ORDER H. S. KAMATH, PRESIDENT. - The applicant seeks revision of the order of the Sales Tax Commissioner upholding the assessment order made on him for the first "quarter" (1-6-47 to 12-11-47) after the commencement of the Sales Tax Act. 2. The first item included in his taxable turnover by the Assessing Officer and objected to by the applicant is a sum of Rs. 21,400 representing the price for which he sold two of his old cars. The Assessing Officer's order gives no reasons for including this amount and is laconic; "......... The sales of old motor cars worth Rs. 21,400............ were altogether omitted from the gross turnover." The Sales Tax Commissioner, however, has given some reasons in support of the inclusion : "The appellant contends that his sales of car worth Rs. 21,400 should have been exempted, as he was not mainly a dealer in cars. The Sales Tax Act does not make any distinction between goods and while fixing the incidence of taxation under Section 4 ............... the sale of a car by a person who has registered as a dealer - may be for other commodities - is clearly liable to sales tax." The fact is not disputed that the applicant is not a dealer in motor cars and that he did not mention motor cars in his application for registration among goods ordinarily purchased by him for resale. In the circumstances, if the Commissioner's view were to prevail, it would mean that sales of every item of the applicant's property, including, for example, his household furniture and kitchen equipment, which have no connection with his business as a dealer, will have to be included in his taxable turnover. We do not think that it could have been the intention of the Legislature to discriminate in this manner against a dealer in comparison to the ordinary citizen, who is not a dealer, in the exercise of his fundamental rights [vide Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution] to dispose of his private property for which he feels he has no longer any use. Our attention, in this connection, has been drawn to an Australian decision, Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation for the State of South Australia v. Ellis & Clark Limited (52 Com. L.R. 85) which dealt with the case of a company carrying on business as electrical engineer and as wholesale and retail dealer in electrical goods. Our attention, in this connection, has been drawn to an Australian decision, Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation for the State of South Australia v. Ellis & Clark Limited (52 Com. L.R. 85) which dealt with the case of a company carrying on business as electrical engineer and as wholesale and retail dealer in electrical goods. As part of his business, it purchased and resold second-hand electrical motors and other second-hand goods. The Australian High Court held that such resales of second-hand goods were not liable to sales tax. The reasons underlying the decision, as explained by Dixon J., are briefly as follows :- "Although the tax levied by the enactments is called a sales tax, it is not a tax upon all sales of commodities. It is a tax levied upon one one only of the transactions which commonly takes place in respect of goods before they reach the consumer after they are imported into or produced in Australia ........................the general policy of the legislation is to levy this tax upon the last sale of the goods by wholesales, that is upon the sale to the retailer by the last wholesaler". The Australian scheme does not appear to be quite similar to ours and it may perhaps not be safe to draw an analogy. In the circumstances governing the general scheme of our Act, we would not be inclined to hold, without fuller examination, that sales of second-hand goods should not be included in the taxable turnover, even where they constitute one of the lines of business of the dealer. The fact whether they constitute one of the lines of business will not necessarily depend on whether he mentioned those goods in his application for registration. What be of practical importance is the volume of and the degree of frequency in business transactions in these lines. In the case before us, by none of the tests applicable can the dealer be considered as engaged in the business buying and selling used or second-hand motor cars; apart from the two cars sold during the quarter, no other instance of his selling either a new or a second-hand car has been brought to our notice. We have, therefore, no hesitation in cancelling the inclusion of the price of these cars (Rs. 21,400) in the taxable turnover for the quarter. 3. The second item objected to is a sum of Rs. We have, therefore, no hesitation in cancelling the inclusion of the price of these cars (Rs. 21,400) in the taxable turnover for the quarter. 