Judgment :- The father of minor defendants 1 to 4 who had been appointed as guardian ad litem has filed this appeal. The plaintiff is the son of the sister of one Pichu Ammal who is now dead. This Pichu Ammal was a Brahmin widow. On 28.4.1115 she had executed a gift deed for the plaint properties in favour of one Valliammal, the mother of the defendants. This Valli Ammal was the daughter's daughter of Pichu Ammal's deceased brother Sankaranarayana Iyer. Valli Ammal died in 1116 Pichu Ammal then executed Ext. B on 6.12.1116 cancelling the gift deed Ext. A to Valli Ammal. The same day she had executed Ext. E, a gift deed for the plaint and other properties in favour of the plaintiff in the case. It was the plaintiff's allegation that Valli Ammal had no knowledge of the execution of Ext. A gift deed in her favour, nor had she accepted the same. She had also not acted according to the provisions made therein. According to him Ext. A was therefore an invalid document. The properties covered by Ext. A remained in the possession of Pichu Ammal, and the plaintiff stated that after Pichu Ammal's death he got possession of the same. The plaintiff applied before the Taluk Office, Thovala for mutation of name in the revenue records. This was not allowed by the Tahsildar. His appeal against the order before the Assistant Peishkar, Padmanabhapuram, and the revision petition before the Division Peishkar, Trivandrum, were unsuccessful. This has cast a cloud on his title, and so he prayed for the cancellation of the orders passed by the revenue authorities. He also prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession, and for a direction to the revenue authorities to grant him Patta pursuant to Ext. E gift deed in his favour. 2. The guardian of the minor defendants contested the case. He had stated that the gift deed Ext. He also prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession, and for a direction to the revenue authorities to grant him Patta pursuant to Ext. E gift deed in his favour. 2. The guardian of the minor defendants contested the case. He had stated that the gift deed Ext. A to Valli Ammal was a valid document, that she had accepted the same, that the donor herself had produced the original gift deed for registration and got it back, that the donor had the custody of the gift deed and the prior title deeds on behalf of the donee, that when it was necessary for Valli Ammal to go and render assistance to Pichu Ammal, the former went and resided with Pichu Ammal at her residence in Erachikulam, that Ext. A gift deed was valid and enforceable, that for the execution of the gift deed by Pichu Ammal to the plaintiff, Pichu Ammal was not a conscious party, that she was also absolutely incompetent to execute the gift deed Ext. E, that the plaintiff had not obtained possession of the plaint properties, for they were still with Pichu Ammal's lessees, that the orders passed by the revenue authorities mentioned in the plaint were all correct, that the minor defendants had obtained Patta for the properties after the death of Pichu Ammal, that the suit was wanting in bona fides and that it was conceived in the hope that the defendants being poor could not effectively resist the plaintiff who was a vakil of the District Court, Nagercoil. They therefore prayed for the dismissal of the suit with costs. They filed an additional written statement in which it was stated that though Ext. A was styled a gift deed, it was in effect a settlement deed, and that it was referred to as the gift deed in the previous written statement because it had been so described in Ext. A. 3. The trial court held that Ext. A gift deed in favour of Valli Ammal had taken effect and become operative, that Pichu Ammal was therefore incompetent to execute Ext. E gift deed to the plaintiff, that Ext. A. 3. The trial court held that Ext. A gift deed in favour of Valli Ammal had taken effect and become operative, that Pichu Ammal was therefore incompetent to execute Ext. E gift deed to the plaintiff, that Ext. E had not come into operation, that the plaintiff was not entitled to effect the mutation in his name, that the question of possession after the death of Pichu Ammal was not very material since she had a right to be in possession of the properties till her death, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. In the course of the suit a Receiver had been appointed for the plaint properties. The trial court gave a direction for handing over possession of the plaint properties to the defendants. The plaintiff appealed against this to the District Court. The learned judge came to the conclusion that Ext. A gift deed had not been accepted by Valli Ammal, that it was therefore incomplete and invalid, that the gift deed Ext. E to the plaintiff was valid, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the decree as prayed for. The Receiver was directed to hand over possession of the properties to the plaintiff. He was also allowed to get all the amounts deposited by the Receiver in Court. The present appeal is against this decree passed by the judge. 