JUDGMENT CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, J. The facts of this appeal are simple and the points to be decided few. One Kanhayalalsing, who had 3 brothers, died on 25-2-1936 issueless, leaving behind him his widow, Tapabai, who died on 28-7-1942. Kewalsing and Chayansing, two of the 3 brothers of Kanhayalalsing, pre-deceased him. Narayansing, the last of the four brothers, filed a suit on 2-10-1942 against Sumersing alias Shankarsing, son of Kewalsing, claiming the properties of Kanhayalalsing and Tapabai as the nearest heir, and alleging that the defendant had taken wrongful possession of the same. Schedule A to the plaint specifies the properties of Kanhayalalsing; and Schedule B the stridhanam properties of Tapabai. The defendant, who is the son of Kewalsing, resisted the suit, and stated that he was adopted to Kanhayalalsing by his widow, Tapabai, and was therefore entitled to the properties. He further alleged that he got the stridhanam properties also under a will executed by the adoptive mother, Tapabai. 2. The Subordinate Judge of Jalgaon, who tried the suit, decreed it in favour of the plaintiff, holding that the defendant failed to prove his adoption, that Tapabai was prohibited by her husband from making an adoption, and that the will set up by the defendant was a forged document. 3. The defendant preferred an appeal to the High Court at Bombay, which was successful. The High Court found as a fact that there was a valid adoption and that there was no prohibition against an adoption by Tapabai. The question whether the will set up by the defendant was genuine was not gone into by the High Court, as it was unnecessary to do so, in view of its finding on the question of adoption. In the result, the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The present appeal is directed against the High Court's decree dismissing the plaintiff's suit. 4. In holding that the adoption was not proved, the Subordinate Judge took the view that a separate and independent declaration of adoption, either contemporaneous with or subsequent to the adoption, was necessary under Hindu law, and as the evidence did not establish any such declaration, the adoption was probably not in fact made. 4. In holding that the adoption was not proved, the Subordinate Judge took the view that a separate and independent declaration of adoption, either contemporaneous with or subsequent to the adoption, was necessary under Hindu law, and as the evidence did not establish any such declaration, the adoption was probably not in fact made. In his judgment, he observed as follows: “The physical act of giving and taking must be accompanied by a specific declaration on the part of the giver as regards her consent and on the part of the taker as regards her acceptance.” In another part of the judgment, he said: “This want of declaration on the part of the adoptive mother vitiates the factum of adoption. Not only that but it creates a doubt in our mind as regards the factum of adoption and as regards the consent of Tapabai to the whole adoption.” We think that the Subordinate Judge went entirely wrong in this view. What Hindu law requires is the giving and the taking of the boy “in adoption” and nothing more. So long as it is made out that the mother of the boy gave him in adoption and the adoptive mother took him as her adopted child with the intention to adopt, no further or separate declaration of any kind is necessary. That there was such giving and taking of the defendant in adoption is proved by Tapabai, who took the defendant in adoption, and Gopabai, who gave the boy in adoption, not to speak of the other witnesses who were present at the ceremony. In this case, we have also a formal declaration very soon after the adoption. There were two deeds of adoption one on the same date as the adoption and another 2 days later. The first deed (Ext. D-61) could not be registered owing to some technical difficulty, and the later deed (Ext. D-62) therefore came into existence. 5. The learned Judges of the High Court have observed that there was overwhelming evidence on the question of the fact of adoption and that the assessment of this evidence by the Subordinate Judge was coloured by the wrong angle of vision from which he approached the question by imagining that some sort of independent declaration was necessary. 5. The learned Judges of the High Court have observed that there was overwhelming evidence on the question of the fact of adoption and that the assessment of this evidence by the Subordinate Judge was coloured by the wrong angle of vision from which he approached the question by imagining that some sort of independent declaration was necessary. In more than one place, the Subordinate Judge states in the course of his judgment that the adoption was in all probability foisted upon Tapabai without any knowledge of what she was actually doing and that she was forced to make a farce of an adoption. In the face of the two deeds of adoption and her own deposition, it is impossible to agree with the view of the Subordinate Judge. Moreover, as has been pointed out by the High Court, there was no case set up of coercion, undue influence or ignorance. 6. In holding that Kanhayalal prohibited Tapabai from making an adoption, the Subordinate Judge was largely influenced by the proceedings in a former suit which the defendant had filed against Jankibai, the mistress of Kanhayalal, alleging that he was the adopted son and claiming recovery of possession of some properties of the deceased. On the evidence then before the court it was held in the said suit that there was such a prohibition, and this finding was affirmed on appeal and on second appeal. The Subordinate Judge mentally felt overpowered by that finding in the prior suit and virtually gave effect to the same in his judgment. The learned Judges of the High Court point out that the proceedings in the earlier suit, which was not inter partes, can at best be evidence, under Section 13 of the Evidence Act, 1872 of a right asserted, denied and recognised, but they could have no further probative value, and that the story of prohibition narrated by 3 witnesses in the present case, namely, the plaintiff, Jankibai, and Jadav Singh, (an alleged friend), was highly incredible, not only because these witnesses were interested and unreliable, but also for the reason that it was against probabilities. 7. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant finally urged that the spuriousness of the will set up by the defendant indicated that the adoption would have been otherwise assailable and it was hence incumbent on the High Court to have gone into the question of the genuineness of the will. We are unable to accept this contention. The argument assumes that the will was not genuine. We express no opinion on the point as we do not find it necessary to consider the question. 8. The High Court has in our opinion reached the correct conclusion, and we affirm its decree and dismiss the appeal with costs.