Judgment LAKSHMINKANTA JHA, J. 1. This is an appeal under the Letters Patent from a judgment of Shearer, J. upholding the concurrent decisions of the courts below & dismissing the suit. 2. The facts relevant to the point for decision may be shortly stated as follows: One Raghunandan Singh, father of the pltfs. along with one Awadh Singh, claimed raiyati interest in 19.5 acres of bakasht land situated in an estate belonging to Mt. Chandrakali Kuar, deft. 1. A dispute arose between the parties over the possession of this land & a proceeding under S. 144, Cr. P. C, was started, which terminated in favour of Raghunandan & Awadh. Consequently, Chandrakali Kuar, along with her granddaughter in whose favour she had executed a deed of gift, instituted a suit (Title Suit No. 113 of 1941) for possession of the disputed land against Raghunandan & Awadh. Raghunandan contested the suit & his defence was that Chandrakali had settled the land in dispute with him & Awadh under a sada patta. In support of his case he produced a hukumnama, which admittedly bore the thumb impression of Chandrakali, & several rent receipts. The defence was disbelieved & the suit was decreed on 13-5-1941, with costs. Raghunandan & Awadh preferred an appeal which was also dismissed on 30-4-1942. Thereupon they preferred a second appeal to this Ct. During the pendency of the second appeal Raghunandan died, & on his death the pltfs., along with their brother Bahrain (since deceased), were substituted. This second appeal was also dismissed with costs on 3-12-1943. 3. During the pendency of the appeal in the first appellate Ct. Chandrakali took out execution for costs of the trial Ct. against Raghunandan & Awadh in Execution Case No. 998 of 1941, & 5.10 acres of land belonging to the joint family consisting of the pltfs. & Raghunandan was sold on 20-1-1942, at Ct. sale & purchased by Chandrakali for Rs. 215/- & she later on took delivery of possession of the land on 9-11-1944. 4. The present suit was instituted by the pltfs. on the 7-4-1945, challenging the sale on the ground that they were under no pious obligation to pay up the decree for costs awarded against their father, Raghunandan, because he was guilty of a fraudulent act in that he produced a forged hukumnama bearing the thumb impression of Mt. 4. The present suit was instituted by the pltfs. on the 7-4-1945, challenging the sale on the ground that they were under no pious obligation to pay up the decree for costs awarded against their father, Raghunandan, because he was guilty of a fraudulent act in that he produced a forged hukumnama bearing the thumb impression of Mt. Chandrakali in support of the settlement of the land in favour of himself & Awadh. The decree for costs, according to them was of the nature of avyavaharika debt, &, therefore, they claimed immunity & sought recovery of possession of 12 annas interest in the suit land which was claimed by them as joint ancestral property. The defence of Chandrakali Kuar was that the pltf. Kirit Singh was himself a party to the fraud along with his father Raghunandan, that the decree for costs awarded against the pltfs. was not at all of the nature of avyavaharika debt & that the sale held in execution of the decree for costs was binding on them. 5. The trial Ct. held that the decree for costs was not an avyaharika debt & that the pltfs. were under pious obligation to pay the same. The suit was accordingly dismissed. On appeal, the learned subordinate Judge upheld the decision of the trial Ct. On second appeal, Shearer, J. also took the same view & dismissed the appeal. 6. The question for determination is whether the pltfs. who are governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, can impeach the sale on the ground that having regard to the nature of the judgment-debt, they were under no liability to pay it & the doctrine of pious obligation could have no application. The contention of Mr. Shambhu Prasad Singh, for the applts., is that the judgment-debt created under the decree of the Ct. is avyavaharika because Raghunandan used a forged document in support of his case. 7. On a review of the Hindu law texts, to which I shall presently refer, & the judicial pronouncements, I think the applts contention must fail. According to Smritis, if a Hindu dies indebted, he goes to hell. is avyavaharika because Raghunandan used a forged document in support of his case. 7. On a review of the Hindu law texts, to which I shall presently refer, & the judicial pronouncements, I think the applts contention must fail. According to Smritis, if a Hindu dies indebted, he goes to hell. For Katyayana ordains: "He who having taken a debt or the like does not pay it back to the creditor (or owner) is born in the flatters) nouse as a slave or a servant (for wages), a wife, or a beast." (Katyayanasmriti by P. V. Kane, V. 591, p. 239). If, however, a Hindu father fails to pay his own debt for any reason, a duty is cast upon his son to discharge it. For Brihaspati ordains: "In the