Judgment :- 1. The first defendant in O.S. 272 of 1120 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Vaikom, is the appellant in this Second Appeal. He had obtained a decree for money against the plaintiff in O.S. 56/1104 of the same court under which he had to get Rs. 450/-. He borrowed Rs. 250/- and executed a bond for repayment thereof in favour of the 2nd defendant, hypothecating the said decree as security. Ext. A dated 5.6.1111 is the bond. On 28.4.1117 the 2nd defendant assigned his interests under Ext. A in favour of the plaintiff by executing a deed of transfer, Ext. B. The plaintiff brought the suit as such transferee, seeking recovery of the amount due under Ext. A personally from the 1st defendant as also by sale of the hypotheca. The total amount claimed in the suit inclusive of principal and interest is Rs. 375/-. 2. Various contentions were raised by the 1st defendant which were all repelled by both the Courts below. The only point that is raised in the Second Appeal is as regards the maintainability of the suit. 3. Mr. Mathew Muricken, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that the legal consequence of the transfer of the deed of hypothecation, Ext. A, in favour of the plaintiff who is the judgment-debtor in the decree which is the hypotheca under which an amount in excess of that which is claimed in the plaint is payable by him is to extinguish the plaintiff's obligation under the decree to the extent of the amount due under the hypothecation bond and that it will not operate to create any right in him which he can enforce by a suit. 4. Ext. A operates to transfer the decree in O.S. 56/1104 in favour of the 2nd defendant though the transfer is only by way of security. The rights of the 2nd defendant under Ext. A have been transferred in favour of the plaintiff. The result is that the plaintiff has become the transferee of the rights of the decree holder (1st defendant) in O.S. 56/1104 under which he is the judgment-debtor, that is to say, the two opposite characters or qualities of debtor and creditor became united in the same person, viz., the plaintiff. It is a principle of jurisprudence that a person cannot, at one and the same time, unite in himself two opposite characters. It is a principle of jurisprudence that a person cannot, at one and the same time, unite in himself two opposite characters. For instance, a person cannot be his own creditor, or the mortgagee of his own rights. The doctrine of merger proceeds on this principle. The rule no doubt owes its origin to the confusio of the Roman Law. The coincidence of the two opposite characters of debtor and creditor in the same person operates as an annihilation or extinguishment, whereafter there is no more creditor or debtor. If the quantum of the interests that coincide is co-extensive, the extinguishment is complete; otherwise there would be an extinguishment pro tanto. The principle applies to all obligations whatever be their origin and nature; it applies to obligations arising out of or merged in and evidenced by decrees as well. The principle would equally apply whatever be the manner in which the two characters happen to become vested in the same individual whether by act of parties or by operation of law. This principle is well established, is covered by authorities from very early times, and has been recognished everywhere. The dictum of Best C.J., in Neale v. Turton (1827 (4) Bing 149 at 151) "There is no principle by which a man can be at the same time plaintiff and defendant" which applies equally to proceedings in execution, is a corrollary. Domat has stated the rule in these terms: " If the creditor succeeds as heir to him who was surety for debtor, or the surety succeeds to the creditor, the obligation of the surety is annulled; but the debtor, nevertheless, remains still obligee. For the surety's obligation which is extinguished by this change was only necessary to the principal obligation and if there were more debtors, or more creditors, for one and the same sum, and if one of the debtors should succeed to one of the creditors, or one of the creditors to one of the debtors, the confusion which would be made in the person of the said heir, being limited to one portion of the debt, would make no manner of change with respect to the others. - - (Civ. Law, S. 2263)." Sherman in his "Roman Law in the Modern Word" Vol. - - (Civ. Law, S. 2263)." Sherman in his "Roman Law in the Modern Word" Vol. II, page 309 paragraph 742, says: "Extinction of obligation: (10) confusion:- In Roman Law an obligation was dissolved by confusion or merger when the debtor and creditor became one and the same person, for instance when a creditor became by succession heir to his debtor and vice versa. Whenever the principal obligation was extinguished by confusion, any accessory obligation for instance suretyship, was also extinguished: but the opposite case was not true- extinction of the accessory did not extinguish the principal obligation. Confusion as a mode of extinguishing obligations is found in modern law, such as the French, Italian, Sapnish, Japanese, Louisiana and Anglo-American. For example, the Japanese Civil Code provides that "if the obligation, right and duty becomes vested in the same person, the obligation is extinguished." It is not necessary to discuss the decisions; it would be sufficient to make reference to the leading and more important ones: Banarsi Das v. Maharani Kaur (ILR 5 