JUDGEMENT : DIXIT, J. These are two petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the orders of Board of Revenue. In Petition No. 33 of 51, the applicant asks us to revise the order of the Board of Revenue refusing to disturb, in the exercise of its revisional power, the decisions of the Commissioner and the Suba whereby the claim of the non-applicant Mt. Puniya, for her name being entered in the revenue papers as a Morusi tenant, was allowed. The petition No. 34 of 51 arises out of Settlement proceedings in which the Settlement Officer recognised the non-applicant Nanuram's possession of certain land and made an entry accordingly. An appeal against the order of the Settlement Officer was preferred by the applicant to the Commissioner. It was rejected. Thereupon, the petitioner appealed to the Bench Appeal Mal, Ujjain. The appeal was allowed and the petitioner's claim as regards possession was allowed. Subsequently, the non-applicant went up in revision to the Board of Revenue against the decision of the Bench Appeal Mal. The Board of Revenue allowed the revision petition and held that the appeal of the petitioner before the Commissioner was barred by time and that the appeal before the Bench Appeal Mal was incompetent. The petitioner Anand Rao now seeks the revision of this order of the Board of Revenue. 2. Mr. Karkare who appeared on behalf of the petitioners argued that the Board of Revenue was a tribunal, subject to the superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; that under this Article this Court had the power to interfere judicially and even to correct errors of law and fact in the decisions of Courts and tribunals in the territories in relation to which this Court exercised jurisdiction. In support of his arguments Mr. Karkare relied on 'Bavalal Jadavji v. Jivanlal Gopalji', AIR (38) 1951 Sau 43 and 'Israil Khan v. State', AIR (38) 1951 Assam 106. 3. In my opinion these petitions must be rejected. The decisions sought to be revised have been given by the Board of Revenue in the exercise of its judicial functions conferred on it by Sections 17 and 37 of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 (Act No. 66 of 1950). 3. In my opinion these petitions must be rejected. The decisions sought to be revised have been given by the Board of Revenue in the exercise of its judicial functions conferred on it by Sections 17 and 37 of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 (Act No. 66 of 1950). There can, therefore, be no doubt that in the exercise of its judicial functions, the Board is a tribunal subject to the superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is also true that there is ample authority to support the view that the power of superintendence includes not only superintendence on administrative points but superintendence on judicial side too. (See 'State of West Bengal v. Durga Devi', AIR (38) 1951 Cal 100 Narendra Nath v. Binode Behari', AIR (38) 1951 Cal 138 and 'Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee', AIR (38) 1951 Cal 193; 'Sheoshankar v. State Govt. Madhya Pradesh', AIR (38) 1951 Nag 58 and 'Shridhar Atmaram v. Collector of Nagpur'. AIR (38) 1951 Nag 90; 'Union of Workmen of R.S.N. and I.G.N. and Rly. Co. Ltd. v. River Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., AIR (38) 1951 Assam 96 and 'Israil Khan v. State', AIR (38) 1951 Assam 106). Article 227 of the Constitution is somewhat analogous to Section 107 of the Government of India Act 1915, which gave to tine High Courts the power of Superintendence over all Courts for the time being subject to its appellate jurisdiction. In 'Pigot v. Ali Mahomed', 48 Cal 522; 'Balkrishna Hari v. Emperor', 57 Bom 93; 'Ganesh Das Shankar Lal v. Asanand Radhsham', AIR (20) 1933 Lah 259 and Maharup Kuer v. Mahabir Singh', AIR (15) 1928 Pat 111, it was held that the power of superintendence under S. 107, Govt. of India Act 1915, included the power of judicial interference. The Allahabad High Court, however, took a contrary view in 'Mukund Lal v. Gaya Prasad', AIR (22) 1935 All 599. The Government of India Act 1935, however, restricted this superintendence to administrative matters only by an express provision to that effect in Section 224 (2). of India Act 1915, included the power of judicial interference. The Allahabad High Court, however, took a contrary view in 'Mukund Lal v. Gaya Prasad', AIR (22) 1935 All 599. The Government of India Act 1935, however, restricted this superintendence to administrative matters only by an express provision to that effect in Section 224 (2). The absence in Article 227 of the Constitution of a provision similar to Sub-section 2 of Section 224, Government of India Act, 1935 and the insertion in Sub-section 2 of Article 227 of the words "without prejudice to the generality of the foregong provision", goes to confirm the views that the word 'superintendence' in Article 227 includes administrative as well as judicial superintendence. 