absence of the debtor, his sons should pay the debt". (Brihaspati 11.47: Dr. Ganganath Jhas Hindu Law in its Sources, p. 203). "The son shall pay off his fathers debts before paying his own debts". (Brihaspati 11.48: Dr. Ganganaths Hindu Law in its Sources, p. 206). Similarly, Narada enjoins: "The son should try his best to absolve his father from debt", (Dr. Ganganath Jhas Hindu Law in its Sources, p. 203). "On the death of the father, the sons divided or undivided shall pay his debt in proportion to their shares." (Narada 4.2: Dr. Ganganath Jhas Hindu Law in its Sources, p. 205). "Fathers wish to have sons on their own account, thinking in their minds, He will release me from all obligations towards superior & inferior beings." (i.e. from the debt which he owes to his ancestors & from creditors). (Naradiya Dharma Sastra, by Dr. J. Jolly, p. 15, V. 5). Yajnavalkya also lays down the rule thus: "When the father has gone abroad, is dead or is immersed in difficulties, his debt should be paid by the sons & grandsons, when established by witnesses in case of a dispute." (Yajnavalkya, 2.50: Dr. Ganganath Jhas Hindu Law in its Sources", p. 203). Likewise katyayana says: "Even when the father is alive, if he is stricken by disease, or has gone away from the country, his sons shall pay his debt after twenty years." (Dr. Ganganath Jhas Hindu Law in its Sources, Vol. I, p. 204). Ganganath Jhas Hindu Law in its Sources", p. 203). Likewise katyayana says: "Even when the father is alive, if he is stricken by disease, or has gone away from the country, his sons shall pay his debt after twenty years." (Dr. Ganganath Jhas Hindu Law in its Sources, Vol. I, p. 204). "If the father is stricken by disease, or insane, or too old, or has been away from the country for a long time, the sons should be made to repay his debt." (Dr. Ganganath Jhas Hindu Law in its Sources, Vol. I, p. 205). "Even when the father is at home, if he happens to be blind from birth, or an outcast or insane, or suffering from consumption, laucoder- ma & such other foul diseases, his debt, when proved, should be paid by his son." (Dr. Ganganath Jhas Hindu Law in its Sources, Vol. I, p. 205). 8 From the texts quoted above, it appears that it is the primary duty of every Hindu to pay his own debt. If for any reason he fails to pay it, the putra, or son, as the son of his father, is under a pious duty to discharge it. According to some smritis, however, the sons liability arises cn the death of his father, whereas, according to others, it arises even in his lifetime. There was divergence of judicial opinion on this point. In Sahu Ram Chandra V/s. Bhup Singh, (44 IA 128 at p. 131) the Privy Council held that the pious obligation of the son does not arise till the death of his father. But the controversy was set at rest by a later pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Brij Narain V/s. Mangla Prasad, (51 IA 129). Their Lordships held "there is no rule that this result (i.e. liability to pay antecedent debt) is affected by the question whether the father, who contracted the debt or (burdens the estate, is alive or dead." 9. The sons obligation to discharge his fathers debt, however, is not unqualified. There are certain kinds of debt which, according to the Smritis, he is not bound to pay, as would appear from the following texts: "The son shall not be liable to pay the fathers debt, on account of surety-money, or a futile gift or gambling debts, or debts due to liquor, or the balance of fines & taxes." (Manu 8.159: Dr. Ganganath Jhas Hindu Law in its Sources, Vol. I, p. 207). "The son may not pay the paternal debt which was contracted for the purposes of spirituous liquor, lust or gambling, or which is due as the balance of an unpaid fine or toll as also a gift without any consideration." (Yajnavalkya, Gharpures Mitakshara, p. 73, V. 47). "That debt which descended hereditarily from the grandfather, which was ascertained by the father (i.e. the son of the grandfather) as due, which is free from taint & which was not repaid by the sons (of the grandfather) should be paid by the grandsons." (This is the view of the Bhrigu). (Katyayana in Smritichandrika, p. 297).* "The sons shall not be made to pay surety- money, trade-duties, debts due to gambling or drinking or fines." (Gautama 12.41: Dr. Ganganath Jhas Hindu Law in its Sources, Vol. I, p. 207). "Debts due to liquor, gambling, futile gifts, gifts promised in lust or anger, surety-money, balance of fines & taxes, these debts of the father the son shall not be made to pay". (Brihaspati 11.51: Dr. Ganganath Jhas Hindu Law in its Sources, Vol. I, p. 207). "Fine or balance of fine, tax or balance of tax, or what is not proper, such debts of the father, the son shall not pay." (Dr. Ganganath Jhas Hindu Law in its Sources, Vol. I, p. 208). 