ORDER The facts of the case are simple and are not in dispute. The applicant-firm is a dealer in bidis, having its head office in Mathura in U.P. and its branch office in Sagar, where bidis are manufactured. The branch office is a dealer registered under our Sales Tax Act (hereafter generally referred to as the Act or our Act) and his grievance in theses proceedings is that the Sales Tax Commissioner has declined to deduct a sum of Rs. 82,114-7-6 from the taxable turnover for the period of assessment 1st June, 1947, to 12th November, 1947, (in fact, the very first quarter after the coming into force of the Act). The deduction was claimed on the ground that sales of bidis of this value were not effected by the dealer at all, much less were they effected in this Province (as it then was). The technique of the firm's operations is that the head office at Mathura receives and accepts orders from customers outside the Province and instructs the branch office at Sagar to consign goods, as per orders received, to the customers' stations, but all addressed to self. The branch office carries out instructions and sends bills prepared at cost price (including, of course, packing and similar charges) along with the relative railway receipts to the head office. The head office prepares bills for payment to customers (adding profit and other charges to the cost price bills received) as per terms agreed upon and sends the bills along with the railway receipts to customers through a bank or by V.P.P. 2. On these facts, it is contended on behalf of the applicant that (a) the property in the goods remains with the firm until the railway receipt is accepted by the customer, which acceptance takes place outside the Province, (b) the transfer of property in the goods or the sale of bidis thus takes place outside the Province, (c) the Act provides for a levy of tax only on the sale of goods in the Central Provinces and Berar, and (d) the sales in dispute are not, therefore, liable to taxation under the Act. 3. In rejecting this contention, the Sales Tax Commissioner relied wholly on Explanation II to Section 2(g) of the Act. 3. In rejecting this contention, the Sales Tax Commissioner relied wholly on Explanation II to Section 2(g) of the Act. This Explanation II, around which learned counsel on both sides have built up their respective cases with erudite arguments and great ability, deserves to be reproduced :- "Explanation II - Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the sale of any goods which are actually in the Central Provinces and Berar at the time when the contract of sale as defined in that Act in respect thereof is made, shall, wherever the said contract of sale is made, be deemed for the purpose of this Act to have taken place in the Central Provinces and Berar." (This is the text of the Explanation as it stood when the Act was first passed and as it was in force during the period of assessment to which this case relates. It has undergone amendments subsequently). The plain meaning of the Explanation would appear to be somewhat as follows :- A sale which may not have taken place in the Central Provinces and Berar is deemed to have taken place in the Central Provinces and Berar, provided that the goods which are the subject-matter of the said sale are actually in the Central Provinces and Berar, when the contract of sale concerning them is made, even if the said contract of sale is made outside the Central Provinces and Berar. 4. Adopting this plain meaning, the Sales Tax Commissioner has held that (a) though the contract of sale was made outside the Province and the actual transfer of property in the goods also took place outside the Province, (b) the sale should be deemed to have taken place in the Province, as the goods were in the province at the time the contract of sale was made. 5. On behalf of the applicant, it has been suggested that such an interpretation of Explanation II is not tenable. A mere legal fiction, such as is sought to be created by the use of the words "deemed to have taken place" cannot alter the fact that the transfer of property in the goods has taken place outside the Province and that the sales, therefore, have not taken place within the Province. A mere legal fiction, such as is sought to be created by the use of the words "deemed to have taken place" cannot alter the fact that the transfer of property in the goods has taken place outside the Province and that the sales, therefore, have not taken place within the Province. The preamble to the Act itself, the argument continues, provides for "the levy of a tax on the sale of goods in the Central Provinces and Berar" and, in fact, the Legislature of the Central Provinces and Berar was not competent to levy any tax on sales outside the territory for which it was competent to make laws, namely, the Province itself. The general presumption being that a legislature does not intend to exceed its territorial or other jurisdiction, it has been urged that unless Explanation II to Section 2(g) is to be held ultra vires the Provincial Legislature the only meaning that could be read into it would be somewhat as follows :- "If the transfer of property in the goods takes place in C.P. and Berar, the fact that the contract of sale was made elsewhere would not matter - provided the goods were in province when the contract of sale was made." According to this reading, it would appear prima facie that there was no need for introducing the Explanation because, even without it, it should be obvious that a transfer of property in goods that has actually taken place in the Province is a sale in the Province within the meaning of Section 2(g) becoming automatically subject to the taxing provisions of the Act. But if we discard this reading and adopt the plain meaning suggested earlier, we shall have to consider the alternative argument that Explanation II is ultra vires the Provincial Legislature. 