Judgment Reuben, J. 1. This is an appeal by deft. 1 against a decision of the Additional Dist. J. of Manbhum-Singhbhum, affirming a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Purulia restraining deft. 1 from executing against the pltfs. respondents a decree obtained by him in Title Suit No. 895 of 1940 in 2. The dispute relates toa building in the town of Purulia known as Pratap Natya Mandir & the premises appertaining thereto. This building is intended for the performance of cinematograph shows & admittedly belonged to Akhoy Kumar Sen (pro forma deft. 3), by whom it was transferred to its present owner Shreemati Radharani Dassi (pro forma deft. 2). The facts as found are that the cinema hall was formerly let to the proprietors of the Shankar Talkies, who held it for some years but relinquished it on fitting to obtain from the Executive Engineer, Hazaribigh Division, a certificate of soundness necessary under the law for the holding of cinematograph shows therein. It was then taken by one Nagendra Nath Dutta, who was unable to make it fit for the purpose & surrendered it in March 1940. Pltf. 1, Raj Kiahore Misra, then entered into possession under an agreement entered into on 24 3-1940 with deft. 2, which is in the following terms : "I, the first party settle (the said theatre house) with you, the second party, on the following terms: That from to-day you shall, at your own cost, go on doing all works of repairs to the said house & of reconstructing the roof, walls, etc. in accordance with the Govt. rules regarding Cinema Houses. After reconstructing the house you shall apply to the Govt. authority concerned for a soundness certificate; & then I shall lease out (the house) to you for 10 (ten) years on a rent of Rs. 75 per month. You shall be in possession of the said Cinema House on monthly rent as a tenant. The rent shall in no case be less than Rs. 75 per month. That within nine months from to-day you shall have to make the house fit for Cinema Show after completing all works (of construction). I shall not be competent to settle (the said house) with anybody else within the specified time. Should I do so, the same shall be null & void. 75 per month. That within nine months from to-day you shall have to make the house fit for Cinema Show after completing all works (of construction). I shall not be competent to settle (the said house) with anybody else within the specified time. Should I do so, the same shall be null & void. On your demand for a pucca deed of lease after making the house fit for Cinema Show (House) withininine months, should I refuse to execute the deed, you shall be competent, by virtue of this agreement, to get the requisite deed executed with the help of the Court & you shall pay rent at the rate of Rs. 75 per month. You shall be competent to deduct from the rent (payable by you) the amount that you shall spend from to-day in making the Cinema House fit & shall go on paying rent when your dues shall be satisfied. Should you surrender the house on your being unable to reconstruct the same making it fit for obtaining the Soundness Certificate within nine months, you shall not be entitled to claim any amount of money from me. Should you not surrender the house on the expiry of the aforesaid time, & should you continue to make the house fit for a Cinema Show & spend money (on that account) & after completing the work should demand a pucca deed of lease from me, I shall be bound (to ?) execute a deed of lease provided that you shall not be entitled to claim or deduct from the rent (payable by you) the amount that you shall spend from to-day for making the Cinema House fit for Cinema Show on the ground of compensating my loss due to your taking a longer time than the time specified in the agreement. Should I, the first party, make any breach of agreement within the time specified in the agreement, I shall be liable for the full amount of your loss caused thereby." He made the necessary repairs & obtained a certificate of fitness on 12-11-1941 & obtained a registered lease from Smt. Radharani Dassi in favour of himself, pltf. 2 & one Rajendra Prasad Misra, who has since transferred his interest to pltf. 3, by which lease the Pratap NATYA mANDIR was settled with these persons for a period of ten years on a monthly rental of Rs. 2 & one Rajendra Prasad Misra, who has since transferred his interest to pltf. 3, by which lease the Pratap NATYA mANDIR was settled with these persons for a period of ten years on a monthly rental of Rs. 75 with an option of renewing the lease for another ten years on the same terms. The lease was executed on 3-11-1941 & was registered on 15-11-1941. 