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1951 DIGILAW 43 (KER)

Rama Subha Iyer v. Janaki Ammal

1951-06-01

GANGADHARA MENON, SUBRAMONIA.IYER

body1951
Judgment :- This appeal is directed against the order of the learned District Judge of Quilon dismissing Company Petition No. 11 of 1124 of his Court filed by the liquidators of a limited Company by name "The Sri Ram Tile Works, Ltd., Quilon", which has gone into voluntary liquidation. On 17.8.1121 respondent obtained a decree against the Company in O.S. No. B of 1121 on the basis of a hypothecation bond dated 31.1.1107. When execution was taken out by the respondent an application was filed on behalf of the Company to have the debt discharged as per the provisions of S.8, 9 and 11 of the Debt Relief Act 11 of 1116. It was dismissed on 11.7.1124 under Ext. 11 order. Thereafter the entire decree amount appears to have been deposited in Court on behalf of the Company by a vendee of the liquidators. But before the decree-holder drew the money from Court the liquidators filed Company Petition No. 11 of 1124 attacking the hypothecation bond was wanting in consideration and the decree based thereon as fraudulent and collusive and praying for an enquiry into the claim of the decree-holder and to call her for proof of the debt. The respondent decree-holder resisted the application on the grounds (1) that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such an application (2) that the liquidators are concluded by the order of the execution Court and (3) that the application is barred by limitation. The Court below repelled the first two grounds of objection but it upheld the plea of limitation and dismissed the petition. One of the joint liquidators has therefore come in appeal. The respondent has filed a memorandum of objections in regard to the findings against her on the first two points. 2. As already stated the hypothecation bond is dated 31.1.1107. The decree was passed on 17.8.1121. It is admitted that the resolution for the voluntary winding up of the Company was passed only on 4.2.1123. The respondent is therefore a secured creditor who has obtained her decree long before the winding up proceedings. This being the case it is contended for the respondent that the winding up Court has no jurisdiction to call her for proof of the debt or to institute an enquiry into the extent and validity thereof. We think that there is considerable force in this argument. 3. This being the case it is contended for the respondent that the winding up Court has no jurisdiction to call her for proof of the debt or to institute an enquiry into the extent and validity thereof. We think that there is considerable force in this argument. 3. S.284 of the Travancore Companies Act which corresponds to S.229 of the Indian Act provides that:-"In the winding up of an insolvent company the same rules shall prevail and be observed with regard to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors and to debts provable and to the valuation of annuities and future and contingent liabilities as are in force for the time being under the law of insolvency with respect to the estates of persons adjudged insolvent; and all persons who in any such case would be entitled to prove for and receive dividends out of the assets of the company may come in under the winding up, and make such claims against the company as they respectively are entitled to by virtue of this section". The words "the same rules as are in force for the time being under the law of insolvency", in the above section are wide enough to include rules contained in the sections of the Insolvency Act, rules if any made under the Act, and any appropriate established rules of practice in the insolvency proceedings unless there is something in the Companies Act itself already providing for the matter in question, or in conflict with the rules which the section purports to import. (Vide A.I.R. 1929 All. 353 F.B.). There are no such provisions in the Companies Act except those contained in S.208 of the Act regarding stay of proceedings and in S.210 regarding granting or refusing leave to commence or proceed with suit or legal proceeding, with which we are not concerned here as no reliefs are sought for in this case on the basis of those sections. Therefore in determining the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors under S.284 of the Companies Act in a winding up proceeding under the Act the provisions of the law of insolvency in respect of that matter are attracted. Therefore in determining the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors under S.284 of the Companies Act in a winding up proceeding under the Act the provisions of the law of insolvency in respect of that matter are attracted. It is a well-etablished principle of insolvency law, that in the case of insolvency of an individual a secured creditor can stand outside the proceedings as indicated by S.9(2), S.28(2) and S.47 of the Travancore Insolvency Act VII of 1108 more particularly the proviso to S.28(2) which provides that nothing in the Sub-section shall affect the power of any secured creditor to realise or otherwise deal with his security in the same manner as he would have been entitled to realise or deal with it if the Sub-section had not been enacted. 4. There is however no warrant for importing the provisions of S.53 of the Insolvency Act also as is contended for by the appellant. With reference to secured and unsecured creditors in the matter of the winding up of an insolvent company the rules of insolvency that S.284 of the Companies Act seeks to import are only those rules that relate to their respective rights. The provisions of S.53 of the Insolvency Act cannot be considered as such rules. 5. Applying therefore the rules under the law of insolvency in determining the rights of a secured creditor as enjoined under S.284 of the Travancore Companies Act, it is evident that a secured creditor can stand altogether out of the winding up proceedings if he so elects and rely upon his security or his decree if he has obtained one subject of course to the restrictions that may be imposed by virtue of Ss. 108 and 110 of the Act. The winding up judge cannot compel a secured creditor to prove his debt or subject it to his scrutiny nor has the judge jurisdiction to annul or modify a secured creditor's security or decree. We are fortified in our conclusions by the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Hansraj v. Official Liquidators, Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., referred to above. No decision has been brought to our notice either English or Indian which takes a contrary view. We are fortified in our conclusions by the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Hansraj v. Official Liquidators, Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., referred to above. No decision has been brought to our notice either English or Indian which takes a contrary view. The decision In re Van Laun Ex-parte Chatterton 1907 (2) K.B. 23, which the learned Advocate for the appellant relied on, does not touch the question that we are called upon to consider in this case. It is clear from the facts of that case that the secured creditor had exercised his option to come into the winding up proceedings and submit his claim to the winding up judge. 6. It therefore follows that the Court below had no jurisdiction to entertain Company Petition No. 11 of 1124. It ought to have been dismissed on that sole ground. 7. Though we are not inclined to accept the view of the lower Court on the question of limitation, we think it unnecessary to discuss the point in detail inasmuch as the application of the liquidators has to be dismissed on the ground of want of jurisdiction. 8. For the foregoing reasons we allow the memorandum of objections of the respondent to the extent indicated above and dismiss the appeal with costs.