Judgment :- 1. An interesting question of law is raised in this second appeal and civil revision petition which arise out of the same transaction. Before dealing with it we shall record our views on the merits of the case. In execution of the decree in O.S. 1480/1108 on the file of the District Munsiff of Irinjalakuda three items of properties among others were brought to sale and the sale was duly confirmed. At that stage M.P. 705/1121 was presented by the assignee of the third item who had got herself impleaded in the execution proceedings. This was for setting aside the sale. The sale of the property took place on 27.5.1120. The petition to set aside the sale was filed on 4.3.1121. Prima facie therefore the petition not having been filed within 30 days is barred by limitation. But the contention of the petitioner in the courts below was that the sale was vitiated by fraud and material irregularity. According to her the sale proclamation was not duly published as required by law. She was not given any notice of the sale. On the other hand, by the fraud practiced by the decree holders knowledge of the sale was kept from her. When she came to know about the fraud and the sale, she filed the petition within 30 days of such knowledge. She urged in the courts below that although by the decree the third item was ordered to be sold free of encumbrance and out of the sale proceeds a sum of Rs. 2000 odd was directed to be paid in the first instance to her, this material fact was not disclosed in the sale proclamation. Therefore she pleaded that there was fraud in publishing and conducting the sale. All the three items fetched a price of Rs. 300 at the court sale. Over the third item alone there is now a subsisting encumbrance of about Rs. 3000/-. She contended in the courts below that if this encumbrance had been disclosed in the sale proclamation and if she had obtained notice of the sale she would have come forward to prevent the sale of the third item for any amount less than Rs. 3000/- which was due to her. She could have realised this debt by purchasing the property. 3000/- which was due to her. She could have realised this debt by purchasing the property. It is also contended that the court had inherent jurisdiction to set aside the sale in view of the fact that the price realised by the sale was grossly inadequate. A commissioner was appointed for valuing the third item alone within a year after the sale and his report is that it would be worth Rs. 6000. It was contended that making due provision for rise in the price of immovable property in any event the third item would be worth not less than Rs. 3000. There were very strong contentions which could not be overruled and both the lower courts have found on the evidence placed before them, that a case has been made out for setting aside the sale. The finding of the lower appellate court is that there was material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale and that it is liable to be set aside. 2. The District Munsiff although he arrived at the same conclusion with regard to the validity of the sale, held that the application to set it aside since it was presented more than 30 days after the sale was barred by limitation and for that reason he dismissed it. This finding has been reversed by the lower appellate court. In his judgment, the learned judge does not in so many words say that as a result of the fraud of the decree holders the sale was kept out of the knowledge of the assignee of the third item of property who applied for setting aside the sale. But on reading his judgment, we entertain no doubt that that was the conclusion reached by him. He consequently held that the petitioner who applied for setting aside the sale came to know about the sale only when the amin went to the spot to effect delivery of the third item on 28.2.1121. The petition having been filed on 4.3.1121 was therefore not barred by limitation. 3. The appellant in the second appeal and the petitioners in the Civil Revision Petition are the decree holders who brought the three items to sale and purchased all the three items for the ridiculously low value of Rs. 300/-. The petition having been filed on 4.3.1121 was therefore not barred by limitation. 3. The appellant in the second appeal and the petitioners in the Civil Revision Petition are the decree holders who brought the three items to sale and purchased all the three items for the ridiculously low value of Rs. 300/-. On their behalf the findings of the court below that the sale is vitiated by fraud and material irregularity and that the owner of the third item was prevented from knowing about the sale by the fraud practised by the decree-holders are attacked in second appeal. We have carefully gone through the relevant records and we are satisfied that there is no ground for interference with these findings. 4. On behalf of the appellants, stress is laid upon the finding of the District Munsiff that there was gross negligence or carelessness on the part of the person who wants to have the sale of the third item set aside and that had she exercised reasonable diligence she would have been in a position to know of the defects in time to cure them. This contention found favour with the District Munsiff but the lower appellate court was not inclined to agree. In this connection we should like to refer to the decision of the judicial Committee of the Privy Council reported in A.I.R 1945 PC 67. The view was expressed by their Lordships in this case that when the case falls distinctly under R.90 of 0.