Judgment :- 1. Defendants 5 and 8 in O.S. No. 80 of 1121 on the file of the Kottayam District Court have filed this revision petition against an order of the learned District Judge of that court disposing 2 issues of law arising in the case. The plaintiffs instituted that suit to establish a right of hereditary management of a mosque at Thazathangadi, Kottayam, in their Methar and Mossambi families, to remove the defendants who claim to be the elected kykars of the mosque from management, for recovery of the mosque properties and for rendition of accounts. Amongst other defences raised the defendants contended that the suit was not maintainable without the sanction contemplated by S.72 of the C.P.C., Travancore (S.92, C.P.C. Act V of 1908) and that the plaintiffs have not paid proper court fee on their plaint. On these contentions, the court raised issues numbered as (2) and (7) reading: (2) Is the suit not maintainable without the sanction of the Government? (7) Has proper court fee been paid? 2. The learned judge held that the suit was maintainable without the sanction of the Government and that the court fee paid was sufficient. Feeling aggrieved by this decision defendants 5 and 6 have moved this court in revision to get the same reversed. 3. On the first question it would seem to be too late in the day to contend that S. 72 has application to suits for the vindication of the rights of management claimed as hereditary rights or to disputes between such managers inter se. Two conditions have to be satisfied for the application of the section; one is that the suit should be one for the vindication of the rights of the general public in any trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature and the other is, that the relief should be all or any of the reliefs enumerated in clauses (a) to (h) of S. 72. The section was intended to govern representative suits brought for the benefit of the public to enforce a public right in respect of any express or constructive trust. It does not apply to suits brought by persons to remedy a particular infringement of their own individual right. The section was intended to govern representative suits brought for the benefit of the public to enforce a public right in respect of any express or constructive trust. It does not apply to suits brought by persons to remedy a particular infringement of their own individual right. The learned judge in the court below took the above view following a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Travancore reported in Bhanu Pandarathil v. Valia Raja 1943 T. L. R. 484. More recently a Full Bench of this Court has affirmed that view in Andaperumal Pillai v. Somasundaram Pillai (1950 T. C. L. R.249: 1950 KLT 86). One of us was a party to that decision and Simon, J. who delivered the leading judgment in the case has after exhaustively reviewing the case law bearing on the question said that to decide whether a particular suit is hit by the section or not the court must go beyond the reliefs and have regard to the capacity in which the plaintiffs are suing and to the purpose for which the suit is brought. In another part of the judgment the learned judge again emphasised that the suit should be one on behalf of the general public if, it should come within the restrictive-provisions in S.73 (S.92(2), Act V of 1908). 4. The view these two Full Bench decisions take is in complete accord with the law as laid down by other High Courts in India. As the question was elaborately considered in 1950 T.C. L. R. 249 we do not think it necessary to traverse the same ground again here. We shall content ourselves by merely mentioning the more important among the decisions referred to and followed in those cases. Those decisions are Budree Das Mukim v. Choonilal Johurr (1906) I. L. R. 33 Cal. 789, Appanna v. Narasinga (AIR 1922 Mad. 17 (F. B.) Shanmukhom v. Govinda (1931 Mad. 92) and Thirumalai Devasthanams v. Krishnayya (AIR 1943 Mad. 466 (F. B.)). We may also add the question is discussed with the usual clarity in Mulla's C. P. C., 11th edition, 1941 at pp. 337-339. In agreement with the court below we therefore hold that S. 72 of the Travancore C. P. C. is no bar to the institution of a suit to establish a right of hereditary management of a mosque and for consequential reliefs. 5. 337-339. In agreement with the court below we therefore hold that S. 72 of the Travancore C. P. C. is no bar to the institution of a suit to establish a right of hereditary management of a mosque and for consequential reliefs. 