4. There is no doubt, that one of the requisites of a valid gift is that it must have been accepted by the donee personally or by some one on the donee's behalf. The rulings in Kalyani Amma v. Gopala Pillai (13 T.L.J. 58) and Raman Pillai v. Padmanabhan (11 T.L.T. 1099) have discussed this position and laid down the principle mentioned above. The learned Advocate for the appellants does not question the correctness of this position, so that what is necessary is to go directly into the question whether Valli Ammal before her death had accepted the gift deed in question. Ext. A is the gift deed. It stated that the donee was the donor's brother's grand daughter. In consideration of the affection the donor felt for the donee and also for the protection of the donee, the donor gifted away the decree schedule properties which were worth Rs. 600. Ext. A is the gift deed. It stated that the donee was the donor's brother's grand daughter. In consideration of the affection the donor felt for the donee and also for the protection of the donee, the donor gifted away the decree schedule properties which were worth Rs. 600. After mentioning this operative portion that the donor's right over the properties were given over to the donee, it was stated that the latter was to enjoy the properties and pay the tax without encumbering the properties during the lifetime of the donor and that after the death of the donor the donee was to meet all the expenses in connection with the funeral ceremonies and to enjoy the properties with absolute right. In the succeeding portion it was mentioned that the donor for her lifetime would appropriate the yield from the properties, that she would also pay the tax in the name of the donee, that the donee was to take good care of the donor, and that the donee was retaining with her all the prior title deeds. The direction that the donee was to take full care of the donor would have been made in it only in consultation with the donee who was to perform these services. The donor might have directed the donee to meet the expenses of the funeral ceremonies also with the latter's consent. The internal evidence in the document would therefore indicate that the gift deed itself was executed with the concurrence of Valli Ammal. 5. In the cancellation deed Ext. B executed by Pichu Ammal after the death of Valli Ammal, it was nowhere state that Ext. A gift deed had not come into operation because Valli Ammal had not accepted the same. Pichu Ammal had also no case in Ext. B that Ext. A was executed due to fraud or misrepresentation. The execution of a gift deed in a small village like Erachakulam would be known to all the parties in the locality. There was a car brought to the village to take Pichu Ammal to the Sub Registrar's Office, Nagercoil, which is four miles away from Erachakulam. One of the attestors to the gift deed was one Krishna Iyer Ganapathi Iyer who was mentioned to be one of the trustees of the Brahmin trust at Erachakulam. Another witness who is D.W.1 is also a resident of Erachakulam. One of the attestors to the gift deed was one Krishna Iyer Ganapathi Iyer who was mentioned to be one of the trustees of the Brahmin trust at Erachakulam. Another witness who is D.W.1 is also a resident of Erachakulam. But he is of a different caste. The execution of Ext. A was therefore with the full knowledge of the villagers. Ordinarily, such a gift deed would be executed after due deliberation and with the concurrence of the persons benefited by the gift. In this case, there is the evidence of D.Ws.1, 3 and 4 to show that Valli Ammal had accepted the gift deed. D.W.1 is an attestor to Ext. A. He was also examined as an identifying witness before the Sub-Registrar. He stated that the parties returned to Erachakulam from Nagercoil by about 8 P.M. with Ext. A and that Pichu Ammal then handed over the gift deed to Valli Ammal who placed it in a trunk which was inside the dwelling house. No doubt, it would appear that there was some sort of artificiality in the part said to have been played by Valli Ammal. But the evidence was clear to show that after registration of the gift deed, D.W.1 and others returned to Pichu Ammal's house at Erachakulam where Valli Ammal was present with her minor children. That was what Valli Ammal's husband also deposed as D.W. 4. There is the further fact that Valli Ammal's husband had accompanied Pichu Ammal to the Sub-Registrar's Office for the purpose of rendering the necessary help to Pichu Ammal to execute the gift deed. If Valli Ammal had not accepted the gift, there would have been no occasion for D.W. 4 to go to the Sub-Registrar's Office. The gift itself was for 91 cents of paddy land, and in view of the poor circumstances of Valli Ammal, her husband and children would have been only too glad to accept the gift by the mere mention of it. 6. D.W. 3 was the Pakuthy Accountant at Erachakulam for three years from 1115. There was provision made in