6. The first question that arises in this connection is whether the Board of Revenue is competent to declare Explanation II ultra vires the Provincial Legislature, while exercising the appellate or revisional powers conferred upon it by the Act. The learned Counsel for the State is of the opinion that the law in this matter is not settled. One view, he says, is that a provision that is ultra vires is no law at all and whosoever acts under it does so at his peril. The learned Counsel for the State is of the opinion that the law in this matter is not settled. One view, he says, is that a provision that is ultra vires is no law at all and whosoever acts under it does so at his peril. Another view is that a tribunal, while exercising powers specially conferred on it by a particular law, is not competent to declare any part of that law ultra vires. The applicant's learned counsel, on the other hand, is very definite about the legal position. The question whether any part of a law is ultra vires or not can, according to his, be raised only before Courts to which functions and powers have been assigned under the law, and these Courts are competent to decide the question. In support of his view he has relied on a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a case arising out of the Income-tax Act : Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor-General in Council ([1947] 15 I.T.R. 332; A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 78.). Section 67 of the Income-tax Act, which bars the jurisdiction of civil Courts in the matter of setting aside or modifying any assessment under the Income-tax Act, was under consideration and their Lordships ruled as follows :- "....... it is clear that the Income-tax Act, 1922 ....... did give the assessee the right effectively to raise in relation to an assessment made on him the question whether or not a provision in the Act was ultra vires. Under Section 30, an assessee whose only ground of complaint was that effect had been given in the assessment to a provision which he contended was ultra vires might appeal against the assessment. If he were dissatisfied with the decision on appeal ............... the assessee could ask for a case to be stated on any question of law for the opinion of the High Court and, if his request were refused, he might apply to the High Court for an order requiring a case to be stated and to be referred to the High Court. It cannot be doubted that included in the questions of law which might be raised by a case stated is any question as to validity of any taxing provision in the Income-tax Act to which effect has been given in the assessment under review ....... It cannot be doubted that included in the questions of law which might be raised by a case stated is any question as to validity of any taxing provision in the Income-tax Act to which effect has been given in the assessment under review ....... Effective and appropriate machinery is therefore provided by the Act itself for the review on grounds of law of any assessment. It is in that setting that Section 67 has to be construed." 7. Now Section 21 of our Sales Tax Act is analogous to Section 67 of the Income-tax Act in barring the jurisdiction of civil Courts. Section 22 of our Act provides for appeal revision to the Sales Tax Commissioner and the Board of Revenue; and Section 23 contains provisions analogous to those contained in Section 66 of the Income-tax Act on the subject of statement of case to the High Court. Thus, on the authority of the ruling cited, it may be said that our Sales Tax Act also contains machinery which enables an assessee effectively to raise the question whether or not a particular provision of the Act bearing on the assessment made upon him is ultra vires and the civil Court's jurisdiction being barred in this matter, that machinery itself should be employed in getting a decision on such a question. The contention is, therefore, correct that the Board of Revenue can entertain the question whether Explanation II is ultra vires the Provincial Legislature. 8. The contention is, therefore, correct that the Board of Revenue can entertain the question whether Explanation II is ultra vires the Provincial Legislature. 8. The case for the applicant on this question would appear to be as follows :- (a) Under Section 99(1) and Section 100(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, (which was in force when the Sales Tax Act was passed by the Provincial Legislature) read with item 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, the Provincial Legislature was competent to levy a tax on the sale of goods effected only within the Province; (b) a sale, where the transfer of property in goods takes place outside the Province, cannot in any sense be construed as a sale effected within the Province, simply for the reason that the goods were in the Province when the contract of sale was made; and (c) if the position were otherwise than as stated in (b) above, the tax levied would be not on the transaction of sale, but on the goods themselves; it will then cease to be a tax on sales and will become a duty of excise, the levy of which is within the sole competence of Central Government under Section 99(1) and Section 100(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, read with item 45 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to that Act. 9. Before considering the reply given on behalf of the State, I might as well deal with the ingenious attempt made by the