Nawal Kishore, J.—This is an appeal by the decree-holder against the order of the learned District Judge holding that the petition for execution referred by him in the court of the Munsif was barred by time. 2. It appears that on 6th of February, 1942 Chandmal appellant obtained an ex parte decree against Baburmal. No appeal was preferred from this decree by the judgment-debtor and instead he filed an application for having it set aside but it was dismissed. On appeal to the High Court, there was a compromise and an order was passed on nth of November, 1943 that if Baburmal paid Rs. 40/- as costs to the decree-holder within fifteen days and gave security for due performance of the decree that may be passed against him within one month, the ex parte decree will be set aside otherwise it will stand. The judgment-debtor did not comply with this order and when an application for execution of the decree was filed on 8th of April, 1945, he objected on the ground that since limitation ran from the date of the decree, it was barred by time. The learned Munsif repelled this objection and held that limitation ran from the date of the order of the High Court and accordingly, execution was not barred by time. The learned District Judge on appeal disagreed with this view and set aside the order passed by the learned Munsif and held that the petition for execution was barred by time as limitation ran from the date of the decree. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant urges that according to Article 29 of the Mewar Limitation Act, the period of limitation was provided as below:— ^^nj[okLr [kkLrs djkus gd:lh rhu lky rkjh[k lqukus rtoht lsA 4. The word "tajveej" is not defined and the learned counsel urges that if there is an appeal, limitation should be deemed to run from the "tajveej" of the appellate court. He has also referred to 1939 Mad. 157(1) (Kunwar Bahadursingh vs. Sheo Shanker.) (Sriramchandra Rao vs. Venka-teswara Rao.) which is based on 1937 Mad. 421(2) (Koya Kutti vs. Veerankutti.). This judgment relates to the meaning to be attached to the words "where there has been an appeal" occurring in clause 2 column 3 of Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act. 157(1) (Kunwar Bahadursingh vs. Sheo Shanker.) (Sriramchandra Rao vs. Venka-teswara Rao.) which is based on 1937 Mad. 421(2) (Koya Kutti vs. Veerankutti.). This judgment relates to the meaning to be attached to the words "where there has been an appeal" occurring in clause 2 column 3 of Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act. A number of authorities were cited in this case in support of the proposition that these words must be taken in their context, that is, with reference to the words in column I of Art. 182 and interpreted to to mean that the appeal must be against the decree or order itself. It was, however, held that it was equally logical to say that it must be something which affected that decree or order, and the reason assigned for this view was that if the legislature had a different intention, it could have ex-pressed with ease by saying "where there has been an appeal against that decree or order." The exact question which calls for a determination is whether the word "appeal" referred to in column 3 of clause 2 of Art. 182 includes an appeal preferred against an order refusing to set aside an ex parte decree or must be confined to an appeal only from the decree or order sought to be executed. In an elaborate judgment reported as 1950 All. 327(2) it was held on a review of a large number of authorities of different courts that appeal in Art. 182(2) means an appeal from the decree sought to be executed and no other appeal. It was further held that where application to set aside an ex parte decree was dismissed and an appeal preferred against the order dismissing such application was also dismissed, limitation for the execution of the ex parte decree ran from the date of the ex parte decree and not from the date of appellate decree. Reference was made to 1939 Mad. 157 and it was not followed. 1951 Pat. 1(2) (Rameshwar Prasad vs. Parmeshwar Parsad.) is another authority where view similar to the one taken in 1950 All. 327 prevailed. This view appears to be so well established now that it is hardly necessary to multiply authorities on the point but reference may be made to 1950 Supreme Court 6(3) (Khimji Poonja & Co. 1951 Pat. 1(2) (Rameshwar Prasad vs. Parmeshwar Parsad.) is another authority where view similar to the one taken in 1950 All. 327 prevailed. This view appears to be so well established now that it is hardly necessary to multiply authorities on the point but reference may be made to 1950 Supreme Court 6(3) (Khimji Poonja & Co. vs. Baldeodas,) where it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the words "where there has been an appeal" were comprehensive enough to include the appeal from an order dismissing the application under O. 9, R. 9, Civil Procedure Code. This argument was, however, held to be a far-fetched one, and it was observed that these words must be read with the words in column 1 of Art. 182 viz., "for the execution of a decree or order of any court" and however broadly the article may be construed, it could not be held to cover an appeal from an order which was passed in a collateral proceeding or which had no direct ox immediate connection with the decree under execution. In this view of the case, the word "tajveej" in Art. 29 of the Mewar Limitation Act must be confined to the "tajveej" which resulted in the ex parte decree against Babur-mal. The result is that this appeal Fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.