Judgment Reuben, J. 1. This is a reference under Sec. 5, Court-fees Act. 2. One Ramyad Gosain, proprietor of three annas and odd share in touzi No. 1484, mortgaged this share usufructuarily in the year 1911 to defendants 1 and 2 to secure a loan of Rs. 1,600. 12 bighas of land which forms the subject-matter of the present appeal was included in the hypothecated property as bakasht land. The present suit has been brought by the plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of Ramyad Gosain to redeem the mortgage. They also seek khas possession of these 12 bighas as against defendants 3 and 4 alleging that these defendants are the benamidar for defendants 1 and 2. The plaintiffs have succeeded as regards the prayer for redemption in both the Courts below and this portion of the decree is not challenged. The present appeal is by defendants 3 and 4, who claim occupancy rights in the 12 bighas, which they claim to have been settled with them by Ramyad Gosain in 1919 with the consent of the mortgagees. This defence was accepted by the Munsiff, bus, in appeal by the plaintiff, the lower appellate Court has held that there was no such settlement and has granted the plaintiff the relief prayed for. Hence, the present appeal. 3. The suit was valued in the Court of first instance at Rs. 1,600 under Clause (ix) of Section 7, Court-fees Act. The same value was placed by the plaintiff on his appeal in the District Court. On an objection by the Stamp reporter that the relief as regards the 12 bighas is not covered by Clause (ix) of Section 7, the District Judge accepted the valuation but on a different basis, namely Rs. 683-7-3 on account of a set-off claimed by the plaintiffs and refused by the Munsiff and the balance of Rs. 916-8-9 as the value of the 12 bighas of land. Regarding this latter sum, the District Judge remarked : "This may be taken as adequate, in view of the fact that defendants 3 and 4 have, according to the judgment of the lower Court, to pay rental of Rs. 36 to the plaintiff." The appellants, to this Court have valued their appeal at Rs. 1,147-8-7 consisting of Rs. 916 and odd as the value of the land and Rs. 230 and odd on account of excess coat etc. assessed against them.. 36 to the plaintiff." The appellants, to this Court have valued their appeal at Rs. 1,147-8-7 consisting of Rs. 916 and odd as the value of the land and Rs. 230 and odd on account of excess coat etc. assessed against them.. 4 This reference has been made to me for a decision on two points : firstly, as to whether Clause (ix) of Section 7 has any application and, secondly, if ad valorem court fee is payable, how it is to be assessed. 5. Really, there is no distinction between the two points. Clause (ix) of Section 7 is not a charging section. It merely prescribes the manner in which the valuation is to be computed in certain cases in which an ad valorem court-fee is pay. able. The charging section in the case of appeals in the High Court against judgments of Subordinate Courts is Sec. 4, which provides that no document of any of the kinds specified in the first or second schedule to the Act as chargeable with fees, shall be filed or received in a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction as regards appeals from the Courts subject to its superintendence unless in respect of such document there be paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said schedules as the proper fee for such document. We have, therefore, to see whether there is any provision in the schedules which applies to the appeal. In the present case, there is no specific article that applies and we-have to fall back on the residuary provision, Article 1 of Schedule I, under which an ad valorem-court-fee is chargeable on "the amount or value-of the subject-matter in dispute". The test is what is the subject matter in dispute and what is its amount or value ? 6. The question of the applicability of Clause (ix) of Section 7 has been referred to me on account of my decisions on references under Sec. 5, Court-fees Act made in Second Appeal Nos. 1500 of 1949 and 704 of 1949, in both of which I held that the value should be computed as provided in Clause (ix). Those appeals arose out of suits for the redemption of, usufructuary mortgages in which the plaintiff had added a prayer for mesne profits. 