State's learned counsel to show that, in some instances at least, if not all, the transfer of property must be considered as actually having taken place in this Province. The applicant's learned counsel has rightly stated that no order, which a customer outside the Province places with the head office at Mathura, could be with reference to ascertained goods and the mere fact of receipt and acceptance of the order could not be constructed, as though transfer of property has taken place. In fact, the orders placed might well have reference not only to unascertained goods but also, in some instances, to future goods, which at the time of receipt and acceptance of the orders are in the shape of raw materials from which the finished product - the bidis - have yet to be manufactured. In fact, the orders placed might well have reference not only to unascertained goods but also, in some instances, to future goods, which at the time of receipt and acceptance of the orders are in the shape of raw materials from which the finished product - the bidis - have yet to be manufactured. In explaining the general scheme of the Act, the learned counsel for the Sate has suggested that the State's intention was to levy the tax only once, in the series of transactions beginning with the purchase of raw materials by the manufacturer and the purchase of the finished product by the ultimate consumer. He suggests, therefore, that the tax is levied not on the occasion of every sale in these series of transactions but only when the transfer of property in the finished product takes place. By way of illustration, he points out that no tax is levied when a dealer in raw materials sells them to the dealer-manufacturer (provided, of course, the latter is a "registered dealer"). Developing this argument, he suggests that, in a case like the one before us, the transfer of property in the finished product should be considered as synonymous and synchronising with the transformation of property (raw materials) into the finished product (bidis) - Such transformation being purposely made for passing on the finished product to the ultimate consumer. If this argument prevails, the transformation of property having taken place at Sagar within this Province, the transfer of property or the sale will also have taken place within the Province and the bottom will thus be knocked out of the argument that sales outside the Province have been taxed. The argument, as already stated, is undoubtedly ingenious and extremely interesting; but the metaphysical conception it involves in construing a certain processing of goods or their mere physical transformation as the transfer of property in them seems to me rather too far-fetched for the practical business of every-day life. I would, therefore, discard the implications, of this argument and hold that in this case the transfer of property or the sale in each instance has taken place outside the Province. 10. I would, therefore, discard the implications, of this argument and hold that in this case the transfer of property or the sale in each instance has taken place outside the Province. 10. When that much is accepted, the case for the State would appear to be as follows :- (a) Assuming that there is an extra-territorial element in Explanation II such extra-territorial legislation is not altogether barred; (b) the levy of a tax on sales is only one thing that the Sales Tax Act does; it does other things besides, and, in particular, it substantially modifies the Sale of Goods Act; in doing so the Legislature has exercised its powers under Section 99(1) and Section 100(2) of the Government of India Act read with item 10 in List III of the Seventh Schedule; (c) in so modifying the Sale of Goods Act, the assent of the Governor-General has been taken under Section 107(2) of the Government of India Act; and consequently, even where a provision in the Sales Tax Act is repugnant to an analogous provision in the Sale of Goods Act, the former prevails, so far as this Province is concerned; (d) the tax is not an excise duty; it is levied not on goods, but is collected from "dealers" as defined in the Act on the turnover of their sales. 11. The first question that may be considered is whether, in the circumstances of this case, where the tax is levied on the strength of Explanation II it ceases to be a sales tax and becomes an excise duty. Much learned argument has been employed on this question not only in this case but also in certain others which were heard at the same time. Three distinct aspects of the case have been presented, namely, that a sales tax can be a tax (a) only on transactions of sales, (b) only on persons carrying on the business of selling, i.e., "dealers" as defined in the Act, and (c) only on goods subjected to sales. The implication of the argument based on (a) is that the moment the tax ceases to be a tax on transactions of sales, it also ceases to be a sales tax and becomes an excise duty. Similarly, the implication of the argument based on (c) is that the tax at the very outset is an excise duty. 12. The implication of the argument based on (a) is that the moment the tax ceases to be a tax on transactions of sales, it also ceases to be a sales tax and becomes an excise duty. Similarly, the implication of the argument based on (c) is that the tax at the very outset is an excise duty. 12. The subject is apparently one of extraordinary interest and would have called for rather elaborate treatment had it not already received a great deal of expert attention from competent authorities. The Board has before it, however, the decisions of (a) the Federal Court in In re Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 ([1939] 1 S.T.C. 