Judgment Sarjoo Prosad, J. 1. The defendants first party are the appellants in this appeal. It arises out of a suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession, or, in the alternative, for recovery of possession of an area of about 25 bighas, 1 katha, 2 dhurs of land appertaining to Khata No. 17/K of Village Thalaha. The khata in question stood recorded in the record of rights in the name of Bachcha Mandal. This Bachcha Mandal executed a sale-deed on the 7th of February, 1922, conveying the entire area to one Raj Kumar Mandal and the said vendee came in possession of the area demised, and thereafter the son of Raj Kumar, who is the plaintiff in the suit, came in possession of this land on the death of his father. The plaintiff alleges that in Asrah 1351, Fasli he learnt that the defendants first party appellants, who were the landlords, instituted a suit for rent in respect of the holding in question, and in execution of the decree got the lands sold and purchased themselves. It is alleged that all the tenants interested in the holding were not made parties to the rent suit or in the execution proceedings arising out of the said decree; nor was the plaintiffs father or the plaintiff who was purchaser of the holding from the recorded tenant as early as 1922 impleaded as a party to the execution case as it should have been done after the amendment of the Bihar Tenancy Act recognising such a transfer as binding on the landlord. The plaintiff accordingly averred that the decree obtained in the suit had the effect merely of a money decree, and the execution sale also took the character of sale in execution of a money decree, and consequently only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor passed under the sale and not the holding itself. 2. The defendants first party and the defendants second party, who claimed to be the settlees under the defendants first party, filed written statements contesting the suit. 2. The defendants first party and the defendants second party, who claimed to be the settlees under the defendants first party, filed written statements contesting the suit. The defendants first party alleged that the plaintiff had no cause of action, and that the suit was barred by general and special law of limitation, that the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff or his father was a fraudulent transaction and that the plaintiff or his father never came in possession of the lands by virtue of the said purchase. They also averred that the rent suit and the rent decree were properly constituted, and the sale in execution of the decree which was a rent decree passed the holding itself and not merely the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor. The defendants first party further stated that after the delivery of possession through Court they came into possession of the property, and thereafter they settled portions of the land out of the holding with defendants second party. The defendants second party supported these allegations of the defendants first party appellants, and claimed to be in possession of the entire lands. 3. The two Courts below have concurrently found that the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs father in 1922 was a genuine document, and by virtue of the sale, the plaintiff and his father came in possession of the disputed lands. They have also held that the rent decree had the effect of merely a money decree inasmuch as all the heirs of the recorded tenant, Baehcha Mandal, were not made parties to the suit, and secondly because the plaintiff or his father whose transfer had come to be recognised as binding on the landlord by virtue of the amendment to the Bihar Tenancy Act was not made a party to the execution proceedings, and, therefore, the sale held in execution of such a decree had merely the effect of a money sale and did not affect the title of the plaintiff to the disputed lands. A further contention which was raised in the case was whether the suit was barred by limitation in view of Article 3, Schedule III of the Bihar Tenancy Act, because the dispossession was alleged to be a dispossession by the landlord. A further contention which was raised in the case was whether the suit was barred by limitation in view of Article 3, Schedule III of the Bihar Tenancy Act, because the dispossession was alleged to be a dispossession by the landlord. Both the Courts below have repelled this contention, and they have held that the suit was governed not by this special limitation but by general limitation, and, as such, was well within 12 years of the alleged dispossession. The trial Court found on remand that the dispossession took place as a result of delivery of possession in October 1938, whereas the appellate Court has found that there was no actual dispossession of the plaintiff at the time of the said delivery of possession but the plaintiff was dispossesed from the lands by the settlement-holders sometime about 1944 within two years of the date of the suit. In that view the appellate Court has held that even if the special limitation under the Bihar Tenancy Act applied to the case, the suit was not barred. Accordingly the Courts below have decreed the suit granting the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff. 4. Mr. Rama Kant Varma on behalf of the appellants has not challenged the findings of fact arrived at by the two Courts below, but he has urged three points for consideration. In the first place, he submits that the decree obtained in the aforesaid suit for rent was not a money decree. Secondly, he argues that if it was dispossession of the tenants in execution of a money decree, then the dispossession was effected by the landlord, and, therefore, the special article of limitation -- Article 3, Schedule III applied to the case; and thirdly his contention is that the appellate Courts finding of dispossession is illegal inasmuch as it does not take any notice of the fact that the defendants first party landlords have been in possession of a large area of the disputed lands. I shall consider these findings in their order. 