Ext. A to make mutation of names in the revenue records in favour of Valli Ammal. Ext. L, copy of A form prepared in connection therewith, would show that within one month of Ext. A, mutation of names has been effected in the revenue records in the name of Valli Ammal. There was provision made in Ext. A to make mutation of names in the revenue records in favour of Valli Ammal. Ext. L, copy of A form prepared in connection therewith, would show that within one month of Ext. A, mutation of names has been effected in the revenue records in the name of Valli Ammal. D.W. 3 would say that he had gone to Pichu Ammal's house at Erachakulam to ask her about the transfer of registry of names, that Valli Ammal was also in that house at that time, that the gift deed in the house was shown to him by Valli Ammal and that Pichu Ammal and Valli Ammal had agreed to the transfer of registry of names. The witness stated that though the proceedings relating to the transfer of registry were undisputed, yet it was the practice to ascertain from the executant of the document her views in the matter. There was no enmity between D.W. 3 and the plaintiff. It was seen that in Medom 1117, the plaintiff had taken Ext. D lease deed from P.W.1 in the handwriting of this D.W. 3. There can therefore be no doubt that the plaintiff and D.W. 3 were then on friendly terms. Nothing had been suggested to show that the relationship between D.W. 3 and the plaintiff got estranged after the date of Ext. D The learned Munsiff who had examined the witness in this case had believed D.Ww.1, 3 and 4 regarding the acceptance of Ext. A by the donee. Though there were some embellishments in the evidence given by D.Ww.1 and 3 as to what transpired after Pichu Ammal returned from the Sub Registrar's Office, there does not appear to be any objection in accepting their statement that Valli Ammal and her children were in Erachakulam in Pichu Ammal's house at that time. The evidence and circumstances mentioned above would lead to the conclusion that Valli Ammal had accepted the gift deed and that the finding of the learned Munsiff on this question has to be accepted. It has therefore to be held that Ext. A is a valid document and that it had come into force. 7. The respondent's learned Advocate then argued that Ext. A was only a revocable instrument for its validity depended upon the performance of certain services mentioned in the document. It has therefore to be held that Ext. A is a valid document and that it had come into force. 7. The respondent's learned Advocate then argued that Ext. A was only a revocable instrument for its validity depended upon the performance of certain services mentioned in the document. He stated that Valli Ammal was to render services to Pichu Ammal and to meet the expenses in connection with Pichu Ammal's funeral ceremonies. These directions appeared after the operative portion of the document for it was stated at first, that in consideration of love and affection the donor had to the donee, and for the well being of the donee the properties were being gifted. The donee was also asked to enjoy the properties and effect mutation of name. The gift was therefore complete. It was then that the other clauses providing for the expenses in connection with the donor's funeral ceremonies and for the services expected from the donee were introduced. These are only pious wishes after the operative portion of the gift deed. Samuel v. Ohsmensa 2 T.L.J. 105 and Yesuvadiyan v. Kanthaswami Nadan 23 T.L.J. 637 would support this position. When there is an out and out transfer followed by a direction to the donees to maintain the donors the latter direction is only a pious wish. On the other hand, if the gift deed starts with a statement that it is made with the object of providing for the maintenance of the donors, and this statement is followed by the operative clause, there can be no doubt that the gift is subject to the liability to maintain the donors. In this case the two directions mentioned above were after the operative portion in the gift deed as in 2 T.L.J. 105. This will not give any right to the donor to revoke the gift if the conditions were not observed. The first condition to meet the expenses of the funeral ceremonies of Pichu Ammal was a contingency that would arise only after Pichu Ammal's death so that the non-performance of that direction could not in any way affect the validity of the gift deed. This contention of the respondent has therefore to be repelled. The plaintiff is therefore not entitled to the relief claimed by him in the plaint. The suit has therefore to be dismissed with costs in all the courts. This contention of the respondent has therefore to be repelled. The plaintiff is therefore not entitled to the relief claimed by him in the plaint. The suit has therefore to be dismissed with costs in all the courts. This appeal is therefore allowed. 