Horwill, J.-The appellant mortgagee filed a suit for a declaration that although the consideration in the mortgage document was shown to be Rs.2,000 it was, in fact, only Rs.1,000. The Court found that this was so. On 27th March, 1941, the respondent, who is the sole executor of the will of the judgment-debtor, filed an application praying that he might be brought on record as the legal representative of the judgment-debtor, whom he reported to be dead. The learned Judge held that it had not been proved satisfactorily that the judgment-debtor was dead. Upon dismissing that application, he decreed the suit ex parte with costs. The respondent filed C.R.P.No.1834 of 1941 against the order dismissing his application to be brought on record; and this was dismissed on 6th January, 1943. The application E.P.No.304 of 1944 was filed on 17th July, 1944, and it is seen that this execution petition was filed more than three years after the passing of the decree in the suit, but well within three years of the date of the dismissal of the civil revision petition. The learned District Munsiff held that the application was barred by limitation. In appeal the. learned District Judge disposed of the matter very briefly by saying “there must be finality in matters of this kind.” The decree-holder appeals. The sole question of limitation turns on the construction of Article 182 of the Limitation Act, which gives three years for the execution of a decree from (1) the date of the decree or order; or (2) where there has been an appeal, the date of the final decree or order of the appellate Court. I have no doubt that if clause (2) of Article 182 had to be construed on a reading of that Article alone, without taking into consideration extraneous matters such as the application of logical principles and the anomalous results that would follow from a strict interpretation of this clause, clause (2) would be read as “where there has been an appeal against the decree or order”. If, however, clause (2) is read in that way, then various appeals-having very much the same effect as an appeal against a decree-would not extend time; e.g., an appeal or revision against an order setting aside, or refusing to set aside an ex parte decree; or, as here, an appeal against an interlocutory order which, if successful, would have the effect of setting aside a decree. If, however, one had to give a wider meaning to Article 182, clause (2), because certain illogical or inequitable results would follow from giving a strict interpretation to it, then one would feel bound to read that clause, as has been done in some cases, as meaning just what it says, i.e., any appeal, including an appeal against an order or decree passed in collateral proceedings. For example, a person not bound by the decree might file another suit raising the same question. Clearly the decree passed would be imperilled by the new suit and whatever be the result of that suit, an appeal might be filed and the result of the pending appeal would also imperil the decree. Similarly with regard to an appeal from a decree passed in a suit to set aside the decree on grounds of fraud and the like. If one is not to read clause (2) strictly, as referring to appeals against the decrees or order referred to in clause (1) the difficulty is to know where to draw the line. It has been clearly held that limitation does run against a decree-holder when collateral proceedings are pending. In those decisions in which a wider scope has been given to clause (2), the need for some sort of restriction on the meaning of the word “appeal” has been generally recognised. The application of this clause has generally been restricted to appeals against orders arising out of the proceedings themselves; such as appeals against a preliminary decree, where a final decree has to be executed; or against an order refusing to set aside an ex parte decree, or a revision petition against an order setting aside an ex parte decree. This restriction seems, however, to be entirely arbitrary; for it has no basis on anything that is to be found in Article 182; or indeed in the Limitation Act at all. This restriction seems, however, to be entirely arbitrary; for it has no basis on anything that is to be found in Article 182; or indeed in the Limitation Act at all. The conclusion that time for executing a final decree runs from the date of the appellate order against the preliminary decree can be based upon a ground that does not require a literal interpretation of Article 182 of the Limitation Act. We find that ground set out in the passage cited from Somar Singh v. Deonandan Prasad Singh1, in the judgment of Venkataramana Row, J., in Koyakutti v. Veerankutti2, where Dawson Miller, C.J., said: “It seems to follow, therefore, as a matter of course, that the appeal in this case was not only an appeal from the preliminary decree but an appeal from all that naturally followed by the passing of that decree, namely, the final decree for sale which after all is merely part of the machinery prescribed for carrying out the direction for sale contained in the preliminary decree.” The case on which most reliance has been placed by the learned advocate for the appellant is Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara3, which, if it had been a decision directly bearing on the point that falls for decision in this civil miscellaneous second appeal, I should be bound to follow. The learned Judges were there considering a case in which there had been an appeal against an order refusing to set aside an ex parte decree. The learned Judges held that time for executing the original decree ran from the date of the final order in the appeal against the order refusing to set aside the ex parte decree. The learned Judges followed Firm Dodhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwandas4, in which it was held that time ran for executing the original decree from the date of the order of the second appellate Court against the order of the first appellate Court refusing to rehear an appeal under Order 41, rule 21, Civil Procedure Code. The learned Judges followed Firm Dodhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwandas4, in which it was held that time ran for executing the original decree from the date of the order of the second appellate Court against the order of the first appellate Court refusing to rehear an appeal under Order 41, rule 21, Civil Procedure Code. In Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara3, the learned Judges referred to the oft-quoted abstract from the judgment of the Privy Council in Nagendranath De v. Sureshchandra De5: “It is at least an intelligible rule that so long as there is any question sub judice between any of the parties, those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so often thorny path of execution, which, if the final result is against them, may lead to no advantage.” One cannot however divorce these words from the context. Their Lordships were there considering whether an appeal that was not maintainable had the effect of extending the period of limitation; and they held that it did. Their Lordships are not be understood from this one passage to suggest that wherever there is any question sub judice between any of the parties, those affected would not be bound to take out execution proceedings. If the passage were to be interpreted in that way, it would apply equally to any collateral proceedings, including a suit to set aside the decree. There has been no decision of the Privy Council as far as I have been able to see which affords any justification for reading the word “appeal” in clause (2) of Article 182 as meaning appeal or revision application against anything but the decree or order referred to in clause (1). The learned Judges disposed of Fakirchand Mandal v. Daiba Charan Farm6, in which it was held that the word “appeal” in clause (2) must be an appeal against the decree or order referred to in clause (1), by saying: “We are unable to see how the narrower view which they (the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court) uphold is ‘clear upon principle.