Thadani C. J-These are two petns. by the same Union Called the Union of the Workmen of the R.S.N. & I.G.N. & Ely. Co. Ltd., under Arts. 226 & 227, Const. Ind., in which be bag prayed for writs of certiorari & prohibition in respect of an order passed by the Industrial Tribunal constituted in the person of Mr. I. P.. Baruah. [2] It appears that a dispute arose between the petnr. & resp. 1, the River Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. & Indian General Navigation & Rly. Co. Ltd., a dispute which was referred by the Govt. of Assam under 8. 10, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by notification in the Assam Gazette, being NO. GIM. 36/47, dated 22-2-1949, to the Dist. J., Lower Assam Districts who bad been previously constituted a tribunal under 8. 7 of the Act. While (be dispute so referred was pending bf fore the Dist. J., L. A. Districts, the Govt. of Assam on 5-10-49 appointed another tribunal under s 7 (l), Industrial Disputes Act in the person of Sri I. P. Baruah, Resp. 2. On 2 2.50, the Govt. of Assam, Resp. 3, published a notification under No. GIM. 36/47 which reads as follows : "Whereas the services of the Dist. & Ses. J. Lower Assam Districts, have ceased to be available for func­tioning as an Industrial Tribunal consequent to the establishment of a separate whole time Tribunal, now,, therefore,, in exercise of the powers under 8. 8 (2), Industrial Disputes Act & in partial modification of this Department Notfn. No. GIM, 36/47, dated 22-2-1949, the Government of Assam are pleased to appoint) Sjt. I. P. Baruah, B. L. retired Addl. Diet. & Ses. J. to constitute the Tribunal to adjudicate upon the dis­pute between the River Steam Navigation & India General Navigation & Railway Company Ltd.,Gauhati, & their workmen, in place of the Dial. & Sea. J. Lower Assam Districts." [3] Sjt. I. P. Barnab. beard the dispute in the absence of the peinr. who elected to remain absent, & in due course made an award, which was published in the Assam Gazette on 23-5-1950. The award was to be given effect to from 1-8.1960 [4] The grounds stated in the two petns. are as follows: "(1) For that the second reference of the dispute to Mr. I. P. Baruah is ultra vires of the powers of the Govt. The award was to be given effect to from 1-8.1960 [4] The grounds stated in the two petns. are as follows: "(1) For that the second reference of the dispute to Mr. I. P. Baruah is ultra vires of the powers of the Govt. of Assam & as such, Mr. I. P. Barnah had DO jurisdiction to adjudicate & give award in the ease. (2) For that the circumstances contemplated in 8, 8(2), Industrial Disputes Act, never arose & the services of the existing Tribunal in seisin of the dispute did not cease to be available consequent on the appoint­ment of another wholetime Tribunal under 8. 7 (1), Industrial Disputes Act. (3) For that the services of the Diet. J., L. A. D., never ceased to be available & in fact, Mr. I. Rasul. the then Diat. & See. J., L, A. D., is still working as such. He as the Tribunal, fixed the date for the peremptory hearing on 20-2-1950 & kept a week exclusively for bearing this case. In a letter addressed by him to the Govt. of Assam, he expressed that he was available & willing to adjudicate the matter. With this determi­nation, Mr. I. Rasul fixed the date on 20 2-1950 & Mr. I. P. Baruah algo fixed the same date, It is, there­fore, clear that Mr. I. P. Baruah could not have fini­shed the case earlier than Mr. I. Basul could. (4) For that the statement in the Gazette Notfn. of 2-2-1950 that the services of Mr. Basul ceased to be available, is misconceived & not borne out by facts. (5) For that Mr. I. P. Baruah has not the qualifica­tion to be appointed a member of a Tribunal under S. 7, Industrial Disputes Act. (6) For that Mr. I. P. Baruah Is neither H. Ct. Judge nor a Dist. J., nor even he had been a H. Ct. Judge or a Diet. J., as such, he is not qualified to be appointed a Tribunal under 8. 7 (3) (a), Industrial Dis­putes Act. (7) For that he is also not qualified to be appointed Tribunal under 8.7 (3) (b) of the said Act as his age was many years more than sixty at the time of his appointment. (8) For that the appointment of Mr. I. P. Baruah was, therefore, illegal & ultra vires of the powera of the Govt. of Assam; as such, Mr. (8) For that the appointment of Mr. I. P. Baruah was, therefore, illegal & ultra vires of the powera of the Govt. of Assam; as such, Mr. I. P. Baruah, had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the case & the award he gave is, therefore, Inoperative & not binding on the parties. Sections 15 & 19 Industrial Dispute! Act, therefore, cannot come into operation & the Govt. of Assam was wrong in ordering