ORDER : The facts leading to this revision are that Zahoor Shah, the plaintiff brought this suit against Mt. Batoolan for the restitution of conjugal rights. He alleged that about 3 years ago, he was married to the defendant No. 1 (Mt. Batoolan), on a dower of Rs. 200/-, that for sometime, the said Batoolan lived with him and later on defendant No. 2, Masoom Shah took her away and now refuses to send her to him. Of the many pleas taken by defendant No. 1, one relates to the right of 'option of puberty', alleged to have been exercised fay Mt. Batoolan, repudiating the marriage, and, it is the decision of the lower Courts on this point that has given rise to this revision. 2. The trial Court in considering this plea has said that Mr. Batoolan is a girl of 16-17 years, who lives by making Pattals out of green leaves, she is unlettered and uneducated, she can only fix her thumb impression - how can such a person be conversant with the principles of Muhammadan law and not knowing them how can she be expected to have exercised the 'option of puberty.' The learned District Judge, without considering the plea in all its seriousness, merely added that 'option' should be exercised without unreasonable delay and that there should be confirmation of it by a decree of the Court and because both these facts do not exist in this case, the plea is not of any avail. 3. Leaving aside the question what Muhammadan law is on the point, the learned trial Court in expressing the view, that because Mt. Batoolan did not know the principles of Muhammadan law, therefore, she cannot be assumed to have exercised the right under the law, has ignored the too well-known legal maxim : Ignorance of law is no excuse. Everyone is supposed to know law and if one cannot plead ignorance of law by way of excuse, it follows, as a necessary corollary to it that one cannot be deprived of a right that some law may confer on him merely on the ground that he did not know the law. 4. Everyone is supposed to know law and if one cannot plead ignorance of law by way of excuse, it follows, as a necessary corollary to it that one cannot be deprived of a right that some law may confer on him merely on the ground that he did not know the law. 4. Considering the point from the angle of Muhammadan law, I would refer to Hamilton's Hedaya, page 104, from which the following passage is quoted : "The Imam (Imam Mohammad, the second' well-known disciple of Imam Aboo Hanifa) does not make knowledge of the right of option a condition, because that is an institute of the law, with which it is supposed that every person ought to be acquainted." What from the view of the general legal maxim and what from the point of view of Muhammadan law, which is specific on the point - it is established beyond doubt that in order to claim some benefit under the provision of some law, it is not a condition precedent that one should know that law personally. I have no doubt that the judgment of the trial Court proceeds on a wrong basis. 5. Let us now consider what is 'option of puberty.' In order to appreciate its significance, we may consider the lines on which the Moslem matrimonial law developed. The trend of Moslem jurisprudence has been to liberalize the law of marriage generally and in particular to give some rights to women which they never enjoyed. The right known as 'Khyarul Baloogh' or 'option of puberty' is peculiar to Moslem legal conception. In Arabic, the women were treated as chattels and on the demise of their husbands, they were treated as property divisable among heirs. But Muhammadan law took a different view of the matter and redeemed the women from the thraldom of centuries. Marriage, among Muhammadans, is re-regarded essentially as a civil contract. In pursuance to this, it was laid down by Muhammadan jurists that where a minor had been contracted in marriage by the father or grand-father, the contract was valid and binding, unless the minor on attaining pubery could establish that it was manifestly to the disadvantage of the minor and that the elders acted negligently or fraudulently. In pursuance to this, it was laid down by Muhammadan jurists that where a minor had been contracted in marriage by the father or grand-father, the contract was valid and binding, unless the minor on attaining pubery could establish that it was manifestly to the disadvantage of the minor and that the elders acted negligently or fraudulently. And where the contract of marriage was entered into for a minor by any guardian other than the father or grandfather, the minor possessed the right to repudiate the marriage on attaining puberty and this right is known as 'option of puberty.' The right given to a minor to repudiate the contract of marriage on attaining puberty marks the liberalisation of law relating to matrimony. On one hand it encouraged the principle of mutual liking, which is regarded as a sure foundation of a happy married life, and, on the other it put a curb on the tendency prevalent in ancient society to perpetuate child-marriage, for fear of its repudiation by either party or attaining majority. 6. There is evidence on record that defendant No. 1 (Mt. Batoolan) exercised her 'option of puberty', but the trial Court dismissed it as being of no consequence because she was illiterate and did not know Moslem law. But it has been said before that knowledge of the law is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the right she possessed. 7. The learned District Judge has expressed the view that in order to be effective the repudiation should be confirmed by Court. There is some conflict as to whether a judicial order is necessary to effectuate cancellation. On one hand, "Fatawa-i-Alamgiri says that such an order is necessary. On the other hand "Radul Muhtar (a treatise on Muhammadan law) explains the position by saying that a judicial declaration is not needed for imparting validity to an act which the parties have power to do, but to provide judicial evidence in order to prevent further disputes." Anyway it may now be taken to be the settled law that the girl can plead the repudiation in defence of her husband's suit against her for restitution of conjugal right and the Court may in that suit declare that the marriage has been annulled or repudiated. 'Badal Aurat v. Queen Empress', 19 Cal 79. 'Badal Aurat v. Queen Empress', 19 Cal 79. I am, therefore, of opinion that she can take the plea of repudiation in this case. 8. Apart from the above considerations, a vital aspect of the matter has escaped the notice of the lower Courts and it must be considered also because it goes to the root of the question. Was Mt. Batoolon validly married? Her age at the time she gave her statement before the Court is 16-17 years. The plaint alleges that she was married 3 years before the commencement of these proceedings. Thus her age at the time of her marriage was 13-14 years, land, therefore she was undoubtedly a minor. Now la minor can be validly married by the father or jgrand-father or other guardians that have been enumerated in Muhammadan law. But it is alleged that defendant No. 2, Masoon Shah gave the minor girl in marriage to the plaintiff and Masoom Shah is neither the father, the grand-father, nor any of the guardians prescribed by Muhammadan law. He is a total stranger, who took pity on the girl and in the absence of the girl's parents brought her up. (See the statement of Mt. Batoolan on Index No. 8.) Now a contract of marriage according to Muhammadan law may be made either directly or through an agent, who can be appointed for that purpose by the parties to the marriage. The girl in this case was admittedly a minor and she was in consequence unable to appoint an agent. In this view of the matter, when Masoon Shah gave this girl away in marriage, he had no authority to do so and marriage through an unauthorised intermediary should be regarded as void. Subsequent ratification may cure the defect, but not only is there no evidence of it - the girl positively repudiates it. For these reasons I cannot regard this to be a valid marriage at all. See 'Shafiullah v. Emperor', AIR (21) 1934 All 589. 9. In the view that I take of the matter, I hold that the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 (Mt. Batoolan) was not a valid one in the first instance, that even if it was valid, the girl having exercised her 'option of puberty' the suit for the restitution of conjugal right must fail. 9. In the view that I take of the matter, I hold that the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 (Mt. Batoolan) was not a valid one in the first instance, that even if it was valid, the girl having exercised her 'option of puberty' the suit for the restitution of conjugal right must fail. For either or both of the reasons, the plaintiff should be non-suited. Having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the case, I order that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Revision is allowed and the suit is dismissed. Revision allowed.