10 A summary of the texts quoted above shows that a son is not under any obligation to pay the following debts of his father: (1) debts due for spirituous liquor; (2) debts due for lust; (3) debts due for gambiing; (4) unpaid fines; (5) unpaid tolls;. (6) futile gifts, or gifts without any consideration or promised in lust or anger; (7) suretyship debts; & (8) debts that are not vyavaharika. 11. There is a divergence of opinion among the Nibandhakars regarding the interpretation of the phrase "na vyavaharikam" which finds place in the text of Ushanas (this text is also attributed to Vyas in Vivada Chintamani & other nibandhas. Vachaspati Misra in his Vivada Cintamani interprets it as "Vyavahara Bahishkritam" . Mitra Misra in his Virmitrodaya says that it means "surapanadinimittarn" that is, incurred for the purpose of liquor & the like. Nilkantha, though he quotes the verse of Ushanas in his Vyavahara Mayukha, does not attempt to explain the expression, but Mandlik translates it as "not proper". Vachaspati Misra in his Vivada Cintamani interprets it as "Vyavahara Bahishkritam" . Mitra Misra in his Virmitrodaya says that it means "surapanadinimittarn" that is, incurred for the purpose of liquor & the like. Nilkantha, though he quotes the verse of Ushanas in his Vyavahara Mayukha, does not attempt to explain the expression, but Mandlik translates it as "not proper". Colebrooke, however, translates the expression as "debt for a cause repugnant to good morals". The sharp difference of opinion among the Nibandhakars as to the precise import of the term led to a divergence of judicial opinion in its English rendering in cases in which the decision depended upon the interpretation of the text. The privy Council in Hemraj V/s. Khem Chand, (AIR (30) 1943 PC 142 at p. 146), on a review of the cases bearing on the point, accepted Colebrookes translation of the expression as correct, being the nearest approach to the spirit of the text, & set at rest the controversy as to its precise meaning. In this connection it is relevant to quote the observation of their Lordships, which runs thus: "Having regard to the principles underlying the rule of pious obligation, which forms the foundation for the sons liability, their Lordships think that the translation of the term Avyavaharika as given by Colebrooke makes the nearest approach to the true conception of the term as used in the Smrithi text, & may well be taken to represent its correct meaning." It is, however, clear from the texts & also authorities that the son is absolved from his obligation to discharge his fathers debt if it is found to be, at its inception, tainted with immorality or illegality. Lord Knight Bruce in Hunoomanpersaud Pandey V/s. Mt. Babooee Munraj Koonweree, (6 MIA 393 at p. 421), said: "Unless the debt was of such a nature that it was not the duty of the son to pay it, the discharge of it, even though it affected ancestral estate, would still be an act of pious duty in the son. Lord Knight Bruce in Hunoomanpersaud Pandey V/s. Mt. Babooee Munraj Koonweree, (6 MIA 393 at p. 421), said: "Unless the debt was of such a nature that it was not the duty of the son to pay it, the discharge of it, even though it affected ancestral estate, would still be an act of pious duty in the son. By the Hindoo Law, the freedom of the son from the obligation to discharge the fathers debt, has respect to the nature of the debt, & not to the nature of the estate, whether ancestral or acquired by the creation of the debt." In Girdharee Lall V/s. Kantoo Lall, 1 IA 321: (14 Beng LR 187 PC), the Privy Council quoting this passage observed: "That is an authority to shew that ancestral property which descends to a father under the Mitakshara law is not exempted from liability to pay his debts because a son is born to him. It would be a pious duty on the part of the son to pay his fathers debts, & it being the pious duty of the son to pay his fathers debts, the ancestral property, in which the son as the son of his father acquires an interest by birth, is liable to the fathers debts." 12. The obligation of the son to discharge his fathers debt depends upon the nature or character of the debt when it originated an examination of the circumstances before or after the liability is incurred is irrelevant to ascertain the nature or character of the debt. If there is something illegal or immoral in the act of the father when the liability is incurred, the son is not bound to discharge it. If, however, the father incurs a debt (voluntary or involuntary) to make good a loss caused by his wrongful act, such a debt cannot be said to be illegal or immoral, & the son cannot claim exemption merely because the act in consequence of which the obligation to make compensation arose was an illegal or Immoral act, or both illegal & immoral. Suppose, for instance, a father steals a property, but later on repents, & being unable to restore the stolen property makes good the loss by incurring a debt. Such a debt cannot be said to be immoral or illegal in its origin because the purpose of the debt is highly moral. Suppose, for instance, a father steals a property, but later on repents, & being unable to restore