3. The suit was brought to resist an attempt by deft. 1 to take possession of the cinema hall in execution of a decree for specific performance of an agreement to lease this property obtained by him against deft. 2 in Title Suit No. 395 of of 1940 in the Court of the Additional Munsif of Purulia. That suit originated as a suit for the enforcement of a registered lease by deft. 2 in favour of deft. 1 dated 5 4-1940 on the allegation that, in spite of executing the lease in his favour, she did not give him possession. In Second Appeal No. 66 of 1943 disposed of on 6 5-1948, it was pointed out by their Lordships that the document relied on was not a valid lease, having been executed by deft. 2 alone, & the plaint was permitted to be altered into one for specific performance & a decree was given accordingly. The lease has now been executed as directed by the decree & deft. 1 is attempting to recover possession. Deft. 1 denied the existence of the alleged contract of 24-3-1940. According to him, this is an ante-dated document fabricated subsequently to his lease & his rights under his decree are unaffected by the pltf.s lease of 13-11-1941, as it was obtained during the pendency of his suit. The Courts below have rejected his story about the fabrication & antedating of the agreement of 24-3-1940 & have held that when deft. 1 entered into the agreement of 5-4-1940 he had notice of the agreement of 24-4-1940 & knew of the pLtfs possession of the cinema hall. 4. The main argument on behalf of the appellant is on this line: the pltfs. rely upon two documents, (1) the agreement to lease of 24-3-1940 & (2) the lease of 3-11-1941; the first is inadmissible for want of registration, & the second is affected by the rule of lis pendens & does not affect the rights of deft. 1 under his decree. rely upon two documents, (1) the agreement to lease of 24-3-1940 & (2) the lease of 3-11-1941; the first is inadmissible for want of registration, & the second is affected by the rule of lis pendens & does not affect the rights of deft. 1 under his decree. Under S. 17 (1) (d), Eegistraticn Act, lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent are required to be registered. Under cl. (7) of S. 2, a lease is defined to include "an agreement to lease". The meaning of this expression is now well settled. It must be an agreement which "effects an actual demise & operates as a lease" & "creates a present & immediate interest in the land" Hemanta Kumari V/s. Midnapur Zamindari Co., 47 Cal. 485. It must be distinguished from an agreement to create a lease on a future date, Panchanan Bose V/s. Chandi Charan, 37 cal. 808 & Bichardas Damodar V/s. Ahmeda- bad Borough Municipality, I. L. R. (1941) Bom. 529. It is not necessary to examine at length the several decisions which were cited before us. The cases in which the agreement was held to be a lease within the meaning of cl. (7) of S. 2 were all cases in which words of present demise had been used. The oriterion in all the cases is the intention of the parties. Ramjoo Mahomed v.j Haridas Mullick, 52 Gal. 695, Sanjib Chandra Sanyal V/s. Santosh Kumar Lahiri, 49 Cal. 507; Poole V/s. Btntley, (1810) 104 E. R. 66, Purmananddas Jiwandas V/s. Dharsey Virji, 10 Bom. 101; Harinath V/s. Promotho Nath, 25 c. w. N. 550; Nur Muhammad Veerjibhai Veelmahomed v. Natwar Lal, 45 ALL. 220 and Khodaijatul Kubra v. Krishna Pershad, A. I. R. (17) 1930 Pat. 530. 5. Let us examine the document in this light. It commences with the recitation that the first party Settles "bando basta karitechhi" the theatre house with the second party & gives the second party the right to enter therein and to make the premises suitable for the purposes of cinema performances, & indicates that on the certificate of soundness being obtained the first party will lease the house to the second party on a certain rent for a certain time. It binds the first party for a period of nine months not to settle the property with anybody else. Apparently, after this period, the second party may make such a settlement but, if she permits the second party to continue in possession & to make the house fit for the purpose she will be bound to execute the deed of lease but will not be liable to pay the amount spent by the second party in making the house fit for use. For the period during which the second party will be in possession for the purpose of making the house fit, no payment by way of rent is provided for. The grant of a lease as such is contingent upon the premises being made fit for the purpose in view. All that the document can be said to entitle the second party to in this respect is a right on complying with the specified conditions to ask for a lease. On behalf of the appellant stress has been laid on the use of the word "settle (bandobasta karitechhi)" & the subsequent use of the term "surrender". These terms, it is urged, indicate the creation of a present interest in the property. This interest, however, is at best confined to the period during which it is contemplated that the second party may remain for making the property fit for the purpose to which it was to be put. The right of the second party to remain on the land for this purpose was confined to a period of nine months. Therefore, the agreement even if it is regarded as a lease would not come within the provisions of cl. (d) of sub-s. (1) of s. 17 which requires the registration of leases from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent. For this reason, the document in question did not require registration. Even if it did, under S. 49 of the Act, it is admissible for collateral purposes. It would, therefore, be admissible to explain the nature of the possession of the pltfs. at the time of the agreement of 5-4-1940 on which deft. 1 relies. 