The Chief Justice.-The only question which arises in this appeal is whether Order 37, rule 4, Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code) applies to the Original Side of this Court. The respondent filed the suit (C.S.No. 260 of 1948) for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 15,050 alleged to be due for principal and interest in respect of a cheque, dated 9th March, 1948, drawn by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant and endorsed over by her in favour of the plaintiff and which was dishonoured on 18th March, 1948. The suit was filed under the provisions of Order VII, Original Side Rules. No application for leave to defend was made by the defendants within the prescribed time and therefore the Master passed a decree on 22nd September, 1948, for the sum of Rs. 15,462-8-0 with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent. per annum from the date of the decree till date of payment and for the costs of the suit. On 12th January, 1949, the first defendant took out an application purporting to be under section 151, and Order 37, rule 4 of the Code praying that the decree drawn up by the Master on 22nd September, 1948, may in the special circumstances of the case be set aside and leave may be granted to the applicant to appear and to defend the suit on such terms as may be deemed reasonable and just. Yahya Ali, J., dismissed the application in limine on the ground that Order 37, rule 4 of the Code had no application to the Original Side of this Court. The first defendant appeals against this decision. Learned counsel who appeared before us conceded that the matter was bereft of direct authority and our decision must therefore rest almost entirely on the material provisions in the Original Side Rules and of the Code. It becomes therefore necessary to examine the scope of the application of these two sets of provisions to the Original Side. Learned counsel who appeared before us conceded that the matter was bereft of direct authority and our decision must therefore rest almost entirely on the material provisions in the Original Side Rules and of the Code. It becomes therefore necessary to examine the scope of the application of these two sets of provisions to the Original Side. Clause 37 of the Letters Patent conferred power on this High Court to make rules and orders from time to time “for the purpose of regulating all proceedings in civil cases which may be brought before the said High Court, including proceedings in its admiralty, vice-admiralty, testamentary, intestate and matrimonial jurisdiction respectively provided always that the said High Court should be guided in making such rules and orders as far as possible by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.” Part IX of the Code contains special provisions relating to the Chartered High Courts of which this Court is one. Section 117 declares that “Save as provided in this Part or in Part X or in rules, the provisions of this. Code shall apply to such High Courts.” An exception is contained in section 120 which enacts that sections 16, 17 and 20 of the Code shall not apply to the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. Under section 122 any of the High Courts may, from time to time, make rules regulating its own procedure and the procedure of the civil Courts subject to its superintendence and may by such rules annul, alter or add to all or any of the rules in the first schedule. Section 129 specially provides for Chartered High Courts. It runs thus: “Notwithstanding anything in this Code, any High Court constituted by His Majesty by Letters Patent may make such rules not inconsistent with the Letters Patent establishing it to regulate its own procedure in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction as it shall think fit, and nothing herein contained shall affect the validity of any such rules in force at the commencement of this Code.” Order 49, rule 3 of the Code mentions the rules which shall not apply to any Chartered High Courts in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. Order 1, rule 3 of the Original Side Rules now in force is as follows: “The rules and forms mentioned in Appendix III hereto and all previous rules and forms, and the provisions of the Code, so far as such provisions are inconsistent with these rules and forms, are hereby repealed and superseded and the following rules, orders and forms shall stand in lieu thereof.” (The Code must mean the Civil Procedure Code). Order 37 of the Code relates to summary procedure, applicable to suits on negotiable instruments such as bills of exchange, hundies or promissory notes. All suits upon such documents may in case the plaintiff desires to proceed under the provisions of that order be instituted by presenting a plaint in a particular prescribed form. Under Order 37, rule 2, sub-rule (2), in any case in which the plaint is filed under that order, the defendant shall not appear or defend the suit unless he obtains leave from a Judge as provided in that order so to appear and defend. In default of his obtaining such leave or of his appearance and defence in pursuance thereof, the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree. Rule 4 of that order runs thus, “After decree the Court may, under special circumstances, set side the decree, and if necessary, stay or set aside execution, and may give leave to the defendant to appear to the summons and to defend the suit, if it seems reasonable to the Court so to do, and on such terms as the Court thinks fit.” Rule 7 provides that save as provided by that Order, the procedure in suits filed under the provisions of that Order shall be the same as the procedure in suits instituted in the ordinary manner. The rules made by this Court which are in force immediately before the Rules now in force contained a separate Order, Order VI-A dealing with procedure on negotiable instruments, corresponding to Order 37 of the Code. One rule in that order expressly laid down that the procedure prescribed by Order 37 of the Code shall be followed in all suits on negotiable instruments with the modification mentioned in that Order. One rule in that order expressly laid down that the procedure prescribed by Order 37 of the Code shall be followed in all suits on negotiable instruments with the modification mentioned in that Order. But in 1932, a new Order, Order VII was substituted in place of Order VI-A. This Order considerably enlarged the scope of the application of the summary procedure. It was made applicable not only to a suit on a negotiable instrument but also to a suit to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant with or without interest arising on a contract or a bond or a guarantee. Rule 2 expressly excludes the ordinary procedure in regard to suits specified in rule 1 of that Order. Suits falling under rule 1 have to be instituted under that Order. There is no option to the plaintiff in such suits. Rule 4 confers power on the Registrar to extend the period of ten days for applying to obtain leave to appear and defend. If leave to appear and defend is not granted, the Master shall on proof by affidavit of service of the summons on the defendant pass a decree for the amount claimed and costs. There is no provision in that Order corresponding to Order 37, rule 4 of the Code. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that all the provisions in the body of the Code and in the rules in the first schedule of the Code apply to the Original Side of this Court unless they are excluded from application or unless they are superseded by rules made by this Court. He conceded that if in respect of the same subject-matter there were two rules, one in the Code and another in the Original Side Rules, inconsistent with each other, then the rule made by this Court on the Original Side would apply. But he argued that where the Original Side Rules were silent in respect of any matter, then the rule in the Code relating to it would apply to the Original Side. In support of this contention he relied upon the decision of Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Yelumalai v. Kuppammal1. The learned Judge held that rules 10 and 11 of Order 33 of the Code were applicable to suits by paupers filed on the Original Side of the High Court. In support of this contention he relied upon the decision of Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Yelumalai v. Kuppammal1. The learned Judge held that rules 10 and 11 of Order 33 of the Code were applicable to suits by paupers filed on the Original Side of the High Court. After a consideration of the various relevant provisions he observed: “The result of these various provisions is that the Code of Civil Procedure is generally applicable to the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, except where it is specifically excluded or unless the High Court itself has made rules superseding any particular provisions of the Code.” Now, the application of Order 37, rule 4 has not been specifically excluded by the Code itself. Order 49, rule 3 of the Code does not mention Order 37, rule 4 among the rules declared not applicable to the Original Side. The argument is that it follows that it is applicable to the Original Side. For a general application of the provisions of the Code to the Original Side reliance was placed on the decision in Ashutosh Basu v. Sudhangshubhushan Mukherji2, which held that Order 21, rule 89 of the Code applied to a sale under a mortgage in a suit filed on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court. (Vide also Virjiban Das Moolji v. Biseswar Lal Hargovind 3.) Appellant’s counsel referred us to the decision in Behram Jung (Nawab) v. Haji Sultan Ali Shustry4, as dealing with a rule made by the Bombay High Court which was inconsistent with the provisions of the Code and therefore prevailed over the latter. This decision was explained by Beaumont, C.J., in Pratapgir Narsingji v. The Official Liquidator of the Prahlad Mills, Ltd5 ., in which it was held that Order 41, rule 10 did apply to appeals on the Original Side. There is no doubt that there is neither specific exclusion nor repeal of Order 37, rule 4 so far as the Original Side is concerned to be found either in the Code or in the Original Side Rules. Yahya Ali, J., was inclined to hold that the adoption of a few of the rules under Order 37 and a deliberate avoiding the adoption of the rules including Order 37, rule 4 by compelling implication amounts to a repeal of the portions not adopted. Yahya Ali, J., was inclined to hold that the adoption of a few of the rules under Order 37 and a deliberate avoiding the adoption of the rules including Order 37, rule 4 by compelling implication amounts to a repeal of the portions not adopted. After a careful consideration we have arrived at more or less the same conclusion. We may describe the result thus: Order 37 of the Code lays down a summary procedure for suits on negotiable instruments which may be availed of by a plaintiff. Order VII of the Original Side Rules deals with the same topic generally but differs in material particulars from Order 37 of the Code in its scope. As we have already mentioned, Order 37 of the Code deals only with suits on negotiable instruments, whereas Order VII, Original Side Rules applies to other suits also on debt and liquidated demands. While Order 37 of the Code gives the plaintiff an option, Order VIII of the Original Side Rules compels the plaintiff to resort to the procedure prescribed therein. While there is no provision in Order 37 of the Code for enlargement of time over and above ten days for applying and obtaining leave to defend, there is provision in Order VII of the Original Side Rules for extension of time by the Registrar. Having regard to all these vital differences, it is clear that Order VII of the Original Side Rules supersedes and stands in lieu of Order 37 of the Code. Yahya Ali, J., discovered a plausible reason for the absence of a provision like Order 37, rule 4 of the Code in the Original Side Rules. We do not think we are called upon to find any justification for the omission. We can imagine cases in which the power of the Registrar to extend time under Order VII, rule 4, read with Order IV, rule 6 of the Original Side Rules may not be sufficient to give adequate relief. We are however not concerned with the hardship that might occur in special cases. We do not see why if this Court chooses a provision corresponding to Order 37, rule 4 of the Code should not be included in Order VII of the Original Side Rules. We are however not concerned with the hardship that might occur in special cases. We do not see why if this Court chooses a provision corresponding to Order 37, rule 4 of the Code should not be included in Order VII of the Original Side Rules. But as Order VII now stands, we think that in regard to suits coming within the scope of that Order, Order 37, rule 4 of the Code can have no application. The learned counsel for the appellant pointed to the fact that Order VII of the Original Side Rules was only concerned with the procedure upto the passing of the decree but was silent as to what happened after that stage and he contended therefore that Order 37, rule 4 of the Code could not be deemed to have been repealed or superseded. We are of opinion that though the argument appears plausible, it is not sound. Order 37, rule 4 of the Code relates to the summary procedure laid down under that Order just as any other rule in that order. Whether before or after the decree, the peculiar features of this procedure is obtaining leave of the Court to appear and defend. While Order 37 of the Code permits the defendant to obtain such leave even after the decree in special circumstances, Order VII of the Original Side Rules does not so permit him. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. K.C. ----- Appeal dismissed.