Judgment :- 1. This appeal has been placed before us now to decide whether proper court fee has been levied on it. The appeal is from a final decree in a suit for partition among the members of a Nair Tarawad in which there was also a claim for rendition of accounts by defendants 1 and 2 regarding the surplus profits of the tarawad properties. During the relevant period these defendants were in management. The appellant was also a defendant (defendant 5) in the suit, but he was not one of the parties liable to account. On the other hand his case throughout has been that on a proper accounting large amounts out of the surplus profits of the common properties will be found due by defendants 1 and 2 to the tarawad. The lower court after an elaborate enquiry found that defendants 1 and 2 were liable in the sum of Rs. 1272-10-0 to the appellant and his thavazhi. The appellant's main complaint in the appeal is that the lower court fixed the liability of defendants 1 and 2 at a very low figure and that further amounts will be found due if accounts are taken properly. The appellant's position in the suit is really that of a plaintiff and the court-fee payable on the appeal preferred by him has to be determined on that basis. 2. Besides paying a court-fee of Rs. 10/- as in a suit for partition the appellant has estimated the value of the relief as to accounting at Rs. 100/- and also paid ad valorem court-fee thereon. The Office Report is: "Whether the court-fee of Rs. 10/- for the partition matter is sufficient, has to be decided." The learned Government Pleader who represented the State before us on this reference conceded that proper fee has been paid regarding the relief as to partition. We are unable to appreciate how the office could have entertained any doubt with regard to it. The learned Government Pleader however urged before us that proper court-fee has not been paid with respect to the relief relating to accounting. We are afraid that in raising this point he omitted to notice that the position of the appellant here is not that of a defendant in an ordinary suit for accounts. The learned Government Pleader however urged before us that proper court-fee has not been paid with respect to the relief relating to accounting. We are afraid that in raising this point he omitted to notice that the position of the appellant here is not that of a defendant in an ordinary suit for accounts. As stated earlier the appellant is not one of the members of the tarawad liable to account for the profits, but is one entitled to call those in management to disgorge the surplus profits in their hands. He was truly a plaintiff in the suit and there is a consensus of judicial opinion that when a plaintiff in a suit for accounts complains that the trial court has not made the defendant liable for all the amounts she is truly liable for it is open to the plaintiff to have the whole case reopened in appeal on court-fee paid on a notional valuation. That appears to us also to be the true construction of the relevant provision of the Court Fees Act. 3. Before proceeding to discuss the question we think it proper to mention here that the appellant's Counsel raised a point before us that when a junior member of a joint family adds a relief asking for accounts, a suit for partition cannot become a suit for accounts and that court-fee payable in partition suits, pure and simple alone need be paid in such suits as well. Reliance was placed for this position on the case reported in Jyotibati v. Lackhmeshwar Prasad A.I.R. 1930 Pat. 1. This is however a controversial matter and for our present purpose it would suffice to state that the memorandum of appeal itself does not proceed on that basis. What we have to decide is what the court-fee payable is on the reliefs as valued in the memorandum of appeal. 4. Now to come back to the point raised by the learned Government Pleader, the relevant provision of law is to be found in S.3(iv)(c) of the Travancore-Cochin Court Fees Act, 1125. It states that in suits, original or appeal, falling within the clause, the amount of fee payable shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal and that in all such suits, the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the reliefs sought. It states that in suits, original or appeal, falling within the clause, the amount of fee payable shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal and that in all such suits, the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the reliefs sought. Treating the appellant here as a plaintiff in the suit and due regard being had to the change the Travancore-Cochin Court Fees Act introduces into the opening sentence of the section from the corresponding provisions of the Indian Court Fees Act (S.7) it appears to us to be plain that it is open to the appellant here to put his own valuation regarding the relief as to accounts claimed in the appeal. The opening sentence in S.7 of the Indian Court Fees Act does not contain the words 'original or appeal' after the words 'in suits'. Even as S.7 of the Indian Court Fees Act, 1870 stands judicial opinion is unanimous that where in an appeal from a suit for accounts the plaintiff claims further amounts from the defendant he can invoke the aid of S.7(iv)(c) of the Act and pay court-fee according to the amount at which the reliefs sought is valued by him in the memorandum of appeal. There is difference of opinion whether a defendant's appeal could be valued likewise and court-fee paid accordingly. There is also difference of opinion whether the above mode of valuation can be permitted to be made when the plaintiff is seeking to get rid of a liability the trial court found against him. However when the plaintiff is by his appeal only claiming further amounts from the defendant we have not come across a single case which lays down that valuation and court-fee should be on a basis different from that found in the provision referred to. 5. The case which would seem to be very relevant here is a decision of the Privy Council reported in Farzullakhan v. Mauladad Khan - AIR 1929 PC 147 - 57 IA 232. The head note to that case as occurring in the Indian Appeals series reads as follows:- "On taking accounts in a partnership suit a decree was made that Rs. 19,991 were due from the plaintiffs to the first defendant. The plaintiffs, who had valued their suit at Rs. The head note to that case as occurring in the Indian Appeals series reads as follows:- "On taking accounts in a partnership suit a decree was made that Rs. 19,991 were due from the plaintiffs to the first defendant. The plaintiffs, who had valued their suit at Rs. 3000, appealed within the time limited, praying that the decree be set aside and that a decree be made for such an amount as might be found due to them. By their memorandum of appeal they valued the appeal at Rs. 19,991, and paid Court Fees accordingly. The Appellate Court remanded the matter for a retrial, but ordered that the plaintiffs should not have a decree for any sum which might be found due to them, since in their view the Court Fees paid did not cover that relief, and to that extent the appeal was then barred by limitation". 