Nawal Kishore, J.— This is a petition by Abdul Rahim, son of Himmat Khan, Sindhi Muslim of village Bandasar, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, and is based on the following three principal grounds:— (1) That on the 10/11th January, 1951, an order was issued by the Government of Rajasthan for the arrest and detention of one Shri Adring, son of Himta, under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, for a period of one year, and was served upon the petitioner on the 16th of January, 1951. Inasmuch as the order related to one Adring and the petitioners name was Abdul Rahim, it had no connection with him, and accordingly the petitioners detention was illegal. (2) That the order of detention was not in accordance with law, inasmuch as it had not been expressly passed in the name of His Highness the Rajpramukh as required by Article 166 of the Constitution, and had been simply signed by the Home Secretary. (3) That the grounds of detention supplied to the petitioner were very vague, incomplete, and insufficient and, therefore, the petitioner had been deprived of his right of making an effective representation to the Government. 2. A copy of this petition was forwarded to the Government of Rajasthan for a reply, and it is stated that the petitioner also bore the name of Adring (Adrim), and being the son of Himta Musalman of village Bandasar, Tehsil Sheo, was the same person for whose arrest and detention the order had been issued by the Government. In support of this a reference has been made to the fact that the petitioner acknowledged the service of the order of detention on him under his signature as Adrim. The grounds of detention had also been received by him under the same signature. Copies of the order and the grounds of detention have been filed along with the reply, and thereafter the learned Public Prosecutor has placed on the record the originals. It is further stated that the order of detention was in proper form and according to law, inasmuch as it has been expressed to have been made in the name of this Highness the Rajpramukh, and has been duly authenticated by the signature of the Home Secretary to the Government. It is further stated that the order of detention was in proper form and according to law, inasmuch as it has been expressed to have been made in the name of this Highness the Rajpramukh, and has been duly authenticated by the signature of the Home Secretary to the Government. As regards the grounds of detention being vague, incomplete, and insufficient, it is stated that the petitioner had already submitted his representation, and that all the necessary particulars, which would enable him to do so, were contained in the grounds supplied to him, and accordingly he had not been deprived of an opportunity of making an effective representation. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length, and have no hesitation in rejecting this petition. So far as the first ground relating to a mistake in the identity of the petitioner is concerned, the learned counsel, after perusing the reply furnished by the Government of Rajasthan and the acknowledgements made by the petitioner under his signature as Adrim deemed it fit not to press it. On the other question whether the order of detention was not in accordance with law, all that has been submitted is that it should have been expressly in the name of His Highness the Rajpramukh. There seems to be no doubt that according to Article 166 of the Constitution, the order should have been issued in the name of His Highness the Rajpramukh, but we consider that the defect in this case, if any, is of a highly technical character, inasmuch as above the signature of the Home Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan it is expli-city mentioned that the order had been issued by His Highness the Rajpramukh. In other words it may be taken to have been made in the name of His Highness the Rajpramukh, and this has been authenticated by the signature of the Home Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan. 4. So far as the last ground is concerned, the learned counsel has in substance urged that although the order of detention contained as many as eight grounds and referred to the manifold activities of the petitioner, it was vague and indefinite, inasmuch as the particular, dates and places where these activities had been carried on by him had not been specifically set out. As stated above, the order of detention describes in considerable detail the various forms of activities imputed to the petitioner For instance, it was mentioned that he was an associate of one Syed Shah Murad of Pakistan, who was convening meetings on the Indo-Pakistan border for the purpose of instigating border Muslims against Hindus, and was accordingly in league with him, and helping him by conveying information about military and police dispositions for the purpose of committing decoi-ties. There is a reference particularly to a decoity having been committed in the Indian territory on the border near Gadra Road when 35 head of catties had been removed, and it was mentioned that the petitioner being in close contact with the raiders in Pakistan territory had offered to recover the cattle from Pakistan if the owners paid a ransom of Rs 600/-. This amount was later raised to Rs. 1000/-. After these grounds had been furnished to the petitioner, he put forward a detailed representation in which he practically denied all the allegations referred to above. The learned counsel urges that inasmuch as it was not mentioned in the grounds to whom information about military and police dispositions on the Indian side of the border had been conveyed, and how and on what dates he had instigated Syed Shah Murad to commit dacoities in Indian territories, the petitioner had been labouring under a serious handicap, and, therefore, had not been able to make a proper representation to the Government. There is, however, no substance in this contention. It appears from the representation itself that the petitioner had no misgiving with regard to the nature of the allegations contained in the various grounds supplied to him, nor was he labouring under any kind of handicap only because the dates were missing from those grounds. Reference may, in particular, be made in this connection to paragraph 11 (e) of his representation where he stated that on the occasion when 35 heads of cattle were taken by Pakistan raiders about a year back, he had gone out of station and was not near Gadra Road. From this alone it appears that the ground put forward is merely an excuse, and allogether without substance. From this alone it appears that the ground put forward is merely an excuse, and allogether without substance. The learned counsel has cited a few authorities, but none of these is in point for the purpose of enabling this Court to hold that if the dates relating to the various activities mentioned in the grounds supplied to the petitioner are missing, the grounds must be held to be vague and indefinite. A.I.R. 1949 All. 148, (Durga-das vs. Rex) a Full Bench judgment of that Court, does not support the contention of the learned counsel. All that was held there was that the question had to be decided upon the basis of the particulars supplied in each case, and that the grounds and particulars supplied mast convey sufficient information to the detenu to enable him to make a representation that the detaining authority was wrong in its belief that his detention was necessary in the interest of public safety. This authority was referred to in 1950 Rajasthan Law Weekly 204, (Haqiqatullah vs. The State) a Division Bench judgment of this Court, and discussed at length, but further reference to it is not necessary, as the point raised by the learned counsel was not gone into. The learned counsel next referred to 1950 Rajasthan Law Weekly 37 (45), (Kasturchand vs. Sarkar) which held that the ground of detention was not communicated to the detenu within a week and was vague and indefinite. The only ground mentioned was that the petitioner was an active communist and as an agitator had been fomenting and organising industrial strikes. This ground was held to be vague and indefinite, as neither the places or place where the detenu had fomented or organized industrial strikes, nor the names of the industries he wanted to be hit by his agitation, nor yet the dates on which this had been done, were indicated in the grounds supplied to him. That case, in our opinion, is distinguishable, inasmuch as a complete picture of the various activities carried on by the detenu was not presented in such great detail as has been done in this case. Whether reference to the dates of these activities is necessary in order that the grounds may cease to be vague and indefinite would, as held in A.I.R. 1949 All. Whether reference to the dates of these activities is necessary in order that the grounds may cease to be vague and indefinite would, as held in A.I.R. 1949 All. 148, (Durgadas vs. Rex) always depend upon the facts of each case and the nature of the grounds supplied to the detenu. In the case before us, we are of the view that the grounds are sufficiently detailed and contain a narration of the various activities with which the petitioner was connected. Not only this, there is a definite reference to a particular raid in which 35 heads of cattle had been removed by a gang of Syed Shah Murad, and the petitioner appears to have known very well of the occasion on which this raid had taken place, inasmuch as he has furnished a reply to this allegation in the representation made by him to the Government. In the circumstances, it is not possible to hold in this case that the grounds of detention supplied to the petitioner were vague, indefinite or insufficient for the purpose of enabling him to make an effective representation to the Government. 5. The petition fails and is hereby dismissed.