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1951 DIGILAW 6 (KER)

Lakshmi v. Narayana Iyer

1951-01-18

KUNHI RAMAN, SUBRAMONIA.IYER

body1951
Judgment :- 1. The defendant in O.S. 851 of 1117 on the file of the District Munsiff of Perumpavoor is the appellant before us. The plaintiffs are the respondents. The suit was for recovery of possession of certain immovable properties on foot of a lease of year 1107. The lease deed is Ext. B. A period of 12 years is fixed as the term in the lease. The rent reserved in the lease is Rs. 88-4-0 per year. There is a provision in the lease deed for forfeiture of the term on default of payment of the rent reserved. On the allegation that the term had been forfeited on account of default in payment of rent pursuant to this provision the suit was filed in 1117 even though the term under the lease would expire only 2 years later. The defence was that the term had not been forfeited and that the suit was premature. In the event of a decree for surrender the defendant claimed value of certain improvements alleged to have been effected by her. In the plaint as originally filed the plaintiffs, claimed Rs. 88-4-0 per year by way of mesne profits from date of suit until date of delivery of possession. Afterwards by an amendment this figure 881/4 was enhanced to Rs. 700 per year. The plaintiffs claimed mesne profits on the ground that from the date on which the defendant should have delivered possession to the plaintiffs pursuant to a notice demanding possession filed as Ext. XIV in the case, the defendant's possession was wrongful and from that date or at any rate from the date of suit the defendant is liable to pay'mesne profits' to the plaintiffs. 2. The courts below have concurrently found that the defendant is entitled to payment of Rs. 549 by way of value of improvements effected by her in the property and that the plaintiff is entitled to possession only on deposit of that amount and notice therefore to the defendant. The learned Munsiff decreed the suit on the 27th Dhanu 1124 decreeing profits at the rate of Rs. 549 by way of value of improvements effected by her in the property and that the plaintiff is entitled to possession only on deposit of that amount and notice therefore to the defendant. The learned Munsiff decreed the suit on the 27th Dhanu 1124 decreeing profits at the rate of Rs. 88-4-0 as originally claimed in the plaint and disallowed the claim for the enhanced profits claimed by the plaintiffs on the ground that except a statement made by the defendant in her written statement that the sugarcane cultivation that she was having on the property would yield a net income of Rs.1500 a year "there are no other materials to find out the proper yield from the property." The sugarcane cultivation that is referred to in the written statement was not continued for any length of time but was stopped some time before the matter was argued before the learned Munsiff as is clear from the Munsiff's judgment. In appeal, the learned District judge decreed the enhanced claim of Rs. 700 a year based on the said statement of the defendant that the property would yield Rs. 1500 a year. 3. Now on the date of the decree passed by the learned Munsiff the amount fixed by way of value of improvements payable to the defendant had not been deposited. In a case where a defendant is directed to deliver possession of property to a plaintiff on condition of depositing a certain amount payable to the defendant the possession of the defendant does not become wrongful until the deposit is made and notice thereof given. Admittedly the amount decreed to be paid by way of value of improvements had not been deposited in court on the date of the decree passed by the learned Munsiff. The possession of the defendant had not, therefore then become wrongful. If so, no question arose of any mesne profits to be considered by the learned Munsiff. 4. The term'mesne profits' has been defined in the Civil Procedure Code in S.2(2). "Mesne profits" of property means those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits, but shall not include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession". O. 20, R.12 provides for a decree for possession and mesne profits. "Mesne profits" of property means those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits, but shall not include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession". O. 20, R.12 provides for a decree for possession and mesne profits. That rule reads thus: "(1) Where a suit is for the recovery possession of immovable property and for rent or mesne profits, and in case in which value of improvements is claimed but the amount of such value is disputed, the court may pass a decree (a) for the possession of the property; (b) for the rent or mesne profits which have accrued on the property during a period prior to the institution of the suit or for the value of improvements or directing an inquiry as to such rent or mesne profits or value of improvements; (c) directing an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits or the value of improvements from the institution of the suit until - (i) the delivery of possession to the decree-holder; (ii) the relinquishment of possession by the judgment-debtor with notice to the decree -holder through the court; or (iii) the expiration of three years from the date or the decree, whichever event first occurs. (2) Where an inquiry is directed under Cl. (b) of Cl. (c) a final decree in respect of the rent or mesne profits shall be passed in accordance