ORDER H. S. KAMATH, PRESIDENT. - The appellant made an application to the Sales Tax Commissioner under the old unamended Rule 25 of the Sales Tax Rules, claiming exemption from payment of tax on the ground that he dealt exclusively in products of cottage and home industries. The Commissioner rejected the application and the result is this appeal. 2. Rule 25 reads as follows : "25. Exemption to cottage and home industries - A dealer, who deals exclusively in products of cottage and home industries, and who claims exemption from payment of tax under item 21 of Schedule II to the Act, shall apply in writing to the Commissioner in this behalf. The Commissioner, after making such enquiry as he deems fit, shall issue to such dealer a certificate in Form VII and the provisions of Rule 24 shall then apply to his case". Schedule II to the Act mentioned above has been amended twice so far - the first time on 11th April, 1949, and the second time on 12th December, 1949. The present case relates to the period prior to 11th April, 1949. Item 21 of Schedule II referred to in Rule 25 (as it stood before 11th April, 1949) reads as follows : ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Serial Description Conditions and exceptions subject to which No. of goods. exemption has been allowed. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ (1) (2) (3) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ * * * * * 21 Products of When sold by persons dealing exclusively cottage and in such products, on authorization made home indus- by the prescribed authority in the tries prescribed manner. * * * * * ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Now, Schedule II has been dealt with under Section 6 of the Act, which reads as follows : "6. (1) No tax shall be payable under this Act on the sale of goods specified in the section column of Schedule II, subject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the third column thereof. (2) The Provincial Government may, after giving by notification not less than one month's notice of its intention so to do, by a notification after the expiry of notice mentioned in the first notification amend either Schedule, and thereupon such Schedule shall be deemed to be amended accordingly". Apart from Section 6, the only other section dealing with exemption from taxation is Section 7, which reads as follows : "7. Apart from Section 6, the only other section dealing with exemption from taxation is Section 7, which reads as follows : "7. The provincial Government may, subject to such restrictions and conditions and conditions as may be prescribed, by order exempt, in whole or in part, any dealer or class of dealers from the payments of tax under this Act". 3. A study of the provisions of the Act reproduced above is necessary, in order to decide the first question raised, namely, whether an appeal at all lies to the Board of Revenue in this case. The learned counsel for the State has said that, so far as item 21 of Schedule II is concerned, he would make no distinction between Sections 6 and 7. Although, in the case before us, the order has been passed by the Sales Tax Commissioner, he argues that it must be deemed to have been passed by him as an agent of the State Government under Section 7. If this view is correct, an appeal would not lie for obvious reasons. The Board of Revenue is a body created by the State Government to exercise some of its powers and discharge some of its functions (vide Section 6 of the Board of Revenue Act) and it cannot, therefore, sit in judgment over the decisions of the State Government. But, in my view, the basic premise on which the State Government's learned counsel relies cannot be accepted. The functions of sections 6 and 7 are distinct and separate. Section 6 deals only with the question of exemption in respect of goods specified in Schedule II, while the scope of Section 7 is unrestricted. The unrestricted power under Section 7 are reserved exclusively to the State Government; and there is no provision, as the law stands at present, whereby the State Government can delegate those powers to a subordinate authority like the Sales Tax Commissioner. As for Section 6, most of the goods specified in Schedule II enjoy unconditional exemption from taxation, while some can obtain exemption only subject to certain conditions and exceptions. Among the latter are "products of cottage and home industries" mentioned against item 21. The essential condition governing their exemption is that they should be "sold by persons persons dealing exclusively in such products", and exemption is to be authorised "by the prescribed authority in the prescribe manner". Among the latter are "products of cottage and home industries" mentioned against item 21. The essential condition governing their exemption is that they should be "sold by persons persons dealing exclusively in such products", and exemption is to be authorised "by the prescribed authority in the prescribe manner". The authority and the manner are both prescribed in Rule 25. The authority is the Sales Tax Commissioner and not the State Government; and it is the Commissioner who has to decide whether exemption should be granted or should be refused. 