4. If as I think, the Board of Revenue is a tribunal subject to the superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and the power of superintendence of this Court extends to interference in judicial matters, then Section 147 of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act Samvat 2007 cannot be construed so as to take away the powers given to this Court under Art. 227. Section 147 says : "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted, or application made, to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the Government are, or a Revenue Officer is, by this Act, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of." 5. The Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act Samvat 2007 was passed after the Constitution came into force and if Section 147 of the Act purports to take away the right of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, then clearly Section 147 of the Act is to that extent ultra vires the Constitution. The right given to this Court under Article 227 cannot be taken away by the State Legislature, and therefore it must be held that a power of superintendence exists in this Court in spite of Section 147 of the Act No. 66 of 1950. 6. The question we have to decide is, what is the extent of judicial interference intended by Article 227, and whether it permits this Court to interfere in every case where it finds some error of law or fact in the proceedings of the lower Courts or tribunals. 7. 6. The question we have to decide is, what is the extent of judicial interference intended by Article 227, and whether it permits this Court to interfere in every case where it finds some error of law or fact in the proceedings of the lower Courts or tribunals. 7. In 'Gopal Singh v. Court of Wards', 7 WR 430, one of the earliest case dealing with the power of superintendence conferred on the High Courts by Section 15 of the High Courts Act of 1861, Norman, J., pointed out that : "This power of superintendence is entirely distinct from the jurisdiction to hear appeals. If the inferior Court after hearing the parties comes to an erroneous decision either on law or fact in a matter within its jurisdiction, the Court having power of superintendence, never interferes. The only mode of questioning the propriety of such a decision is by appeal." 8. In 'Kedarnath v. Kshetra Nath', 6 Cri LJ 400 (Cal) Mitra, J., observed that the power of superintendence could only be exercised in cases of non-exercise or an illegal exercise of jurisdiction. Rankin, C.J., of the Calcutta High Court described in 'Manmatha Nath v. Emperor', AIR (20) 1933 Cal 132, the power of superintendence by saying that : "The superintendence is not a legal fiction whereby a High Court Judge is vested with omnipotence but is a term having a legal force and signification. The general superintendence which this Court has over all jurisdiction subject to appeal is a duty to keep them within the bounds of their authority to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. It does not involve responsibility for the correctness of their decision either in fact or law." 9. The principles laid down by Rankin, C.J., in AIR (20) 1933 Cal 132, have been followed by a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in 'Dalmia Jain Airways, Ltd. v. Sukumar', AIR (38) 1951 Cal 193. 10. The Madras High Court held in 'Ponnappa Iyengar v. Ramanuja', AIR (7) 1920 Mad 847, that it is only in very rare cases that the High Court would interfere under Section 107, Government of India Act 1915 and even when there was a question of jurisdiction. If there was no question of jurisdiction it would interfere only if very great miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. If there was no question of jurisdiction it would interfere only if very great miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. The Patna High Court by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 107 of the Government of India Act 1915, interfered in cases where there was a gross error apparent on the face of the record and there was a denial of justice. See 'Nilmani Nath v. Pratap Udai Nath', AIR (6) 1919 Pat 573; 'Brindaban Chander v. Gour Chandra', AIR (7) 1920 Pat 568. 11. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held in 'Emperor v. Jamnadas Nathji', AIR (24) 1937 Bom 153, that : "The powers of superintendence under Section 107 Government of India Act 1915 are not ordinarily meant to be exercised where no power of revision or interference exists and such power ought to be exercised only in rare cases where an obvious miscarriage of justice cannot be otherwise prevented." 