Allahabad 27) Kudhai v. Sheo Dayal (ILR 10 Allahabad 570) Mt. Asiz Bibi v. Malik Aziz Ahmad (54 Allahabad 448) Muhamad Abdul Kadir Sahib Marakkayar v. Abdul Kadir Marakkayar (51 Madras Law Journal Khelat Chandra Roy v. Peary Lal Mallick (ILR 1945 (1) Calcutta 233) 5. Mr. Krishnamoorthi Iyer, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent relied upon two decisions:-Rappai v. Raman Nair (XXXII Cochin LIZ 290) and Subramania Pattar v. Viswanatha Pattar (XXXV Cochin LIZ 414). The one in XXXV Cochin does not appear to have any application to the present case. XXXII Cochin 290 was a decision under the second Proviso to the 14th Rule of the 21st Order of the Cochin Code of Civil Procedure, XXIX/1111, which provides as follows: "O.21, R.14. The one in XXXV Cochin does not appear to have any application to the present case. XXXII Cochin 290 was a decision under the second Proviso to the 14th Rule of the 21st Order of the Cochin Code of Civil Procedure, XXIX/1111, which provides as follows: "O.21, R.14. Where a decree or, if a decree has been passed jointly in favour of two or more persons, the interest of any decree holder in the decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree holder: Provided that where the decree, or such interest as aforesaid, has been transferred by assignment, notice of such application shall be given to the transferor and the judgment-debtor and the decree shall not be executed until the Court has heard their objections (if any) to its execution: Provided also that, where a decree for the payment of money against two or more persons has been transferred to one of them, it shall not be executed against the others", and the question that arose there was whether the legal representatives of a deceased judgment-debtor would be a "judgment-debtor" within the meaning of the said 2nd proviso. O.21, R.14, Proviso 2 is also bottomed on the principle of extinction occasioned by the co-existence of opposite qualities of debtor and creditor in the same person. The principle of extinction is accepted in XXXII Cochin 290 and in the various cases of the Courts in India which are referred to therein. The two learned judges who heard the case first could not agree. The learned Chief Justice was of the opinion that the proviso prohibited execution only in case of a total extinction occasioned by a complete transfer of the entire rights under the decree which was not the case there. The other learned judge took the view that the prohibition applies to partial extinctions as well occasioned by the coincidence of the two characters even to a fractional extent. There was agreement between the two learned judges upon the point that there would be an extinction whether partial or total according to the quantum of the coincidence. The other learned judge took the view that the prohibition applies to partial extinctions as well occasioned by the coincidence of the two characters even to a fractional extent. There was agreement between the two learned judges upon the point that there would be an extinction whether partial or total according to the quantum of the coincidence. Their difference was merely upon the extent of the application of the prohibition contained in the proviso to R.14, 0.21 of the Cochin CPC. The third learned judge before whom the matter was placed on account of such a difference of opinion also accepted the principle of extinction as aforesaid after a discussion of the various authorities cited before him, but was of the opinion that that principle had no application to the facts of that case, as in his view, though the person who sought execution of the decree was a legal representative of the judgment-debtor, he was not himself a judgment-debtor within the meaning of the prohibition which did not, therefore, stand in the way of his executing the decree. The decision in XXXII Cochin thus is in support of the view that we have taken in this case. 6. The plaintiff was a judgment-debtor in O.s. 56/1104 to the tune of over Rs. 450/-. The amount of the hypothecation bond, as the transferee of which the plaintiff has brought the suit is only Rs. 250/- which, with interest as claimed in the plaint, as already stated, comes to 375/- only, which is far less than the amount that the plaintiff is liable to pay under the decree. The result is that on account of the operation of the rule of extinction occasioned by the plaintiff becoming debtor and creditor, the decree is satisfied to the extent of the consideration for Ext. A, that is to the extent of the amount that is sought to be recovered in the suit. The plaintiff, having thus got satisfaction of the amount due to him under the hypothecation deed by the discharge of his liability under the decree to that extent, has nothing to recover by an action. The suit filed by the plaintiff cannot therefore, be maintained and the Second Appeal should be allowed with costs in this Court. The plaintiff, having thus got satisfaction of the amount due to him under the hypothecation deed by the discharge of his liability under the decree to that extent, has nothing to recover by an action. The suit filed by the plaintiff cannot therefore, be maintained and the Second Appeal should be allowed with costs in this Court. As regards costs in the Courts below, we direct the parties to bear their own costs as the question does not appear to have been presented to either of the Courts below in the manner in which it was done before us. Allowed.