Judgment.- This is a rather interesting petition. The petitioner was decreed a one-fourth share of vast joint family properties in O.S.No. 292 of 1923, and a Commissioner, who was appointed for that purpose, went and divided the items belonging the joint family into four shares and delivered to the petitioner his one-fourth share, and to the respondents, their one-fourth share, and to certain other persons, against whom I.A.No. 2091 of 1947 was dismissed, the remaining two one-fourth shares. The decree in the suit was taken in appeal and second appeal, and got finally settled. But the petitioner, to his horror, in 1944, nearly 20 years after the decree and delivery of his one-fourth share to him, found that two small items of land, namely, S.No. 181/1, measuring 82 cents, and S.No. 84/3, measuring 31 cents, had been omitted by the commissioner to be divided in spite of their having been included among the properties in the plaint schedule and not disputed by the other parties as not belonging to the family or held by the judgment as not belonging to the family. So, he put in I.A.No. 2091 of 1947 against 16 respondents, representing the other three one-fourth shares, under section 151 to section 153, Civil Procedure Code, praying the Court to appoint a commissioner either to divide the omitted two items into four shares and deliver to him his one-fourth share, or to re-value the shares in the B schedule properties of the plaint in O.S. No. 292 of 1923 and work out again the equities and pay him compensation from the other sharers regarding his one-fourth share in those two items omitted to be given to him. The District Munsiff of Peddapuram, in whose Court the I.A. was filed, held that he had no power to do either of the things prayed for in the I.A. and that, if he chose to do so, the petitioner might move the High Court, which had finally settled the matter of partition in the second appeal. Of course he found that these two items of land were not actually divided by the commissioner and the one-fourth share in them given to the petitioner. Of course he found that these two items of land were not actually divided by the commissioner and the one-fourth share in them given to the petitioner. But he was of opinion that during the course of 22 years, from 1923 to 1945, it was not probable that the petitioner, who was an agriculturist, and the other sharers, who were also agriculturists, would not have discovered the alleged mistake with reasonable diligence if there was a mistake. He, therefore, rather curiously held that their negligence would not save limitation for the purpose of the I.A., though no question of limitation would arise in the case of a bona fide error which the commissioner and the Court and the parties discovered only after the petitioner discovered it provided there was no damage to the vested rights of any person, party or not party to the suit. In the lower Court, the petitioner, as stated above, gave up the respondents representing the other two one-fourth shares, leaving only the present respondents having a one-fourth share. As the lower Court dismissed the I.A. this petition has been brought to revise this order on the ground that the lower Court failed to exercise a jurisdiction lawfully vested in it by correcting a bona fide error of the commissioner and the Court and the parties in not dividing the above two plots of 82 and 31 cents. One curious thing in this case is that neither the counsel for the petitioner nor the counsel for the respondents was able to tell me as to who was in possession of those two items of land from 1923 to 1945 and as to who is in possession of them now. I agree with Mr. Balaparameswari Rao, for the petitioner, that a bona fide error of the parties, commissioner and Court, in failing to divide two undoubted items of family properties, can be rectified by a Court, and the decree amended even after appeal and second appeal, without any danger of limitation, provided the vested interests of other persons, whether parties to the suit or not, are not affected. The mere fact that there has been a first appeal and a second appeal will not stratify the error and make it unrectifiable, without limitation operating in law nor will it take away the jurisdiction of the trial Court to rectify the error where it is rectifiable within the period of limitation. When a matter is finally settled in first appeal and second appeal, the appellate Courts become functus officio, and the trial Court is the residuary legatee for all future I.As. and other matters of litigation connected with the suit, provided such matters do not seek to modify the decrees in appeal. So, the trial Court (lower Court) had undoubtedly the power to rectify any bona fide error not affecting the vested interests of others, like limitation adverse possession, etc. But, in the present case, it is clear to me, as to the lower Court that neither the petitioner nor the respondents are in possession of any portion of the two items from 1923 onwards. The learned counsel for both sides also say that these parties are not in possession. The other respondents, owning the other two one-fourth shares and given up in the lower Court, may or may not have posses- . sion of these items or any portion thereof. I do not want to give a finding about the title to these items, or possession of them, since more than 22 years have elapsed and the normal period of limitation is only 12 years, and nobody knows who are the person or persons in actual possession of these items and what their rights and contentions are, and it will be ludicrous to adjudicate on their rights without bringing them on record and hearing them. I am of opinion, therefore, that a petition under sections 151 to 153, Civil Procedure Code, would not lie, in the circumstances of the case, either to rectify an alleged error, or for readjusting the equities, which latter relief was wisely given up by Mr. Balaparameswari Rao as too stale to be pursued further. I am of opinion, therefore, that a petition under sections 151 to 153, Civil Procedure Code, would not lie, in the circumstances of the case, either to rectify an alleged error, or for readjusting the equities, which latter relief was wisely given up by Mr. Balaparameswari Rao as too stale to be pursued further. In the end, therefore, I am of opinion that the only course which the petitioner can be allowed to take is to file a separate suit, if he is so advised, in respect of his alleged one-fourth share in these two items against any persons in possession of these items now, or claiming them, and to abide by the result of such a suit. Sections 151 to 153, Civil Procedure Code, are certainly not intended for such enquiries into titles of parties to properties. In the end, therefore, the civil revision petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed, but, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, without costs. K.C. ----- Petition dismissed.