8. But another matter that has incidentally arisen in the case has to be mentioned and provided for. Valli Ammal's legal representatives would get the right to take the yield from the properties only after the death of Pichu Ammal. Pichu Ammal died on 23.9.1117. Till then she was in possession of the properties. But by the end of 1116 she had executed Ext. E to the plaintiff transferring her right over the properties. Naturally therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to be in possession of the properties till her death. The unregistered lease deed Ext. D also would show that at least from Meenom 1117 the plaintiff had entered into possession of the plaint properties. While he was thus in possession, a receiver had been appointed for the properties. The trial court directed the receiver to hand over the properties to the defendants, whereas, the lower appellate court reversed that direction and gave possession to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also has obtained possession from the receiver. Though he is not entitled to be in possession, he cannot be ousted from possession in this suit. That is not to be the case as regards the money in court deposited by the receiver. The defendants are the rightful persons to the properties as well as to the profits arising therefrom. So the money in court will be paid to the defendants. They will have to file a suit for possession of the properties with arrears of profits, excluding the sum they are allowed to draw from court. This will be the direction as regards the money held in deposit in court. Allowed. Koshi, J. 1A. I agree that this second appeal should be allowed and the plaintiff's suit dismissed with costs in all the courts. At the same time I desire to add a few words of my own. 2A. An incomplete gift can be revoked at any time. The main question in the case therefore is whether the gift evidenced by Ext. A had become complete by Valliammal accepting it. At the same time I desire to add a few words of my own. 2A. An incomplete gift can be revoked at any time. The main question in the case therefore is whether the gift evidenced by Ext. A had become complete by Valliammal accepting it. The further point raised that Pichuammal, the donor, could have revoked it even after acceptance by the donee, is to my mind not at all tenable. Reading the gift deed as a whole it appears to me that the true intention of the donor was to effect a transfer in presenti of the proprietory interest in the property and to vest the same in the donee, with a reservation of the right to enjoy the usufruct during her own life time. The whole interest in the property was intended to be vested in the donee immediately and the donor reserved for herself no power of disposal over it. The only right that was reserved to her was to enjoy the profits thereof. There is an immediate gift of the property, but the enjoyment by the donee of its profits was postponed till after the death of the donor. A gift of this character is recognised as valid under Hindu Law. See Lallu Singh v. Gur Narain A.I.R. 1992 All. 467 F.B. To quote from Mulla's Transfer of Property Act (3rd Edn.1949 p. 758). "A gift may be revocable by being subject to a condition subsequent; or it may be contingent so that there is no gift at all, unless a condition precedent is fulfilled. But the condition cannot depend upon the will of the donor, for a gift revocable at pleasure is no gift at all." Ext. A does not impose any condition precedent for the gift to take effect nor does it contain any defeasance clause. Reference may usefully be made here to certain passages in Mayne's Hindu Law and Usage (Eleventh Edn.1950). At pp. 868-869 it is seen stated: "A gift can be made in favour of a person so as to take effect on the happening of specified uncertain event or if a specified uncertain event shall not happen. In such a case, the donee acquires only a contingent interest which becomes a vested interest on the happening of the event in the one case, or when it becomes impossible in the other. In such a case, the donee acquires only a contingent interest which becomes a vested interest on the happening of the event in the one case, or when it becomes impossible in the other. A gift can be made in favour of a person with the condition superadded that if a specified uncertain event happens, the interest shall pass to another person, or that if a specified uncertain event does not happen such interest shall pass to another person ...................... 