4. Now under Rule 53(4) of the Sales Tax Rules "an appeal against an order passed by the Commissioner" lies to the Board of Revenue. To have a proper idea of the implications of this sub-rule, it is necessary to examine the three preceding sub-rules. The first two sub-rules provide for appeals against original orders of assessment, passed by subordinate officers of the department. In these matters, the final appellate authority is the Commissioner himself. Sub-rule (3) provides for appeals "against any order under this Act, other than assessment with or without penalty" passed by officers of the department subordinate to the Commissioner. The final appellate authority under this sub-rule is also the Commissioner. Sub-rule (4) is a combination into one of the three preceding sub-rules in regard to original orders passed by the Commissioner. In other words, sub-rule (4) must be construed as providing for appeals "against any order under this Act, including original assessment orders" passed by the Commissioner. The learned counsel for the State contends that the sub-rule must be regarded as providing for appeals only against judicial orders and, in his view, an order passed by the Commissioner granting or declining to grant exemption under Rule 25 is not a judicial order, but an administrative order. Apart from what I what I have said of my view of sub-rule (4), I must note that neither the Sales Tax Act nor the Sales Tax Rules make any distinction between judicial orders and administrative orders. Such distinction, in fact, would be artificial and unnecessary. As I read the Act, the Commissioner is not strictly a court of law, but an administrative Tribunal whose functions include the decision of question of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature. In arriving at such decisions, he must be guided by certain judicial principles. Such distinction, in fact, would be artificial and unnecessary. As I read the Act, the Commissioner is not strictly a court of law, but an administrative Tribunal whose functions include the decision of question of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature. In arriving at such decisions, he must be guided by certain judicial principles. His orders, therefore, are those of an Administrative Tribunal which follows or which ought to follow certain judicial principles. Against all such orders under the Act, appeals would lie to the Board of Revenue. The present appeal, therefore, is competent. 5. What I have said above should also largely decide the attitude of the Board towards appeals of this character. Under Rule 25, on receipt of an application for exemption from payment of tax under item 21 of Schedule II, the Commissioner is required to make such enquiry as he deems fit. Grant of exemption will follow if he is satisfied that a case for exemption has been made out; otherwise it will be refused. This is the view that one can take of what has been left unsaid in the rule. The procedure laid down leaves a great deal to the Commissioner's discretion and judgment; and the function of the Board, as far as I can see, is mainly to examine whether the discretion and judgment have been exercised properly, not ignoring certain basic judicial principles. Among these, I would mention three :- (a) the approach to the question should be made without bias or pre-conceived notions, except for deriving guidance from established precedents; (b) no order prejudicial to a party should be passed without a full opportunity being given to him for being heard and there should be a fair investigation of the facts on which he bases his case; and (c) the order passed should give adequate and convincing reasons for the decision takes. If the Board is satisfied on the counts enumerated, it would nor-mally be reluctant to interfere in appeal with the order passed. In particular, it will not be its business to go minutely into questions essentially of fact and not of law. 6. Having regard to the principles stated above let us consider the facts of the present case. Admittedly, the appellant deals in cloth made on hand-looms and on power-looms and also in jari. His learned counsel agrees that jari is not a product of cottage industry. 6. Having regard to the principles stated above let us consider the facts of the present case. Admittedly, the appellant deals in cloth made on hand-looms and on power-looms and also in jari. His learned counsel agrees that jari is not a product of cottage industry. A point which had weighed with the Sales Tax Commissioner in refusing exemption - that the appellant was purchasing cloth from a class of weavers called master-weavers - has not been pressed in appeal. But apparently the Commissioner held that cloth produced on power-looms was not a product of cottage or home industry; and his view that jari is similarly not a product of cottage or home industry has not been disputed by the appellant's learned counsel. Thus, on a plain reading of the entry in column (3) of Schedule II against item 21, the appellant does not qualify for exemption from taxation, But in this case, as well as in certain other heard about the same time, it was argued at considerable length on behalf of the appellants that Section 6 of the Act provides for exemption for specified goods from taxation and not for persons dealing in those goods. The implication of this argument is that if exemption is to be granted in respect of products of cottage and home industries, it should be available to all those who deal in such goods and there should be no distinction made between dealers in such goods as has been made by the entry in column (3) providing that the exemption is available only to those who deal exclusively in such goods. Following this line of argument, it has been suggested that the entry in column (3) is contrary to the law as stated in Section 6. In this connection, the view that the Board has already taken of the nature of a tax on sales may be restated. The question was examined at some length in Govindram Laxman Prasad v. The State ([1951] 2 S.T.C. 176; (1951) N.L.J. 503, 509) where it was held that a sales tax is "a tax on person in respect of their transactions of sales of certain goods". If the tax is a levy on persons, the exemption from taxation is also intended for persons in respect of certain specified goods. If the tax is a levy on persons, the exemption from taxation is also intended for persons in respect of certain specified goods. This is the true meaning and import of Section 6(1); and in this view of the law, the entry in column (3) against item 21, which particularises the class of persons to be exempted, cannot be considered as open to challenge. 