‘The only principle we can discover in the rulings cited for the respondents is that the words ‘where there has been an appeal’ must be taken in. their context, that is to say, with reference to the words in column 1 of Article 182.” The learned Judges were then confronted with the difficulty raised by Mr. their context, that is to say, with reference to the words in column 1 of Article 182.” The learned Judges were then confronted with the difficulty raised by Mr. Ramanarasu, who appeared in that case, that if the word “appeal” were given the wide meaning that the learned Judges thought should be given, (hen it would apply equally to appeal against a decree in a separate suit to set aside the first decree on some such ground as that of fraud. This they overcame by saying: “That is a situation with which we have not now to deal and may well we think be left until it arises.” They however found it necessary to limit in some way the meaning of the word “appeal” in clause (2) and so went on to say: “Meanwhile it is not difficult to perceive a clear distinction between an appeal arising from an order in the very suit whose decree is sought to be executed and an appeal from a decree in quite a different suit. We do not therefore feel deterred by the consideration of that particular hypothetical case from expressing our respectful agreement with Firm Dedhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwandas1.” With due respect, the learned Judges seem to have treated rather lightly the difficulties in the way of the interpretation they put upon clause (2) and of the decisions to the contrary in particular, Fakirchand Mandal v. Daiba Charan Parni2. There is undoubtedly a considerable weight of authority for not restricting the word “appeal” in clause (2) to an appeal from a decree or order referred to in clause (1); but the nature of the test to be applied to ascertain whether a particular appeal comes within the mischief of clause (2) seems, on the cases decided, to be rather uncertain. I can find no authoritative rule which would lead me to conclude that the filing of C.R.P.No.1834 of 1941, by a person not a party to the suit would extend the period of limitation; but there are dicta in Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara3, and elsewhere wide enough to make clause (2) applicable. I can find no authoritative rule which would lead me to conclude that the filing of C.R.P.No.1834 of 1941, by a person not a party to the suit would extend the period of limitation; but there are dicta in Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara3, and elsewhere wide enough to make clause (2) applicable. As this civil miscellaneous second appeal raises an important question which may frequently arise, and which requires an authoritative ruling, I do not think it desirable that I should add to the confusion by expressing any view of my own, especially as I should feel it necessary to allow a Letters Patent Appeal if I decided this case myself. I consider it desirable that this civil miscellaneous second appeal should be disposed of by a Bench. I direct that the papers be placed before the Chief Justice for that purpose. [Pursuant to the aforesaid Order, this appeal coming on for hearing before Satyanarayana Rao and Chandra Reddi, JJ., the Court made the following Order of Reference to the Full Bench:] Satyanarayana Rao, J.-For the very reasons given by Horwill, J., we think that the question raised in the order referring the case to a Bench should be heard by a Full Bench. There are two lines of cases on the interpretation of Article 182, column 3, of the Limitation Act. One view is that in clause (2) of column 3 the expression “where there has been an appeal” refers and is confined to an appeal directly against the decree or order sought to be executed; and the other view includes also appeals against orders in suit which are likely to imperil the decree sought to be executed. The various decisions were considered in Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara3 and the conclusion reached was that the wider meaning implied in the second of the interpretations should be accepted. As the question as pointed out by Horwill, J., is of sufficient importance and occurs frequently, we think that there should be an authoritative decision by a Full Bench. The papers will be placed before the Chief Justice for necessary directions. (In pursuance of the aforesaid Order of Reference, this appeal coming on for hearing, the Court delivered the following Judgment): Rajamannar, C.J.-The question which falls for decision on this reference concerns the interpretation of Article 182, column 3, clause (2) of the Limitation Act. The papers will be placed before the Chief Justice for necessary directions. (In pursuance of the aforesaid Order of Reference, this appeal coming on for hearing, the Court delivered the following Judgment): Rajamannar, C.J.-The question which falls for decision on this reference concerns the interpretation of Article 182, column 3, clause (2) of the Limitation Act. The facts material for a discussion of this question are as follows: The appellant before us filed a suit (O.S.No.479 of 1939) in the Court of the District Munsif of Chittoor against one Bayya Subbiah Chetti. During the pendency of the suit the respondent filed I.A.No.265 of 1941 stating that the defendant was dead and praying that he may be brought on record as his legal representative. On objection by the plaintiff the Court held that the death of the defendant was not proved and dismissed the application. Thereupon the advocate on record reported no instructions and the suit was decreed ex parte on 27th March, 1941. The respondent filed a Civil Revision Petition to this Court (C.R.P.No.1834 of 1941) against the order dismissing his application I.A.No.265 of 1941 and that petition was dismissed on 6th January, 1943. The appellant as decree-holder filed an execution petition on 17th July, 1944, impleading the respondent as party as he had mean while obtained a probate in respect of the will left by the defendant Subbayya Chetti. This execution petition was dismissed as not pressed on 2nd December, 1944. On 23rd December, 1946, the appellant filed another execution petition out of which this appeal has arisen. Both the District Munsif of Chittoor and the District Judge dismissed the application as barred by limitation on the ground that the first execution petition filed on 17th July, 1944, was itself barred by limitation as having been filed more than three years after the date of the decree, namely, 27th March, 1941. The decree-holder appeals. The appeal originally came