to give effect to the award from 1-8-1950. (9) For that the petnr. Union have the fundamental right to form an association & enjoy all the privileges & benefits of a recognised Union. The Opposite Party 1 had all alone; refused to reply to any correspondence made by this Union to the Opposite Party 1 & had never responded to any demand made by the petnr. Union. It was one of the main issues of the dispute. The learned Tribunal held that neither in law nor in facts this Union was entitled to be recognised. That this has very heavily prejudiced the petnr. Union & its members by encroachment to their fundamental rights of association & the ancillary & analogous rights & privileges. (10) For that in spite of the fact that the Industrial Tribunal in a dispute between the Opposite Party 1 & its workmen in Bengal gave the award that the Puja advance was bonus & directed the Opposite Party 1 to give a bonus equivalent to one month's basic salary to-all workmen in all profit years, including the year 1948. & this award was given on 31-4-1949, Mr. I. P. Baruah, however, dismissed the claim of the bonus altogether to the great detriment of the interests of the petnr, Union so far so that while the workmen of the same Company in West Bengal will enjoy the Bonus, the workmen in Assam will have none. (11) For that the pay scale approved by Mr. I. P. Baruah falls far below the one that was approved by the Tribunal of the West Bengal; so also dearness, allowances thus again leading to the discriminate privilege enjoyed by workers In Assam & West Bengal. (12) For that on all other issues Mr. I. P. Baruab has given award against the petnr Union, while on the question of security of service, he refused to give any relief. (13) For that Mr, .1. (12) For that on all other issues Mr. I. P. Baruab has given award against the petnr Union, while on the question of security of service, he refused to give any relief. (13) For that Mr, .1. P. Barush was very much prejudiced against the peter. Union & unfortunately took it to be a personal attack when his jurisdiction was questioned. & his order would disclose how much irritated he was when he declared that the appoint­ment of the Dist. & Ses. J., L. A. D., was illegal &. Mr. I. Basul had no jurisdiction. This prejudice in the mind ot the Tribunal, Mr. I. P. Baruah, his led to a very onesided award to the great detriment of the interests of the petnr." [5] At the hearing, Mr. Ghoae, learned coun­sel for the petnr. stated that he did not propose to assail the award on the merits & addressed-us on one point only, namely, whether Mr. I. P. Baruah was validly constituted as a tribu­nal. In other words, he confined himself to the first 8 grounds stated in the petn. [6] In assailing the constitution of the tribu­nal, Mr. Ghos9 has placed himself in a very difficult position from the point of view of the applicability of Arts. 2S6 & 227, Const. Ind. In my opinion, Art. 226 contemplates a duly constituted person or authority, including, in appro­priate cases, a Govt. & not any parson, authority or Govt. not duly constituted. If a petnr. comes to Ct. with a case under Art. 226 alleging that a person or authority, including, in appropriate cases, a Govt. is not duly constituted, be puts himself out of the purview of Art. 236, Const. Ind. According to Mr. Ghose, Mr. I. P. Baruah not having been duty constituted as a tribunal, was a usurper. A H. C. does not issue writs of j high prerogative against usurpers of office. Its writs are issued only against duly constituted' authority. [7] This view is supported by what is stated in Art. ]482 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailaham, 2nd Edn , namely, "Where grounds are made out upon which the Ct. might grant the writ, it will not do so where no benefit could arise from granting it & where the proceedings in the Ct. [7] This view is supported by what is stated in Art. ]482 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailaham, 2nd Edn , namely, "Where grounds are made out upon which the Ct. might grant the writ, it will not do so where no benefit could arise from granting it & where the proceedings in the Ct. below are not merely voidable but absolutely void, as where an unauthorised person has purported to not in a judicial capacity or where such proceeding have become void by the operation of a statute, certiorari shall not be granted." Similarly, Cts. & tribunals contemplated by! Art. 227 must be Cts. & tribunals duly constituted, & not usurpers of office. On this ground8 alone we will be justified in refusing to not under the provisions of Arts. 