Order. - This is an appln. in revn. by one Hari Singh against the judgment and order of the learned Ses. J. of Mahasu, dated 16-5-1950, dismissing his revn. against the judgment and order of a first class Mag. of Kasumpti, dated 15-12-1949, whereby the appln. of the resp. Mt. Parbati, the wife of the present appct. u/s. 488, Cr. P. C. was allowed, and she was granted a monthly allowance of Rs. 60 by way of maintenance against the appct. 2. There was a preliminary objection taken on behalf of the resp. that the revn. was time-barred or was, in any case, unduly delayed There is no limitation prescribed by law for the filing of a criminal revn. There is, however, no doubt that, except in exceptional cases, the filing of a criminal revn. should not be unduly delayed. The revn. of the appet. was dismissed by the Ses. J. on 16-5-1950. On 17-5-1950 the appct. applied for a copy of that judgment. The copy was ready on 30-5-1950 but it was not till 22-7-1950 that delivery of the copy was taken by him. Even after that the appct. waited for 28 days before he filed the present revn. on 19-8-1950. (After discussing the evidence, the judgment proceeded:) I therefore hold that the filing of the present appln. in revn. was unduly delayed, and that no expln. worth the name for the delay has been offered. 3.It appears to me, however, that even a revn. filed with undue delay, and without any expln. for the delay, might be entertained if, on a consideration of the case on merits, it appears that there has been a failure of justice. That does not appear to be so in the present case. 4. The first point urged on behalf of the appct. was that the present proceedings should, under Cl. (8) of S. 488, have been taken before the appropriate Ct. at Solan, because village Kundanpur Bater, where the appct. last resided with the resp., is situate within that sub-division, and not by the first class Mag. at Kasumpti. But u/s. 631, Cr. P. C., the order of maintenance passed by the trial Ct., cannot be set aside merely on the ground that the proceedings were had in a wrorng place, unless it appears that such an error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. at Kasumpti. But u/s. 631, Cr. P. C., the order of maintenance passed by the trial Ct., cannot be set aside merely on the ground that the proceedings were had in a wrorng place, unless it appears that such an error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. On such failure of justice, however, no suggestion whatsoever has been made on behalf of the appct. It is noteworthy that the present plea was not taken by the appct. in the trial Ct. and that, although taken before the Ses. J. it was not pressed there. That by itself shows that the appct. was not in any way prejudiced, and there was no failure of justice. The learned counsel for the appct. cited before me in this connection the ruling reported as Emperor v. Sham Bai, A. I. R. (28) 1941 Nag. 175; but the provisions of S. 531 were not cited in that case and, therefore, the present revn. cannot, on its authority, be allowed merely on the ground of the proceedings having been had in a wrong place. It may further be stated in this connection that the appln. u/s. 488 was filed before the Dist. Mag. of Mahasu, and that the appcts. place of residence lies within that district. The appln. for maintenance was, therefore, filed in a proper Ct. The Dist. Mag. thereafter made the case over to the Mag. at Kasumpti, which he was fully entitled to do u/s. 192, Cr. P. C. The first ground of want of jurisdiction in the trial Ct. has, therefore, no force. 5. It was next urged on behalf of the appct. that, in the course of the proceedings before the trial Ct. he made an offer to the resp. to come and live with him, but that the Mag. did not take her statement in reply to that offer and recorded no finding with regard to the same. According to the learned counsel for the appct. it was incumbent upon the Mag. to have done so in view of the provisions of cl. (4) of S. 488. In other words, before allowing maintenance to the resp. the Mag, should have recorded a finding that the resp. had refused the offer, and that the refusal was based on sufficient reason. it was incumbent upon the Mag. to have done so in view of the provisions of cl. (4) of S. 488. In other words, before allowing maintenance to the resp. the Mag, should have recorded a finding that the resp. had refused the offer, and that the refusal was based on sufficient reason. The proposition of law thus propounded appears to be correct, but the contention that the resp.s reply to the offer was not obtained and the Mag. recorded no finding with regard to the offer and refusal is not correct. The offer was made in the appct.s written statement on 12-9-1949, and in her statement subsequently made by the resp. on 26-10-1949 she clearly stated that she was not ready to go to the appct. because, firstly, her life would be in danger and, secondly, the appct. was in liaison with his sister-in-law. The learned Mag. also recorded a finding on the point by holding that he was not prepared to believe that the appct. was sincere in his offer, and that the resp. was justified in not agreeing to live with him. This technical ground raised on behalf of the appct. has also no force. It was not argued before me that the reason for which the appct.s offer was held not to have been made bona fide was not a valid reason in law. 6. Finally, it was argued that the evidence produced by the parties in this case did not merit the conclusion that the appct. had been guilty of neglect or refusal to maintain the resp. There is evidence for and against on that point, and it cannot be said that in weighing that evidence a perverse finding of fact has been recorded by the trial Ct. It is immaterial that this Ct. might have come to a different finding on that evidence. I see no reason, therefore, to disturb the finding of fact regarding the appct.s neglect or refusal to maintain the resp. 7. The appln. in revn. accordingly fails, and it is hereby rejected with costs. Application dismissed.