Govinda Menon, J.-The judgment-debtor against whom a decree for a sum of money had been passed in I.P.No. 8 of 1927 is the appellant in this appeal. One Chekka Rangayya was adjudicated an insolvent on 17th November, 1927, and his properties vested in the Official Receiver of West Godavari. This Chekka Rangayya had to realise a certain sum of money from the present appellant and therefore, the Official Receiver filed an application under section 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act and the Court passed an order directing the appellant to pay a sum of money as due to Chekka Rangayya to the Official Receiver of West Godavari on 9th April, 1941. According to the provisions of the Act, this order is tantamount to a decree which is capable of execution. The decree was for a sum of Rs. 8,120-5-11. Against the order directing the payment of this sum, an appeal was preferred to this Court in C.M.A.No. 545 of 1941 which was dismissed on 4th February, 1943. In the meanwhile, the insolvent had died on 13th November, 1941, and his legal representative had been brought on record on 22nd September, 1942. But this is a matter of minor importance because nothing depends on the question as to whether the legal representative was brought on record in time or not. As the Official Receiver had obtained the decree on 9th April, 1941, which was confirmed on appeal on 4th February, 1943, he applied for executing the same against the appellant on 14th July, 1943, by E.P.No. 59 of 1943. This petition underwent various adjournments and finally it was dismissed with costs on 28th February, 1944. Thereafter an application for annulling the adjudication had been taken before the Insolvency Court with the result that on 18th November, 1944, the adjudication of Chekka Rangayya had been annulled. The result of this order according to section 37, Provincial Insolvency Act is that the insolvent was relegated to the position which he occupied prior to the date on which the application for adjudication had been made. This order annulling the adjudication was again taken up to this Court and in C.M.A.No. 641 of 1945, this Court set aside the order annulling the adjudication and restored the adjudication to its original state on 3rd September, 1947. The present application E.P.No. 8 of 1948 out of which this appeal arises was filed on 7th February, 1948. This order annulling the adjudication was again taken up to this Court and in C.M.A.No. 641 of 1945, this Court set aside the order annulling the adjudication and restored the adjudication to its original state on 3rd September, 1947. The present application E.P.No. 8 of 1948 out of which this appeal arises was filed on 7th February, 1948. The learned District Judge held that the application was not barred because according to him the period of three years which has to be computed from 28th February, 1944, expired during the period when the order annulling the adjudication was in force and therefore the Official Receiver had three years from 3rd September, 1947, to file the application for execution. Mr. V. Ramaswami Aiyar for the appellant contends that even though there was an order annulling the adjudication on 18th. November, 1944, it was open to the insolvent who had been relegated to the position which he occupied prior to the adjudication to have applied for executing the decree and he not having done so within three years of 28th February, 1944, i.e., before 28th February, 1947, the present application is barred under Article 182 (5) of the Limitation Act. On the other hand Mr.V. Suryanarayana for the Official Receiver very strenuously contends that the Official Receiver was eo nomine the decree-holder and when by reason of the order annulling the adjudication it became impossible for him to execute the decree there was something in the nature of an impediment or embargo-put upon the Official Receiver from executing the decree with the result that when that impediment was removed or the embargo dissolved, it was possible for the Official Receiver to have availed of the provisions of Article 181 of the Limitation Act and apply for execution of the decree. In other words the learned counsel contends that there was an obstacle put upon the Official Receiver from executing the decree by the annulment of the adjudication. In our opinion the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant has to be accepted. Ex concessis, after the adjudication was annulled, it is possible for the quondam insolvent to have applied for execution of the decree obtained by the Official Receiver because the decree was for moneys due to him and not to the Official Receiver. Mr. In our opinion the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant has to be accepted. Ex concessis, after the adjudication was annulled, it is possible for the quondam insolvent to have applied for execution of the decree obtained by the Official Receiver because the decree was for moneys due to him and not to the Official Receiver. Mr. Suryanarayana contends that the capacity in which the Official Receiver obtained the decree is not only as representing the estate of the insolvent but he had another role, i.e., as representing the creditors of the insolvent. We are afraid we cannot accede to that contention. When money is due to a person who has been adjudicated an insolvent and the Official Receiver in whom the estate of that person has become vested files a suit to realise that sum of money, it cannot be said that he is representing any of the creditors of the insolvent in realising that sum of money. Quite a large body of case-law of this Court have held on interpreting section 37, Provincial Insolvency Act, that after an adjudication has been annulled it is open to the quondam insolvent to take such steps regarding his property which he could ordinarily have done unless there had been an order under section 37 (1), clause (2) Provincial Insolvency Act, vesting the property in a trustee or in the Official Receiver. There is no such vesting in this case at all. If there had been such a vesting, it would have been all the worse for the Official Receiver, because, then, even the present argument based on an impediment or embargo or an obstacle cannot be put forward by the Official Receiver. In our opinion since the decree was capable of being executed after the adjudication had been annulled and till that order was set aside, failure by the insolvent to apply for execution during that period would disentitle the Official Receiver from seeking to execute the decree after three years from 28th February, 1944. The learned counsel for the respondent invited our attention to a passage at page 282 of Chhattar Singh v. Kamal Singh1, as well as to a judgment of our learned brother, Raghava Rao, J., in Venkinani Rajagopala Venkataratnam and another v. Vegunta Anjaneyalu and others2. The learned counsel for the respondent invited our attention to a passage at page 282 of Chhattar Singh v. Kamal Singh1, as well as to a judgment of our learned brother, Raghava Rao, J., in Venkinani Rajagopala Venkataratnam and another v. Vegunta Anjaneyalu and others2. The facts of these two cases cannot be said to be in any way approaching the points in controversy in this case. Our learned brother had to construe the meaning of the word “closed” in an application and he was of opinion that in the particular context of the circumstance of that case, the word “closed” should be understood as that for the time being the matter had proceeded out of the ordinary role of pending proceedings. The application to restore should be deemed to be a revivor. We fail to see how this case has any application to the facts of the present case. If our view that during the time when the insolvency stood annulled and before that order was set aside it was possible for the quondam insolvent to have applied for execution of the decree is right, then there is no impediment or any obstacle to execute the decree. The decree was in full force. It can be executed by whomsoever is competent to execute the same. To take an illustration, supposing the Official Receiver, after getting the decree, had assigned it over to a third party who did not put in any application for execution within three years of getting the decree and thereafter re-assigned it in favour of the Official Receiver, can it be said that the Official Receiver can ignore the time during which the decree had been in the ownership of the third party, having been assigned in his favour, when seeking to execute the decree. The answer to it is an emphatic “no.” We are therefore of opinion that since the decree could have been executed between 28th February, 1944 and 9th March, 1947, and since no steps were taken towards that end, the Official Receiver’s application, E.P.No. 8 of 1948, dated 7th February, 1948, is barred under Article 182 (5), Limitation Act. The appeal is therefore allowed and the E.P.No.8 of 1948, is dismissed with costs throughout. The costs will come out of the estate. K.S. ----- Appeal allowed.