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure: "However dilatory and unsatisfactory the conduct of the appellant may have been, he has not on the facts found debarred himself from the right to have the sale set aside". We are referring to this decision incidently because apart from this view the material placed before us discloses that there was no reason to charge the second respondent with negligence or dilatory conduct. 5. There is however another contention urged on behalf of the appellants who are the decree holders and who have purchased the three items of properties which were sold in one single lot. 5. There is however another contention urged on behalf of the appellants who are the decree holders and who have purchased the three items of properties which were sold in one single lot. The order made by the lower appellate court appears on the face of it to imply that the sale of all the three items and not merely of item No. 3 in respect of which a petition was put in for setting aside the sale should be set aside and the sale vacated. On their behalf it is stressed by their learned counsel that the party interested in item 1 and 2 which were also purchased by the decree holders had applied for setting aside the sale of these items and it was finally decided that he was not entitled to that relief. The conditions which should be fulfilled before a court can set aside a sale were not fulfilled in the case of items 1 and 2. The owner of these items is impleaded as respondent to this appeal. He appears by learned counsel. On his behalf it is strenuously contended that since all the three items were sold in one lot, if the sale of item No. 3 is vitiated by fraud and material irregularity, relief cannot be given to the owner of that item alone. The sale must either be set aside in its entirety in respect of all the three items or it must be held to be good in its entirety in respect of all the three items. There cannot according to this argument be any partial relief afforded to the person who is interested in item No. 3 of the properties brought to sale without affording similar relief to the persons interested in items 1 and 2. 6. We must state in the first place that it is not a correct proposition of law to say that when a sale of immovable properties has taken place and properties were all clubbed together at that sale, it is not competent for a court to set aside the sale of one of those items without setting aside the sale of the remaining items. It is enough to refer by way of illustration to a case in which three properties are brought to sale in a single lot in execution of a decree and after sale it is discovered that the judgment debtor had no saleable interest in one of those items. It is open to the purchaser at the sale to apply under 0.21 R.91 of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure (corresponding to O. XXI R. 87 of the Cochin Code of Civil Procedure) to set aside the sale of that particular item. The question however is whether when three properties as in the present case are clubbed together and sold in one lot at a court sale and it is established that there has been fraud or material irregularity in the sale of one of these items, is it incumbent upon the court to set aside the sale of all the three items, the transaction being one and indivisible or can relief be granted to the party who establishes that there was fraud or material irregularity in respect of the item in which he is interested? Speaking broadly we take the view that fundamentally it is only the party who proves that there was fraud or material regularity in the sale of the particular property in which he is interested that can ask for relief. Moreover according to the proviso to R.90 mere proof of fraud or material irregularity will not be sufficient for obtaining relief. It must also be established to the satisfaction of the court that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of the irregularity or fraud. These requirements have been established in the present case only in respect of item No. 3 which was clubbed together with items 1 and 2 and sold for Rs. 300 at the court sale. In respect of items 1 and 2 not only is there no evidence about fraud or material irregularity or consequent substantial injury but the person interested in these items had already brought his grievance to the notice of the court and the application for setting aside the sale of these items has been dismissed. In such circumstances, it would be a travesty of justice being in direct contravention of an express provision of law to set aside the sale of these items also when relief is afforded to the party interested in item No. 3. 7. In such circumstances, it would be a travesty of justice being in direct contravention of an express provision of law to set aside the sale of these items also when relief is afforded to the party interested in item No. 3. 