6. It was held by their Lordships, reversing the decision of the Judicial Commissioner of the North-west Frontier Province Peshawar, that the memorandum of appeal by the plaintiff to the court below correctly stated "the amount at which relief is sought" within the Court Fees Act, 1870, S. 7 (iv)(f) and that the Court Fees paid entitled the plaintiffs to claim a decree if any sum should be found to be due to them. The claim in the appeal to the court of the Judicial Commissioner was expressed as follows: "Claim in appeal - For reversal of the decree against the appellants and for granting a decree in their favour for such of that amount as may be found due. Value for purposes of Court Fee of Appeal, Rs. 19,991". Two sentences from the judgment Lord Shaw delivered in that case may usefully be quoted here: "Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that the Memorandum of appeal in the present case did state in terms of the Act the amount at which the relief was sought. This determines the appeal". 7. This case has been differently interpreted by different High Courts as to whether it would apply to an appeal by a defendant in a suit for accounts or to an appeal by a plaintiff when he is seeking to get rid of a liability the trial court found against him. See Uman v. Ali Umar - AIR 1931 Rang. 146 (F.B.), In re Venkatanandam A.I.R. 1933 Mad. See Uman v. Ali Umar - AIR 1931 Rang. 146 (F.B.), In re Venkatanandam A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 330, Tarif Singh v. Kanshi Ram A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 458, In re Dhanukodi Nayakkar A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 435 (F.B.), Kashiram v. Ranglal - AIR 1941 Bom. 242, Ramadoss v. Appalanarasayya A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 685 and Megh Raj v. Rupchand Uttamachand - AIR 1946 Lah. 280 (FB). Even cases which give a very restricted scope to the Privy Council decision (A.I.R. 1929 P.C.147) are agreed that when a plaintiff prefers an appeal claiming more amounts from the defendant than that found by the lower court his appeal need be valued and court-fee paid only as envisaged in S. 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act, 1870. In the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court mentioned above viz., A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 435 referring to the Privy Council decisions in A.I.R. 1929 P.C.147 Sir Lionel Leach, C.J. said: "In the course of the arguments which are to be found reported in 57 M.L.J. 281-31 Bombay L.R. 841 it was pointed out by Lord Tomlin that the scheme of the Act was that the plaintiff should be allowed to value his own relief, and the decision proceeded on this basis". Lord Tomlin's observations are found quoted at page 290 of the Lahore Full Bench case mentioned above. (A.I.R. 1946 Lah. 280 at 290). Those observations are: "In S.7 the amount of the fee is to be computed, in suits for accounts, according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. If, therefore, the appellant (who was the plaintiff) values the relief in the memorandum of appeal and pays a fee thereon, that is the amount of fee properly payable. Of course if the appellant recovers more he pays the extra fee under S.11 of the Act (which again applies to plaintiffs alone). But you counsel for respondents) cannot complain that the amount valued in the memorandum of appeal is not the proper amount". Later on in his judgment Sir Lionel Leach, C.J. observed: "Faizulla Khan's case (A.I.R. 1929 P.C.147) as I have already indicated, only dealt with the case of a plaintiff-appellant. The section gives great freedom to plaintiff-appellants, but we do not consider that it gives the same freedom to defendant-appellants". Later on in his judgment Sir Lionel Leach, C.J. observed: "Faizulla Khan's case (A.I.R. 1929 P.C.147) as I have already indicated, only dealt with the case of a plaintiff-appellant. The section gives great freedom to plaintiff-appellants, but we do not consider that it gives the same freedom to defendant-appellants". We will also quote here a passage from the decision of Beaumont, C.J., in the Bombay Case mentioned above. (AIR 1941 Bom. 242). The Bombay High Court does not share the view of Madras, Lahore or Rangoon High Courts that the Privy Council decision would govern all manner of appeals by a plaintiff in a suit for accounts. In the case now under reference Sir John Beaumont, C.J., and Sen, J., held that when a plaintiff is seeking to get rid of a liability found against him by the lower court he must value the appeal and pay court-fee according to the amount of liability sought to be got rid of. In laying down that rule what Sir John Beaumont says about a plaintiff's appeal of the kind before us now is instructive. The relevant observations are: "If the plaintiff's suit had failed and he had appealed against the refusal to take an account, the appeal would have related solely to a right to an account, and I agree that the appellant might have placed his own value on the memorandum of appeal. But as the suit resulted in a decree for a certain amount against the plaintiff, it seems to me that the appeal is not merely in relation to an account, but is really an appeal against a money decree, and he must at any rate stamp his memorandum of appeal with an ad valoram stamp in respect of the amount of the decree. He may add a nominal amount in respect of any further relief claimed which may accrue by reason of the account being taken on a different basis from that adopted by the lower court; but the stamp on the memorandum of appeal must, to my mind, cover the amount of the decree which is standing against the appellant, and which he seeks to have set aside." The learned Chief Justice's view as to how a plaintiff seeking to obtain more amounts from the defendant should value his appeal or pay court-fee can be found in the first part of the last sentence of the above extract. 8. For the reasons stated by us earlier and on the authority of the cases referred to here we hold that proper court-fee has been paid regarding the relief for accounting sought for by the Memorandum of appeal and we decide accordingly. In appeal the suit does not lose its character of being an account suit so as to entitle the court or the parties to treat it as an appeal from a money decree. 9. Even at the risk of repetition we once again state that we have here confined ourselves to the immediate requirements of the case on hand viz., how a plaintiff in a suit for accounts' should value his appeal for purposes of court-fees when all that he claims in the appeal is to make the defendant liable for more amounts than that found by the lower court. Though the appellant here is only a defendant in the suit we have proceeded to decide the question on the basis that he is to all intents and purposes a plaintiff. In fact it is an accepted view now that in a suit for partition every party is in the position of a plaintiff.