the stolen property makes good the loss by incurring a debt. Such a debt cannot be said to be immoral or illegal in its origin because the purpose of the debt is highly moral. A son cannot be absolved from liability to pay such debt simply because the father was guilty of an immoral act when he committed the theft. In support of this view I may refer to the case of Kartar Singh V/s. Harji Mal, (128 PR 1879 at p. 374), & Natassayyan V/s. Ponnusami, (16 Mad 99). In Kartar Singhs case, one B. S. stole and converted to his own use certain property belonging to H. M. who sued & obtained a decree for the value of the property. In execution of the decree some ancestral property belonging to B. S. was attached for the purpose of being sold in satisfaction of the decree. N. S., a son of B. S., brought a suit through his guardian to set aside the attachment on the ground that the ancestral property was not liable to his fathers debt, such debt having been contracted for an immoral purpose. It was held that the property was liable to be attached & sold in satisfaction of the pltfs decree. Plowden, J., in the course of his judgment, observed: "Granting that the son may go behind the decree, it is impossible to hold that the debt created by the decree is a debt contracted for an illegal or immoral purpose, merely because the act from which the obligation to make compensation arose was an illegal or immoral act, or both illegal & immoral........The most analogous case would be that of a father who had voluntarily contracted to compensate the person whom he had by a criminal offence deprived of property. A debt created by such a contract could not without an utter perversion of language be styled a debt contracted for an illegal or immoral purpose; on the contrary, it would be a debt contracted for a highly moral as well as lawful purpose, & the case of a debtor enforcing an obligation to pay an ascertained sum by way of such compensation stands upon at least as sound a basis, though the obligation be unwillingly contracted under lawful compulsion." In Natasayyan V/s. Ponnusami, (16 Mad 99), a decree was obtained against a Hindu for money dishonestly retained by him from the pltfs family to which he was accountable in respect of it. The J. D. having died, the D. H. sought to attach in execution property of the family which had passed into the hands of his son by survivorship. The sons objected that such property was not liable to attachment & the D. H. was referred to a regular suit. Thereupon he brought a suit against the sons. It was held that the sons were not entitled to go behind the decree except for the purpose of showing that the judgment debt was immoral or illegal in its origin. In that case the learned judges observed: "Upon any intelligible principles of morality a debt due by the father by reason of his having retained for himself money which he was bound to pay to another would be a debt of the most sacred obligation, & for the non-discharge of which punishment in a future state might be expected to be inflicted, if in any. The son is not bound to do anything to relieve his father from the consequences of his own vicious indulgences, but he is surely bound to do that which his father himself would do were it possible, viz., to restore to those lawfully entitled money he has unlawfully retained." This passage has been quoted with approval in Hemrajs case, (AIR (30) 1943 PC 142), to which I shall refer hereafter in detail. 13 For determination of the liability of the son, courts in India have drawn a distinction between a civil & a criminal liability of the father in incurring a debt. If the father is liable to criminal prosecution for a debt incurred by him, the son is not under any pious obligation to discharge such debt. 13 For determination of the liability of the son, courts in India have drawn a distinction between a civil & a criminal liability of the father in incurring a debt. If the father is liable to criminal prosecution for a debt incurred by him, the son is not under any pious obligation to discharge such debt. If, however, the liability of the father originates in the breach of civil duty, the son cannot claim freedom from the obligation to discharge such debt of the father. Mookerjee J. in Chhakauri Mahton V/s. Ganga Prasad, (39 Cal 862 at pp. 871-72) observed: "The cases of Mahabir Prasad V/s. Basdeo Singh, (6 All 234); Parernan Dass V/s. Bhattu Mahton, (24 Cal 672); & Mc Dowell & Co.,- Ltd. V/s. Ragava Chetty, (27 Mad 71), seem to negative the liability of the son under such circumstances, while the cases of Natasayyan V/s. Fonnuswami, (16 Mad 89); Venfeappayya V/s. Krishna Chariya, {31 Mad 281); & Gurunatham V/s. Raghavalu Chetty, (31 Mad 472), apparently support the liability of the Bon. These cases, however, may possibly be re- conciled if we recognise the distinction between a criminal offence & a breach of civil duty. In the flrst three cases, the father was guilty of criminal misappropriation as regards sums