7. The question raised is not novel. It had arisen for consideration in the High Court of Calcutta and the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in two of such cases accords with the conclusion that we have reached on the material placed before us in the present case. The latest decision of the Calcutta High Court which was cited at the Bar is reported in 55 Calcutta Weekly Notes 196 where the facts seem to be very similar to the facts of the present case. It is enough to read the head-note of this decision which pointedly refers to the question of law raised in the present case: "Generally a sale should be set aside or confirmed in its entirety, but this proposition is subject to certain qualifications as for instance, the bar of limitation, res judicata, etc. Where therefore six rules were obtained from the High Court by six judgment-debtors against an order passed on an application by one of them under O.21 R.90 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the entire sale and it was found that of the remaining five judgment-debtors three had made such applications but failed and two had made no such application at all, notwithstanding that a notice under O.21 R. 66 had been served on them and at the time of the present proceedings, such applications were time-barred. Held:- That the sale would be set aside only to the extent of the share of the present applicant under 0.21 R.90 of the Code. That the sale would stand confirmed as regards the shares of the three judgment-debtors whose previous applications had been unsuccessful. That the sale would not be set aside in respect of the shares of the two judgment-debtors who had not up till now made a proper application under O.21 R.90 of the Code for setting aside the sale stating when they had had knowledge of the sale and meeting the bar of limitation. That the sale would not be set aside in respect of the shares of the two judgment-debtors who had not up till now made a proper application under O.21 R.90 of the Code for setting aside the sale stating when they had had knowledge of the sale and meeting the bar of limitation. Moreover, these two judgment-debtors could not come in and get the sale set aside in respect of their shares in view of the provisions of proviso (ii) to O.21 R.90 of the Code". A similar decision is reported in 41 Calcutta Weekly Notes 224. In that case also some of the judgment-debtors applied for setting aside a sale under O.21 R.90. Their application was dismissed. Subsequently an application made by another judgment-debtor was allowed and the view taken by the court was that the entire sale should not be set aside. It should stand confirmed as regards the share and interest of the judgment debtors whose application had previously failed. The Madras High Court has also taken a similar view in the case reported in ILR 59 Mad. 438. In that case a contention was urged that in a case like the present it is wrong to set aside the sale in part and confirm it in part. That contention was based upon the case reported in I.L.R. 12 Patna 181. But the learned judges of the Madras High Court were not prepared to accept the view which was in contravention of the provisions of O.21 R.90. We should in this connection refer also to two other decisions of the Calcutta High Court which are relied on by the learned counsel for the party interested in items 1 and 2 that were sold. They are AIR 1920 Cal. 349 and AIR 1945 Cal. 434. The court held in both these cases that a sale which is affected by the defects mentioned in R.90 of O.21 cannot be set aside in part where the sale was a single sale and not a sale of properties in different lots. With respect we are not prepared to accept the divergent view expressed in these cases. 8. 434. The court held in both these cases that a sale which is affected by the defects mentioned in R.90 of O.21 cannot be set aside in part where the sale was a single sale and not a sale of properties in different lots. With respect we are not prepared to accept the divergent view expressed in these cases. 8. In the result in the second appeal and the civil revision petition we hold that the sale that is vitiated by fraud and material irregularity and which has resulted in substantial loss to the owner in the sale of item No. 3 in the list of properties that were put up for sale and it is only the sale of item No. 3 that can be set aside and not the sale of items 1 and 2 with regard to which a futile attempt was made to avoid the sale by the owner at a previous stage of the proceedings. The second appeal must be dismissed with costs in respect of item No. 3 and allowed in respect of item Nos.1 and 2. The Civil Revision Petition must also be allowed in respect of items 1 and 2. We must mention here that the only person who is injuriously affected by the partial setting aside of the sale is the decree-holder who has purchased all these three items for Rs. 300/-. On his behalf his learned counsel says that he would adhere to the bargain so far as the consideration is concerned, although he is deprived of item No. 3 which was included in the sale. Therefore no directions are necessary in respect of the price of Rs. 300/- paid by the decree-holder purchaser which will be regarded by his consent as the price for items 1 and 2, the sale of which has not been interfered with in this second appeal and Civil Revision Petition. The next question relates to the costs to be awarded to the parties. The first respondent in the second appeal is the person who put forward a contention in respect of item No. 3 sold at the court sale and which has been accepted by us. Therefore the first respondent is entitled to her costs of the second appeal from the appellant. Since the second respondent's contentions have not been accepted in second appeal he shall pay costs to the appellant. Therefore the first respondent is entitled to her costs of the second appeal from the appellant. Since the second respondent's contentions have not been accepted in second appeal he shall pay costs to the appellant. In the Civil Revision Petition the respondent shall pay the petitioner's costs.