3. The second item objected to is a sum of Rs. 657-7-6 representing municipal taxes on certain goods sold by the applicant. The Assessing Officer, after examining the applicant's accounts, found that the amount had been charged to customers and he help that it must therefore be regarded as part and parcel of the sale price. Somewhat contrary to what has been stated in the application for revision, an attempt has been made to suggest in the course of arguments that these were taxes paid to the Municipal Committee for storing cloth in the ware-house and that the account books did not show that the amount was included in the sale price. This is essentially a question of fact which cannot be urged in revising under Rule 57. We also note that on this question of fact the two Courts below have arrived at concurrent findings. 4. The third item is in respect of sales of plain glass sheets, such as are used window panes and door panes. The Sales Tax Commissioner has upheld the interpretation of the Assessing Officer in including them under "glass-ware", appearing as part of item 14 of the unamended Schedule I to the Act. Under the proviso to Section 5, articles mentioned in this Schedule are subject to a tax of 0-1-0 in the rupee of the taxable turnover. It has been urged on behalf of the applicant that plaint glass sheets do not constitute "glass-ware" and should have been taxed at the ordinary rate of 0-0-6 in the rupee, mentioned in the main Section 5. In support of the contention, our attention has been drawn to the context in which "glass-ware" appears in item 14, which reads as follows : "glass-ware, domestic pottery and china". The learned counsel for the State has suggested that the assessing authorities have apparently proceeded on the strength of the dictionary meaning of "glass-ware" which, according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, is "articles made of glass". In this generic sense, it is just possible to hold that plain glass sheets are covered by "glass-ware", but dictionary meaning cannot be regarded as the last word on the subject. In this generic sense, it is just possible to hold that plain glass sheets are covered by "glass-ware", but dictionary meaning cannot be regarded as the last word on the subject. According to Maxwell, (page 34 of the Interpretation of Statutes, 9th edition) "definition in dictionaries have been deprecated." He quotes Lord Coleridge : ... "dictionaries are not to be takes as authoritative exponents of the meaning of words used in Acts of Parliament, but it is a well-known rule of courts of law that words shall be taken to be used in their ordinary sense, and we are therefore sent for instruction to those books." Considered in this light, there is a great deal of force in the contention of the applicant's learned counsel that the context in which "glass-ware" appears in Schedule I to the Act is important. Of importance also is the intention of the Legislature in laying down that goods mentioned in this schedule shall be liable to a higher rate of taxation than others. These goods apparently have been regarded luxuries, used mostly by the comparatively richer classes of people, who can legitimately be expected to pay a higher rate of tax in respect of them. There can be no doubt that "glass-ware" understood in the sense of glass tumblers, dishes, bowls, decantors and the like and domestic pottery and china are goods that one generally comes across only in the dinning rooms and public rooms of well-to-do households in our country, who have, in various degrees, been influenced by contact with the West. On the other hand, plain glass sheets do not constitute a luxury article in that sense. We are inclined, therefore, to uphold the contention advanced on behalf of the applicant and to direct that sales of glass sheets should be taxed at the ordinary rate of six pies in the rupee. 5. The remaining four items all relate to supply of linseed to four different concerns : Name of concern Sale price of linseed supplied. (a) Ishwarmal Bhagwandas Rs. 2,567-6-8 (in Central Provinces) (b) Swaika Oil Mills, Calcutta " 77,212,11-0 (c) Royal Trading Co., Calcutta " 24,323-7-3 (d) Udairam Laxminarain of Calcutta. " 17,984-2-3 Exclusion of all these amount from the taxable turnover has been claimed for different reasons. 6. (a) Ishwarmal Bhagwandas Rs. 2,567-6-8 (in Central Provinces) (b) Swaika Oil Mills, Calcutta " 77,212,11-0 (c) Royal Trading Co., Calcutta " 24,323-7-3 (d) Udairam Laxminarain of Calcutta. " 17,984-2-3 Exclusion of all these amount from the taxable turnover has been claimed for different reasons. 