of money for which he was accountable; while in the second set of three cases, the father merely failed to ac- count for the money received by him, & his fail- ure to do so constituted nothing more than a breach of civil duty. The distinction is real though refined, & was recognised in Medai Tiru- malaiyappa Moodeliar v, Veerabudra, X9 ML J T59), where it was ruled that if a debt was in- curred by an agent, his son was liable to pay the debt & the liability of the son was not affected by the circumstance that the father subsequently misappropriated the sum or made himself crimi- nally liable. The case last mentioned consequently supports the view that, where the taking of the sassey itseif is Tiot a criminal offence, a subse- quent misappropriation by the father cannot dis- charge the son from his liability to satisfy the debt; but the position is different if the money has been taken by the father & jmsappr-o^risied ygder fi&eaaistaiiees which render the taking itself a criminal offence." The rule formulated by Mokherjee, J. was recog- nised by the Judicial Committee in Toshanpal Singh V/s. Dist. J. Of Agra, (61 IA 350: 56 All 548). la. Hze£ -ems « f&i&er iisd jjiuurred liability to a -school committee, of which he was secretary, the total liability amounting to nearly Rs. 43,000/-. The R£X fmz^n®.tj3g.my&mm tfeai i&z iatfc&r had mis- appropriated part of this sum amounting to about Bs. 30,000.00 for which he could have been prose- cuted for criminal breach of trust, & accordingly the sons were absolved from the liability for that "mount, but with regard to the balance for which the father did not incur any criminal liability Jfor -gwasesu-tiss,, tfee wm& w£?s siade- i&e&le. Sn "Hemrajs case*, (AIR (30) 1943 PC 142), again their Lordships observed: "It has now been definitely established by the. slecision of this Board in 61 IA 350, that a son > na$: Jiafeks £q pay a -£e&t created by his father which would  render the father liable to criminal prosecution." 14. On a review of the relevant decisions bear- ing on the point, the general principle on which a sons obligation to discharge his fathers debt Is to be determined has been laid down by the Judicial Committee in HemraJ V/s. Khem Chand*,. allowed to be barred by limitation, impleading the executants of the note also as defts. It was ad- mitted in the suit that the other document which had been filed by Danpal instead of the document in question was a forgery. It also appeared that Danpal allowed the promissory note to becoma barred by acting fraudulently towards HemraJ. The suit was dismissed against t he executants of the note as time barred but it was decreed against Danpal. Prom the decree passed against Danpal an appal was preferred by him, & during the pendency of the appeal he died. It also appeared that Danpal allowed the promissory note to becoma barred by acting fraudulently towards HemraJ. The suit was dismissed against t he executants of the note as time barred but it was decreed against Danpal. Prom the decree passed against Danpal an appal was preferred by him, & during the pendency of the appeal he died. Hemraj took out execution of the decree against the sons of Danpal, & they objected to the execution being taken out against them on the ground that the debt waa created by the misconduct and stupidity of Danpal; therefore, there was no liability on them to pay the debt & the ancestral property in their hands was not liable to be attached & sold. On these facts the question that arose for decision before the Judicial Committee was whether the sons were under a pious obligation to discharge their father filed a forged document St failed to carry out his duty under the award. Their Lordships held that the sons were liable, & the principle for fixing the liability of the son was enunciated thus: "That the doctrine has reference to the nature or character of the debt which creates the liablity can hardly be disputed..........It also appears to be clear on principle, & on authority, that examination of the nature or character of the debt should be made with reference to the time when it originated, in other words, when the liability was first incurred by the father. If, on such examination, it is found that at its inception the debt was not tarnished or tainted with immorality or illegility, then it must be held that It would be binding on the son___The rule Is not rigid but has to be applied with reference to the circumstances of each case." Quoting with approval the passage from the Judgment of the learned Judges of the Madras H. C in Natassayyan V/s. Ponnusami, (16 Mad 99 at p. 104), which I have already quoted, their Lordships further observed: "The subsequent dishonest conduct of Danpal, which led to the suit & the decree, so much relied upon by the Cts. in India & made the basis of their decision cannot in their Lordships view affect the nature of the fathers debt which at its inception was a just & true debt. in India & made the basis of their decision cannot