ORDER : 1. This is a revision by the defendants non-applicants, against the order dated 27-1-51 restoring a suit to file passed by the Subordinate Judge, Begumganj. 2. The suit for a sum of Rs. 5694 was, after the whole of the evidence except of one witness, pending in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Begumganj, fixed for 8-11-50, when it was dismissed for default, in the presence of the defendants. An application dated 23-12-50 was filed in that Court on 26-12-50 alleging that an application dated 2-12-50 was filed on 6-12-50 by Abdul Rashid Beg, Clerk of Shri R. C. Rai, Advocate in that very Court, but was returned by the Judge without any order as the record was said to be at Raisen and therefore it was filed in the Munsiffs Court at Raisen who returned it on 8-12-50 for presentation to the proper Court but it was actually returned on 23-12-50 and therefore it was filed on that latter date. The reasons for the non-appearance of the plaintiffs on 8-11-50 were also stated and supported by an affidavit. The allegations were denied by the defendants who also contended that the application was barred by time. The Subordinate Judge, on 27-1-51 restored the suit to file subject to payment of Rs. 80 as cost which the defendants' pleader received and the suit was restored. 3. The defendants now come up with this revision petition and contend that no application was filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge on 6-12-50 and even if it was filed, it was not properly presented and as such the application dated 23-12-50 was barred by time. The non-applicants contended that the application was presented, on 6-12-50, by the pleader's clerk, but it was returned though properly presented by the clerk, and was thus within time; that no such objection was raised in the lower Court and it could not be raised now; that the defendants' pleader having received the cost for restoration of the suit, cannot challenge the order. 4. The first point for determination, therefore, is whether the applicants (can?) challenge the order despite their pleader accepting the costs for restoration of the suit. It must appear that the order of the Court was that the application for restoration was allowed on payment of Rs. 80 as cost which were to be paid on the next date. 4. The first point for determination, therefore, is whether the applicants (can?) challenge the order despite their pleader accepting the costs for restoration of the suit. It must appear that the order of the Court was that the application for restoration was allowed on payment of Rs. 80 as cost which were to be paid on the next date. It was further ordered that if the costs were not paid, the order shall stand cancelled. There is no denying of the fact that this amount of Rs. 80 was received by the pleader's clerk and that the suit was restored at the next hearing. It would thus appear that the defendants through the pleader, accepted the order of the lower Court in so far as it related to the payment and receipt of the cost of restoration. The question, therefore, would be whether they can accept one part of the order and challenge the rest. The principle was discussed in a decision of the Madras High Court in Venkatarayudu v. Rama Krishnayya, AIR 1930 Mad 268 and it was observed that : "When an order shows plainly that it is intended to take effect in its entirety and that several parts of it depend upon each other, a person cannot adopt one part and repudiate another. For instance, if the Court directs that the suit shall be restored on the plaintiff's paying the costs of the opposing party, there is no intention to benefit the latter except on the terms mentioned in the order itself. If the party receives the costs, his act is tantamount to adopting the order. But if a party receives benefit receiving his right to object to the order, he will not in that case be precluded from attacking it." It is thus obvious that the principle of estoppel is applied to the circumstances and the decision fully applies to the case on hand. In the circumstances, I find that the defendants (who ?) have received, through their pleader, the cost for restoration of the suit, cannot now challenge the order of restoration and their revision petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. 5. The next point for determination is whether the application dated 2-12-50 was properly presented on 6-12-50 in the Court of the Sub-Judge, Begumganj. 5. The next point for determination is whether the application dated 2-12-50 was properly presented on 6-12-50 in the Court of the Sub-Judge, Begumganj. The application dated 23-12-50 had clearly stated the circumstances under which it was filed on that date. Along with it was filed the application dated 2-12-50 on which the Munsiff, Raisen has endorsed his order on 8-12-50. The question was whether the application was presented to the Sub-Judge, Begumganj, on 6-12-50. In this connection it is worthwhile to examine the affidavits of not only the non-applicant, Nandkishor, but also of the applicant, Mohd. Siddique himself, which have been filed on this record. Nandkishor, in his affidavit dated 11-6-51 affirms the allegations which he has made not only in the lower Court, but also in this Court. The affidavit of Mohd. Siddique, the applicant, in paras 1 and 2 partly supports the allegations in the matter of Abdul Rashid Beg's going to Raisen on 7-12-50 and stating to a pleader at that place that he had come to file an application for restoration and it was returned by the Munsiff, Raisen for presentation to the proper Court. It would thus appear that the allegations of Nandkishore, in his affidavit, appear to be not only correct, but also true. A report had to be called from the Sub-Judge in this matter in the absence of any order on the application dated 2-12-50 passed by him and except for the date on which the application was presented to him, he also supports the allegations of Nandkishore as stated in the affidavit. In fact these allegations should have been challenged by the defendants in the lower Court itself, but it appears that they did not do so as no statement seems to have been filed by them to counter the application dated 23-12-50 on facts. In view of the affidavits and the report of the Sub-Judge dated 4-7-51, I find that an application for restoration was presented by Abdul Rashid Beg, on 6-12-50 in the Court of the Sub-Judge. 6. The question then arose as to whether the pleader's Clerk had power to present the application to the Court concerned. I have seen the application which was presented to the Munsiff, Raisen on 8-12-50 and I find that it is signed by Shri Rai, admittedly the pleader for the plaintiffs. 6. The question then arose as to whether the pleader's Clerk had power to present the application to the Court concerned. I have seen the application which was presented to the Munsiff, Raisen on 8-12-50 and I find that it is signed by Shri Rai, admittedly the pleader for the plaintiffs. It is thus obvious that it was authorised by the pleader and the only matter which was left over, was the actual presentation of the application to the Court and this was done by Abdul Rashid Beg. It is also obvious from the affidavits of the parties filed on this record that Abdul Rashid Beg was Shri Rai's registered clerk and it has been held in Mohansingh v. Raghunathsingh, second Appeal No. 62 of 1950-51 in the Court of the Additional Judicial Commissioner, decided on 8-11-50 that : "the presentation by a pleader's Clerk was not contrary to law." The decisions in Sawarmal v. Kunjilal, AIR 1939 Rang 1 and Queen-Empress v. Karuppa Udayan, 20 Mad 87 have been relied upon. I am in respectful agreement with the observations of my learned brother in his above decision and I find that the application filed by Abdul Rashid Beg on 6-12-50 was properly presented as he was a registered clerk. I would only add a proviso that an application presented by a pleader's Clerk should bear the signature of the pleader, and not merely of the party, so as to indicate that the Clerk was acting on behalf of his master, the pleader. 7. It would also appear that in the case on hand, no such objection was raised, by the defendants to the presentation of the application by the pleader's Clerk and it must be deemed to have been waived and cannot be now allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal or revision. I would refer to the decision in Gopal Singh v. Bhaga AIR 1924 Lah 296. 8. In the circumstances, the revision petition is dismissed with costs and the applicants are ordered to pay the costs of the non-applicants in this Court. Pleaders' fees will be Rs. 20 for each party if certified in time. The parties shall appear in the lower Court on 22-10-51. Revision dismissed.