5. The next point relates to court fees. Admittedly, the plaintiffs have paid proper court fee with reference to the relief's as to the declaration claimed and for rendition of accounts. As mentioned in the opening paragraph of this order there is an express prayer for recovery of the mosque properties from the possession of the defendants and the contention the defendants raised in the court below and repeated before us Was that ad valorem court fee on the market value of the properties sought to be recovered should have been paid and not merely the fixed fee leviable under Cl. 7 of Article VIII of Schedule II of the Travancore Court Fees Act, VI of 1087 which corresponds to cl. 6 of Article XVII of Schedule II of the Indian Court Fees Act, 1870. That clause fixes the proper court fee as Rs. 10/- for every suit where it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject matter in dispute and which is not otherwise provided for by the Act. It was considered to be a vexed question as to what the proper court fee leviable is in a suit brought by a trustee or a manager to remove the defendant from such office and to recover possession of the trust properties from him. Some early cases can be found which support the view contended for by the learned counsel, but it would seem to be the accepted view now that where the right to management is made the subject matter of the suit the case would fall under Art. 17, cl. 6, Schedule II, Court Fees Act, 1870. (In re Gowri Shankar v. Mohan Lal A.I.R. 1938 Oudh 20). Where a plaintiff seeks to remove the defendant from management of trust properties that would involve the defendant's ejectment from the immovable property of which he was in possession in that capacity and as such full court fee need not be levied on the value of the property. (Yad Ali v. Mubarak Ali 1909 (2) I.C.107). Where a plaintiff seeks to remove the defendant from management of trust properties that would involve the defendant's ejectment from the immovable property of which he was in possession in that capacity and as such full court fee need not be levied on the value of the property. (Yad Ali v. Mubarak Ali 1909 (2) I.C.107). When there is no dispute that the properties sought to be recovered do not belong to the trust and the plaintiffs seek their recovery only on behalf of the trust and not on their own behalf, the subject-matter of the litigation is not the property itself but the right claimed by the plaintiffs, to manage the property. (Ramdoss v. Hanumantha, 1913 I. L. R. 36 Mad. 363). In a suit for an office no possession of the properties relating to the office need be asked. (Swaminatha Aiyar v. Ramier, A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 421). In computing court fee an unnecessary or incidental relief can well be ignored. (Sudali Muthu V. Peria Somasundaram, A. I. R. 1925 Mad. 722; Gouri Sankar v. Mohanlal, A.I.R. 1938 Oudh 20 and Karuppanna Nadar v. Karuppa Nadar, A.I.R, 1939 Mad. 776). In determining questions of valuation the court must look into the nature and object of the suit, into the substance of the claim and not merely into the language used in the plaint. (Nand Kishore v. Achambit Kumar, A. I. R. 1937 Pat. 514). Viewed in the light of these authorities the contention that court fee should be levied on the market value of the properties would appear to us to be devoid of merit. The lower court has really taken the correct view of the matter. 6. Further light on the subject can be gathered from the decision reported in Sri Sitaramaji Mandir v. Raghunath Das, A.I.R. 1944 All. 279 brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the counter-petitioners. There a similar question was raised that when the plaintiff had asked for the removal of the deft from the management of a Hindu religious endowment and to recover possession of the properties of the endowment as manager from the possession of the deft. court fee on the market value of the property should be paid. The Subordinate Judge accepted the contention but what Malik, J. (as he then was) said in repelling it may usefully be quoted here. court fee on the market value of the property should be paid. The Subordinate Judge accepted the contention but what Malik, J. (as he then was) said in repelling it may usefully be quoted here. As in this case there was no dispute there as regards title, it being admitted on all hands that the properties belonged to the trust. The only dispute was whether the plffs. were entitled to the management or it was the deft. who held that right. After referring to certain decisions which apparently supported the Subordinate Judge's view the learned Judge (Ismail, J. concurring) went on to say as follows: "Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on a case reported in 10 Cal. 599 [Omrao Mirza v. M. Jones]. In that case a suit had been filed for accounts and for removal of the defendant from trusteeship and for the plaintiff's own appointment as a trustee. The plaintiff had valued the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 7000 but it was held that the plaintiff's interest was not capable of valuation as he was a mere trustee and had, therefore, no beneficial interest in the subject-matter and Schedule II, Article 17, CI. [vi] was held applicable for purposes of payment of court fee. I,19 All. 60 [Thakuri v. Brahma Narain] a similar suit was filed for a declaration that the property was endowed property, that the plaintiff should be appointed a trustee and the defendant should be removed from