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. However, we propose to consider the grounds l to 3 on the assumption that the •challenge to the validity of the constitution of the tribunal has been abandoned. (8) The first ground is based upon the fact that originally the dispute was referred to the Dist. J., L. A. Districts, & it was. later with-drawn from the Dist. J. & referred to Mr. I. P. Baruah. It is urged on behalf of the petnr. that the Dist. J., Mr. Rasul, was on the material date (2-2-50) functioning as a Dist. J., & it cannot, therefore, be said that he was not available for 4he purpose of deciding the dispute within the meaning of. S. 8 (2), Industrial Disputes Act. Sub-section (2) of 8. 8, Industrial Disputes Act is in terms: "Where a Court or Tribunal consists of one person only and his services cease to be available the appro­priate Government shall appoint another independent person in his place, and the proceedings shall be conti­nued before the person so appointed." [9] It is not correct to say, as Mr. Ghose for the petnr. has said, that so long as Mr. Rasul was functioning as a Diat, J. he must be regard­ed as available for the purposes of the Indus­trial Disputes Act. Nor is it correct to say that it is for the Ct. to decide whether the Dist. J, It. A. D., was available or not. As regards the first part of Mr. has said, that so long as Mr. Rasul was functioning as a Diat, J. he must be regard­ed as available for the purposes of the Indus­trial Disputes Act. Nor is it correct to say that it is for the Ct. to decide whether the Dist. J, It. A. D., was available or not. As regards the first part of Mr. Ghose's contention, it is suffi­cient to say that it does not follow that because a person is available for one purpose, he is also available for another purpose. A Dist. J. has multifarious duties to perform, judicial & admi­nistrative, & his availability as a Dist. J. cannot necessarily be regarded as availability for the purpose of adjudicating upon a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act. As to the 2nd part of Mr. Ghose's contention, it is not for this Ct. to say whether the services of a tribunal have ceased to be available; it is for the appropriate Govt. to say so. In this case, it is quite clear from the notification published by the Govt. of. Assam on 2-2-50 that it regarded the services of the Dist. & 8es. J., L. A. Districts, as not avail­able. [10] Mr. Ghose has contended that the words used in the notification, namely, "consequent to the establishment of a separate wholetime Tribunal" do not furnish clause for saying that the services of the Dist. & Sag. ,T., L. A. Districts, have ceased to be available. We do not think this is a reasonable interpretation of the noti­fication The fact that Govt. appointed a whole-time tribunal in the person of Mr. Baruah shows that it regarded further functioning of the Disfc. J., Mr. Rasul, as tribunal, undesirable from the point of the administration of justice. It is from this point of view that Govt. appears to have regarded the services of the Dist. J , L. A. Dis­tricts, as tribunal not being available. It makes no difference that the Dist. J. Mr. Rasul, wrote to the Govt. of Assam that he was avail-•able. It was not for the Dist. J. to say whether he was or was not available for performing duties other than his duties as a Dist. J. It is for the Govt. to say so. [11] It was next argued by Mr. Ghose that the withdrawal of the dispute from the Dist. J. & placing it before Mr. It was not for the Dist. J. to say whether he was or was not available for performing duties other than his duties as a Dist. J. It is for the Govt. to say so. [11] It was next argued by Mr. Ghose that the withdrawal of the dispute from the Dist. J. & placing it before Mr. I. P. Baruah is not con" templated by any provision of the Industrial Disputes Act. Now, apart from the question of the applicability of S. 21, General Clauses Act, Sub-s. (2) of S. 8, Industrial Disputes Act, ex­pressly lays down that the proceedings shall be continued before the person so appointed. In this case, it is common ground that the proceed­ings were continued by Mr. Baruah. [12] The rest of the grounds, aside those pertaining to the merits, relate to the qualifica­tions of Mr. Baruah for appointment as tribu­nal. We have satisfied curatives that Mr. I. P. Baruah was fully qualified to be a member of the tribunal under s. 7, Industrial Disputes Act. Apparently, Mr. Ghose was not aware that Mr. Baruah had been a Disk. J. At the hearing, a notification was produced before us which show­ed that Mr, Baruah had at one time acted as a Dist. J. It is true that he has retired as an Addl. Dist. J,, but it cannot be said that he has not been a Disfc. J. The fact that he was over the age of 60 years at the date of his