6. To deal with the second part o! tha contention on behalf of the appellant it is necessary to examine the effect of s. 52, T. P. Act. This provides that "during the pendency ... at the time of the agreement of 5-4-1940 on which deft. 1 relies. 6. To deal with the second part o! tha contention on behalf of the appellant it is necessary to examine the effect of s. 52, T. P. Act. This provides that "during the pendency ... of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive & in which any right to immovable property is directly & specifically in question the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any of the parties thereto under any decree or order which may be made thereunder except &c." The protection ia given only to the rights of the parties as they existed when the suit was commenced & find embodiment in the decree in the suit. Nothing done by a party during the pendency of the suit can affect the rights of any other party under the decree, but, if a right exists in a stranger from before in relation to the property it will not be affected merely because the title to the property in pursuance of that right was perfected during the pendency of the suit. 7. I am supported by Bachan Singh V/s. Bijai Singh, 48 ALL. 221. In that case two pre-emption suits were filed & on the day when the second of these suits was filed one P. S. entitled to preempt equally with tha pltfs. in the two suits purchased the properties from the defts. vendees. The High Court gave a limited application to the doctrine of lis pendens & held that P. S. was entitled to share as a pre-emptor along with the pltfs. If the principle had been applied fully the Court would have had to hold that P. S. having acquired the property during the pendency of the suit could not resist the successful pltfs., who should, therefore, have got a decree for pre-emption in respect of the entireproperty. This decision was followed in Malik Singh V/s. Shiam Lal, 118 I. 0. 143, where the purchaser pendente lite was a preferential pre-emptor. Their Lordships pointed out that a person entitled to pre-empt may either come to Court & ask for pre-emption or he may avoid a suit by induoing the vendee to transfer the property directly to him. This decision was followed in Malik Singh V/s. Shiam Lal, 118 I. 0. 143, where the purchaser pendente lite was a preferential pre-emptor. Their Lordships pointed out that a person entitled to pre-empt may either come to Court & ask for pre-emption or he may avoid a suit by induoing the vendee to transfer the property directly to him. The purchaser pendente lite as a preferential pre-emptor had a right before the institution of the suit to pre-empt in preferenje to the pltfs & so his purchase during the pendency of the suit was not affected by S. 52. In Sharif Hussain V/s. Nur Shah, 123 I. 0. 124, one Imam Bibi sold certain lands on 13-12-1900. A suit in preemption was brought by three persons who got a decree & made the deposit on 28-11 1902 from which date the rights of the vendee vested in them under o. 20, R. 14 (1) (b). In the meantime, between the degree in the pre-emption suit & before the deposit of the money, certain in reversioners of Imam Bibis husband had instituted a declaratory suit against her without impleading the D- H. pre-emptors & obtained a decree in their favour on 13-1-1903. On the death of Imam Bibi, they sued for recovery of possession of the property. Their suit was dismissed by the High Court which observed that the dootrine of lis pendent applies to things coming into existence during the pendency of the suit & not where there is an existing right prior to the suit. Eeliance was placed on a decision of a Single Judge reported in Bhag v. Ujagar Singh, 96 I C. 450, which was subsequently affirmed in Letters Patent Appeal in Bhag v. Ujagar Singh, 135 1 C. 48. The facts there were similar, the D. H. in a pre-emption suit having perfected his title by the deposit of purchase money during the pendency of the declaratory suit against the original vendee. Their Lordships observed that : "the right to take over the bargain accrued to the defts. before the commencement of the suit for declaration brought by the pltf. & it has