3A. The next S.735 proceeds to state: "A gift is revocable only when there is a condition authorising it, or on the grounds of coercion, fraud or undue influence. If a man will improvidently bind himself up by a voluntary deed, and not reserve a liberty to himself by a power of revocation, a court of Equity will not loose the fetters he has put upon himself, but he must lie down under his own folly." The second sentence of the S. (735) is from Lord Nottingam's Judgment in Villers v. Beamont - White & Tuder's Leading Cases, 6th Edn. p. 353 and is often referred to in text books and decided cases a laying down a test to determine whether a particular gift is revocable or not. The law appears to be well settled that when once the gift becomes complete it cannot be revoked unless there is an express reservation in that behalf in the deed of gift itself. The mention in Ext. A that Valli Ammal should took after the donor in her old age and that she should meet the donor's funeral expenses etc. cannot be taken to be directions amounting to an obligation, they are merely an expression of the donor's wishes and belief. They come after the dispositive words contained in the earlier part of the document which are absolute in terms. A Madras decision reported as Ankamma v. Narasayya (1946) 2 M.L.J. 357 may with advantage be referred to here. For the present purpose it would suffice to quote the relevant portion of the head note. "A donor by a deed of gift conveyed to the donee the suit properties and the relevant words in the deed were to this effect. "I have a belief that you would maintain me well during my life time. And as I bear affection towards you, I have got the idea of conveying my property to you. "A donor by a deed of gift conveyed to the donee the suit properties and the relevant words in the deed were to this effect. "I have a belief that you would maintain me well during my life time. And as I bear affection towards you, I have got the idea of conveying my property to you. Therefore I have conveyed to you under dhakal the property worth Rs. 800". By a later document, he revoked the same and some years later sold the suit properties to the appellant. The donee in his turn sold the same properties to the plaintiff. In a suit by the plaintiff for a declaration of his right under the sale to him and for possession it was contended that the gift deed was conditional and that the donor was entitled to revoke it when the condition was not fulfilled and that therefore the revocation was valid and the donor had the right to transfer the properties to the appellant. Held: that the gift deed was valid, that it was not conditional but absolute, that it was intended to be given effect to and had been actually acted upon and therefore the revocation by the later deed was not valid and operative." 4A. In the view of the law set out in the preceding paras Ext. B, the cancellation deed, or the subsequent gift to the plaintiff cannot be of any avail to the plaintiff if the gift under Ext. A had become a completed one during Valli Ammal's lifetime. The trial court was of the view that the evidence that the gift deed (Ext. A) was handed over to Valli Ammal on the same day as it was executed and registered was worthy of credence. The appellate court, however, took a different view regarding that evidence and reversed the trial court's judgment and decree. I am unable to place any reliance on the testimony of D.W. 1, D.W. 2 or D.W. 4 when they say that there was any such formal handing over of the document to the donee. The appellate court, however, took a different view regarding that evidence and reversed the trial court's judgment and decree. I am unable to place any reliance on the testimony of D.W. 1, D.W. 2 or D.W. 4 when they say that there was any such formal handing over of the document to the donee. For one thing, even though the plaint set out in clear language that the gift deed had throughout remained in the possession of the donor herself, the written statement filed in the case on behalf of the defendants by no less a person than D.W. 4 their father, makes no mention of the delivery of the document though that was sought to be made the central fact at the stage of evidence. I have carefully read the testimony of these three witnesses and I am in full agreement with the lower appellate court that no reliance can be placed on their evidence. The whole episode of the gift deed changing hands looks unnatural and artificial. That however does not mean that the court cannot infer from the facts and circumstances of the case an acceptance by Valli Ammal of the gift. 5A. The rule of pure Hindu Mitaksahra law as to acceptance of a gift is not different from that laid down by the Transfer of Property Act. See Mulla's Transfer of Property Act p. 749 and 750 under head "Acceptance" and "Hindu law" Mulla's commentaries to S. 122 of the Transfer of Property Act (pp. 749 and 750) and Mayne's Hindu law and Usage pp. 862 and 863 show that an acceptance may be either express or implied. An acceptance can be inferred from the facts and surrounding circumstances attending a transaction of gift. Here I quote the following from a decision of Sulaiman and Young,JJ. (as they then were) reported as Mt. Annandi Devi v. Mohanlal A.I.R. 1932 All. 444. The Judgment was pronounced by Young, J. "We accept the findings of the learned judge as regards the value to be attached to the oral evidence called on behalf of the plff. and his finding that an express acceptance by Mt. Kapuri (donee) has not been proved. The learned judge however merely finds acceptance not proved because he disbelieves the actual case