appointment is wholly immaterial. It is true that the supe­rannuation age of a H. C. Judge is 60 years, but the age of 60 years is not a qualification for the appointment of a H. C. Judge. It is a disquali­fication for a Judge to continue as a H. 0. Judge when he attains the age of 60. Moreover, Mr. Ghose has overlooked the provisions of S. 9, Industrial Disputes Act, which lays down that: "No order of the appropriate Government appoint­ing any person as a member of a Board, Court or Tribunal, shall be called in question in any manner." Our conclusion then is that the tribunal in the person of Mr. I. P Baruah was duly constituted. [131 Mr Bose for the opposite party has contended that the petna., under Arts. I. P Baruah was duly constituted. [131 Mr Bose for the opposite party has contended that the petna., under Arts. 226 & 227 of the Constitution are misconceived; that writs of certiorari & prohibition cannot be granted in matters arising out of an award passed under the Industrial Disputes Act, the award not being a determination of a judicial or qnasi-judicial body. This aspect of the case, however, is concluded by the decision of the majority of their Lordships of the S. Ct in the case of Bharat Bank Ltd v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. d tht Bharat Bank Employee's Union, i960 S. C. B. (0. W. N. Supp, parts 15 & 16 ) p. 317: (A. I. B. (37) 1950 8. 0. 188) where their Lordships held that an Indus-i trial Tribunal is a judicial body, & that its award is a determination within the meaning' of Art. 136, Const. Ind. [14] It was next contended by Mr. Bose that in any case a party should not be, permitted to move this Ct. .under the provisions of Arts. 326 & 227, Const. Ind. where an aggrieved party has a right of appeal on facts & law, as in this case It is not necessary to consider this aspect in the present proceedings in the absence of any rules 'earned by this Cti. under Arts 226 & 227 of the Constitution. On an appropriate occasion, we will express out; views not only on this as­pect but also upon the limits within which a H. C. will act in the exercise of its jurisdic­tion under Arts. 226 & 227 of the Constitution. In this case, we ate content merely to record the fact that it is not the case of the petnr. that the tribunal, if duly constituted, had no (jurisdiction or had exceeded its jurisdiction or had acted irregularly in the exercise of its •jurisdiction. [15] In the result, the petns. are dismissed "with costs. Hearing fee is fixed at as. 100 one set. [16] Ram Labhaya J-I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice in the conclusion he has reached in this case. I wish, however, to add a few words. [17] The petnr. in both the cases is what is described as the Union of the Workmen of the RSN & IGN & RLy,, Co., Ltd.,Gauhati, Assam. 100 one set. [16] Ram Labhaya J-I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice in the conclusion he has reached in this case. I wish, however, to add a few words. [17] The petnr. in both the cases is what is described as the Union of the Workmen of the RSN & IGN & RLy,, Co., Ltd.,Gauhati, Assam. A dispute arose between the Union & the River Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., Opposite Party 1, as to the conditions of service of the members of the Union. The dispute was referred to the Disk J., L. A. D., by a notification of the Govt. of Assam No. GIM 83/47 dated 22-2-1949. The proceedings continued in the Ct. of the Dist. J., L. A. D., for about a year & while yet these proceedings were pending, the Govt. of Assam appointed Mr. I. P. Baraah to function as a Tribunal under 8. 7 (1), Industrial Disputes Act Certain industrial disputes were referred to him. On 2.2 1950, the Govt. of Assam acting in the exercise of powers conferred on it by "8. 8 (2), Industrial Disputes Act, & in partial modification of the Notification NO. GIM. 36/47 dated 22-2-1949 appointed Mr. I. P. Baruah, retired Addl. Dist. & Ses. J. to constitute the Tribunal for adjudicating the dispute between the Union & the Opposite Party 1 in place o! ihe Dist. J., L. A. D. [18] It has been contended before us on be­half of the petnr. that the award made by Mr. I. P. Baraah is a nullity as Mr. Barnah had no jurisdiction under the -Industrial Disputes Act to make the award. Two reasons have been given in support of this contention. It is point­ed out first that Mr. Baruih was not qualified to be appointed tribunal under 8. 7 of the Act. The 2nd ground urged was that the services of the Dist. J never ceased to be available & there­fore the conditions under which the Provincial Govt, could exercise its powers under S. 8 did not exist. The virtual withdrawal of the dispute from the Dist. J. & its transfer to Mr. Baraah is challenged as an act in flagrant disregard of the provisions contained in 8. 