been held that the dootrine of lis pendens does not apply to the enforcement of a right which existed prior to the existence of the lis." 8. Their Lordships observed that : "the right to take over the bargain accrued to the defts. before the commencement of the suit for declaration brought by the pltf. & it has been held that the dootrine of lis pendens does not apply to the enforcement of a right which existed prior to the existence of the lis." 8. The same principle was applied in Chinna- swami Padayachi V/s. Dharmalinga Padayachi, 139 I. c. 309, to the pendente lite purchase in execution of a mortgage decree. Krishnan Pandalai J., with whom Waller J., agreed, observed: "With the greatest respect, I understand by Us pendens the rule by which by reason of a suit being pending about the rights to some property, subsequent dealings by the parties with that property so as to prejudicially affect the determination of these rights in that suit are invalidated. ... In my view the opinion expressed by Mukherjee J., in Bam Scnchi Lal V/s. Janhi Prasad, 134 I. G. 1, on the subject of lis pendens in mortgage suits is correct. It is that the rule only applies to transfers by the pltf. or daft, of their respective interests after the suit including transfers by Court sale in money decrees against either party. But it does not apply to previously eiisting transfers (including mortgages) or legal proceedings to enforce suoh transfers by those entitled." This decision was followed by Venkatasubba Eao J., in Suramma v Surayya, A. I. R. (21) 1934 Mad. 585, where his Lordship observed : "The reason for the doctrine is that but for it, interminable litigation might be the consequenoe. The alienations aimed against by the rule (as the passages extracted above show) are those made daring the pendency of the suit & not those whioh have been effected previously. If acertain right remains unaffected, the legal remedy to enforce that right must also continue. No suit, therefore, can operate as a lis pendens so as to affect the antecedent transfers which had come into existence prior to it ; the transfers being unaffected, it follows that the legal proceedings brought to enforce those transfers are likewise immune from the operation of the rule." My reasoning is supported by Madhur Sah v. Thag Sah, 1 Pat. L. J. 455, where the pltf. suing for speoific performance of sale by deft. 1 & for a declaration that a sale deed executed by deft. L. J. 455, where the pltf. suing for speoific performance of sale by deft. 1 & for a declaration that a sale deed executed by deft. 1 in respect of the same property in favour of deft. 3 was not binding on him, obtained during the pendency of the suit a sale deed from deft. 1 in respect of the disputed property. The High Court held that he was entitled to succeed if he proved that his contract for sale was prior to the conveyance in favour of deft. 2 & that deft. 2 purchased with notice of the contract. [8a] The question, therefore, is whether when the lease of 3-11-1941 was executed in their favour the pltfs. had any right in respect of the suit property whioh should get priority over the lease under which deft, 1 claims. It ia important to remember that this lease was executed in favour of deft. 1 on 6-4-1940, within the period of nine months mentioned in the contract on which the pltfs. rely, & also that the finding is that deft. 1 took the lease with notice of the contract of 24-3-1940; hence, the rights of the pltfs. continued unaffected by the lease in favour of deft. 1. It has been suggested that at the time when the lease in favour of the plctfs. was executed no right to ask for a lease in pursuance of the contract existed. The argument is based on an observation which fell from me in the course of the hearing. The contract makes specific arrangements for two periods, the first a period of nine months from the contract, the second such period following the nine months during which the pltfs. might be left in occupation of the premises & permitted to complete the repairs. With reference to the first period it is provided that after the repairs are completed deft 2 shall be bound on demand to execute a lease on a monthly rental of Bs. 75 & in the event of her doing so the other side may sue for specific performance. It also provides that the lessees shall be entitled to de. duct from the rent payable the amount spent by them in making the premises fit for use. 75 & in the event of her doing so the other side may sue for specific performance. It also provides that the lessees shall be entitled to de. duct from the rent payable the amount spent by them in making the premises fit for use. Then, coming to the second period, the agreement says that if the premises are surrendered after the period of nine months the grantees will not be entitled to any compensation on account of money spent in repairs. They