set up by the plff. as regards express acceptance. and his finding that an express acceptance by Mt. Kapuri (donee) has not been proved. The learned judge however merely finds acceptance not proved because he disbelieves the actual case set up by the plff. as regards express acceptance. He never directed his mind to the vital question as to whether there was proof of acceptance within the meaning of S. 3 Evidence Act. It has been argued here by counsel for the respondents that the only acceptance under S. 122, T.P. Act, contemplated by that section is an express acceptance. We however do not find anything in the section to limit acceptance to an express acceptance, and we must take it that acceptance may be either express or implied. As the learned judge has not considered the question of an implied acceptance based upon circumstantial evidence at all, we must consider it." The learned judge then proceeds to show that the rule of English law which presumes acceptance of a gift was not applicable to India and concludes that part of the discussion by stating that there is no difficulty in reading into S. 122 T.P. Act that the acceptance may either be express or implied. A few observation made in discussing the evidence in that case is also worthy of notice. At page 445 Col. 2 the following passage occurs: "Further, the deed of gift was witnessed by four witnesses, two of them actually resident in the village of Karauli itself. There must have been publicity of the deed of gift we think that apart from what we have said above knowledge of the deed of gift must, in all probability have come to the wife. The husband proceeded immediately to apply for mutation. In the ordinary course proclamation was made in the village of the intended change of names. This therefore must have been known to the inhabitants of the village and again we think that knowledge of this must, in all probability, have come to the wife. A few days later Mohan Lal (donor) filed the deed of gift itself in the Revenue court." 6A. In the case in hand Pichu Ammal executed Ext. A when she was over 75 years of age. She was a childless widow and had considerable properties. Valliammal was her deceased brother's grand daughter and was in really indigent circumstances. She had a large family too. In the case in hand Pichu Ammal executed Ext. A when she was over 75 years of age. She was a childless widow and had considerable properties. Valliammal was her deceased brother's grand daughter and was in really indigent circumstances. She had a large family too. Admittedly she did not come in the line of heirs to Pichu Ammal. In these circumstances the probability is that Pichu Ammal must have taken Valliammal and her husband into confidence regarding this gift. Though I cannot believe D.W. 4 when he speaks to a handing over of the gift deed to Valliammal there is no reason to disbelieve him when he states that he accompanied Pichu Ammal to the Registration office and assisted her to get the document written, executed and registered. That would not have been the case if Valliammal or the witness did not assent to the gift being made. It is impossible to believe that Valliammal never knew anything about the proposal or for that matter about the gift itself. For Pichuammal to have kept the information back from Valliammal served no other purpose than to defeat her own ends. Regard being had to her circumstances Valliammal would only have accepted the gift gladly. The thought of cancellation occurs to Pichuammal only some months after Valliammal died. The contents of Ext. B clearly show that it is a case of her being made to become wise when it was too late. I am therefore in full agreement with my learned brother in holding that Valliammal had actually accepted the gift and thus made it a completed transaction. 7A. The inference I seek to draw from the facts and surrounding circumstances is reinforced by the testimony of D.W. 3. He is admittedly a friend and confident of the plaintiff as Ext. D would show. He states that both Pitchuammal and Valliammal had spoken to him about the gift while he was attending to his official duties in connection with the transfer of patta to the name of Valliammal. He holds a position in life and there was occasion for him to contact the donor and the donee. I cannot therefore agree with the lower appellate court or accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the witness cannot be relied upon. When his testimony is accepted there is sufficient proof of express acceptance as well. He holds a position in life and there was occasion for him to contact the donor and the donee. I cannot therefore agree with the lower appellate court or accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the witness cannot be relied upon. When his testimony is accepted there is sufficient proof of express acceptance as well. His evidence is that Valliammal also wanted the mutation of names to be effected. With these observations I concur in my learned brother's decision. Allowed.