JUDGMENT : This is second appeal by the defendant decree-holder arising from a suit filed by the plaintiffs objectors under O.21, R.63 in Execution Case No.13 of 1946. An objection had been brought by Dhanna and Pusaji that cattle and house attached in the execution of the decree did not belong to the judgment-debtor, Gendi Bai but belonged to them. The objection about house was allowed but the objection about cattle was disallowed. Pusaji is the son-in-law of Gendi Bai the judgment-debtor and he with his brother Dhanna brought this suit for a declaration that cattle belonged to him. The trial Court dismissed the suit but the District Judge Mand-leshwar in appeal reversed the finding and set aside the decree and decreed the suit. The defendants have filed this second appeal against the decree and judgment of the District Judge. 2. As the question involved in this second appeal is question of fact I am not inclined to interfere. 3. Mr. Samvatsar, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that the view of the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight as the conclusion was arrived at by it after having had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. He places reliance on the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in - 'Veeraswami v. Narayya' , AIR 1949 PC 32 (A). It is true that the appellate Court should bear in mind that it has not enjoyed the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses, but it has nowhere been laid down that, the Judge of the first instance can be treated as infallible in determining which side is telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration. The principles which should guide an appellate Court in deciding whether to reverse the trial Judge on a question of fact were stated by Lord Thankerton in - 'Watt v. Thomas', (1947) 1 All ER 582: 1947 AC 484 (B); and the two judgments of the Privy Council reported in - ' AIR 1949 PC 32 (A)' and - 'Prem Singh v. Deb Singh', AIR 1948 PC 20 (C), are based on this judgment. The third principle laid down by Lord Thankerton at page 587 of the All ER is in the following words: "The appellate Court, either because the reasons given by the trial Judge are not satisfactory, or because it unmistakably so appears from the evidence may be satisfied that he has not taken proper advantage of his having seen and heard the witnesses and the matter will then become at large for the appellate Court." 4. Applying this principle to the facts of this case I find that the trial Judge has measured the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs by a standard required only in criminal proceedings and has forgotten that there is a strong and marked difference as to the effect of the evidence in civil and criminal proceedings. In civil cases, it cannot be said that the benefit of every reasonable doubt must necessarily go to the defendant. 5. The Indian Evidence Act has adopted the requirements of the prudent man as an appropriate concrete standard by which to measure proof and in civil proceedings a mere preponderance of probability, due regard being had to the burden of proof, is a sufficient basis of decision. If a Court requires a standard of proof higher than that laid down by the Evidence Act the appellate Court must interxere. In this case, the plaintiffs had produced licences to graze cattle Exs. P/3, P/4, P/5 and P/6 issued from 1-7-1945 to 1-7-1946. The attachment of cattle took place on 13-10-1946. The licences for grazing cattle were issued in the name of Pusaji and that shows that the authorities were confident that Pusaji was the owner of the cattle. The licences were issued much before the attachment and therefore the licences are not tainted with any suspicion. This circumstance which alone outweighs other considerations, in this case, has entirely been ignored by the trial Court. The second circumstance is that the cattle were attached in the house which has been held to be of Pusaji. These two circumstances ought to have been considered by the trial Court and if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is read along with the aforesaid circumstances then the conclusion is irresistible that the cattle belong to Pusaji and not to Gendi Bai. These two circumstances ought to have been considered by the trial Court and if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is read along with the aforesaid circumstances then the conclusion is irresistible that the cattle belong to Pusaji and not to Gendi Bai. There is no reason why so many witnesses would come to depose in the Court that Pusaji purchased cattle from them and the trial Court has not recorded that the witnesses were inimical to the defendant or partial towards Pusaji. Thus, it is clear that the trial Court had left its decision fairly open to attack and the appellate Court has rightly set aside the finding of fact. 6. That Pusaji was son-in-law to Gendi Bai is a circumstance which warns the Judge that Pusaji' s evidence must be received with caution. But this does not mean that it must be rejected altogether and in this case the adverse presumption has been rebutted, and the initial suspicions seem to be unfounded. I, therefore, come to the conclusion that the Judgment of the learned First Appellate Court is sound and does not warrant any interference. 7. I, therefore, disallow the appeal with costs.