before Horwill, J., who found a conflict of views in the decided cases as to the interpretation of the relevant provision of the Limitation Act and as the question was an important one which might frequently arise and which required an authoritative ruling, he considered it desirable that the appeal should be disposed of by a Bench. It was then posted before Satyanarayana Rao and Chandra Reddi, JJ., who for the very reasons given by Horwill J., considered that the case should be heard by a Full Bench. Article 182 in so far as it is material is as follows: Description of application Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 182. For the execution of a decree or order of any civil Court not provided for by Article 183 or section 48, C.P.C. Three years; or where a certified copy of a decree or order has been registered six years. * * * 2. (where there has been an appeal) the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court or of the with-drawal of the appeal, or......" But for a proper construction of clause (2) in column 3 it is useful to set out also clauses (1), (3) and (4) of the same column which run thus: "1. The date of the decree or order; 3. (where there has been a review of judgment) the date of the decision passed on the review,or 4. (where the decree has been amended) the date of amendment." Before dealing with decided cases I think it desirable to examine the scheme of this Article. The Article deals with an application for the execution of a decree or order of a civil Court not provided for by Article 183 or by section 48, Civil Procedure Code. Different dates are given in the third column from which the period of limitation begins to run. The first date is the date of the decree or order. It is obvious that the decree or order in this clause refers to the decree or order the execution of which is being sought. Glauses (2), (3) and (4) appear to provide for cases where there have been proceedings directly connected with the decree or order mentioned in clause (1). The three contingencies provided are (a) where there has been an appeal, (b) where there has been a review of judgment, (c) where the decree has been amended. The three different proceedings contemplated are proceedings taken after the passing of the original decree or order. There is one thing common to these three classes of proceedings, namely, in each of these a new decree emerges. The three different proceedings contemplated are proceedings taken after the passing of the original decree or order. There is one thing common to these three classes of proceedings, namely, in each of these a new decree emerges. It is clear that the decree in clause (4) refers to the decree which is the subject-matter of the execution petition. I think it is equally clear that the judgment in clause (3) refers to the judgment which is the basis of the decree or order sought to be executed. On the same analogy it appears to me that the appellate decree or order mentioned in clause (2) refers to the decree or order for the execution of which the application is filed. Clauses (2), (3) and (4) in their context obviously have a meaning and significance only in relation to clause (1), under which the date of the original decree or order is specified as the starting point. When the review and amendment which result in postponing the starting point of limitation have a direct connection with the original decree or order, the appeal mentioned in clause (2) must likewise be directly connected with the original decree or order. Reading all these clauses together and giving the words a plain common sense meaning no other construction seems to be possible. In my opinion the language of clause (2) indicates that the appeal referred to therein is an appeal from the original decree or order mentioned in clause (1). The clause states that where there has been an appeal the starting point shall be the date of the final decree or order of the appellate Court or the withdrawal of the appeal. Now we know that an appeal from the original decree may result in confirmation, modification or setting aside of the original decree. It is a well accepted principle of procedural law that once there has been an appeal the original decree is set at large and even when the original decree is confirmed in appeal, the final decree is the decree of the appellate Court. Of course, when there has been a modification, undoubtedly the appellate decree is the only decree which can be executed. When an appeal is withdrawn before hearing, it may not be accurate to say that the appellate Court passes another decree. Of course, when there has been a modification, undoubtedly the appellate decree is the only decree which can be executed. When an appeal is withdrawn before hearing, it may not be accurate to say that the appellate Court passes another decree. Nevertheless, the enactment gives to the decree-holder the benefit of the period during which the original decree or order was pending in the appellate Court. Reading column 1 and clause (2) of column 3 it seems to me that the final decree or order of the appellate Court is the decree or order for the execution of which an application is filed. The scheme of clauses (1) to (4) of the third column appears to provide for four different dates in four contingencies, namely, (1) the date of the original decree or order, (2) the date of the appellate decree or order, (3) the date of the decree as reviewed, (4) the date of the amended decree. Though the matter looks simple, when we go by the plain language of the enactment, it becomes complicated once considerations of anomalies and hardship in actual application come in. I am not aware of any law which does not in some particular case work hardship; nor is there any law on a particular subject matter which does not fail to adequately deal with some exceptional aspect or provide for a rare contingency. In such a case, there is always present a tendency to strain the language of the enactment so as to avoid an anomaly or to prevent hardship. Following such a tendency, learned Judges from early times have tried to interpret the word “appeal” in clause (2) of column 3 as not necessarily referring to an appeal from the original decree in the suit. The widest connotation to that term was given thus by Kulwant Sahay, J., in Somar Singh v. Deonandan Prasad Singh1, as an appeal which in any way imperils the decree sought to be executed. Logically speaking this would lead to the position that if after a decree has been passed in a suit, there is years later a suit to set aside that decree and there is an appeal against the decree in that suit, time would have to be computed from the date of the appellate decree in the later suit. Logically speaking this would lead to the position that if after a decree has been passed in a suit, there is years later a suit to set aside that decree and there is an appeal against the decree in that suit, time would have to be computed from the date of the appellate decree in the later suit. I do not see any objection to this extension once we accept the principle that the appeal need not be directly against the original decree. Learned Judges have therefore tried to impose a limitation, for which again there is no warrant in the enactment itself, namely, that the appeal must be in the suit besides being likely to affect the decree sought to