8 of the Act. In other words, the contention is that the Provin­cial Govt. has not validly appointed Mr. Baniah to constitute a Tribunal under 8. The virtual withdrawal of the dispute from the Dist. J. & its transfer to Mr. Baraah is challenged as an act in flagrant disregard of the provisions contained in 8. 8 of the Act. In other words, the contention is that the Provin­cial Govt. has not validly appointed Mr. Baniah to constitute a Tribunal under 8. 7 of the Act; nor has the dispute been validly referred to him under S. 8. It is, therefore, argued that the notifications from which he purported to have derived authority did not confer on him any power to adjudicate upon the dispute which he disposed of by his award. This is being challenged by two petns. under Arls. 226 & 227, Const Ind. [19] It seems to me fairly obvious that no relief can be allowed to the petnr. under Art. 2S7. By virtue of the authority conferred on the High Courts by this Article a H. 0. may exercise powers of superintendence over all Cts. & tribunals throughout the territories over which the H. C. has jurisdiction. All Cts. & tribunals within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a H. C. are thus made subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the H. 0. A tribunal appointed under the Industrial Dis­putes Act would no doubt be a tribunal - within the meaning of the word as used in Art. 227. The power of superintendence, therefore, could be exercised in respect of the acts of the tribu­nal. This position is not disputed & in fact there is no room left for controversy on this point as the matter is concluded by a decision of their Lordships of the 8. C. reported in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., & the Bharat Bank Employees Union, 1950 S C. B. (C. W. N Sup.) 317 : (A. I. R. (37) 1950 S.C.188). The word tribunal occurs in Art. 136 & also in Art. 2S7 & it must be given the same meaning in both the Articles. This, however, does not solve the difficulty. The ques­tion raised by the patnr. is that the Provincial Govt, has appointed a wrong person to consti­tute a tribunal under the Act & in referring the dispute in this case to htm after his appoint­ment, it has also contravened the provisions contained in 8. 8, Industrial Disputes Act. This, however, does not solve the difficulty. The ques­tion raised by the patnr. is that the Provincial Govt, has appointed a wrong person to consti­tute a tribunal under the Act & in referring the dispute in this case to htm after his appoint­ment, it has also contravened the provisions contained in 8. 8, Industrial Disputes Act. The contention challenges the validity of certain acts of the Provincial Govt. & not that of the tribunal. If there is any error in the appoint­ment or there was a subsequent error in the reference of this particular dispute to Mr. Baruah, the errors are of the Provincial Govt. & not of the tribunal. These alleged errors, if committed, were committed before Mr. Baruah started functioning as a tribunal. Under Art. 227, powers of superintendence can be exercised only over the Cts. & tribunals. The learned counsel has not contended that the Provincial Govt, when acting under S. 7 or 8 of the Act is a tribunal within the definition of the word "tribunal" occurring in Art. 227 of the Consti­tution. [20] The learned counsel has, however, eon-tended that the notification of the Provincial Govt. by which the dispute between the patnr. & the Opposite Party l was referred to Mr. Baruah amounted to a transfer of the casa from one tribunal to another & this transfer of the case would be an act which was subject to judicial scrutiny by the H. C under Art. 227. The argument apparently is fallacious. If the Provincial Govt. acting under SB. 7 & 8 cannot be regarded as a tribunal subject to H. 0. for the purposes of Art. 227, the notification by which the dis­pute in question was referred to Mr. Baruah under 8. 