JUDGMENT : Panigrahi, J. - The Appellant filed a suit in the Court of the Munsif. Puri, for recovery of possession of a house and for arrears of rent and damages against the Defendants who were his tenants in O.S. No. 392 of 1945. The suit was ultimately compromised and a decree in terms of the compromise was passed on 1-2-47. Under Clause (1) of this compromise decree the Defendants agreed to pay Rs. 372/- towards arrears of rent due for the period prior to the institution of the suit as well as for the period for which the suit was pending. Out of this sum, Rs. 200/- was to be paid on the date of the decree and the balance to be released by execution. Clause (2) of the compromise decree says that the Defendants would continue to remain in possession of the suit house from 1-2-47 the date of the decree-upto 31-7-48, paying a monthly rental of Rs. 22/-. Clause (3) says that at the end of this period Defendants shall surrender possession that is on 31-7-48, and in the event of the Defendants failure show to surrender possession the Plaintiff shall take possession by dispossessing the Defendants "through Court". Clause (4) says that in respect of future rent, the Defendants shall make payments regularly but if there is any arrear the Plaintiff shall be entitled to recover it, with damages and interest at 12/- per annum according to law. The judgment-debtors continued to remain in possession of the house up to 31-7-48 but refused to surrender possession after that date. The decree-holder therefore wanted to take possession "through Court" in accordance with the stipulation contained in clause (3) of the compromise and filed an execution petition o 14-8-48. The present miscellaneous appeal arises out of this execution petition. 2. The contention raised by the judgment-debtors was that by reason of the compromise a new tenancy was created and that such a tenancy could be terminated and possession retaken only after a fresh suit instituted for the purpose and not by means of an execution petition. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the stipulation appearing in one of the clauses of the compromise decree Clause (1) whereby it was agreed that the balance of the rent, after payment of Rs. 200/- was to be realised by execution. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the stipulation appearing in one of the clauses of the compromise decree Clause (1) whereby it was agreed that the balance of the rent, after payment of Rs. 200/- was to be realised by execution. This provision is interpreted to mean that the parties did not intend that possession should be taken through the executing court, but that a fresh suit was contemplated. This argument appears to have found favour with both the Courts below. The learned. Subordinate Judge, in disposing of the appeal, expressly says that inasmuch as fresh tenancy was created by the compromise possession could be taken only by a fresh suit and that the intention of the parties was that a fresh suit for ejectment had to be instituted. We are unable to agree with this view for that would be reading too much into the words "through Court" appearing in clause (3). What happened in, this case was that, after having one through the entire gamut of litigation, the decree holder obtained this compromise decree and was good enough to give some more time to the judgment-debtors to remain in possession upto 31-7-48. Could it be said in the circumstances of this Case that he expressed an intention to file a fresh suit for ejectment, at the end of that date, in the event of Defendants failure to deliver back possession of the house? If that were so, he would have said so in much clearer terms instead of employing so frail a carrier as the expression "through Court". The argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent does not therefore carry conviction as, in my opinion, no decree-holder, who has obtained a decree after filing a suit, will ever agree to such a condition being put in in the compromise decree which is destructive of his right and which would involve him in hardship by driving him to a fresh suit. All that the stipulation means is that the judgment-debtors were shown, by way of indulgence, a concession to remain in occupation of the house from 1-2-47 upto 31-8-48, that, is for a period of 17 months, with an understanding that they should quit at the end of the period and that if they would not surrender possession amicably the decree holder would be at liberty to take possession through court, that is to say through such help as the found could give him for taking possession under the decree by way of execution. I am therefore unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge and would hold that no fresh suit was contemplated, and that what all the parties intended was that the judgment debtors should not be ejected by force but that they should be removed through the agency of the Court. The decree-holder is accordingly entitled to execute the decree and take back possession under it. The orders of the Courts below are set aside and this appeal is allowed. 3. This, however, is not enough for the disposal of this execution petition. A fresh point has been raised by the learned Counsel for the Respondent-judgment debtors. Our attention has been drawn to the Orissa House Rent Control Act 1951 (Orissa Act Xl of 1951) recently passed by the Orissa Legislature, extending the provisions of the Act to the while of the State of Orissa. It is argued that the decree is not executable now unless the requirements of the Act are complied with. But whether that is so or not, and if so what the requirements are, are matters which must be left to the Executing Court for investigation as the point has been raised for the first time here. While therefore setting aside the orders of the Courts below we have decided to sent the case back to the Court of First Instance, with the direction that the judgment debtors will be at liberty to raise this point formally and the executing court will then decide about the applicability of the Act and come to a decision whether the execution can proceed in its present form. In the result the appeal is allowed, the order of the learned Subordinate Judge is set aside, and the case is remitted to the Court of the Munsif, Puri, for disposal according to law in the light of the observations made above. The Appellant shall have his costs. Das, J. 4. I agree. 5. Appeal allowed. Final Result : Allowed