be executed. This is the view which appealed to Venkataramana Rao, J., in Koyakutti v. Veerankutti1, affirmed on L.P. Appeal in Veerankutti v. Koyakutti2, and to King and Krishnaswami Aiyangar, JJ., in Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara3. The earliest decision which supports this view is in Lutful Huq v. Sumbhudin Pattuck4. In that case it was held that limitation for the execution of an ex parte decree ran from the date of the dismissal of an appeal from an order rejecting an application to set aside the ex parte decree. The ratio decidendi of that decision is contained in the following sentence in the judgment of Morris, J.: "The application to revise the suit really kept the decree open and that decree did not become final until the order of the appellate Court was passed on the 19th December, 1877" (i.e., in the appeal arising out of the application to set aside the ex parte decree). With great respect to the learned Judge, I think he overlooked the fallacy underlying that reasoning. If the application to revise the suit really kept the decree open, then, even if there had not been an appeal against the rejection of that application, time should be computed from the date of the disposal of that application. But for this there is no basis in the language of column 3. So far as I am aware it has never been held that time to execute an ex parte decree would not commence to Tun from the date of the decree when there is an application to set aside that decree. But for this there is no basis in the language of column 3. So far as I am aware it has never been held that time to execute an ex parte decree would not commence to Tun from the date of the decree when there is an application to set aside that decree. Supposing for the sake of argument that such an application is not disposed of till three years from the date of the decree sought to be executed, can it be contended that the decree would not get barred after three years? The reason of Morris, J., in Lutful Huq v. Sumbhudin Pattuck4, is really based on a ground which cannot be maintained. Unless one is able to subscribe to the view that any proceeding which is likely to imperil the decree sought to be executed automatically suspends the running of time for execution of the decree, a view which has never been adumbrated, it appears to me impossible to hold that in one contingency, namely, if there happens to be an appeal in any such proceeding, time would run from the date of the decree in such an appeal. An ex parte decree is as much imperilled by an application to set it aside as by an appeal against an order rejecting such application. Yet it has never been held that where there has been no appeal, the date of the disposal of the application is the starting point under column 3 of Article 182. With very great respect to the learned Judges who followed the ruling in Lutful Huq v. Sumbhudin Pattuck4, I am constrained to say that this anomaly has been completely overlooked by them. The view of Morris, J., in Lutful Huq v. Sumbhudin Pattuck4, was expressly disserted from in Jiva Ji v. Ramachandra5. Birdwood and Parsons, JJ., held that the appeal referred to in the clause corresponding to clause (2) of column 3 of Article 182 clearly appeared from the context to be an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed. In that case the decree-holder sought to compute time from the date of the dismissal of an appeal from an order refusing to set aside the ex parte decree. In that case the decree-holder sought to compute time from the date of the dismissal of an appeal from an order refusing to set aside the ex parte decree. Referring to Lutful Huq v. Sumbhudin Pattuck4, the learned Judges say: "The infructuous efforts of the defendant to set aside the plaintiff’s decree cannot have the effect of extending the period within which the plaintiff was allowed by law to execute it." Even in Calcutta the view was not followed. In Baikantanath Mittra v. Aughorenath Eose6, Petheram, C.J. and Beverley, J., were of opinion: "That the ‘final decree" mentioned in that article must be the final decree in the suit and cannot be held to include an order in appeal upon an application to set aside that decree under section 168 of the Code." (Order g, rule 13 of the present Code.) In Fakirchand Mandal v. Daibacharan Parni7, Page and Graham, JJ., dissented from Lutful Huq v. Sumbhudin Pattuck4. They took it as clear on principle and concluded by authority that "decree on appeal" means "decree on appeal from the decree to obtain execution of which the application is made". In their opinion no other view was possible. The case in Lutful Hug v. Sumbhudin Pattuck1, was according to them wrongly decided and could not be regarded as good law (vide also Profulla Kumar v. Soroj Bala2). In Brijraj v, Nauratanlal3, the Patna High Court too dissented from Lutful Hug v. Sumbhudin Pattuck1. In Madras, a single Judge (Madhavan Nair, J.) also took a view contrary to Lutful Hug v. Sumbhudin Pattuck1, in Ahammad Kutty v. Kottikkat Kutti4. In Somar Singh v, Deonanandan Prasad Singh5, no doubt Kulwant Sahay, J., expressed the opinion that the intention of the Legislature was that if an appeal in any way imperils the decree sought to be executed, then, the date of the final disposal of the appeal should be the date from which the period of limitation ought to be computed, but he was not prepared to say that Brijraj v. Nauratanlal2, was wrongly decided in so far as it held that “where there has been an appeal” means “where there has been an appeal against a decree in the suit” and would not include an appeal against an order made on an application to set aside that decree. He distinguished that case from the case before them on the ground that in the latter there was an appeal against the decree in the suit. There was a preliminary decree in a mortgage suit against which there was an appeal to the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal the mortgagee decree-holder obtained a final decree for sale. The appeal to the High Court against the preliminary decree was dismissed subsequently. It was held that limitation for execution of the final decree ran from the date of the final disposal of the appeal against the preliminary decree by the High Court. In my opinion, the case of an appeal from a preliminary decree stands on an entirely different footing from the other classes of appeals against interlocutory orders in the same suit and from appeals against decrees in other suits. An appeal against a preliminary decree is as much an appeal against the final decree also, as the only final decree which can be executed would be the final decree as affected by the decision of an appellate Court or by the decision in an appeal against the preliminary decree. A preliminary decree in a mortgage suit is not a decree capable of execution as such and as the final decree would depend upon the preliminary decree, an appeal against the preliminary decree necessarily implies an appeal against the final decree in so far as it depends on the former. In Sheoprasad v. Anrudh Singh6, it was held by a Division Bench that the words “where there has been an appeal” in clause (2) of Article 167 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act of 1871 contemplate and mean an appeal from the decree and do not include an appeal from an order dismissing an application