8 on the ground that the services of the Dist J., L. A. D , had ceased to be avail­able would not be open to challenge before the H. C. The Provincial Govt. when it acts under S. 8 is not a superior tribunal directing transfer (of a case from one subordinate tribunal to [another. It is itself admittedly not subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the H. C. which Art. 227 confers on it. Its order may be errone­ous. It may have made a mistake in appointing Mr. Baruah as a tribunal. when it acts under S. 8 is not a superior tribunal directing transfer (of a case from one subordinate tribunal to [another. It is itself admittedly not subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the H. C. which Art. 227 confers on it. Its order may be errone­ous. It may have made a mistake in appointing Mr. Baruah as a tribunal. It may also have gone wrong in referring the dispute pending before the Dist J. to him under S. 8. In both cases, the acts of the Provincial Govt. are not open to challenge under Art. 227. [21] Section 7 of the Act authorises the appro­priate Govt. to constitute one or more Industrial Tribunal for the adjudication of industrial disputes. Section 8 authorises the appropriate Govt. to fill vacancies when the services of the Chairman of a Board or of the chairman or other member of a Ct. or tribunal cease to be available. Section 9 provides that no order of the appropriate Govt. appointing any person as a member of a Board, 04. or tribunal shall be called is question in any manner. Section 9 covers appointments both under 8s. 7 & 8 & it also forbids interference with these orders. In other words, all orders of the appropriate Govt. under 8s 7 & 8 are clothed by the statute with the attribute of finality. The learned counsel has urged that S. 9 of the Act is void & is of no authority inasmuch as it conflicts with Art. 227 of the Constitution. [22] I do not think there is any such conflict. Section 9 clearly indicates that the orders of the Provincial Govt. by which tribunals are consti­tuted & vacancies, when they occur, are filled are not on the same level with the orders of the tribunal & have to be dealt on a distinct basis. Article 227-may be utilised for correcting errors of the tribunal when it has started functioning but not for interfering with the orders appoint­ing tribunals or members thereof. In this view of the matter there is no conflict between S. 9 of the Act & Art. 227, Const. Ind. In fact, the existence of this provision lends support to the view taken above that orders passed under Ss. 7 & 8 cannot be regarded as orders of any Ct. or tribunal subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the H. C. under Art. 227. Ind. In fact, the existence of this provision lends support to the view taken above that orders passed under Ss. 7 & 8 cannot be regarded as orders of any Ct. or tribunal subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the H. C. under Art. 227. [23] The next question is whether in the circumstances of the case relief can be afforded to the patnr. under Art. 226 of the Constitution. High prerogatives, writs in the nature of certiorari & prohibition have been prayed for in the alternative. Very recently their Lord­ships of the 3. C. had to consider the question as to when & under what circumstances write in the nature of certiorari may issue. Their Lordships in Province of Bombay v. Khushal-das S. Advani, (1950) 13 S. o. J. 451: (A. I. R. (37) 1950 S. c. 222) have laid down that a writ of certiorari will lie to control a statutory body if it purports to act without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the princi­ples of natural justice provided that on a true construction of the law under which it acts it can be said to be a quasi-judicial body en­trusted with quasi-judicial functions. In the words of the learned Chief Justice 'whenever any body of person having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, & having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority, a writ of certiorari may issue.' According to him 'it would not be correct to say that whenever there is a determination of a fact which affects the parties, the decision is quasi-judicial' The test laid down by him is that the law under which the Ct. is making a decision should itself require a judicial approach. It follows that a certiorari will not lie to correct errors of a statutory body which is entrusted with purely administrative functions. The question that then arises for decision in this case is whether the orders of the Govt. appointing Mr. I. P. Baruah to constitute a tribunal & then referring the dispute in this case to him acting under S. 8 are mere administrative acts or whether they can be regarded as acts of a quasi-judicial body which was required by statute to deter­mine the question of appointments under Ss. 7 & 8 in a quasi judicial manner. appointing Mr. I. P. Baruah to constitute a tribunal & then referring the dispute in this case to him acting under S. 8 are mere administrative acts or whether they can be regarded as acts of a quasi-judicial body which was required by statute to deter­mine the question of appointments under Ss. 7 & 8 in a quasi judicial manner. The learned counsel on either side have not been able to cite any apt precedent that may cover the case. Section 7 requires certain minimum qualifica­tions