JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This is a petition by the defendant in the suit to revise the order of the Additional District Judge Gwalior refusing to grant the temporary injunction prayed for to the applicant. 2. The facts of the case are that the plaintiff-non-applicant has instituted a suit in the Court of District Judge Gwalior against the applicant for a partition of joint family property. The defendant is said to be in possession of a joint family Hosiery Factory known as the Trilok Hosiery. Some time after the institution of the suit the defendant made a report to the Police that the plaintiff had stolen yarn belonging to the factory. Criminal proceedings were then instituted in respect of the alleged theft. They resulted in the discharge of the plaintiff who was the accused in those proceedings. During the investigation, the police seized some yarn from Ram Prasad, the plaintiff. As regards this yarn, it was ultimately ordered on 11-5-51 by this Court in Criminal Revision No.43 of 1951 that the yarn be returned to Ram Prasad from whose possession it was taken. On 12-5-1951, the applicant Ram Swarup presented an application to the lower Court praying that the Court should issue an order of injunction under S.151 of the Civil P.C. prohibiting the plaintiff Ram Prasad from taking possession of the yarn which was in the custody of the City Magistrate Lashkar and also prayed that the yarn be made over to the applicant. The learned District Judge rejected the application for the grant of injunction holding that the Court had no power under S.151 to grant injunction and that, therefore, the petitioner's application for the grant of injunction was incompetent. 3. Mr. Bhagwandas Gupta for the applicant urged before me that even if O.39, Rr.1 and 2 do not apply to the facts of this case, there is an inherent power in the Court to issue an injunction if it is satisfied that the applicant has no other remedy and that if injunction prayed for is not issued, the applicant would suffer an irreparable injury. 4. I am unable to accede to the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. I am unable to accede to the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The application for the issue of an interim injunction was made under S.151, Civil P.C. Obviously, O.39 Rr.1 and 2 have no application to the facts of the case, nor was it contended before me that it bad any application. In my opinion, the power of subordinate Courts to issue injunctions has been expressly stated in O.39 and S.151 of the Code, cannot be invoked to add to the powers conferred by O.39. It is true that it has been ruled in some decisions that apart from the powers under O.39 Rr.1 and 2, the Court has power to issue an injunction under S.151. - 'Kanshi Ram v. Sharaf Din', AIR 1923 Lah 144 (2) (A); - 'Adaikkala Thevan v. Imperial Bank, Madura Branch', AIR 1926 Mad 574 (B).A different view was taken in - 'Nasarvanji Cawasji v. Shahajadi Begam', AIR 1922 Bom 385 (2) (C). In regard to the cases which hold that O.39 is not exhaustive of the Court powers to grant to a temporary injunction, it was observed by Varadachariar J. in - 'Murugesa Mudali v. Angamuthu Mudaliar', AIR 1938 Mad 190 (D), that those cases do not give due weight to the words "if it is so prescribed" occurring in the opening paragraph of S.94 of the Code. With due respect I find myself in complete accord with Varadachariar, J. The word "prescribed" in S.94 means 'prescribed by the rules contained in 1st Schedule of the Code'. This is clear from the definition of the words "prescribed" and "Rules" given in S.2 of the Code. Reading, therefore S.94 and O.39 together, it follows that the power of a Court to grant a temporary injunction is limited to one prescribed by Rr.1 and 2 of O.39. I think it is impossible to hold that in a matter which is specifically dealt with by O. 39, there can be implied in the Court outside the limits of O.39, Rr.1 and 2 a general and wider discretion to grant temporary injunctions under Ss.94 and 151 of the Code in circumstances not covered by O.39. I think it is impossible to hold that in a matter which is specifically dealt with by O. 39, there can be implied in the Court outside the limits of O.39, Rr.1 and 2 a general and wider discretion to grant temporary injunctions under Ss.94 and 151 of the Code in circumstances not covered by O.39. I do not, however, propose to discuss the question further, because even assuming for the sake of arguments that the Court has power under S.151 to grant temporary injunctions, there is no justification in this case to exercise that power. The yarn of which the plaintiff is entitled to retain possession under the order of this Court in criminal Petition No.43 of 1951 was in the plaintiff's possession on 18-1-48 when the criminal proceedings were instituted against him in respect of the theft of yarn. On 27-4-48, the learned District Judge passed an order prohibiting either party from interfering with the possession of the properties held by the other party; the applicant is, therefore, clearly not entitled to say that the yarn which was not proved to be in his possession prior to 27-4-48 and 18-1-48 but which was in possession of the plaintiff-non-applicant, should now be made over to him. No authority has been cited to me to show that the retention by the plaintiff of the yarn under the orders of this Court and consistent with the order dated 27-4-48 of the trial Court would amount to committing an irreparable injury to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner suggested that if the order of injunction is not given, the plaintiff would be encouraged to disturb the possession of the applicant as regards other property and that the petitioner would not be able to get yarn for the factory from the Controller. I am not impressed with this argument which is hardly relevant to the question of the grant of an injunction in respect of the possession of the yarn. If the plaintiff disturbs the applicant's possession of other property, he is at liberty to complain to the Court that the plaintiff be punished for disobedience of the order made on 27-4-48. 5. For the above reasons, I think the learned Additional District Judge was right in refusing to grant the temporary injunction prayed for to the applicant. 6. In the result this revision petition is dismissed with costs.