to set aside a decree. In Narasingh Sewak Singh v. Madho Das7, another Division Bench without disapproving of the earlier decision distinguished it on the facts before them in which there had been a review of judgment and then an appeal from the decree passed on review. The time for filing an application for execution was held to run not from the date of the original decree but from the decree of the appellate Court in the appeal filed against the amended decree. The time for filing an application for execution was held to run not from the date of the original decree but from the decree of the appellate Court in the appeal filed against the amended decree. The ground on which Sheo Prasad v. Amrudh Singh6, was distinguished was that “in that case there had been no appeal from any decree”. The preponderance of authority in the several Courts was therefore that the appeal referred to in clause (2) of column 3 of Article 182 must be confined to an appeal against the decree in the suit and not extended to an appeal from any interlocutory order in the suit or an appeal in any collateral proceeding. Then came the decision of the Privy Council in Nagendranath De v. Sureschandra De8. It is perfectly plain that the actual decision in the case did not directly bear on the question now before us. In the case before their Lordships there was an appeal against the original decree in the suit. Several Judges have dealt at length with this decision and I cannot usefully add to what has been already said about it. It is not without significance that neither in the judgment of the Judicial Committee nor in the argument is there any reference to the several decided cases in India on this question. The argument was that the appeal was not in proper form and was defective in that all the judgment-debtors were not parties. Sir Dinshah Mulla delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee said: “They think that the question must be decided upon the plain words of the article:”Where there has been an appeal“time is to run from the date of the decree of the appellate Court. Sir Dinshah Mulla delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee said: “They think that the question must be decided upon the plain words of the article:”Where there has been an appeal“time is to run from the date of the decree of the appellate Court. There is, in their Lordships’ opinion, no warrant for reading into the words quoted any qualification either as to the character of the appeal or as to the parties to it; the words mean just what they say.” Having pointed out that equitable considerations were out of place and strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide, their Lordships went on to say: “It is at least an intelligible rule that, so long as there is any question sub judice between any of the parties, those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so often thorny path of execution, which, if the final result is against them, may lead to no advantage.” Now it is clear that these observations were incidental and only suggested a plausible reason behind the rule, but finally the decision in the case rested on the actual words of the Article and not on any theoretical justification of the provision. It is these observations of Sir Dinshah Mulla in Nagendranath De v. Sureschandra De1, that have been relied on by learned Judges of some of the Courts as supporting the view originally taken in Lutful Huq v. Sumbhudin Pattuck2. The swing of the pendulum is indicated in the decisions of this Court in Koyakutti v. Veerankutti3, Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara4, and of other Courts in Firm Dedhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwan Das5, Nagappa Bandappa v. Gurushantappa Shankarappa6 and in Naranadhabai v. Hidayatalli7. But there has also been in other cases a reaffirmation of the view taken in Jiva Ji v. Ramchandra8, Fakirchand Mandal v. Daiba Charan Parni9 and Brijraj v. Nauratanlal10. In Mahadeo Bhimsankar v. Fatumya Hussainbhai11 the learned Judges Bavdekar and Dixit, JJ., held that the expression. “appeal” occurring in clause (2) of column 3 of Article 182 means an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed and would not include any appeal which is likely to affect the decree sought to be executed. In Mahadeo Bhimsankar v. Fatumya Hussainbhai11 the learned Judges Bavdekar and Dixit, JJ., held that the expression. “appeal” occurring in clause (2) of column 3 of Article 182 means an appeal from the decree or order sought to be executed and would not include any appeal which is likely to affect the decree sought to be executed. Dixit, J., was satisfied, on an examination of the case the contentions raised and the actual decision that their Lordships in Nagendranath De v. Sureshchandra De1, did not intend to lay down that the expression “appeal” occurring in Article 182, column 3, clause (2) of the Indian Limitation Act referred to or embraced an appeal other than an appeal against the decree sought to be executed. In Kunwar Bahadur Sing v. Sheo Shankar12 Wanchoo and Seth, JJ. (A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court) also held likewise. In that case there was an application to set aside an ex parte decree which was dismissed and an appeal preferred against that order which was also dismissed and limitation for the execution of the ex parte decree was sought to be computed from the date of the dismissal of the appeal. The learned Judges held that time ran crom the date of the original ex parte decree. Though I do not agree with every observation made by Seth, J., in his judgment, I am in entire agreement with the conclusion arrived at by him. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court of India in Bhawanipur Banking Corporation, Ltd. v. Gouri Shankar Sharma13, the expression “where there has been an appeal” came up for construction. The material facts in the case are as follows: On 21st August, 1940, a preliminary mortgage decree was passed ex parte. There was an application to set aside the ex parte decree but this was rejected. On 11th July, 1941, the judgment-debtor filed an application under section 36 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act for reopening the preliminary decree. But this application was dismissed for default of appearance. A final mortgage-decree was then passed on 22nd December, 1941. The judgment-debtor then made an application under Order 9, rule 9, Civil Procedure Code, for the restoration of his application under section 36 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act. But this application was dismissed for default of appearance. A final mortgage-decree was then passed on 22nd December, 1941. The judgment-debtor then made an application under Order 9, rule 9, Civil Procedure Code, for the restoration of his application under section 36 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act. This application was dismissed on 1st June, 1942, and the judgment-debtor thereafter preferred an appeal to the High Court against the order dismissing his application. This appeal was dismissed on 3rd July, 1944. On 9th April, 1945, the decree-holder filed an application for execution which was dismissed for default and he filed another application on 2nd June, 1945. The question which the Supreme Court had to decide was whether the application was in time. It was obviously more than three years after the date of the final mortgage decree and was prima facie hatred by time. It was contended on behalf of the decree-holder that it was saved from the bar of limitation if time were calculated in accordance with the provisions of clause (2) or clause(3) of column 3 of Article 182. But the learned Judges overruled the contention and held that the application was barred by time. We are not concerned with clause (3). The argument based on clause (2) was that the words “where there has been an appeal” were comprehensive enough to include an appeal from the order dismissing the application under Order 9, rule 9, Civil Procedure Code, made in connection with the proceeding under section 36 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act. Fazl Ali, J., delivering the judgment of the Court repelled this argument thus: “This argument also is a highly far fetched one, because the expression”where there has been an appeal“must be read with the words in column 1 of Article 182, viz., ”for the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court......