1; A.I.R. 1939 F.C. 1.); (b) the Federal Court in the Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna & Sons ([1942] 1 S.T.C. 104; A.I.R. 1942 F.C. 33.) (c) the Privy Council in Governor-General in Council v. The Province of Madras ([1945] 1 S.T.C. 135; A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 98) arising mostly out of (b) above. It is hardly necessary to quote at length from these most illuminating judgments which contain a full discussion on the nature of taxes on sales vis-a-vis duties of excise. The following, however, from the judgment of the Privy Council in the last-mentioned case deserves reproduction, as it clinches the whole issue :- "....... A duty of excise is primarily a duty levied upon a manufacturer or producer in respect of the commodity manufactured or produced. It is a tax upon goods not upon sales or the proceeds of sale of goods ..... The two taxes, the one levied upon the manufacturer in respect of his goods, the other upon a vendor in respect of his sales ..... are separate and distinct imposts." In other words, in the Privy Council's view, a sales tax as well as an excise duty is a tax on persons - upon a vendor in respect of his sales and upon a manufacturer in respect of his goods respectively. With great respect to their Lordships of the Privy Council, I would carry forward the harmonising or integrating process indicated in their decision and would say that all taxes are taxes on persons in respect of certain of their activities, actions or transactions concerning certain goods or other property. With great respect to their Lordships of the Privy Council, I would carry forward the harmonising or integrating process indicated in their decision and would say that all taxes are taxes on persons in respect of certain of their activities, actions or transactions concerning certain goods or other property. Thus, an income-tax would be a tax on persons in respect of their activity of making money or earning incomes from certain sources. An excise duty would be a tax on persons in respect of the manufacture or production by them of certain goods. And a sales tax would be a tax on persons in respect of their transactions of sales of certain goods. Considered in this light, there can be little doubt that what has been levied in this case is a sales tax and not an excise duty. And therefore, so far as the lists of subjects for legislation are concerned, the Provincial Legislature has not exceeded its jurisdiction in the matter of the Sales Tax Act. 13. We come next to the question whether, in enacting Explanation II to Section 2(g), the Provincial Legislature has exceeded its territorial jurisdiction and, if so, whether it was competent to do so. In this connection, the use of an expression involving the word "deemed" seems to leave little room for doubt. If there was any doubt, that must be considered as having been set at rest by the observations of Bose, J., in Gopal v. Shamrao ([1941] I.L.R. 1941 Nag. 54, 83.). When the Explanation says certain sales should "be deemed for the purpose of this Act to have taken place in the Central Provinces and Berar", the obvious inference is that they have not in reality taken place in that territory. The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that there is in this Explanation an element of extra-territoriality. But, will the existence of this element make the Act, in so far as it relates to sales that have in reality taken place outside the Province, invalid or ultra vires the Provincial Legislature ? That is the question to which we have now to turn our attention. 14. Now, the legislation of a country (or, in the present context, of an administrative and legislative unit like a Province under the Government of India Act, 1935) is primarily territorial. (Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, Section 1, Chapter VI). That is the question to which we have now to turn our attention. 14. Now, the legislation of a country (or, in the present context, of an administrative and legislative unit like a Province under the Government of India Act, 1935) is primarily territorial. (Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, Section 1, Chapter VI). But there does not appear to be any absolute bar to extra-territorial legislation. To quote this authority again, "an intention that a statute shall have extra territorial operation may be readily collected from the nature of the enactment." In the case of our Sales Tax Act, an intention of this kind is discernible in Explanation II. The applicant's learned counsel agrees that in the abstract a legislature can legislate extra-territorially. In his view, however, there is nothing to suggest that the Legislature has done so in this case (apart from the fact that he feels that it was not free to do so). He contends, with considerable force, that an Explanation cannot enlarge the scope of the original section nor can it override its provisions. This is, of course, clear from the observations in the case cited (Kishan Singh v. Prem Singh ([1940] I.L.R. 1940 Lah. 223, 230.), even if an authority were necessary for a proposition of this kind. But the other authority cited, which concerns the nature of a proviso, does not appear to me equally apposite. "The proper function of a proviso (it has been stated in Madras & Southern Mahratta Railway Co. Ltd. v. Bezwada Municipality ([1944] A.I.R. 1944 P.C. 71, 73.) is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case. Where ..... the language of the main enactment is clear and unambiguous, a proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it by implication what clearly falls within its express terms." But an explanation is different in nature from a