at the auction on that date might be taken as furnishing a workable basis for assessing damages, due allowance being made for the absence of a proper market at Alandur and the depreciatory character of the sale conditions and the differences in the market rates ruling at Madras and Cuddalore. In the circumstances we think that the proper course is to remand the case for assessing the damages payable to the plaintiffs on the principles mentioned above. In the circumstances we think that the proper course is to remand the case for assessing the damages payable to the plaintiffs on the principles mentioned above. Both parties will be at liberty to adduce fresh evidence. We accordingly set aside the decree of the Court below and remand the case for trial on the question of damages. The costs of this appeal will be provided for in the decree to be passed at the re-trial. K.S. ----- Case remanded.