with the result of such inquiry." It appears to us that in a case where at the time the decree is passed the possession of the defendant is not wrongful with the result that no liability for mesne profits arises on the part of the defendant, 0.20 R.12 would have no application. It is only in a case where at the time the decree is passed the possession is wrongful that an inquiry into mesne profits can be made by the court. Under the old Code the question of mesne profits used to be inquired into in execution. It is only in a case where at the time the decree is passed the possession is wrongful that an inquiry into mesne profits can be made by the court. Under the old Code the question of mesne profits used to be inquired into in execution. That procedure was altered and the provision in the new Code is for consideration of that question in the suit itself but subject to this, namely, that the question must properly arise for adjudication in the suit which will arise only if at the time the decree is passed the defendant's possession is wrongful. If the liability thus arises, decree may provide therefore till date of delivery or three years from date of decree whichever is earlier. 5. In this case, as has already been mentioned, the possession, of the defendant was not wrongful. No question of her liability for mesne profits arose and the learned Munsiff was perfectly right in decreeing payment only of the amount of rent reserved in the lease deed, Ext. B, though he fixed it not as rent but as 'mesne profits'. In this he was wrong because there may be liability to pay rent or whatever is fixed by way of rent in the lease deed even after the termination of the tenancy; but unless the possession of the quondam tenant becomes wrongful the tenant's liability to pay rent cannot be characterised as liability to pay mesne profits which liability, as already mentioned, arises only in a case where the tenant's possession becomes wrongful. 6. In the view we have taken, namely, that the learned Munsiff was right in decreeing only payment of the amount reserved by way of rent in Ext. B the learned judge was wrong in having reversed the judgment of the learned Munsiff. The decree passed by the learned judge is unsustainable and ought to be reversed. It is unnecessary to canvass the various points made by the learned judge in his judgment except that we have to mention that the learned judge also calls the liability of the defendant even before the amount is deposited as one for 'mesne profits'. 7. The decree passed by the learned judge is unsustainable and ought to be reversed. It is unnecessary to canvass the various points made by the learned judge in his judgment except that we have to mention that the learned judge also calls the liability of the defendant even before the amount is deposited as one for 'mesne profits'. 7. The learned judge states in paragraph 12 of the judgment; "It goes without saying that the rental fixed as early as 1107, when commodities sold low, requires to be enhanced in proportion to the present high level of prices." We must take strong exception to this statement. When a rent is fixed in a lease deed whenever it might have been fixed the liability of the tenant is only to pay that rent unless the tenant has by any supervening cause incurred further liability. He might have made a good bargain and subsequent events including rise in prices may enable him to make a profit. But that is no consideration to effect an alteration in his liability. Another statement in the judgment of the learned judge is "If the defendant chooses to cling on to the property even after that sum is deposited it is only proper that she pays mesne profits at the rate claimed by the plaintiffs". This statement also is open to a similar objection because in a case where mesne profits are claimed by a plaintiff against a person alleged to be in wrongful possession on the ground that with due diligence the latter might have obtained a certain amount of profits the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove it. It is not enough for him to claim. It is only in a case where the defendant says that he, as a matter of fact, got only so much by way of profit that the onus is upon the defendant to prove it because the matter is more within his knowledge than within the knowledge of the plaintiff. 8. Though another point was raised in the memorandum of appeal relating to costs in the lower courts Mr. Krishna Menon, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant did not think it worthwhile to press it. Mr. 8. Though another point was raised in the memorandum of appeal relating to costs in the lower courts Mr. Krishna Menon, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant did not think it worthwhile to press it. Mr. Varadaraja Iyengar, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff's respondents submitted before us that as a matter of fact the amount fixed as value of improvements was deposited by his clients in court before the lower appellate court passed its decree. If his clients have done so and if notice thereof has been given to the defendant his clients would be entitled to pursue appropriate remedies against the defendant defaulting to deliver possession of the property. 9. We, therefore, allow the second appeal with proportionate costs, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and restore that of the Munsiff, as regards the quantum of future profits decreed against the defendant which is the only point urged in this second appeal. Appeal Allowed.