Order. - Ramanand resps. suit to pre-empt a sale was decreed by the Subordinate Judge of Rohru against the present petnr. Sarjit, the vendee, on condition of his depositing the purchase money within two months. The deposit was made beyond the prescribed time and Ramanands prayer in execution of the decree for possession of the property was resisted by Sarjit on that ground. Sarjits objection has been dismissed both by the Ct., executing the decree and by the appellate Ct. the Senior Subordinate Judge, Rampur, on the ground that Ramanand had within the prescribed time made an offer both of payment to Sarjit and of deposit in the Ct. which passed the decree, but that both the offers had been wrongfully refused. Sarjit has, therefore, come up to this Ct. in revn. 2. On one of the dates fixed for the hearing of this revn. it was stated by the learned counsel for the parties that a compromise had been arrived at, and they wanted time to enable the petnr. to file the compromise. The revn. was accordingly adjourned, but on the adjourned date no compromise was filed and it was contended, by the learned counsel for the resp. that the certification of the adjustment and the recording of that adjustment as duly certified now lay within the jurisdiction of the execution Ct. under o. 21, R. 2, Civil P. C., and that no interference by this Ct. in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction was any longer called forth because o. 23 of the Code did not apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order in view of R. 4 of that order. 3. On the other hand, it was contended by the learned count el on behalf of the petnr. that as o. 23, R. 3 of the Code applies to appeals (as no doubt it does, as held in Uttam Singh v. Munshi, A. I. R. (12) 1925 Lah. 145), it should also apply to revns. and, therefore this Ct. as a Ct. of revn. is empowered under that Rule to determine the terms of the compromise which has admittedly been arrived at between the parties, to record the terms of that compromise and to pass a decree in accordance therewith. 4. The learned counsel for the resp. cited before me two rulings Krishna Nair v. Kavalappara Mooppil, A. I. R. (2) 1915 Mad. is empowered under that Rule to determine the terms of the compromise which has admittedly been arrived at between the parties, to record the terms of that compromise and to pass a decree in accordance therewith. 4. The learned counsel for the resp. cited before me two rulings Krishna Nair v. Kavalappara Mooppil, A. I. R. (2) 1915 Mad. 41, and Ramchandra v. Balmukand, 29 Bom. 71. Both these were appeals against orders of lower appellate Cts. under o. 41, R. 5, Civil P. C. refusing to stay execution, and the objection that the appeals in the H. C. did not lie because the appellate Cts. which passed the orders were not Cts executing the decree within the purview of S. 47 of the Code was upheld. No such question has arisen before me since I am not required to pass an order under O. 41, R. 5 as a Ct. of appeal. These rulings have, therefore, no application. 5. In my opinion, the objection taken on behalf of the resp. Ramanand ought to be upheld but on different grounds. To my mind this Ct. is precluded from determining the terms of the compromise, ordering the compromise to be recorded and passing a decree in accordance therewith because O. 23 applies neither to execution proceedings nor to a revn. That it does not apply to execution proceedings is clear enough from the specific provision of R. 4 of that Order The correct provision of the Code applicable to adjustments in execution proceedings is O. 21, R. 2. But the Ct. to which an adjustment has to be certified and by which the certification is to be recorded under that Rule, is "the Ct. whose duty it is to execute the decree", which, cannot certainly be predicated of this Ct. but only of the Ct. of the Subordinate Judge of Rohru. 6. The other bar to my taking any action on foot of the alleged compromise is equally insurmountable. O. 23 of the Code, which is the only provision under which I am called upon to act, applies to withdrawal and adjustment of suits. But a revn. is not "a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint, which is the description of a suit given by their Lordships of the P.C. in Hansraj v. Dehra Dun-Mussorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., 54 ALL. 1067. But a revn. is not "a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint, which is the description of a suit given by their Lordships of the P.C. in Hansraj v. Dehra Dun-Mussorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., 54 ALL. 1067. Nor can the provisions of O. 23 be made applicable to revns. by application of S. 141 of the Code since, as has been laid down by their Lordships of the P. C. in Thakur Prasad v. Fakir-ullah, 17 ALL. 106, the proceedings refd. to in S. 141 relate only to original matters in the nature of suits. Their Lordships have laid down in that ruling as follows : "The proceedings spoken of in S. 647 (of the old Code which was replaced by S. 141 of the Code in 1908 and which if anything was more general than the present section) include original matters in the nature of suits such as proceedings in probates, guardianships and so forth and do not include executions." I am further supported in this view by the following two rulings : Hafasji v. Mangalgirji, A.I.R. (33) 1946 Bom. 201 and Mohd. Sadaat Ali Khan v. Administrator, Corpn. of City of Lahore, A.I.R. (36) 1949 Lah. 186 (F. b.). Both these were no doubt cases relating to the applicability of O. 22 of the Code to revns. but the principle on which that Order was held not applicable to revn. proceedings applies with equal force against the applicability of O. 23 to such proceedings. 7. For both the above reasons, therefore, I hold that the proper forum for the determination of the terms of the compromise, the recording of that compromise and passing suitable orders in accordance therewith is the execution Ct. and not this Ct. 8.Furthermore, it is discretionary with the H. C. to interfere or not in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction according to the circumstances of a particular case. Such discretion in favour of interference would not generally be exercised where a party has another remedy open to him. The remedy in the present case is the taking of suitable action under O. 21, R. 2, Civil P. C. in the Ct. whose duty it is to execute the decree. 9. For reasons recorded above, I do not deem it fit to pass any order in this revn. The remedy in the present case is the taking of suitable action under O. 21, R. 2, Civil P. C. in the Ct. whose duty it is to execute the decree. 9. For reasons recorded above, I do not deem it fit to pass any order in this revn. and in the special circumstances of the case, I make no order as to the costs of this revn. Application dismissed.