ORDER : This is a reference under S. 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Municipal Committee of Shivapuri wrote to the Honorary Municipal Magistrate Shivapuri to realise Rs. 53/12/- due from Parshadilal under Section 78 of the Gwalior Municipal Act. Parshadilal by an application dated 10-8-1949 objected to the dues stating that the liability has been wrongly fixed. The municipal magistrate directed the Municipality to produce evidence, in support of the dues. As the municipal committee failed to adduce the evidence the honorary municipal magistrate dismissed the claim of the municipality. The municipal committee Shivapuri preferred a revision against the order of the Municipal magistrate before the Sessions Judge, who has made this referrence for setting aside order of the lower Court. 2. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of Parshadilal on the ground that the reference under Section 438, Cri. P. C. cannot be entertained as the proceedings are of a civil nature. Mr. Sahastrabhudhe, who appears on behalf of the municipal committee Shivapuri, contends that as the order of the trial Court is passed by a magistrate it is revisable under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and hence the preliminary objection has no force. 3. It is no doubt true that under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure any proceedings before any inferior criminal Court is revisable by the High Court. But the question to consider in this case is whether realisation of a tax is a proceeding before a criminal Court. Section 78 of the Gwalior Municipal Act reads as follows : Under this section, it is no doubt the municipal magistrate who is authorised to take action. But the action is that of realising a tax. Liability to a tax is a civil matter. The realization of the tax is also to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Consequently although an action is taken under Section 78 by the municipal magistrate, the nature of the proceedings is civil and not criminal. Liability to a tax is a civil matter. The realization of the tax is also to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Consequently although an action is taken under Section 78 by the municipal magistrate, the nature of the proceedings is civil and not criminal. In the case of 'Ahmedabad City Municipality v. Vadilal' their lordships of the Bombay High Court observed as follows : "We think, however, that this is a matter relating to a civil liability and the intention of the legislature was, under the old Section 86, to give only one remedy by way of an appeal to the magistrate or Bench of magistrates." 'Vide AIR (15) 1928 Bom 376. In 'Lokmanya Mills Ltd. Barsi v. Municipal Borough, Barsi', Beaumont, C.J., with whom Wadia, J., agreed made the following observations : "The position is some what anomalous, because the question of liability to tax is a purely civil matter, and the magistrate hearing an appeal against a demand notice is a Criminal Court so that an appeal lies from him to the Sessions Court, and not to the District Court." His Lordship further added : "It certainly would seem anomalous that this Court should have jurisdiction to revise a civil order made by a District Judge and a criminal order made by a Sessions Judge, who of course, is the same individual, but should not have power to revise a civil order made by a Sessions Judge sitting under a statute temporarily as civil Court." 'Vide AIR (26) 1939 Bom 477'. The question in the latter case for consideration was whether a revision under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, can be entertained in respect of an order made regarding a demand notice. However it has clearly been laid down in both the cases cited above, that the proceedings with regard to demand notice are of civil nature. In 'Dimonte v. Bandra Borough Municipality', AIR (37) 1950 Bom 397 (FB) Chagla, C.J., observed as follows : "Now it cannot be disputed that the subject-matter of the decision of the magistrate is a purely civil matter. He is dealing with rates and taxes. He is not exercising any criminal jurisdiction, nor is he dealing with any criminal matter. In 'Dimonte v. Bandra Borough Municipality', AIR (37) 1950 Bom 397 (FB) Chagla, C.J., observed as follows : "Now it cannot be disputed that the subject-matter of the decision of the magistrate is a purely civil matter. He is dealing with rates and taxes. He is not exercising any criminal jurisdiction, nor is he dealing with any criminal matter. Therefore, when the matter comes before us in revision, it is a matter which is civil in its nature; and we see no reason why such a matter should be entertained on the criminal side of the High Court and not on the Civil side." I respectfully agree with the view taken by their Lordships of the Bombay High Court. The proceedings are no doubt undertaken by the municipal magistrate; but under Section 78 of the Municipal Act the municipal magistrate does not exercise any criminal jurisdiction but deals with a purely civil matter. Hence the realisation of dues is not a proceeding before a criminal Court. The preliminary objection, therefore, must be upheld. 4. In the view that I take the reference under Section 438 does not lie. 5. The reference is, accordingly, rejected. Reference rejected.