in their Lordships view affect the nature of the fathers debt which at its inception was a just & true debt. As no such immorality or illegality in the nature of the original debt as would absolve them from the obligation to discharge it has been shown by the resps., the debt sought to be realised is not an Avyavaharika debt & the applts. are therefore entitled to proceed against the ancestral property in their hands in execution of the decree for payment of that debt." 15. Bearing in mind the dicta of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, we have to examine the nature or character of the debt in the case before us at the time when the liability was first incurred by Raghunandan. The obligation, it may be observed, was unwillingly incurred by him under a lawful compulsion. S. 35, Civil P. C. gives a discretion to the Ct. to award costs & the Ct has power to determine by whom or out of what property & to what extent such costs are to be paid. If by virtue of such power the Ct. awarded costs to the resps. in the exercise of its discretion. said to be tainted with any illegality or immorality. Even if Raghunandan was guilty off a fraudulent aet in Sling a hukumnama which was not genuine, his conduct before the date of the decree cannot be taken into consideration. The decree for costs, in my view, cannot be said to be Avyaraharika. The pltfs., therefore, as sons of Raghunandan, are under a pious obligation to discharge the judgment-debt & tae sale cannot be assailed by them. 16. A similar point arose in Prayag Sahu v. Kasi Sahu, (11 CLJ 599). The point for consideration in. that case was whether the sons were liable for the costs awarded against their father by an order of the Ct. It was contended that the sons were not liable because the debt came within the meaning of "Danda" or fine in the text of Yajnavalkya quoted in the Mitakshara. Chatterji, J. held that the decree for costs could not come within the meaning of the word "Dand" because Hindu Cts. It was contended that the sons were not liable because the debt came within the meaning of "Danda" or fine in the text of Yajnavalkya quoted in the Mitakshara. Chatterji, J. held that the decree for costs could not come within the meaning of the word "Dand" because Hindu Cts. of justice did not allow costs to successful litigants but imposed upon the party who took a false plea a fine payable to the King, equal to the claim. He also held that the debt could not be characterised as Avyavaharika. The sons were accordingly held liable for the amount of costs decreed against their father. This decision seems to be in consonance with the decision of the Judicial Committee in Hemrajs case, (AIR (30) 1943 PC 142). 17. In Lakshminarasimhamurti V/s. Venkata Jogisomayyajulu, (AIR (26) 1939 Mad 928!; Ramiengar V/s. Secretary of State, (4 I C 105); Mohammad AH V/s. Jhao Lal, (AIR (15) 1923 Oudh 10), & Darbeshwari V/s. Raghunath. (28 Pat 165), it was held that a decree for costs is an avyavaharika debt & the son is not liable to pay such debt. Mr Shambhu Prasad Singh strongly relied upon these cases in support of his contention. In my opinion, after the decision of the judicial committee in Hemrajs case, (AIR (30) 1943 PC 142), a decree for costs cannot be said to be avyavaharika, for the liability is created by -an order of the Court in the exercise of its discretion. The origin of the debt, therefore, cannot be said to be tainted with illegality or immorality. The cases relied upon by Mr. Shambhu Prasad Singh are, moreover, clearly distinguishable & the decisions in those cases must be read with reference to the facts arising therein & cannot be taken to be of general application. In Lakshminarasimhamurti v. Venkata Jogisomayyajulu, (AIR (26) 1939 Mad 928), the decree for costs was made against the father personally, although he was not a party to the suit. Therefore, this case has no application even if it be assumed that it was correctly decided. In Ramiengar V/s. The Secretary of State. (4 IC 105), the father had brought a suit in forma pauperis as next friend of his minor son to establish his adoption & recover possession of pro- perty. Therefore, this case has no application even if it be assumed that it was correctly decided. In Ramiengar V/s. The Secretary of State. (4 IC 105), the father had brought a suit in forma pauperis as next friend of his minor son to establish his adoption & recover possession of pro- perty. The alleged adoption was found to be false & the suit was dismissed & the father was directed to pay costs. The point that arose for consideration was whether the son was liable for the costs awarded against the father who was guilty of an immoral act in bringing a suit which ho must have known to be false. It was held that the son was not bound to pay the costs, & the costs were treated as fine within the meaning of Hindu law texts. For the reasons given by Chetterji, J. in Prayag Sahus case, (11 CLJ 599), the decision cannot be supported. Moreover, the decision in this case is against the dicta of the judicial committee in Hemrajs case, (AIR (30) 1)43 P C 142). In Mohammad Ali V/s. Jhao Lal, (AIR (15) 1928 Oudh 10), it was held that the son is not liable to pay costs in suits brought & defended by the father on false & dishonest grounds. But this decision clearly stands overruled after the decision of the P. C. in Hemrajs case", AIR (30) 1943 PC 142). 