proviso, where the latter excepts, excludes or restricts, the former explains or clarifies. Such explanation or clarification may be in respect of matters whose meaning is implicit and not explicit in the main section itself. The question for consideration is whether the Explanation in the case before us has exceeded its proper function and has overridden the provisions of the section itself. Such explanation or clarification may be in respect of matters whose meaning is implicit and not explicit in the main section itself. The question for consideration is whether the Explanation in the case before us has exceeded its proper function and has overridden the provisions of the section itself. It has been argued on the strength of the preamble of the Act that the intention of the Legislature was to levy a tax on the sale of goods in the Central Provinces and Berar and that, in so far as the Explanation attempts to bring within the scope of the legislation, sales that have not in reality taken place within the Province, it has exceeded its proper function. The preamble, no doubt, "is a good means of finding out the meaning of a statute and, as it were, a key to its understanding." But, to quote Maxwell further in Section 5 of Chapter I - "....... the preamble cannot either restrict or extend the enacting part, when the language and the object and scope of the Act are not open to doubt. It is not unusual to find that the enacting part is not exactly co-extensive with the preamble. In many Acts of Parliament, although a particular mischief is recited, the legislative provisions extend beyond it. The preamble is often no more than a recital of some of the inconveniences, and does not exclude any others for which a remedy is given by the statute. The evil recited is but the motive for legislation; the remedy may both consistently and wisely be extended beyond the cure of that evil, and if on a review of the whole Act a wider intention than that expressed in the preamble appears to be the real one, effect is to be given to it notwithstanding the less extensive import of the preamble." 15. Having regard to these observations, one can say that the preamble to the Act contains only a brief statement of the intention of the Legislature in enacting it. For a proper and a fuller understanding of the intention, it is necessary to study its provisions as a whole. Having regard to these observations, one can say that the preamble to the Act contains only a brief statement of the intention of the Legislature in enacting it. For a proper and a fuller understanding of the intention, it is necessary to study its provisions as a whole. When that study is made, one will find that the intention is to collect from certain classes of dealers, as defined in Section 2(c) read with Section 4, resident in the Province, a tax on the turnover of the sales effected by them of certain classes of goods [vide Sections 2(j), 2(d), 2(g), 6 and 7] situated within the Province, when the contract of sale was made. The intention is thus broader than could be surmised from the preamble itself. If the three elements involved in any kind of taxation to which reference has been made earlier (paragraphs 11 and 12, supra) namely (a) persons from whom the tax is to be collected, (b) the activities, actions or transactions of those persons in respect of which the levy is to be made, and (c) the goods or other property of those persons to be subjected to taxation, the Legislature intended that the persons and the goods were to have actual physical connection with the territory for which it was competent to make laws. It did not apparently consider that the third element need have similar connection with that territory. 16. The question that next arises is whether the Provincial Legislature acted rightly in deciding that, to justify the levy of the tax, it was sufficient, if only two of the three elements involved in taxation of any kind had connection with the territory for which it was competent to make laws. The decisions in the cases mentioned below have been cited by the learned counsel for the State in support of the Legislature : (i) Governor-General in Council v. Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. ([1944] 12 I.T.R. 265; A.I.R. 1944 F.C. 51, 60.) (ii) Wallace Bros. and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City and Bombay Suburban District ([1948] 16 I.T.R. 240; A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 118, 120.), and (iii) A. H. Wadia as Agent of the Gwalior Durbar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay ([1949] 17 I.T.R. 63; A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 18, 25.). Ltd. ([1944] 12 I.T.R. 265; A.I.R. 1944 F.C. 51, 60.) (ii) Wallace Bros. and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City and Bombay Suburban District ([1948] 16 I.T.R. 240; A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 118, 120.), and (iii) A. H. Wadia as Agent of the Gwalior Durbar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay ([1949] 17 I.T.R. 63; A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 18, 25.). All those cases arose out of proceedings under the Income-tax Act; and one of the questions for the decision in them was the validity or otherwise of Section 4 of that Act - Whether that section was ultra vires the Central Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935. That section includes within the expression "total income" certain incomes accruing elsewhere than in British India (as it then was); and though no tax was leviable on incomes accruing out of British India, the total income, of which those incomes were a part, was taken into consideration for determining the rate of taxation. The