5. In my opinion, the Courts below were justified in holding that it was necessary for the defendants first party to make Bhola or Bidya as parties to the rent suit, they being also interested in the holding, and in the absence of these parties, the suit could not be properly constituted as a suit for rent. Mr. 5. In my opinion, the Courts below were justified in holding that it was necessary for the defendants first party to make Bhola or Bidya as parties to the rent suit, they being also interested in the holding, and in the absence of these parties, the suit could not be properly constituted as a suit for rent. Mr. Varmas argument is that in any case Kamal, who was the karta of the family, represented the entire holding, and, therefore, the decree obtained against him was sufficient to bind the entire body of tenants. As to whether Kamal did or did not represent the entire holding was a question of fact, and that question of fact has been answered against him by the Court of appeal below. The Court of appeal below says that the presence of Kamal in the suit or in the execution case was not such as to represent the interest of Bhola or Bidya in the holding. On behalf of the appellants I have been referred to a decision of this Court in Jagdeo Nath V/s. Pratap Udai Nath, AIR (11) 1924 Pat 339. That case, in my opinion, has been rightly distinguished by the learned Additional District Judge who heard the appeal. In any case whether Kamal could or could not represent the interest of the other tenants in the holding was a pure question of fact, and, in my opinion, it is no longer open to the learned Counsel for the appellants to contend before me that the decision of the lower appellate Court on the point is erroneous. 6. The other point which has been argued is that it was not necessary for the landlord to make the plaintiff or his father a party to the execution case. Sec.26-B of the Bihar Tenancy Act came into operation by virtue of an amendment on the 10th of June, 1935, and by authority of that provision the transfer effected in 1922 came to be binding on the landlord. The attachment in the execution case was served on the 6th of July 1935, and the sale took place on the 12th of August 1935. Now it is well settled that the sale in order to have the effect of a sale in execution of a rent decree must be in the presence of a person who is the tenant of the land. Now it is well settled that the sale in order to have the effect of a sale in execution of a rent decree must be in the presence of a person who is the tenant of the land. The effect of this change in the law was that on the 10th of June 1935, the judgment-debtor against whom the decree had been obtained had ceased to be a tenant of the landlord, and the plaintiff or his father had become a tenant of the land. It was, therefore, very necessary to make the sale effective as a sale in execution of a rent decree to make the plaintiff or his father a party to the execution proceedings, because the relationship of landlord and tenant must continue up to the date of sate, and if it had ceased during this period, then the sale held in presence of a party who is not the actual tenant or has ceased to be a tenant cannot have the effect of passing title to the holding itself. In my opinion, therefore, the decision of the Courts below is perfectly justified on both these points. 7. The only question which has worried me is the next question, namely, whether Article 3, Schedule 3 applies to the case. The argument of Mr. Varma which he has forcefully put before me is that the relationship of landlord and tenant having continued, and the sale having the effect of a money sale, the dispossession of the tenant even though as a result of delivery of possession through Court is by the landlord, and, therefore, Article 3, Schedule 3 applies to the case. For this purpose he relies upon the observations of Meredith, J., in Mt. Deorati Kuer V/s. Dasrath Dubey, AIR (27) 1940 Pat 476, where his Lordship observed as follows: "In any case, however, I think that the point does not really arise in the present case, since the finding is that the decree obtained against the original tenant was only a money decree and the tenancy continued. The landlord therefore was auction-purchaser only of the right, title and interest of the original tenant (defendant No. 3), whatever that might have been, and not of the holding or of the tenancy right of the plaintiff. The landlord therefore was auction-purchaser only of the right, title and interest of the original tenant (defendant No. 3), whatever