18. Mr. Sambhu Prasad Singh strongly relied upon the decision of this Ct. in Darbeshwari v. Raghunath, (28 Pat 165). In my opinion this case, though it apparently lends support to his contention, is clearly distinguishable. There arc certain observations in this case which are contrary to the dicta of the P. C. in Hemrajs case, (AIR (30) 1943 PC 142). I would have been inclined to refer the present case to a larger Bench if I were satisfied that the proposition of law laid down in that case could be taken to be of general application. In that case the facts were as follows: One Tejan Tewari succeeded to the property of one Bisundayal Tewari as his next reversioner. Tejan sold the property inherited by him to one Darbeshwari who obtained possession thereof. Several years after, one Sarjug Prasad obtained a fraudulent & collusive sale deed from Ramphal Dubey who claimed to be the daughters son of Bisundayal. Tejan sold the property inherited by him to one Darbeshwari who obtained possession thereof. Several years after, one Sarjug Prasad obtained a fraudulent & collusive sale deed from Ramphal Dubey who claimed to be the daughters son of Bisundayal. Sarjug having failed to obtain possession brought a title suit against Tejans vendee for recovery of possession of the lands alleged to have been purchased by him. The Munsif decreed the suit, but on appeal the Dist. J. set aside the decree. This Ct. dismissed the second appeal & awarded costs to the vendee who was deft. 1. In execution of the decree, the entire joint family property was sold by the executing Ct. & purchased by the deft. 1 himself. The sale was ultimately confirmed & deft. 1 was granted dakhaldehani. Thereupon Sarjugs son brought a suit alleging that the decree for costs was an immoral debt & his share in the joint family property was not liable to be sold. The suit was contested on the ground that the pltf. was under a pious obligation to pay the decree for costs made against his father & the entire joint family property was liable for the payment thereof. On these rival contentions the subordinate Judge held that Sarjug had opposed the previous suit on a deliberately false claim, that the decree for costs was an avyavaharika debt & that the pltfs share in the joint family property was not liable to be sold in execution of the decree. There was an appeal to this Ct., & it was held that before instituting the previous suit Sarjug knew that Bisundayal had no daughter, that Ramphal was not the latters grandson, & that he had no valid title to the property conveyed by the kebala. On these facts it was held that "the costs incurred by Sarjug in the present case in prosecuting the previous suit was Avyavaharika debt for which the son is not liable & his share cannot be sold for payment of the decretal amount." In the case before us, there is no rinding that the hukumnama produced by Raghunandan was a forged & fabricated document. On the other hand, the finding is that pltf. 1 himself was conducting the previous litigation & after the death of Raghunandan the pltfs. were substituted in his place in this Ct. The learned subordinate Judge has also found that pltf. On the other hand, the finding is that pltf. 1 himself was conducting the previous litigation & after the death of Raghunandan the pltfs. were substituted in his place in this Ct. The learned subordinate Judge has also found that pltf. 1 had been instrumental in taking the thumb impression of deft. 1 on a blank paper. It has been further found that the pltfs father had tried to acquire the land on behalf of the joint family & the attempt had been made by him to the knowledge of the pltfs. In "act, the second appeal which had been filed in the previous case by Raghunandan was, after his death, prosecuted by his sons, including the present pltfs., after getting themselves substituted in his place. In the circumstances, even cn the findings of fact, it cannot be said that the pltfs. were under no pious obligation to pay the judgment-debt. 19. Mr. Shambhu Prasad Singh also relied upon Govindprasad Tewari V/s. Raghunathprasad, (AIR (26) 1939 Bom 289). The question as to the liability of the son for payment of costs did not arise in this case. Therefore it is not necessary to consider whether certain dicta laid down in that case hold good after the P. C. decision in Hemrajs case, (AIR (30) 1943 PC 142). 20. In my opinion, the decision of the Cts. below is correct & Shearer, J. has rightly dismissed the suit. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. CHATTERJI, J. 21 I agree and there is nothing which I can usefully add.