contention on behalf of the parties aggrieved in the cases cited was that the provision permitting the taking into account of incomes, accruing out of British India, for howsoever limited a purpose was ultra vires the Indian Legislature. That contention did not prevail and the Indian Legislature was held competent to legislate extra-territorially in this matter. The following from the judgment of their Lordship of the Privy Council in the second of the cases cited deserves reproduction :- "There is no rule of law that the territorial limits of a sub-ordinate legislature define the possible scope of its legislative enactments or mark the field open to its vision. The ambit of the powers possessed by a subordinate legislature depends upon the proper construction of the statute conferring those powers. No doubt the enabling statute has to be read against the background that only a defined territory has been committed to the charge of the legislature. Concern by a subordinate legislature with affairs or persons outside its own territory may, therefore, suggest a query whether the legislature is in truth minding its own business. It does not compel the conclusion that it is not. Concern by a subordinate legislature with affairs or persons outside its own territory may, therefore, suggest a query whether the legislature is in truth minding its own business. It does not compel the conclusion that it is not. The enabling statute has to be fairly construed." Again, in his judgment in the third case cited, Kania, C.J., observed as follows :- "Generally, States can legislate effectively only for their own territories, but for purposes of taxation and similar matters, a State makes laws designed to operate beyond its territorial limits." In both the Federal Court's judgments in the cases cited, the following principles suggested by Dixon, J., of the High Court of Australia, have been quoted with approval :- "So long as the statute selected some fact or circumstances which provided some relation or connection with New South Wales and adopted this as the ground of its interference, the validity of an enactment would not be open to challenge. "If a connection exists, it is for the legislature to decide how far it should go in the exercise of its powers. As in other matters of jurisdiction or authority, courts must be exact in distinguishing between ascertaining that the circumstances over which the power extends exist and examining the mode in which the power has been exercised. No doubt there must be some relevance to the circumstances in the exercise of the power. But it is of no importance upon the question of validity that the liability imposed is, or may be, altogether disproportionate to the territorial connection." 17. On behalf of the applicant, it is contended that these decisions dealing with certain provisions of a Central Act like the Income-tax Act can have no application to the problem now posed by a Provincial Act like our Sales Tax Act. The view has also been urged that Section 4 of the Income-tax Act involves no exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction. That Act did not make incomes accruing out of British India assessable to Indian income-tax, but only took them into account for determining the rate of taxation. It has, therefore, been suggested that it could be called extra-territorial, if at all, "only very loosely". 18. The arguments deserve examination and I shall take them in the reverse order. That Act did not make incomes accruing out of British India assessable to Indian income-tax, but only took them into account for determining the rate of taxation. It has, therefore, been suggested that it could be called extra-territorial, if at all, "only very loosely". 18. The arguments deserve examination and I shall take them in the reverse order. It can be conceded, without difficulty, that the element of extra-territoriality involved in our Sales Tax Act is rather more considerable than that involved in the provisions of the Income-tax Act above referred to. But the fact that the latter does involve some element of extra-territoriality cannot be denied. And to the extent of such involvement, the decisions cited should furnish guidance in the present case. Coming to the second point, I must confess I am not much impressed by the argument that decisions arising out of the Income-tax Act cannot be of any help in deciding analogous questions under the Sales Tax Act. For, the principles involved are identical and relate to the question - to what extent any taxing statute should have connection with the territory to which it is intended to apply. No more satisfactory answer can be given to this question than the one contained in the extracts from the judgment of Dixon, J., which have been given in paragraph 16. It seems correct, however, that no example is available of a Provincial Legislature exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction in matters of taxation, which has formed the subject-matter of judicial decisions. But the learned counsel for the State has brought to our notice the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Debendra Narain Roy v. Jogendra Narain Deb ([1936] A.I.R. 1936 Cal. 593.), generally known as the Bijni Succession case, in which the question at issue was the competence of the Assam Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1919, to introduce an extra-territorial element in the Assam Bijni Succession Act (II of 1931). The question was answered in favour of the Assam Legislature. In appeal before the Privy Council ([1942] A.I.R. 1942 P.C. 44 (46).), however, their Lordships did not think it necessary to decide the particular question of extra-territoriality and