trusteeship and an injunction should be issued against the defendant. As regards the first part of the relief the Court held that Sch. 2, Art. 17, Cl. [vi], Court Fees Act, governed the case and a fixed court fee of Rs. 10 was payable, but for injunction it was held that the plaintiff had to pay separately under S. 7, Sub-section [vi], Cl. [d]. Court Fees Act. A I. R. 1925 Mad. 804 [In Re Mohammad Gouse] where the plaintiff was a sajjanashin of two dargas and had been dispossessed by the defendant he brought a suit for possession of the dargas and a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court held that a suit of this kind fell under S. 7, Cl. [v]. Court Fees Act and ad valorem court fees were payable and Art. 17 of Sch. 2 was not applicable, In A. I. R. 1934 Pat. [v]. Court Fees Act and ad valorem court fees were payable and Art. 17 of Sch. 2 was not applicable, In A. I. R. 1934 Pat. 647 [Maulavi Sayeed v. Shah Tafazul] the Patna High Court in a case exactly similar to the case before us has held -that the proper court fee payable was under Sch. 2, Art. 17, para 6, Court Fees Act. They held that the dispute in the case really was as to the right of mutwalliship and not to the trust property about which there was no dispute. It must be remembered that on the allegations in the case that the property in suit was trust property of which plaintiff 1 was the owner and plaintiff 2 was the manager and the defendant had no right to manage, the question really was between two rival sarbarahkars for their right to manage as sarbarahkar. Sri. Thakurji, plaintiff 1, must be deemed to be in possession of the property and no question of possession of land, buildings or gardens as required by S. 7 [v] of the Act arises. The possession of an agent must be deemed to be on behalf of the principal and plaintiff 1 being therefore deemed to be in possession of the property, to our mind the case does not come under S. 7, Cl. [v] Court Fees Act. In some cases it has been held that "the value of the subject matter" in S. 7 [v] must be deemed to be the value of the interest in dispute and where therefore the interest in dispute was not the full beneficial ownership the Courts have accepted such valuation as the plaintiff had chosen to give on his so-called interest: see 15 All. 63 [Ram Kaj v. Girnandan Bhagut] and 5 Pat. 631 [Mt. Barketunnisa Begum v. Mt. Kaniza Fatma]. The method, however, as to how the subject matter is to be valued is given in the section itself when it is land and when it is a building or a garden. 63 [Ram Kaj v. Girnandan Bhagut] and 5 Pat. 631 [Mt. Barketunnisa Begum v. Mt. Kaniza Fatma]. The method, however, as to how the subject matter is to be valued is given in the section itself when it is land and when it is a building or a garden. If a plaintiff has share in such land, building or garden naturally the value of the subject matter can be easily worked out in accordance with his share, but if the plaintiff is not the beneficial owner it seems to be obvious that the value of the subject matter should not be the value of the property and it being not possible to estimate at a money value the subject matter it seems more equitable that Sch. 2, Art. 17 should apply. A suit between rival managers for their right to manage can hardly be deemed to be a suit for possession of the property as both naturally admit that the possession is with the principal. To our mind, therefore, the court fee paid by the plaintiff on relief [2] was correct." 7. The relief forming the subject of the controversy was relief No. 2 in the plaint in that suit. The view set forth above is in agreement with the view expressed in the case the learned judge in the court below follows, viz., Kolappa Pillai v. Parvathi Pillai, 25 T. L. J. 1122. Another case cited at the Bar viz., Maulavi v. Shah Tafaazul, A. I. R. 1934 Pat. 647 is referred to in the extract from the decision in A.I.R. 1944 All. 279, and it is therefore unnecessary for us to make further reference to it. 8. The last of the Cases cited by the counter petitioner's learned counsel viz., Hariday Kishore v. Hari Bhusan, A.I.R. 1934 Cal. 250 is also in agreement with the view taken in the Allahabad case. The head note to that case which correctly sets out the sense of the decision is in these terms:- "Where plaintiff sues for the removal of defendant from shebaitship and for the appointment of any competent person as shebait and prays further for injunction against the defendant that he may not waste or possess the debuttar properties, the plaintiff need not pay ad valorem court fee on the valuation of debuttar property. 9. 9. Before concluding we may mention that the Government Pleader to whom notice was given on the question of fee payable supported the lower court's order. 10. For the reasons stated above the revision petitioners cannot succeed on the second point either. The revision has therefore to be dismissed and it is so ordered. The petitioners will pay the counter petitioners their costs in this court. Dismissed.