for appointments under it. Even when a vacancy under S. 8 is created, the parson ap­pointed is to fulfil the qualifications that S. 7 requires. The vacancy is created when the ser­vices of a member of the tribunal cease to be available. In making appointments under Ss. 7 & 8, the Provincial Govt. has to comply with the provisions contained in Bs. 7 & 8. But appoint­ments under 8s. 7 & 8 do not seem to involve any determination affecting the rights of the subjects. The tribunal when appointed has to deal with rights. When the Govt. is making an appointment there is no Us in the sense of a dispute between the two parties. The, Act does not requite the Provincial Govt. to hold a judi­cial inquiry for making the appointment. It has, however, to see that there is an occasion for making an appointment & the person appointed does possess the qualifications required by law. [24] The question is not free from difficulty. It is, however, not necessary in my opinion to give any decision on it as on patnr.'s own showing an action would be a more appro­priate remedy in a case of this kind. If the tribunal by the reason of the invalidity of its appointment or by reason of the invalidity of the reference had no jurisdiction, the award would be a nullity & its operation could be avoided by a suit. That this remedy is avail-able to the petnr. is not denied. Certiorari may not be granted where proceedings are abso­lutely void as where an unauthorised person has purported to act in a judicial capacity vide para. 1482, Halsbury'a Lawa of England (Vol. 9). The award has not been assailed on any ground except the absence of jurisdiction in the tribunal which made the award. With-out determining, therefore, whether the impugn­ed orders of the Provincial Govt. 1482, Halsbury'a Lawa of England (Vol. 9). The award has not been assailed on any ground except the absence of jurisdiction in the tribunal which made the award. With-out determining, therefore, whether the impugn­ed orders of the Provincial Govt. are liable to be quashed & justify grant of high prerogative writs in the nature of certiorari & prohibition, the petn. may be disposed of on the ground that a more appropriate & effective remedy exists which the petnr. can avail of, vide 2 Labour Law journal 1219. The allegations made in the petn. raise question of fact. An inquiry into these facts is necessary before the orders of the Govt. can be quashed or treated as a mere nullities, An action is, therefore, a more appro­priate remedy. [25] It may be remarked that though Art. 226 confers very wide powers on the High Courts, these powers have to be exercised very sparingly. The Article is not intended to provide an addi­tional or an alternative remedy where another effective remedy is available. The remedy under this Article may not be utilised as a substitute for the usual mode of redress by an action particularly when an inquiry into facts a involved. The extraordinary jurisdiction of the H. C. under the Article may be invoked in eases where no adequate remedy is available ;o the aggrieved party & application of Art. 226 alone affords a convenient & effective mode of redress. [26] It has been urged on behalf of the Oppo. site Party 1 that the petnr. has also got the right of appeal to the appellate tribunal. The award in this case was admittedly published after the Act conferring a right of appeal to parties aggrieved by an award under the Indus, trial Disputes Act came into force. The appel. late tribunal under the new Act could not be constituted at once. It took some time. The appel. admittedly had the right of appeal under the Act, but it could not file the appeal in time as the appellate tribunal was not in existence. It, therefore, invoked the jurisdiction of this Ct. under Arts. 226 & 227, Const. Ind. The ap­peal now would be time barred. The appellate tribunal, however, baa got powers to extend time if it is satisfied that the applt. l was pre­vented by sufficient causes from filing the ap­peal in time. It, therefore, invoked the jurisdiction of this Ct. under Arts. 226 & 227, Const. Ind. The ap­peal now would be time barred. The appellate tribunal, however, baa got powers to extend time if it is satisfied that the applt. l was pre­vented by sufficient causes from filing the ap­peal in time. The circumstances in this case are such that the appellate tribunal may be induc­ed to grant necessary extension. But as the petnr. cannot now appeal as of right, it would not be fair to refuse relief on this ground- This, however, does not affect the result as the remedy by an action is certainly available to the petnr. [27] For the reasons given above, I agree that the petn. be dismissed. K.S. Petition dismissed.