JUDGMENT Malik, CJ. - A representative suit was filed by the Hindus of Amethi against the Muslim inhabitants of the same place for the following reliefs.- (1) That it be declared that the Hindus of the town of Amethi in the district of Lucknow have a right to conduct their processions on the public streets of Amethi with music and that they have a right to blow conches and play music in the procession, and in their private houses or public or private temples and that they have a right to pass by the sites occupied by mosques in the town without any obstruction or hindrance by or on behalf of the Defendants. 2. The suit was resisted on various grounds, the main ground being that there was a custom in Amethi according to that custom the Hindus were not entitled to any of the rights claimed in the plaint. It was also pleaded that in 1894 there was an award "Ext. N14" given by one Haji Majid Husain under which the Hindu inhabitants of Amethi were given the right to blow conches only in the Mohallas of Shahzadpur and Rambagh and that only when it did not conflict with the time fixed for Muslim prayers. It was further pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. 3. The objection to the grant of the declaration were over-ruled by both the lower Courts and the suit was decreed. 4. The Defendants have appealed. 5. As regards the award Ext. No. N14, though the reference to arbitration was not produced, a document purporting to be a plain copy of the award was produced and Sheikh Ahmad Ali, brother of Haji Majid Husain, deposed that he was the scribe of the original award and the award was exactly similar to the copy filed in Court. Sheikh Ahmad Ali also gave evidence to the effect that he was present at the time when the award was given and he purported to reproduce the terms of the award. Learned Counsel has urged that the lower Court was not justified in holding that the award was not proved. Even if it be assumed that the award was established I do not see how it can be said that it was binding on all the Hindus for all time. Learned Counsel has urged that the lower Court was not justified in holding that the award was not proved. Even if it be assumed that the award was established I do not see how it can be said that it was binding on all the Hindus for all time. No names are given in the alleged copy of the award but it is mentioned that a reference was made to Haji Majid Husain on behalf of the Muslims and the Hindus of the locality. Learned Counsel has urged that from that it must be assumed that every Hindu and every Muslim in Amethi must have joined in the reference. This would be a most unreasonable assumption. What is more likely to have happened is that the prominent members of the two communities or such of them as assumed to themselves the role of being the leaders of the community must have joined in the reference. In my view, such a reference might bind only those who were parties to it but cannot bind all the people living in the locality and for all times to come. 6. Learned Counsel has referred to the provisions of Order I, Rule 8, CPC Code, and has said that if a representative suit can bind the whole community or those who are supposed to be represented by the Plaintiff to an action there is no reason why an award given on a reference purporting to be on behalf of the whole community should not bind the whole community. The analogy is not perfect. Order I, Rule 8 makes statutory provisions for binding those who have similar rights but who may not have joined in the suit or who may not have wished to be represented but it does give everybody a right to enter-appearance if he so desires. There is no statutory provision which would make a private award given on a reference by some persons claiming to be representatives or leaders of a community binding on all members of the community. The award therefore to my mind, cannot defeat the Plaintiffs' claim. 7. As regards the plea of limitation, I fail to see how the question of limitation can arise on the basis of the order of the District Magistrate dated 14th April, 1922. That order does not relate to the blowing of conches. The award therefore to my mind, cannot defeat the Plaintiffs' claim. 7. As regards the plea of limitation, I fail to see how the question of limitation can arise on the basis of the order of the District Magistrate dated 14th April, 1922. That order does not relate to the blowing of conches. It only restricted the right of the Hindus to take out a procession which was objected to by the Muslims and it was further mentioned in the order that such a pro cession was not to be taken out so long as the Hindus had not got their rights established by a civil court. Reliance is placed on Article 120 of the Limitation Act and it is urged that under Article 120 a suit should have been filed within six years of the date of the order. It is further urged by learned Counsel that Section 23 of the Limitation Act relied on by the lower court has no application. Section 23 relates to continuing breaches and wrongs. It is not necessary for me to consider whether Section 23 applies to such a case. The order of the Magistrate was merely an administrative order and it could only be passed to prevent breaches of peace or in the interest of maintenance of law and order. The mere fact that the Magistrate prevented the Hindus of the locality from bringing out a procession and further directed them not to bring out such processions unless their rights were determined by a civil court cannot bind all Hindus for all times. The same remarks that I have made as regards the award of the arbitrator apply to the order of the Magistrate. Every time a section of the population wants to take out a procession and they are prevented from doing so there is a fresh cause of action. In Ponnu Nadar and Ors. v. Kumaru Reddiar and Ors. 1935 AIR (Mad).967, a Bench of the Madras High Court has held that so long as a legal order of a Magistrate remains in force there could be no cause of action against the Defendants for obstructing the taking out of a procession. I can find no provision of law and learned Counsel has not been able to point out any under which a Magistrate can be processions for all times. I can find no provision of law and learned Counsel has not been able to point out any under which a Magistrate can be processions for all times. Even if such an order was legal that did not give the Defendants the right to enforce the order and prevent the bringing out of a procession. With great respect to the learned Judges, I fail to see why there was no cause of action for a suit for a declaration that the Hindus had a right to take out a procession and the Muslims had no right to obstruct the same. I may, however, say that learned Counsel has not urged that there was no cause of action for the suit. His contention is that the suit was barred by limitation. In my view, no question of limitation arises. 8. As regards custom, the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court is that there is no such custom as was pleaded by the Defendants. The lower appellate court has held that even if there be such a custom it would not be reasonable. The claim must be divided in two parts. Firstly the right of the Plaintiffs to use their own property in their own way, that is the right that they claim to blow conches or perform their worship inside their houses or inside their temples. It cannot be denied that everybody has a right to make such use of his own property as may be lawful so long as it does not interfere with the rights of his neighbours. It is possible to conceive that the Plaintiffs or some of them might make such use of their property as might amount to a nuisance. In such a case the Defendants would, no doubt, have a cause of action, but they have no right to object to the blowing of conches etc. on the mere ground of sensitiveness. It was said, by learned Counsel, that idolatory is repugnant to Muslim sentiment and conches are usually blown at the time of worship by the Hindus. In a country like India which is populated by various communities following different religions people must learn to respect the sentiments not only of their own community but of others as well, and this kind of hypersensitiveness cannot be too strongly condemned by all right-thinking men and cannot be encouraged by courts of law. In a country like India which is populated by various communities following different religions people must learn to respect the sentiments not only of their own community but of others as well, and this kind of hypersensitiveness cannot be too strongly condemned by all right-thinking men and cannot be encouraged by courts of law. So long, therefore as it is not established that the right of user of the Plaintiffs' own property is such as to amount to a nuisance as recognised by law, the Plaintiffs' right to blow conches or carry on worship inside their houses cannot be interferred with and the declaration given was, therefore justified. 9. As regards the right of public highway the matter is now well settled by the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Saiyid Manzur Husain v. Saiyid Mohammad Zaman AIR 1925 P.C. 360. Their Lordships have laid down that there is a right to conduct a religious procession with its appropriate observances along a highway. Persons of whatever religion or sect are entitled to conduct their religious processions through public streets so long as they do not interfere with the ordinary use of such streets by the public and subject to such directions as the Magistrates may lawfully give to prevent obstructions of the thoroughfare or breaches of the public peace. The declaration given by the learned Judge of the lower appellate court is to the same effect. 10. There is therefore, no force, in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs.