This is an appeal from the judg­ment and decree of the District Judge, U.A.D., by which the order of the Special Subordinate Judge, A.V.D., dismissing plaintiffs' suit was reversed and it was held that plff. Mt. Khohuli Ahomani was a legitimate daughter of Muhikanta and Mt. Elachi. (2) Tileswar Ahom, the 1st deft, assails the correctness of this decision. Plff.-resp. sued for] a declaration of his title and recovery of possession of the property in dispute. She also claimed] mesne profits. Her case was that Muhikanta, her father, was the owner of this property. He ac­quired it himself. After his death, she was en-1 titled to inherit it. She stated in her plaint that after her father's death, she applied for mutation and in spite of objections from deft., Tileswar the I mutation was attested in her favour. She, how­ever, did not succeed in getting possession of the property. A proceeding under S. 145, Criminal P. C. initiated on her behalf did not succeed. In this proceeding deft. 1 disputed her legitimacy. She, therefore, instituted the suit for a declaration of her title and possession alleging in the plaint specifically that her father was Muhikanta. She was begotten by him from Mt. Elachi, who was his lawfully married wife. She also put forward an alternative case. It was that if she was found to have been begotten from Bundi, mother of deft. 1, as alleged by deft. 1, even then she was entitled to succeed to the property in preference to deft. 1, under custom. (3) The suit was resisted. The defence was that though plff. was begotten by Muhikanta, it was not from Mt. Elachi as alleged. She was begotten from Mt. Bundi, mother of deft. 1. She, accord­ing to the deft., was a widow when she gave birth to the plff. She was not in wedlock. Muhikanta never became her husband by any lawful marriage. Plff. was the result of an illicit union between Muhikanta and Bundi and therefore not a legiti­mate daughter of Muhikanta. (4) Even when setting up the alternative case, plff. did not aver that Bundi was her father's lawfully wedded wife. If, therefore, she was be­gotten from Bundi, she would be an illegitimate daughter of her father. (5) The learned Special Subordinate Judge did not make any presumption in favour of legitimacy. He considered the evidence produced by both sides. He found that plff. did not aver that Bundi was her father's lawfully wedded wife. If, therefore, she was be­gotten from Bundi, she would be an illegitimate daughter of her father. (5) The learned Special Subordinate Judge did not make any presumption in favour of legitimacy. He considered the evidence produced by both sides. He found that plff. was the "result of an incestuous connection between Muhi and his brother's wife" and therefore an illegitimate daughter not entitled to succeed to the property left by Muhikanta. (6) The learned District Judge observed that it was an accepted principle that the presumption I of legitimacy would always arise when a man or a woman claims to be the child of a certain indi­vidual and it must be for the other party to prove that she is illegitimate or to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. He also expressed the view that the learned Subordinate Judge had proceeded on the assumption that it was for the plff. to prove that she was the legitimate child of Muhikanta. This assumption, in his view, was not justified. He noticed further that evidence having been adduced on both sides, the question of onus was not very material. Inspite of this, (after observing that the learned Subordinate Judge in rejecting plff's evidence on the ground that she was supported mostly by her relatives, lost sight of the fact that her witnesses were also related to deft. 1) he brought out such defects in the deft's. version which appeared to him to be salient. After that I he considered plff's. evidence and finding that I there were no good reasons for rejecting the testi­mony of plff's. witnesses Nos. 1, 2 and 3 found that the defence version that plff. was given birth to by the mother of the deft, was a pure myth and after­thought. • (7) It has been contended before me on behalf of deft.-appellant that the finding that plff. was a legitimate daughter of Muhikanta from Mt. Elachi has been influenced by the view that there was a presumption of legitimacy in favour of the I plff. It is pointed out that there was no case for any presumption in plff's. favour and that it was for her to prove the case set up by her. was a legitimate daughter of Muhikanta from Mt. Elachi has been influenced by the view that there was a presumption of legitimacy in favour of the I plff. It is pointed out that there was no case for any presumption in plff's. favour and that it was for her to prove the case set up by her. It is also contended that the learned District Judge had no adequate grounds for differing from the conclusion arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge on a question of fact and therefore the find­ing which is not warranted by evidence is open to question in second appeal. (8) Mr. Deb, for plff.-resp. has urged that in view of the fact that deft, admitted that plff. was begotten by Muhikanta, the presumption was that , she was a legitimate child of her father and that it was for the deft, to prove that she was born of Mt. Bundi, who was not a lawfully wedded wife of Muhikanta. He also urges that the learned District Judge was justified in reversing the find­ing of the learned Special Subordinate Judge on the ground that he failed to notice that there was a presumption of legitimacy in her favour and that the onus of proving illegitimacy was on the deft. (9) From the argument that was addressed, the first question that arises is whether any presump­tion arises in favour of the plff. It is obvious that S. 112 of the Evidence Act has no application to the facts of the case. This section provides that ii any person is born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, it shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten. The continuance of valid marriage must be there if a presumption is to be made under S. 112. Here the main point in controversy is whether Muhikanta was lawfully wedded to Mt. Elachi, the alleged mother of the plff. Any presumption that may be made in this case must come under S. 114 of the Evidence Act. The continuance of valid marriage must be there if a presumption is to be made under S. 112. Here the main point in controversy is whether Muhikanta was lawfully wedded to Mt. Elachi, the alleged mother of the plff. Any presumption that may be made in this case must come under S. 114 of the Evidence Act. This section provides that the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events; human conduct and public and private business in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Under this section continuous cohabitation for a number of years with habit and repute may give rise to a presumption in favour of marriage. Habit and repute should be of that particular status which can lead to a recognition of lawful marriage. Where concubinage Is recognised or connived at, the presumption becomes weak. On le other hand, where concubinage is not prevalent and is looked upon with disfavour, the presumpon from long cohabitation and living together as husband and wife would be strong. (10) In 'Mohabbat Ali Khan v. Mahomed Ibrahim Khan', 56 Ind App 201, the son of a female (errant claimed a declaration of his legitimacy. His parents had continuously cohabited for a number of years and the father had on several occasions acknowledged the plff. as his son. There was some evidence of a 'nikah' marriage. It was held that there was a presumption of legitimacy stag from the acknowledgments. That presumption was not rebutted in the case. The presumption, however, was made on the basis of acknow­ledgment involving the assertion that the father of the plff. was married to his mother. In 'Kishen Singh v. Sadhu1, AIR (20) 1933 Lah 520, it was held that where a child establishes the possession of filiations which is the acknowledgment of the bents and habit and repute, everything such as kfitimacy must be presumed in his favour. In this Be, there was evidence that Sadhu, whose legitimacy was in dispute, had been brought by Natha Singh and that he had told the village people that Sadhu was his son. The acknowledgment here was held to be a basis for the presumption in favour of legitimacy. (11) These two cases have been relied on by the learned counsel for the resp. The acknowledgment here was held to be a basis for the presumption in favour of legitimacy. (11) These two cases have been relied on by the learned counsel for the resp. He has also referred me to 'Dularey Singh v. Suraj Bali Singh', 43 Ind Cas 478. The headnote of this case is that where a party admits the paternity of the other party but pleads that he is of illegitimate descent, the legal presumption being in favour of legitimacy, the onus lies on the party alleging illegitimacy to prove it. The headnote is somewhat misleading. The learned Judge found in that case that pre­sumption of legitimacy may arise under S. 114. He observed that in order to raise a presumption of this kind there must be some facts to support it. He then referred to facts which justified this presumption. He considered that the fact that the paternity of the plff. was admitted by the deft, is a factor which should be taken into considera­tion. He also referred to some documentary evi­dence on the record which showed that plff. 1 had been recorded in the 'khewats' for many years as being in possession of under-proprietary shares in this village, shares which he seemed to have inheri­ted equally with the father of the deft. On this evidence he thought that a presumption could be made in favour of legitimacy. The case is no authority for the proposition that there is general presumption in favour of legitimacy in all cases where the question arises. The authorities con­sidered above, on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Deb, will show that a presumption may arise from long cohabitation leading to a reputa­tion of marriage or from an acknowledgment of paternity. (12) In this case it is not possible to make any presumption of legitimacy for the simple reason that Pirika Ahom (P. W. 3), who deposed that Mt. Elachi, the alleged mother of the plff. was his sister, stated that Muhikanta's connection with Mt. Elachi was illicit to begin with. According to his statement Muhikanta used to visit Mt. Elachi. He was carrying on with her. The connection was secret and clandestine. Mt. Elachi then went away with him. The witness could not state what was the relationship between them. He said: "I do not know on what arrangement Mt. Elachi was taken. Elachi was illicit to begin with. According to his statement Muhikanta used to visit Mt. Elachi. He was carrying on with her. The connection was secret and clandestine. Mt. Elachi then went away with him. The witness could not state what was the relationship between them. He said: "I do not know on what arrangement Mt. Elachi was taken. I do not know how long she lived with Muhi. Elachi died of illness." What is conceded in this statement is that the connection between Muhikanta and Elachi was illicit in its commence­ment. But there is no allegation that there was any marriage before she went with Muhikanta. Taking the statement of P. W. 3 at its face value for the present, it appears that cohabitation was the result of an illicit connection. Long cohabita­tion may raise the presumption of marriage but if it is known that the connection started in mere concubinage, the presumption does not arise. In 'Mt. Indi v. Jaimal Singh', AIR (14) 1927 Lah 48, Addison, J., held that presumption of marriage arises from long cohabitation but if it is known that it arises from mere concubinage, this pre­sumption cannot arise. He further held that re­lations or conditions of persons or things once shown to exist are presumed to continue until the contrary is proved. If it is proved that a certain woman was unmarried at a certain date, the pre­sumption is that she continues so until she is proved to have married. (13) In this case P. W. 3, is the only witness who has deposed to the commencement of the con­nection between Muhikanta and his alleged wife Mt. Elachi. According to him, the connection began illicitly and secretly. The presumption would be that it continued on till marriage is proved. This is neither alleged nor proved. Plff. in her own statement stated that Mt. Elachi was her mother. The witness did not depose to any marriage between Muhikanta and Elachi, whom the plff. claimed to be the mother. Mt. Basanti also deposed that the plfi's. mother was Mt. Elachi. She also did not suggest that there was any marriage ever performed by which Elachi became the wife of Muhikanta. Khora Ahom, P. W. 2, has supported his wife Basanti. He also did not depose to any marriage between Muhikanta and Elachi. All that he said was that Mt. Elachi was the mother of the plff. Elachi. She also did not suggest that there was any marriage ever performed by which Elachi became the wife of Muhikanta. Khora Ahom, P. W. 2, has supported his wife Basanti. He also did not depose to any marriage between Muhikanta and Elachi. All that he said was that Mt. Elachi was the mother of the plff. She may be a mother but it does not follow that she was the wife of Muhikanta by a lawful marriage. Even P. W. 3, who claims to be the brother of Elachi does not make any claim to that effect. The situation that arises from plff's. evidence is that plff. is said to have been begotten by Muhikanta from Mt. Elachi. The connection between the parents of the plff. was admittedly illicit to begin with. The presumption would be that the illicit connection continued till marriage is proved. In the absence of such proof, no presumption of legitimacy could be made in plff's. favour. (14) In 'Gangadhar Tukaram v. Rachappa Nagappa', A I R (16) 1929 Bom 246, it was observ­ed that 'evidence relied on as proving that the parties were living as husband and wife by repute must be satisfactory and strong.' The learned Judges refused to make any presumption in the case before them on the ground that the status of the man was lower than the wife's and the inter­course between them was admittedly illicit for a large number of years. In coming to this conclu­sion, their Lordships of the Bombay High Court referred to two Privy Council cases. The first of these cases was reported in 'Mt. Jarintool Butool v. Mt. Hoseinee Begum', 11 Moo Ind App 194. In this case it was observed as follows: "If it were once conceded that a woman once a concubine could be converted by judicial pre­sumption into a wife, merely by lapse of time and propriety of conduct, and the enjoyment of con­fidence with powers of management reposed in her, when and after what period of time should such presumption arise? The ordinary legal presump­tion is, that things remain in their original state." The second case relied on was reported in 'Ghazan-far All Khan v. Kaniz Fatima', 32 All 345. The ordinary legal presump­tion is, that things remain in their original state." The second case relied on was reported in 'Ghazan-far All Khan v. Kaniz Fatima', 32 All 345. It was held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that the presumption of marriage in that case which might have arisen from a prolonged cohabita­tion did not apply because the mother before she was brought to the father's house was admittedly a prostitute. In this last case there was no evi­dence of marriage between the parents or of ack­nowledgment or of treatment of the claimant as a son by his father. No presumption of marriage was made from long cohabitation even though there was evidence that two sisters of the claimant had been given in marriage by the father and these marriages were performed with due formali­ties. (15) So, on the authorities referred to above, it is clear that it is not possible to make any pre­sumption in favour of the legitimacy of the plff. from mere cohabitation on the ground of its illi­cit beginning. The cohabitation was not also for, a very long time. According to the plff., she was three years old when her mother died. This state­ment was made in June 1947 when she was thirty years old according to her own statement. The mother died some 27 years before that. She has not stated how long her mother remained with Muhikanta, her father. (16) The statement of P. W. 3, if believed, would show that Mt. Elachi was taken away by Muhi­kanta sometime in 1921. He said he was 9 years old when Muhikanta took Mt. Elachi to his house. At the time of making the statement he put his age at 35 years. If his age was correctly stated, he was born in 1912 as his statement was taken in June 1947. If, at the time when Mt. Elachi went to the house of Muhikanta, he was 9 years old, the taking away of Mt. Elachi would come in 1921. According to the plff., Mt. Elachi died before that. The witness also stated that Mt. Elachi died 20 years ago. He also deposed that she lived with Muhikanta for 30 years. This last statement cannot be reconciled with plff's. state­ment. (17) Prom the evidence of the plff. it is not , possible to fix the duration of the period for which Elachi remained with Muhikanta. Elachi died before that. The witness also stated that Mt. Elachi died 20 years ago. He also deposed that she lived with Muhikanta for 30 years. This last statement cannot be reconciled with plff's. state­ment. (17) Prom the evidence of the plff. it is not , possible to fix the duration of the period for which Elachi remained with Muhikanta. It can­not be said that there was long cohabitation; nor is there any evidence of repute or treatment re­lating to the period immediately preceding Elachi's death. (18) No acknowledgment of paternity also has been proved. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Deb in this regard on evidence bearing on the marriage of the plff. with Petua. It has been stated by the plff. as well as by her witnesses that she was married to Petua. This marriage, according to plff's. own showing, must have taken place, if at all, during the time when Muhikanta was in jail. Plff. deposed that she was married to Petua about 10 years ago. This statement was made in June 1947. The marriage, therefore, would be sometime in 1937. She herself stated in para. 6 of her plaint that her father shifted to her house about 8 years ago after his release from jail. This release from jail would be in 1938. The suit was instituted in June 1946. The marriage came in 1937. At the time of the marriage, plff's. father could not have been present if plff. is believed. If the father went to live with her after his release, she was a married woman with a house before the release. This is necessarily implied in the state­ment. According to Khora, P. W. 2, Muhikanta was out of jail for about 8 or 9 years when he was murdered. He does not state when he was mur­dered. According to P. W. 5, Khahuli was married 10 or 12 years before his statement. This will also place the marriage before 1937. The evidence be­sides being conflicting fails to show that Muhi­kanta could possibly be present at the time of her daughter's alleged marriage. The learned District i Judge has described the fact of this marriage as^ something admitted. This is not correct. But assuming that some ceremony of marriage did take place, it has not been established by the plfi, that Muhikanta was at that time out of jail and could be present. The learned District i Judge has described the fact of this marriage as^ something admitted. This is not correct. But assuming that some ceremony of marriage did take place, it has not been established by the plfi, that Muhikanta was at that time out of jail and could be present. The statement that Muhikanta was present at this marriage is demonstrataly false, No case of acknowledgment, therefore, can be said to have been made out. (19) My conclusion on a consideration of the plff's. evidence is that cohabitation was illicit in the beginning and there is no evidence to show that there was any marriage. The presumption that it remained illicit, therefore, would continue. There is no reliable evidence of acknowledgment of paternity so far as plff. is concerned. No pre­sumption at all could, therefore, arise in plff's,, favour regarding the alleged marriage of her parents or regarding her legitimacy. Her claim that she is a legitimate daughter of Muhikanta must obviously fail in these circumstances. (20) The evidence produced on behalf of the plff, has been examined in its bearing on the question whether proved facts justify any presumption