7. Attention was next drawn by the appellant's learned counsel to item 23 of Schedule II as amended on 11th April, 1949. This entry reads as follows : Serial Description of Conditions and exceptions No. goods. subject to which exemption has been allowed. (1) (2) (3) 23 Products of cottage When sold by persons dealing and home industries exclusively in such products other than hand and on authorisation made by the power loom industries. prescribed authority in the prescribed manner. Item 23 in this amended Schedule no doubt takes the place of item 21 in the earlier Schedule and the entry in column (2) contains the additional words "other than hand and power-loom industries". The fact that these words were added in amending the Schedule, it was argued, suggests that item 21 in the old Schedule should be taken to include "hand and power-loom industries", which were now specifically excluded from the scope of the new item 23. Such a conclusion does not necessarily follow. It is apparently one of three conclusions possible, the other two being (a) that the matter was placed beyond doubt by the amendment, though, from the very commencement the intention was the one conveyed by the amended entry, and (b) that whatever the original intention or interpretation, the position from 11th April, 1949, was to be the one indicated by the new item 23. In actual practice, judging from the cases heard by the Board, it would appear that officers of the department have generally regarded hand-loom cloth produced under suitable conditions as a product of cottage and home industry, but not cloth produced on power-looms. In the circumstances obtaining in this State, one cannot seriously question the correctness of the view they have taken. We have not yet reached a stage here when power-looms could be set up in cottages; and cloth produced on power-looms cannot, therefore, be regarded as a product of cottage industry. 8. As regards jari, an interesting point has been raised by the appellant's learned counsel. We have not yet reached a stage here when power-looms could be set up in cottages; and cloth produced on power-looms cannot, therefore, be regarded as a product of cottage industry. 8. As regards jari, an interesting point has been raised by the appellant's learned counsel. It has been urged that small quantities of jari and, sometimes even of silk, are used in the production of cotton cloth on hand-looms. Even a person dealing exclusively in hand-loom cloth produced as a cottage industry finds it necessary to purchase small quantities of materials like jari and silk to be supplied to weavers with whom he places orders. I have seen, in this connection, the Calcutta High Court's decision of the 30th May, 1946, in Ishwardas Kapoor and Sons v. Member, Board of Revenue ([1950] 1 S.T.C. 153) where it was held that hand-loom-woven cloth which, after it comes out of the loom, is subjected to needle-work performed by hand or machine and thereby has its value increased, cannot be regarded as hand-loom-woven cloth within the meaning of item No. 16 of the Scheduler to the Bengal Act, 1941. Item 16 of the Bengal Schedule, however, is quite different from our item 21, though Section 6(1) of our Act is identical with Section 6(1) of the Bengal Act. Item 16 of the Bengal Schedule mentions only "hand-loom-woven cloth", whereas our item 21, as already stated, refers generally to a larger category of goods, namely, "products of cottage and home industries." The Bengal decision will not, therefore, in my view, be applicable to the present case. Hand-loom cloth, subjected to silk and jari embroidery, can still qualify for exemption, provided the work of embroidery itself is a cottage industry. From this point of view, a dealer who buys small quantities of jari or silk required solely for use on hand-loom cloth produced as a cottage industry will not be debarred from claiming exemption under Rule 25. I consider that the Board should be content with laying down this principle, leaving it to the Sales Tax Commissioner to determine in each case what quantities of materials of embroidery can be regarded as required strictly for the purpose indicated. In the light of the principle laid down, it is open to him to review his decision, should the circumstances of a case make it just and proper he should do so. 9. In the light of the principle laid down, it is open to him to review his decision, should the circumstances of a case make it just and proper he should do so. 9. So far as this case is concerned, however, the appellant has no valid claim for exemption. Even if on the question of dealings in jari he should have an arguable case, his dealings in power-loom cloth are sufficient to negative any claim he may have on other grounds. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.