1500 of 1949 and 704 of 1949, in both of which I held that the value should be computed as provided in Clause (ix). Those appeals arose out of suits for the redemption of, usufructuary mortgages in which the plaintiff had added a prayer for mesne profits. I pointed out in my decisions that the claim for mesne profits-was superfluous, as the Court was bound under the provisions of Section 76, T.P. Act read with Order 34, Rule 7, Civil P.C., to take accounts between the parties. The suits were, therefore, plain and simple suits for redemption. Hence, foe the purposes of the payment of court fee they were governed in the Court of first instance by Clause (ix) of Section 7. The appellants in the High Court raised the very same points that had been raised in the Courts-below. In one case, the plaintiff was the appellant, in the other case the defendant. So far as the appeal by the plaintiff was concerned, it was clear that the matter in dispute in second appeal should be valued on the same basis as his claim was valued in the Court of first instance. From this it would follow that the same basis of valuation should be accepted for the appeal by the. defendant, for there is no reason why an appeal, which raises the same points as were raised in the Court of first instance, should be valued differently according to whether the appellant is the plaintiff or the defendant. My decisions in those cases have no application to the present case, where redemption has been granted and the correctness of the decree to that extent has not. been challenged. The question that is raised in, the present appeal is not a question which arises between the mortgagor and the mortgagee. It arises between the mortgagor and persons who are strangers to the mortgage. Clause (ix) of Section 7, therefore, is entirely foreign to the present appeal. For this reason, I would answer the first point in the negative. 7. As regards the second point, the test for valuation is plain, namely, what is the subject-matter in dispute and what is its amount or value ? The matter in dispute in this appeal is I the right to hold the land as an occupancy raiyat at a particular annual rent. 7. As regards the second point, the test for valuation is plain, namely, what is the subject-matter in dispute and what is its amount or value ? The matter in dispute in this appeal is I the right to hold the land as an occupancy raiyat at a particular annual rent. It has been urged on behalf of the appellants that this value should be computed in accordance with Clause (xi), Sub-clause (cc) of Section 7. That section relates to a suit for the recovery of immovable property from a tenant including a tenant holding over after the termination of a tenancy. It has no application to a suit in which the relationship of landlord and tenant is denied by the plainfr.fi Next, it is suggested that following the principle in Clause (iv), Sub-clause (c) of Section 7, the valuation placed on the relief sought in the memorandum of appeal should be accepted. It is well Established, however, that the Court is not bound to accept a valuation which on the face of it is arbitrary. The valuation stated in the memorandum of appeal is based on that adopted by the District Judge. That valuation was a fortuitous one arising out of particular facts of the appeal before the District Judge. The appellants-plaintiffs had there placed a total value of Rs. 1,600 on their appeal in accordance with Clause (ix) of Section 7. The District Judge having held that Clause (ix) has no application and having allotted a portion of the stated valuation to one of the specific reliefs claimed, accepted the remaining amount as sufficient to cover the other relief. The reason given by him for accepting that amount as sufficient has no logical connection with the value of that relief. It is based on the amount of the rent claimed as payable by the tenant. No attempt was made by the District Judge to ascertain what proportion that rent bore to the net produce of the land. It might have been a high rent which would considerably diminish the value of the holding On the other hand, it might have been a very low rent, which would have exactly the contrary effect. So there is no logical connection between the rent and the value of the holding. The property consists of 12 bighas of cultivable and, and, prima facie Rs. 916 seems a low valuation. 8. So there is no logical connection between the rent and the value of the holding. The property consists of 12 bighas of cultivable and, and, prima facie Rs. 916 seems a low valuation. 8. It has also been suggested, though somewhat faintly, that the decision of the District Judge as regards the valuation of the property is final. The decision has no finality even as regards the correctness of court fee charged in the Court below vide Clause (ii) of Sec.12 of the Act. It is certainly not binding for the purpose of valuing the appeal in this Court and the Taxing Officer is empowered to assess the value: Krishna Mohan v Raghunandan, 4 Pat. 336, 9. For the reasons I have given above, I hold that the court-fee is payable on the appeal under Article 1 of Schedule I to the Court-fees Act. In addition to the ad valorem court-fee payable on account of excess cost etc., the appellants are liable to pay ad valorem court-fees on the value of the interest claimed by them in the 12 bighas of land. The reference is answered accordingly,