it plff's. favour. If perused as a whole it leaves the impression that it is wholly unreliable. Plff. her­self stated that she did not know when Mt. Bundi died nor did she know who murdered her. She had never heard of it. She also did not know that her father was in prison. She expressed ignorance as to the cause of her father's imprisonment. She made a positive statement that her father was away only for two years and she could not state ' where he was during these two years. These are all reckless lies. Her aunt Basanti and her husband both have admitted that Bundi was murdered by Muhikanta and he was sentenced to imprisonment. It was also stated by Basanti that another woman named Lahi was also murdered by him : (Muhikanta.) and he got a longer term of imprisonment this time. These obvious facts are denied by the plff. Her father remained in jail for not less than 15 or 16 years. The period may be longer. She deposed that he was away for two years only. Her statement cannot be believed. Basanti is no doubt related to both the plff. and the deft. These obvious facts are denied by the plff. Her father remained in jail for not less than 15 or 16 years. The period may be longer. She deposed that he was away for two years only. Her statement cannot be believed. Basanti is no doubt related to both the plff. and the deft. But Muhikanta was her real brother while Durga, father of deft., was her step brother. Besides, her husband went to take possession of the land from the deft. He was resisted. A pro­ceeding under S. 145, Criminal P. C., was initiated by him on behalf of the plff. Plffs husband Petua was dead. She was admittedly living with Basanti and her husband. They are thus interested per­sons. Their interests arise not only because of closer relationship but also from the fact that if the plff. gets the land, they are likely to be bene­fited. They have, however, not deposed to either prolonged cohabitation or marriage between Muhi­kanta and Mt. Elachi. The statement of Pirika Ahom, P. W. 3, who claims to be the brother of Mt. Elachi is also palpably false. He stated that Elachi died of illness. She died after living with Muhikanta for about 30 years. This statement is not only opposed to plff's. statement taut to the ad­mitted circumstances of the case. If she went away with Muhikanta in 1921, as suggested by this witness she should have alive even after the institution of the suit. The statement is impos­sible and yet the learned District Judge could see no reason to discard it. It would appear that plff. had absolutely no chance of succeeding on this evidence and the view of the learned Special Subordinate Judge was correct. Considerations which prevailed with the learned District Judge do not make out a case for reversal of the trial Court's judgment. The learned District Judge began with the observation that the presumption of legitimacy would arise when a man or a woman claims to be the child of a certain individual. No authority has been cited in support of any such principle. (21) As found above, a presumption can only be made under S. J 14 of the Evidence Act. This presumption has to be made on certain facts. It was the wrong view of the law that has to a very great extent influenced the judgment of the learned District Judge. (21) As found above, a presumption can only be made under S. J 14 of the Evidence Act. This presumption has to be made on certain facts. It was the wrong view of the law that has to a very great extent influenced the judgment of the learned District Judge. The circumstances of this parti­cular case do not justify any presumption of mar­riage between Muhikanta and Elachi or of the legitimacy of the plff. on any other ground. (After dealing with the judgment of the District Judge his Lordship concluded.) The finding of the learned District Judge is due mainly to a mis­apprehension of the legal position arising in the case and is thus unsustainable. (22) The learned counsel for the appellant has also contended that if the decision in the case hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then un­less there were some special features about the evidence of a particular witness which had escaped the trial Judge's notice or there was a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lay, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. Reliance was placed on 1951 S. C. 120, in support of this contention. It may be argued on the basis of this authority that the learned District Judge had no adequate grounds for reversal of the trial Court's order, but a distinctive feature of this case is that their Lordships of the Supreme Court were not dealing with the case under S. 100, I have, however, come to the conclusion that the order of the learned District Judge is liable to interference on the ground that no presumption could be made in plfl's. favour; nor was there any evidence proving the marriage between Muhikanta and Elachi or of her acknowledgment by Muhikanta. In this view of the matter, this appeal must succeed. It is allow­ed; the order of the learned District Judge is re­versed and that of the trial Court restored with costs throughout. V.S.B. Appeal allowed.