6. In regard to (a)- Iswarmal Bhagwandas - exclusion has been disallowed on the ground that the sales took place on 2-9-47 when the vendee was still unregistered. He became a registered dealer on 11-10-47. The position in this respect, so far as the first quarter is concerned, has been fully examined in the Board's order in Hirji Govindji v. The State ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 263); and the applicant's learned counsel is justified in urging that what matter is the date on which the application for registration was made and the date on which he was actually registered by the authorities. Unfortunately, on information is available in the record regarding this date, nor has the applicant's learned counsel who promised to supply the information has done so up-to-date. In the circumstances, we have no option but to hold that sales for the amount in question were made to an unregistered dealer and have been rightly taxed. 7. In regard to (b), the contention on behalf of the applicant is that the sales were made to the firm of Ramdas Mahadeoprasad, who own the Swaika Oil Mills at Calcutta and who have their head office at Calcutta and branch office at Jabalpur, the latter being a registered dealer in the province. On this point, the applicant's agent stated as below before the Assessing Officer :- Ramkaran Mishra of Ramdas Mahadeo & Co. had come here for purchasing Alsi somewhere in the month of Kumvar last year. He placed an order with us for the purchase of Alsi at Raipur. We purchased linseed worth Rs. 77,212-11-0 including gunny bags, commission etc., from various dealers in the market and despatched the goods to Calcutta, Swaika Oil Mills. We purchased the linseed from the various registered dealers after furnishing declarations to the effect that the goods were meant for resale ................ Ramdas Mahadeo & Co. also furnished us declaration to the same effect." In declining to exclude the amount from the taxable turnover, the Assessing Officer gave the following reasons, which have been upheld by the Sales Tax Commissioner : "............ Ramdas Mahadeo & Co. also furnished us declaration to the same effect." In declining to exclude the amount from the taxable turnover, the Assessing Officer gave the following reasons, which have been upheld by the Sales Tax Commissioner : "............ the linseed was despatched to Swaika Oil Mills, Calcutta, and not to Ramdas Mahadeo & Co., of Jabalpur which is a registered dealer. The sales were made not to the latter but to the former dealer and therefore were not sales to a registered dealer." There is nothing to suggest in this rather brief order that the nature of the transactions described by the applicant's agent was seriously considered, nor is there anything to suggest that his statement was disbelieved. From the facts proved in another case which we have heard, Ramdas Mahadeoprasad v. The State (D.B.R.R. No. 12/XXXIII-7/51) we are satisfied that the Swaika Oil Mills is owned by the firm of Ramdas Mahadeo. That being so, the main point for consideration are whether or not the contract of sale in this case was made with the Jabalpure branch of the firm, which is a registered dealer, and whether or not this dealer gave a declaration that the linseed was required either for resale or for being crushed and turned into oil for sale. If the answers to these questions are in the affirmative, the transactions would be exempt from taxation, even if the manufacture or resale was to take place outside the province. On these points there is need for further enquiry and decision afresh. 8. The cases of (c) and (d) in paragraph 5 above are rather obscure. The Assessing Officer has dismissed the case of despatches to the Royal Trading Co., Calcutta, in one sentence : "These are not obviously sales to registered dealer and have therefore been disallowed." The Sales Tax Commissioner has given some more details : "......... The appellant's contention is that the Royal Trading Co. was working as his agents, and the despatch of linseed was made to Calcutta, to be sold there. The appellant has no evidence to prove that these goods were sold out of the province. The goods were despatched to the Royal Trading Co., Calcutta, whom the assessee calls to be his agent. was working as his agents, and the despatch of linseed was made to Calcutta, to be sold there. The appellant has no evidence to prove that these goods were sold out of the province. The goods were despatched to the Royal Trading Co., Calcutta, whom the assessee calls to be his agent. As this so-called agent was free to sell the goods at any price, and settle the bargain with anybody he liked, and was thus responsible for any loss on account of bankruptcy of the buyer, he is actually not an agent, but the buyer." The learned Sales Tax Commissioner has reproduced the above almost verbatim from a report he called for and obtained from the Assessing Officer, after the appeal was instituted before him. We have been unable to find out wherefrom the Assessing Officer obtained the information which he passed on to the Commissioner. When the case was before him (the Assessing Officer) he does not appear even to have recorded a statement from the applicant or his agent concerning the despatches to the Royal Trading Company, Calcutta, in the manner he has done in most other instances. 