12. A reference may also be made to 'Harsaran Das v. Mukandilal', AIR (38) 1951 All 514, where Malik, C.J., forebore from expressing any concluded opinion on the question whether under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Courts have not only administrative superintendence but also judicial superintendence, but was at the same time compelled to say that : "The power given under Articles 226, 227 of the Constitution should be restricted to interference in cases of grave dereliction of duty for which no other remedy is available and which would have serious consequences if not remedied." 13. In 'Sheoshanker v. State Govt. of Madhya Pradesh', AIR (38) 1951 Nag 58, Mangalmurti and Mudholkar, JJ., observed that : "Under Article 227 ordinarily it will be open to the High Court in the exercise of the power of superintendence, only to consider whether there is an error of jurisdiction in the decision of a Court or tribunal subject to its superintendence, whereas there is no limitation, under Article 226." 14. An elaborate review of the cases on the subject is to be found in 'Ismail Khan v. The State', AIR (38) 1951 Assam 106, where it was held that : "Since the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 is extraordinary, it should not serve ordinarily as a substitute for revisional jurisdiction in cases where the revisional jurisdiction has been taken away from the High Court by a competent Legislature though even in such cases absence, excess or abuse of jurisdiction will, no doubt, justify interference. The High Court may also in such cases draw on its power of superintendence, to avoid or prevent obvious miscarriage of justice. It will not be justified in constituting itself a Court of appeal and substitute its own views on findings of fact after minute scrutiny of the evidence, though the extraordinary jurisdiction may be utilised for correcting miscarriages of justice which have been occasioned by patent errors of law or procedure which cannot be corrected otherwise." 15. In so far as it is necessary for me to express my own preference between these different views, I agree with the observations of Rankin, C.J., in AIR (20) 1933 Cal 132, which if I may respectively say so, appear to me to be more consonant with the character of the extraordinary power of superintendence than the views expressed in other cases. If I have correctly understood the opinion of Rankin, C.J., the power of superintendence is not restricted to cases of non-exercise or illegal exercise of jurisdiction but extends also to cases where there has been an obvious miscarriage of justice because a Court or a tribunal has approached the matter entrusted to it in an arbitrary or despotic manner and against all rules of natural justice. In saying so I do not pretend to lay down rigid principles for all cases and to define the circumstances or cases in which the extraordinary power under Article 227 should be exercised. I do not think it would be proper for any Judge to particularise the cases in which the power should be exercised and thus to restrict the wide generality of the language deliberately used in Article 227. I do not think it would be proper for any Judge to particularise the cases in which the power should be exercised and thus to restrict the wide generality of the language deliberately used in Article 227. I am, however, quite clear that the power cannot be exercised to disturb a decision of a Court or a tribunal merely because it has misconceived a point of law or come to a wrong decision of the facts. 16. In the present case, it is not the case of the petitioner that the Board of Revenue in passing the orders, they did, exceeded or abused its jurisdiction. In Petn. No. 33 of 51, the petitioner challenges the correctness of the findings of fact arrived at by the Revenue Courts. In the other petition, the applicant's grievance is that the interpretation put by the Board of Revenue in a Departmental Order and Section 17 of the Settlement Manual, was wrong and that the Board of Revenue erred in not giving him the benefit of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act with respect to the appeal before the Commissioner. I fail to see how the decisions of the Board of Revenue in these two cases have resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Learned counsel for the petitioners said everything that could be said in favour of the petitioners. Nonetheless, I am not satisfied that there is any ground to entertain the applications. In my judgment, they must be dismissed. 17. SHINDE, J. :- I agree. Applications dismissed.