that might have been, and not of the holding or of the tenancy right of the plaintiff. Therefore, in dispossessing the plaintiff, the dispossession was not really in the capacity of auction-purchaser of his interest, but merely upon the excuse of being an auction-purchaser, just as it was upon the excuse of having got the decision of a Criminal Court in the landlords favour. In my opinion this is clearly a case where the special limitation under Article 3, Schedule 3, Bihar Tenancy Act, is applicable." It is to be noticed that in that case the landlord had dispossessed the tenant subsequent to the alleged delivery of possession taking advantage of a criminal proceeding and dispossession was not by process of Court. Under those circumstances clearly Article 3, Schedule III, of Bihar Tenancy Act did apply. But the observations do lend countenance to the contention of Mr. Varma, that even if the delivery of possession was through Court, the relationship of landlord and tenant having continued, the dispossession would attract the mischief of this special limitation under the Bihar Tenancy Act. This decision of Meredith, J., with which Fazl Ali, J., (as he then was,) agreed, has been distinguished in a later case of this Court in Kapil Singh V/s. Feda Ali, 25 Pat 695. Ray, J., who delivered the judgment in the case observed that the decision in question was obiter. This case, in my opinion, therefore, does not help the contention of Mr. Varma, a contention which is directly met by the decision of the Special Bench of this Court in Gajadhar Rai V/s. Ram Charan Gope, 9 Pat 788. In that case also the decree in question had not been obtained against the entire body of tenants. In execution of such a decree the lands had been sold and purchased by the landlord himself who obtained delivery of possession of the same. The tenants who were not made parties to the suit then filed a suit for declaration of title and delivery of possession. In execution of such a decree the lands had been sold and purchased by the landlord himself who obtained delivery of possession of the same. The tenants who were not made parties to the suit then filed a suit for declaration of title and delivery of possession. It was urged that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 3, Schedule III of the Tenancy Act, and their Lordships following a long line of cases of the Calcutta High Court as well held that the suit in question was not so barred. The principle which they lay down is that the dispossession in such a case by the landlord is not dispossession qua landlord but the landlord claimed possession by virtue of the execution sale and delivery of possession as a representative of a person whose right, title and interest he had purchased. Therefore, even if the dispossession was in execution of a money decree, the dispossession would not be deemed to be dispossession by the landlord but as a person representing the interest of a co-tenant. The further principle which they lay down is that where the dispossession is by an act of Court, and the landlord gets into occupation of land by a process of Court, it is not an act of dispossession by the landlord within the meaning of the Article. I do not see any reason to hold that the value of this authority has in any manner been shaken or affected by the observations of Meredith, J., in the case to which I have already referred. In my opinion, therefore, the dispossession in the present case even though in execution of a money decree was by process of Court, and consequently was by a person who claimed to represent the interest of some of the tenants in the land. In either event the mischief of Article 3, Schedule III of the Bihar Tenancy Act could not affect the suit of the plaintiff, and the Courts below were, therefore, justified in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation in any case. The lower appellate Court has come to a definite finding that the plaintiff was not dispossessed as a result of delivery of possession in 1938 but the dispossession, if at all, took place in 1944. This part of the finding is challenged by Mr. The lower appellate Court has come to a definite finding that the plaintiff was not dispossessed as a result of delivery of possession in 1938 but the dispossession, if at all, took place in 1944. This part of the finding is challenged by Mr. Varma on the ground that the entire land had not become inundated, and the Court says nothing about the possession of the defendants first party in respect of a large portion of the land. As I have said, to some extent the point has become academic in view of what has been held by the Court below that the suit is not hit by Article 3, Schedule III of the Bihar Tenancy Act. But the finding to my mind quite clearly shows that the defendants first party landlords did not acquire possession by virtue of that delivery of possession. It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff was not dispossessed as a result of the delivery of possession, and he continued to be in possession until the settlees came to be in occupation of the lands sometime in 1944 or thereafter when the dispossession took place. 8. Having regard to all these factors, I hold that the decision of the Court of appeal below is right and must be affirmed. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.