9. In regard to the despatched made to (d) in paragraph 5 above, rather more information is available. The following is from the statement of the applicant's agent before the Assessing Officer : "........... The sale proceeds (were) received by us from time to time and credited to his personal account. There is no written agreement between us and Udairam Laxminarain. It was orally settled between us that he will change Re. 1 commission and other expenses at Calcutta incurred by him. When he found suitable rates in Calcutta market, he sold the goods there." Apparently, on the basis of this statement and on no other evidence discernible in the record, the Assessing Officer gave reasons analogous to what the Sales Tax Commissioner did in the case of the despatches to the Royal Trading Co., and rejected the claim for exemption from taxation. 10. On the facts, as they appear in the record, we find ourselves unable to come to a decision in regard to the linseed supplied to the Royal Trading Co. and Udairam Laxminarain, both of Calcutta. The sales, of course, have taken place and sale proceeds have been received by the applicant. 10. On the facts, as they appear in the record, we find ourselves unable to come to a decision in regard to the linseed supplied to the Royal Trading Co. and Udairam Laxminarain, both of Calcutta. The sales, of course, have taken place and sale proceeds have been received by the applicant. But the questions for consideration are : (a) where and when exactly and between whom were the contracts of sale made in each case ? and (b) where were the goods situated when the contracts were made ? The learned counsel for the State has argued that these were matters within the knowledge of the assessee and information concerning them should have been furnished voluntarily and fully by him, when his case was before the Assessing Officer. He has relied for this proposition on certain decisions in Messrs. Gangaram Balmokand v. Commissioner of Income-tax, ([1937] 5 I.T.R. 464; A.I.R. 1937 Lah. 721), Lal Mohan Krishna Lal Paul v. Commissioner of Income-tax ([1944] 12 I.T.R. 441; A.T.R. 1945 Cal. 62) and Mahabir Prasad Munnalal v. Income-tax Officer, Cawnpore, ([1947] 15 I.T.R. 393; A.I.R. 1947 All 414), arising out of the Income-tax Act. In urging the application of the principles explained in those decisions to cases under the Sales Tax Act, he suggests that when once the assessing authorities prove the sale or when once the sale is admitted by the assessee himself, or when the sale is otherwise established, the exact terms of the sale must be disclosed by the assessee himself, as they are matter within the personal knowledge of the assessee rather than that of any other person. Briefly and broadly he would say, the burden of proof on questions of law would be on the assessing authorities, but on questions of fact the burden inevitably is on the assessee. He has drawn attention to Section 114 of the Evidence Act which provides in illustration (g) that the court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. There is a great deal of force in these arguments and we would normally be inclined to accept them. He has drawn attention to Section 114 of the Evidence Act which provides in illustration (g) that the court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. There is a great deal of force in these arguments and we would normally be inclined to accept them. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that the assessment in the case before us relates to the very first quarter after the coming into force of the Act, when neither the assessee nor the Assessing Officer could have been clear enough in their minds about the procedures and methods to be employed, nor could they have been fully aware of all the legal implications of several of the issues involved. Therefore, partly as a matter of grace and partly as a matter of equity, we would refrain from enforcing the principles suggested, in so far as the proceedings of the first quarter are concerned, provided that we have no reason, prima facie, to suspect the assessee's bona fides. 11. In the result, therefore, we allow the application in regard to the following items : (i) sales of second-hand motor-care for Rs. 21,400, and (ii) sales of glass sheets (for an amount unspecified). We reject the application in regard to the following items : (i) municipal octroi dues charged to customers, to the extent of Rs. 657-7-6, and (ii) sales of linseed to Iswarmal Bhagwandas for Rs. 2,567-6-6. In regard to the remaining three items, namely, despatches of linseed to the Swaika Oil Mills, Calcutta, the Royal Trading Co., Calcutta, and Udairam Laxminarain, Calcutta, we remand the case to the lower court for further enquiry on the lines suggested and decision afresh. Ordered accordingly.