Judgment :- 1. Defendant 1 in O.S. 245 of 1951 on the file of the Court of the District Munsiff of Haripad, seeks revision of an order passed by that Court to the effect that the suit has been properly valued and that proper court-fee has been paid on the plaint. The only respondent to this revision petition is the plaintiff. Notice was given to the State in this revision and Mr. Parameswaran Pillai learned Government Pleader appeared. Besides supporting the petition generally, he had no further points or arguments to urge. 2. The plaintiff avers in the plaint that he and Defendants 6 to 10 are members of a divided branch of a Marumakkathayam tarwad, that pursuant to a family arrangement in that tarwad made in the year 1084 and a partition effected in the year 1125 certain properties came into the possession of the plaintiff as karanavan, that he was in management of those properties as such, that certain other properties were acquired out of the income derived by him from out of the tarwad properties under his management, and that in respect of such fresh acquisitions which were all tarwad properties, a document describing the said properties as his own and providing for his possession and enjoyment thereof until his death and for their devolution upon Defendants 1 to 3 after his death, was proposed to be brought into existence by defendants 1 to 3 who are his sons who represented to him that such a document, if executed, would enable him to secure a larger share at a partition of tarwad properties. Having agreed to this proposal, the plaint avers that the plaintiff entrusted Defendants 1 to 3 with the preparation of the said document who, accordingly got a document prepared, represented to the plaintiff that it was in accordance with the arrangement as aforesaid and even read to him portions thereof indicating its tenor as aforesaid, which was accordingly signed by the plaintiff on 8th Meenam 1122, got registered and delivered to Defendants 1 to 3. Some time afterwards, in the year 1125, there was a proposal for partition in the tarwad when the plaintiff wanted a larger share than would ordinarily be due to him and referred to the aforesaid document to found that claim. Some time afterwards, in the year 1125, there was a proposal for partition in the tarwad when the plaintiff wanted a larger share than would ordinarily be due to him and referred to the aforesaid document to found that claim. His ananthiravans, Defendant 6 onwards to whom the claim was made obtained a copy of the document which revealed that the document was not the one that the plaintiff agreed to execute and thought he was executing at the time when he affixed his signature thereto. It was discovered that the document which was got signed by him by Defendants 1 to 3 was a deed of gift which was meant to be effective and which stated that the properties were to be in the possession of the donees thereof in presenti. The suit was therefore filed by the plaintiff for declaration and other reliefs because for the aforesaid reasons the document was not binding upon him. 3. The plaintiff avers further that the properties mentioned in the document were and are in his continuous possession as karanavan. The reliefs asked for in the plaint are: (a) for a declaration that the gift deed dated 8th Meenam 1122 was one got executed by him by misrepresentation and fraud, that it is void, that it was not meant to nor has it come into effect and that it may be cancelled; and (b) for a perpetual injunction restraining Defendants 1 to 5 from entering into, or taking, the income from the properties. 4. Relief (a) was valued by the plaintiff at Rs. 800 and relief (b) at Rs. 70 and the plaintiff paid ad valorem court-fee upon the aforesaid valuations separately. The other reliefs in the plaint relate to costs and consequential reliefs. There is no question raised as to the propriety of the valuation for prayer (b). The question raised is only as to the propriety of the valuation of prayer (a). The court-fee paid upon that prayer is in excess of the proper court-fee as in a suit for declaration, which is only Rs. 10. 5. It was contended on behalf of Defendant 1 that the valuation of the plaint was improper, that it should be Rs. 10,000 which is the amount mentioned as the value of the properties in the gift deed and that ad valorem court-fee should be paid upon that valuation. 10. 5. It was contended on behalf of Defendant 1 that the valuation of the plaint was improper, that it should be Rs. 10,000 which is the amount mentioned as the value of the properties in the gift deed and that ad valorem court-fee should be paid upon that valuation. The Court below was of the opinion that the suit is one falling under S. 3, Sub-s. (4), Cls. (f) and (b), Travancore-Cochin Court-fees Act 2 of 1125 corresponding to S.7, Cl. (4)(c) and (d), Indian Court Fees Act. The Court below also found that the suit was valued properly and that the court-fee paid was proper. The Court below also stated that under the said provision of the Court-fees Act, the plaintiff is given an unrestricted right to value the relief he seeks. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner raises two contentions in this revision: first, that the suit does not fall under S. 3(4)(f) and (b) as found by the court below and that the suit really falls under Cl. (5) of that section. It is also contended that assuming the suit falls under Cl. (4) of S. 3, the valuation is too low and arbitrary and that the proper valuation should be the value of the properties dealt with under the gift deed which itself states their value to be Rs. 10,000. Authorities were cited, upon the question as to whether, the provision contained in the Court-fees Act, S. 7, Cl. (4) to the effect, that the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought does not confer an absolute power on the plaintiff to make any valuation he likes, but that, though the plaintiff may in the first instance put a valuation that is liable to be revised by the Court, should it find the valuation to be too low. It appears to me that in the facts of this case, that question does not arise for consideration. The cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are, none of them, cases of suits filed merely for adjudging a document as void or voidable and to have the same delivered up and cancelled for that reason. A suit of that kind is provided for by S. 39. The cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are, none of them, cases of suits filed merely for adjudging a document as void or voidable and to have the same delivered up and cancelled for that reason. A suit of that kind is provided for by S. 39. Specific Relief Act, which is in the Statute Book of the States of Travancore and Cochin and the number of the Section and the wording thereof are same everywhere. S. 39 reads as follows: "39. Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the Court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act the Court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation." 7. Valuation for a suit under the said section can be fixed by the plaintiff who is bound to pay ad valorem court-fee thereon. The nature of the relief being such as not to admit of a standard for valuation, it is not possible for the Court, assuming that it has got the power, to question that valuation and characterise it arbitrary and too low, except by resort to another and higher valuation which would be equally arbitrary. The cases in Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal (I.L.R. 54 All. 812 (F.B.)), Parvatibai Kom Mahadev v. Vishvanath Ganesh (29 Bom. 207), Chinnammal v. Madrsa Rowther (27 Mad. 480) and Suraj Ket Prasad v. Chandra Mul (A.I.R. 1934 All. 1071) support the above view. Reference may also be made to Arunachalam Chetty v. Rangaswamy Pillai (38 Mad. 922 (F.B.) and Umarannessa Bibi v. Jamirannessa Bibi (A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 362). Mookerjee, C.J., and Chotzner, J. observe in A.I.R. 1923 Calcutta case as follows: "There can be no room for controversy that if the allegation of the plaintiff is well founded, the document cannot be treated in law as her deed, and was not merely voidable but void ab initio. 362). Mookerjee, C.J., and Chotzner, J. observe in A.I.R. 1923 Calcutta case as follows: "There can be no room for controversy that if the allegation of the plaintiff is well founded, the document cannot be treated in law as her deed, and was not merely voidable but void ab initio. This view is based on the principle that where a person is induced to execute a document other than what he had undertaken to execute, the document is void and need not be cancelled. Illustrations of this principle will be found in Throughgood's case (2 Co. Rep. 9A) and Foster v. Mackinon (1869) 4 C.P. 704). In Throughgood's case, it was held that if an illiterate man have a deed falsely read over to him and he then seals and delivers the parchment, that parchment is nevertheless not his deed. In Foster v. Machinon, Byles, J., pointed out that his doctrine was not confined to the condition of an illiterate grantor and that it made no difference whether the grantors were lettered or unlettered. The essential position is that if a grantor or covenantor be deceived or misled as to the actual contents of the deed, the deed does not bind him: Edwards v. Brown ((1831) I.C. & J. 312), Swan v. North British Australasian Land Company ((1863) 2 H. & C. 175). The learned judge adds: "It is plain that there may be cases in which a declaration may be sufficient for his protection. In such an event, the plaintiff cannot be compelled to seek a consequential relief. In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that she is still in possession of the property and all that she requires at the present moment is a declaration that the deed which is in the hands of the defendant is not her deed." 8. That was a case of a conveyance executed by the plaintiff in respect of certain immovable properties in favour of the defendant about which allegations similar to the ones made by the plaintiff in the present case had been made. There was no prayer for a cancellation of the document, the only prayer being one for declaration. It was held that the document being void under the circumstances, no consequential relief need have been asked for. There is no doubt that another view has been taken in certain cases. There was no prayer for a cancellation of the document, the only prayer being one for declaration. It was held that the document being void under the circumstances, no consequential relief need have been asked for. There is no doubt that another view has been taken in certain cases. The controversy however is limited to this, viz., whether the court-fee should be as in a suit for declaration or as in a suit for declaration where consequential relief is also asked for. If the suit can be regarded as one for declaration, notwithstanding the addition of a prayer for cancellation of the deed, which may be regarded as purely incidental to the declaration, then a court-fee of Rs. 10 which is the court-fee prescribed for a declaration would be sufficient. Even if the relief by way of cancellation of the deed be regarded as a consequential relief, the plaintiff has the liberty of valuing the relief which cannot be revised by the Court. 9. None of the cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, lay down anything against the above view upon this and the only aspect of the question relevant in this case, nor is any a case under S. 39, Specific Relief Act, except Gurdawara Param Hans Mahatma Panap Dassji Maharaja v. Gopi Chand (A.I.R. 1941 Lah. 265) which supports the above view. It is not, therefore, necessary to consider those cases and canvass their correctness as they are inapplicable to the facts of the present case. Defendants 6 to 10 who are other members of the plaintiff's branch and who are benefitted by the order passed by the Court below are not impleaded in this revision. In their absence, it would be improper to interfere with the order. The order passed by the Court below is therefore right and the petition for its revision should be dismissed with costs. Dismissed.