they, therefore, left it open. All that need be added is that the legislative powers of a Provincial Legislature under the 1935 Act are not inferior to or less restricted than those under the 1919 Act. 19. All that need be added is that the legislative powers of a Provincial Legislature under the 1935 Act are not inferior to or less restricted than those under the 1919 Act. 19. I might as well refer here to Section 297 of the Government of India Act, 1935, on the strength of which also it has been argued on behalf of the applicant that sales which in reality have taken place outside the Province could not be subjected to taxation in this Province. Now Section 297 prevents a Provincial Legislature from, "(i) passing any law prohibiting or restricting the entry into, or export from, the Province, of goods of any class or description, [sub-section (1)(a)], and (ii) imposing any tax, discriminating in favour of goods manufactured or produced in the Province as against similar goods produced outside, or, in respect of goods manufactured or produced outside, discriminating in favour of those manufactured or produced in one locality as against those manufactured or produced in another locality [sub-section (1)(b)]." The implication of the argument appears to be that a tax collected in the Province on sales of goods sent out of it will probably have the effect of discouraging exports from the Province. This may or may not happen, as, in matters of trade, a great deal depends on the general availability of supplies and also on the nature and extent of sales tax legislation in other parts of the country. But any indirect effect of the kind that the tax itself may have cannot be construed as an attempt to prohibit or restrict exports. In fact, the intention underlying the levy of the tax is directly opposed, or, at any rate, dissimilar to the intention that the legislature might have had, had it thought of prohibiting or restricting exports. Further, as the learned counsel for the State has pointed out, the legislation prohibited by sub-section (1)(a) is what may be claimed of purported to have been passed by virtue of two specific entries in List II, namely, items 27 and 29. The Sales Tax Act is based not on either of those entries but on item 48. As for sub-section (1)(b), the question of discrimination would hardly arise; if it does at all, it would be in a sense contrary to that envisaged by that sub-section. 20. The Sales Tax Act is based not on either of those entries but on item 48. As for sub-section (1)(b), the question of discrimination would hardly arise; if it does at all, it would be in a sense contrary to that envisaged by that sub-section. 20. I am, therefore, of the opinion that Section 297 was even less of an obstacle to extra-territorial legislation in this case than Section 99(1) and sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 100, read with item 45 in List I and item 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. 21. In the light of the foregoing discussion, I hold that Explanation II to Section 2(g) of the Sales Tax Act is not ultra vires the Provincial Legislature. There is, without doubt, an element of extra-territoriality in it, but, in introducing that element, the Provincial Legislature did not exceed its jurisdiction its jurisdiction in enacting a taxing statute. The tax imposed by the enactment is a tax on sales within the meaning of item 48 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, and not an excise duty, mentioned under item 45 of List I of that Schedule. Once this conclusion is reached, it follows that Explanation II should be given its plain meaning, as stated in paragraph 3 of this Order. When the plain meaning of the Explanation is not in doubt, and is the only meaning that could be accepted, there is no room for the argument that a taxing statute or fiscal enactment must be construed strictly in favour of the subject. The validity of this argument is not open to question when there is reasonable doubt about the language of the statute. But in this case, we are going by the plain meaning of the impugned provision, which has been stated in reasonably clear and unambiguous language. 22. A plea on grounds of equity has also been raised. It has been stated that taxes have been paid separately in Provinces or other areas where the sales actually took place. No proof has been adduced, and, in fairness to be applicant, it must be said that no proof was demanded. Even if the statement were true it would not affect the validity of any provision of the Act. It has been stated that taxes have been paid separately in Provinces or other areas where the sales actually took place. No proof has been adduced, and, in fairness to be applicant, it must be said that no proof was demanded. Even if the statement were true it would not affect the validity of any provision of the Act. The position is, in certain respects, not dissimilar to that which their Lordships of the Privy Council discussed in The Governor-General in Council v. The Province of Madras ([1945] 1 S.T.C. 135.) where the imposition of two distinct taxes - an excise duty and a tax on sales - more or less simultaneously, at the time the goods left the factory or workshop for sale, was considered not open to objection in law. Dual taxation of the kind alleged, where it has actually been levied, on a single transaction of sale, may be attacked on grounds of policy, but cannot be called in question legally, under any of the provisions of our Sales Tax Act. 23. The case, in my view, has been rightly decided by the learned Sales Tax Commissioner and, as my learned colleague shares this view, the application for revision is dismissed. Application dismissed.