“, and, however broadly we may construe it, it cannot be held to cover an appeal from an order which is passed in a collateral proceeding or which has no direct or immediate connection with the decree under execution.” Though there is no long discussion of the divergent views which had been prevailing in the several Courts, presumably their Lordships were aware of the case-law on the point. In my opinion, the opinion expressed by the Supreme Court is against the view which gives a very wide meaning to the expression “where there has been an appeal”. A Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Rameshwar Prasad v. Parmeshwar Prasad1, has also come to the same conclusion and overruled the decision in Firm Dedhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwan Das2. The state of authority now is that the High Courts of Allahabad, Calcutta, Bombay (save in one decision of a single Judge) and Patna have adopted what has been sometimes called the narrower interpretation of the word “appeal” and the recent decision of the Supreme Court of India supports them. On a careful examination of the two decisions of our Court which take a different view, namely, Koyakutti v. Veerankutti3 (confirmed on appeal in Veerankutti v. Koyakutti4) and Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara5, I find that the entire reasoning of the learned Judges in the two cases is based on the observations of the Privy Council in Nagendranath De v. Sureschandra De6, already adverted to earlier on in this judgment. King, J., for instance says in Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara5: “And it is, of course, obvious that the ‘intelligible rule’ laid down by their Lordships in the concluding sentence of the second passage quoted must apply to the facts of the present case, where the success of an appeal against an order refusing to set aside an ex parte decree has precisely the same effect in regard to execution as a successful appeal against the decree itself” (at page 257). What King, J., apparently overlooked is that on the same reasoning, an ex parte decree will be affected by the result of a successful application to set it aside quite as much as by the success of an appeal against an order refusing to set aside the ex parte decree, but there is no provision under which time can be computed from the date of the disposal of such an application. I can discover no conceivable reason why the decree-holder should get the benefit of the time spent over an application to set aside an ex parte decree and the time taken for an appeal against an order on that application, but should not get the benefit of the time taken for the application when there is no appeal. I can discover no conceivable reason why the decree-holder should get the benefit of the time spent over an application to set aside an ex parte decree and the time taken for an appeal against an order on that application, but should not get the benefit of the time taken for the application when there is no appeal. And yet that is exactly what the learned Judges who advanced the “imperilling theory failed to notice. The learned Judge (King, J.) refused to meet the situation which was pressed before him as necessarily following from the acceptance of the wide interpretation of the word”appeal“which the learned Judges in that case were adopting, namely, a situation in which there had been a separate suit to set aside a decree on some such ground as that of fraud and the filing of an appeal against a decree in that suit. It must also be mentioned that King, J., expressly followed the decision of the Patna High Court in Firm Dedhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwandas1, as a direct authority on the facts before him. As mentioned above, this decision has since been overruled by a Full Bench of that Court in Rameshwar Prasad v. Parmeshwar Prasad2. With great respect to the learned Judges who decided Koyakutti v. Veerankutti3, Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara4 and Veerankutti v. Koyakutti5, I would dissent from their interpretation of the word “appeal” in clause (2) of column 3 of Article 182. In my opinion, that word which is no doubt a general word must bear a meaning restricted by its context and the meaning that I would give to it is an appeal from a decree or order of the nature mentioned in clauses (1) (3) and (4); that is to say, an appeal from the original decree or order, an appeal from a decree following a review of judgment, and an appeal from an amended decree. The true test is that the decree of the appellate Court in the appeal must be the decree which is sought to be executed. This, I think, irresistibly follows from reading column 3 along with cloumn 1 of the Article. In the case of an appeal against an order refusing to set aside the ex parte decree, this test will not be satisfied, for it is not the order passed in that appeal that is sought to be executed. It is the original decree itself. In the case of an appeal against an order refusing to set aside the ex parte decree, this test will not be satisfied, for it is not the order passed in that appeal that is sought to be executed. It is the original decree itself. That appears to be conclusive of the matter. In some of the cases to which reference has been made above, there was an appeal against the preliminary decree in a mortgage suit and an appeal therefrom; the question was whether for the execution of the final decree in such a case, time could be computed from the date of the disposal of the appeal against the preliminary decree. I am of opinion that it could be, but not because of the”imperilling“theory. An appeal against a preliminary decree involves an appeal against the final decree which follows that preliminary decree. Though the terminology gives an impression that there are two decrees, I think the correct legal position is that there is only one decree in a suit in the sense that it is the expression of an adjudication determining the rights of the parties with regard to all the matters in controversy in the suit. A preliminary decree is merely a stage in working out the rights of parties which are finally determined by the final decree. An appeal against a preliminary decree would be an appeal within the meaning of the