will, however, be entitled to a lease if they are left in possession & complete the repairs again subject to the proviso that they will not recover anything on account of money spent in repairs. The particulars of the lease to be granted are not mentioned in this portion of the deed & there is no special mention that in the event of failure by deft. 2 to execute the lease the grantees will be entitled to specific performance. On a careful reading of the contract, I am satisfied that this division of the document between the two periods ia merely to emphasise the difference in the conditions on which the grantees will be entitled to a lease according as the lease is given in one or other of the two periods. If it is given in the earlier period, the grantees will be entitled to recover the repair expenses. If it is given later, they will not be so entitled. As regards the other terms, the lease will be on the same terms, namely for ten years on a rental of Rs. 75 per month. These terms, it may be noticed, are Specified in the portion of the contract which preceds the portions dealing with the two specific periods. The omission in the portion relating to the later period to provide for a suit for specifio performance has, in my opinion, no significance. The power to enforce a contract does not depend on the existence of sucha condition in the contract & it is clear from the contract that deft. 2 bound herself to execute a deed of lease 1951 Pat./78 & 79 within the second period if the grantees complied with the conditions specified therein. 9. Next, it has been contended that the lease on which the pltfs. rely is not in pursuance of the contract. 2 bound herself to execute a deed of lease 1951 Pat./78 & 79 within the second period if the grantees complied with the conditions specified therein. 9. Next, it has been contended that the lease on which the pltfs. rely is not in pursuance of the contract. It is pointed out that whereas the agreement is with plff. 1 alone the lease was. given to the pltf. & two other persons, The case of the pltf. was that pltf. 1 entered into the contract on his own account & on account of the other two persons. This oase was not challenged before the Courts of fact & it cannot be challenged in second appeal. It is further pointed out that the contract contains a renewal clause for a further period of ten years & provides for adjustment out of the rents payable of an advance of Es. 500 said to have been made by the pltfs. to deft. 2. These are merely additional terms & are not such as to justify a finding that the lease is not a transaction in pursuance of the contract. 10. There is another way in which the right of the pltfs, to resist the execution of the decree can be looked at. On the findings of the Courts of fact, it is clear that when deft. 1 instituted his suit the pltfs. were in bona fide possession of the cinema hall on their own account & that deft. 1 was aware of this fact Hence, on the position as it then was, the pltfs. were entitled to resist the execution of any decree that might be passed in the suit. The agreement on which deft. 1 succeeded in hia suit was executed within the aforementioned period of nine months, & the suit itself was instituted on 30-9-40 within the period of nine months. On the finding, therefore, that deft. 1 had notice of the contract, the pltffs, if they had been impleaded as defts. in that suit, would have been able to interpose the shield of S. 53A, T. P. Act. The fact that while standing in this position the pltffs. took the deed of lease from deft. 2 cannot make their possession worse than it was. It was at the worst merely an attempt to better their position. The plffs. in that suit, would have been able to interpose the shield of S. 53A, T. P. Act. The fact that while standing in this position the pltffs. took the deed of lease from deft. 2 cannot make their possession worse than it was. It was at the worst merely an attempt to better their position. The plffs. retained their possession of the property & are entitled to rely on it in resisting the execution of the decree obtained by deft. 1. 11. Finally, it is commented that whereas the lease under which the pltffs. claim entitles them to remain on the property for a period of ten years from November 1951, the injunction granted to them is a permanent injunction & is not confined to the beriod of the lease. The fallacy in the argument is that in the suit we are not concerned with determining the period for which the pltfs. are entitled to occupy the suit property. The only issue is whether deft. 1 is entitled to execute his decree against the pltfs. & to evict them therefrom. The Court having held that he is not, the injunction Has rightly been granted in a permanent form. 12. For these reasons, I consider that the appeal has no merits & must be dismissed with costs. Narayan, J. 13 I agree.