word”appeal“in clause (2) of column 3. With respect I agree with the following observations made by Dawson Miller, C.J., in Somar Singh v. Deonandan Prasad6: ”There can be no doubt that the appeal to the High Court from the preliminary decree had it been successful would have had the effect of discharging the final decree passed by the trial Court as well as the preliminary decree. It seems to follow, therefore, as a matter of course that the appeal in this case was not only an appeal from the preliminary decree but an appeal from all that naturally followed by the passing of that decree, namely, the final decree for sale which after all is merely part of the machinery prescribed for carrying out the direction for sale contained in the preliminary decree. In the case before us there was only an application to bring on record the respondent as the Jegal representative of the defendant alleged to have died and a petition under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code to revise the order dismissing that application. Assuming the word “appeal” includes a civil revision petition as decided by the Full Bench in Chidambara Nadar v. Rama Nadar7, it is obvious that it is not the order on the civil revision petition that is being executed. That order cannot be the final decree or order of the appellate Court referred to in clause (2) of column 3 of Article 182. The execution petition was therefore rightly dismissed. The civil miscellaneous second appeal is dismissed with costs. Viswanatha Sastri, J.-I agree. Were it not for the importance of the question at issue and for the fact that we are overruling the considered decision of a Division Bench in Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara1, which was subsequently followed by this Court, I should have been content to express my formal concurrence in the judgment of my Lord. In the circumstances I shall proceed to state my reasons briefly. Interpreting clause (2) of the third column of Article 182 of the Limitation Act the Judicial Committee observed: “The fixation of periods of limitation must always be, to some extent, arbitrary and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, their Lordships think, the only safe guide” (Nagendranath De v. Sureshchandra De2). The only way of finding out the intention of Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act is for me to read it in the context in which it occurs, remembering that words and expressions take their colour from their environment and see what is the plain and ordinary meaning of the words “where there has been an appeal, the date of the final decree or order of the appellate Court” in Article 182(2). The proper way of reading Article 182 is to take the three columns together and clauses (1) to (4) in the third column so as, if possible, to give an interpretation which is both consistent and in accordance with general legal principles. Column 1 of Article 182 describes the nature of the application as being an application for the execution of a decree or order. Column 1 of Article 182 describes the nature of the application as being an application for the execution of a decree or order. Clause 1 of the third column of Article 182 refers to the date of the decree or order, which must mean, the date of the decree or order under execution. When clause (2) of the third column of Article 182 refers to an appeal, without expressly describing the thing which is the subject of appeal, the clause must be read along with column 1 of Article 182 and clause (1) of the third column of that Article. So read, the word “appeal” in clause (2) of the third column of Article 182 means an appeal from the decree or order described in column 1, and clause (1) of the third column, namely, the decree or order the execution of which is sought. It is as if clause (2) of the third column of Article 182 ran in these terms: “Where there has been an appeal from the decree or order the execution of which is sought, 3 years, from the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court.” The period of limitation is determined by column 2. The thing that is the subject of “appeal” in clause (2) of column 3 is indicated by reference to column 1 of Article 182 and the juxtaposition to clause (1) of column 3 of the Article. The genius of the English language or its idiosyncrasy, if you like, recognises such elliptical forms of expression, leaving something which has been previously expressed to be understood in what is said later in the same complex sentence. The draftsman of Article 182 has been somewhat laconic which is not a matter for surprise when 183 methods of non-suiting a litigant had to be devised and formulated instead of a few simple provisions easily understood and applied as in the English statutes. The draftsman of Article 182 has been somewhat laconic which is not a matter for surprise when 183 methods of non-suiting a litigant had to be devised and formulated instead of a few simple provisions easily understood and applied as in the English statutes. The construction contended for by the appellant and accepted by this Court in Sriramachandra v. Venkatarswara1, involves the reconstruction of the 2nd clause of the 3rd column of Article 182 as follows: “Where there has been an appeal from any decree or order capable of affecting or imperilling the decree or order sought to be executed, the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court.” I cannot take so much liberty with the second clause of third column of Article 182 when reading it with column 1 and clause (1) of column 3 as it should be it is easily understood and applied as it stands. This interpretation is also in accord with the scheme of our Civil Procedure Code. Under Order 41, rule 5, the filing of an appeal from a decree or order does not suspend the operation of the decree or order unless the appellate Court so directs. Where however an appeal is preferred from a decree, the Court of appeal is really seized of the whole suit and has the powers of the trial Court, though the relief given by it will ordinarily, but not necessarily, be limited to the portion of the decree appealed against. See section 107 and Order 41, rules 4 and 33, Civil Procedure Code. An appeal is considered as a continuation of the suit for purposes of res judicata and lis pendens. Clause (2) of the third column of Article 182 proceeds on this judicial view of the nature and effect of an appeal from a decree. See per Bhashyam Aiyangar, J., in Krishnamachariar v. Mangammal1; per Gwyer, C.J., in Shyamakanth Lal v. Rambhajan Singh2 and per Varadachariar, J., in Lachmeswar Prasad Shukal v. Keshwar Lal Chowdri3. Whether the appellate decree confirms, modifies or reverses the original decree, the original decree is merged in the decree of the appellate Court and the final decree to be executed is the decree of the appellate Court. Hence it is that special statutory provision is made in section 37, Civil Procedure Code, for execution of an appellate decree by the trial Court itself. Hence it is that special statutory provision is made in section 37, Civil Procedure Code, for execution of an appellate decree by the trial Court itself. Viewed in this light the words "where there has been an appeal" in clause (2) of column 3 of Article 182 must naturally refer to an appeal directly from the decree or order sought to be executed. Clause (2) of column 3 of Article 182 is part of a fasciculus of clauses dealing with cases where the finality of a decree or order is directly sought to be affected by an appeal from or review or amendment of that very decree or order. Surely it cannot be contended that the review contemplated in clause (3) or the amendment contemplated in clause (4) of the third column of Article 182 can refer to any decree or order, other than the decree or order sought to be executed and which has been subject of a review or amendment. Clauses (2), (3) and (4) of the third column of Article 182 alike contemplate and provide for cases where the decree or order whose execution is sought has been directly the subject of an appeal, review or amendment. In my view it would be impossible to read these clauses as meaning that if any order passed in the course of a suit is taken up on appeal or is sought to be reviewed or amended, the date of the disposal of the appeal, review or amendment as the case may be furnishes the starting point of limitation for the execution, not of that order, but of a decree that might be passed in the suit from which no appeal has been preferred or of which no review or amendment has been sought. The legislative history of Article 182(2) also confirms this view. Before the enactment of Article 182 of the Limitation Act of 1908, Article 179 of the Limitation Act of 1877 and Articles 167 and 168 of the Limitation Act of 1871 which corresponded to Article 182, were interpreted in the same manner in which we are now inclined to construe Article 182(2). Before the enactment of Article 182 of the Limitation Act of 1908, Article 179 of the Limitation Act of 1877 and Articles 167 and 168 of the Limitation Act of 1871 which corresponded to Article 182, were interpreted in the same manner in which we are now inclined to construe Article 182(2). With the exception of Lutful Huq v. Sumbhudin Pattuck4, which was dissented from in Jivaji v. Ramachandra5 and Baikantanath Mitra v. Aughorenath Bose6, it had been generally held by the High Courts that the words "where there has been an appeal" in Article 179(2) of the Limitation Act of 1871 meant ‘‘where there has been an appeal from the decree for whose execution application is made." See also Sheo Prasad v. Amrudh Singh7 . Where the language of an enactment has received judicial interpretation and the Legislature again employs the same language in a subsequent enactment dealing with the same subject-matter, the presumption is that the Legislature intended that the language so used by it in the subsequent enactment should be given the meaning which in the meantime had been judicially attributed to it. From this point of view also, the view which we are taking of the meaning of Article 182(2) is justified. In my humble opinion Article 182(2) offers no choice of interpretation and only a sophisticated reading could import any ambiguity into its meaning. I must now refer to a passage in the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Nagendranath De v. Sureshchandra De1, which has provided a jumping off ground for those who tried to leap the statutory fence. Sir Dinshaw Mulla observed: "It is at least an intelligible rule that so long as there is any question sub judice between any of the parties, those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so often thorny path of execution, which, if the final result is against them, may lead to no advantage." This passage has been relied upon for what has been called a "beneficial" interpretation of Article 182(2), that is to say, an interpretation according to one’s own notions of what is just, convenient and equitable. I humbly venture to think that this judicial vindication of legislative wisdom was not quite necessary for the purpose of the case before the Judicial Committee. The decision of the Judicial Committee rested on a literal reading of Article 182(2) without any gloss or qualification. I humbly venture to think that this judicial vindication of legislative wisdom was not quite necessary for the purpose of the case before the Judicial Committee. The decision of the Judicial Committee rested on a literal reading of Article 182(2) without any gloss or qualification. It is unfortunate that the above passage from the judgment of the Board got crystallised into a test and was applied as a touchstone to other cases calling for the application of Article 182(2). This passage has, by degrees, been allowed to obscure and even modify or alter the plain meaning of Article 182(2) as if it was a statutory explanation appended to the Article. It is not for me to say nor do I know for certain what the Legislature may or may not have had in its mind when it enacted Article 182(2) in the terms it did. I am bound by what it has said and left" unsaid. The Judicial Committee sought to justify Article 182(2) on grounds of convenience. Other reasons might be suggested and earlier in this judgment, I have indicated the judicial basis of this provision. I am therefore unable with great respect to read the passage in the judgment of the Judicial Committee, as if it laid down a principle of general application in interpreting the Articles of the Limitation Act. My Lord pointed out in the course of the arguments and has also indicated in his judgment the anomalous consequences of the opposite construction. If the view that any proceeding which is likely to imperil a decree sought to be executed suspends the running of time-a view opposed to the provisions of Order 41, rule 5, Civil Procedure Code-is to be acted upon, I do not know where we are to stop or why we should draw a line between proceedings in the same suit and proceedings in another suit as the learned Judges did in Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara2. I consider that the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Bhawanipore Banking Corporation, Ltd. v. Gowri Shankar Sarma3, is decisive of the point now under consideration. I consider that the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Bhawanipore Banking Corporation, Ltd. v. Gowri Shankar Sarma3, is decisive of the point now under consideration. Their Lordships expressed the view that the words "where there has been an appeal" in clause (2) of column 3 of Article 182 must be read with column 1 of that Article and could not be held "to cover an appeal from an order which is passed in a collateral proceeding or which has no direct or immediate connection with the decree under execution." Though there is no reference to the earlier decisions of the High Courts the learned counsel who appeared and the eminent Judges who decided the case must well have been aware of the difference of opinion between the High Courts. Apparently the Supreme Court thought that the construction of Article 182(2) was so simple that it did not require elaboration by reference to precedents. However all the earlier decisions have been reviewed by my Lord in his judgment and I respectfully agree with him in his appraisal of their value. I also agree that an appeal from a preliminary decree may perhaps stand on a somewhat different footing from appeals against interlocutory orders in the same suit. I agree that this civil miscellaneous second appeal should be dismissed with costs. Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.-I agree. K.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.