Balakrishna Aiyar, J.-The Sessions Judge of Ramanathapuram has convicted the appellant of the murder of his concubine and sentenced him to death. Mr. Rajaraman, the learned advocate for the appellant, has raised this preliminary objection. The evidence in the case was heard by Mr.H.A. Ayyar who also appears to have actually written the judgment in the case. He handed over charge of his office as Sessions Judge on the forenoon of the 14th December, 1950 and the judgment which he wrote was pronounced by his successor in office, Mr. Sankaran Nambiar. This procedure, Mr. Rajaraman contends, is illegal because what Mr.H.A. Ayyar wrote cannot be called a judgment; in law it can only be regarded as an expression of his opinion on the merits of the case. After he ceased to be the Sessions Judge of Ramanathapuram he became functus officio in the matter and he had no power to write a judgment in the case. When thereupon Mr. Sankaran Nambiar purported to pronounce judgment he was only reading out the opinion of his predecessor and was not pronouncing the judgment in the case. In a Sessions case, he contended, the judgment must be written and pronounced by the very same officer who heard the evidence in the case. In support of this objection he referred us to the decision in Patan Alli Khan, In re1. In that case what happened was this. The evidence was heard by Mr. Nainar when he was Sessions Judge, Chittoor. After he handed over charge to Mr. A.S.P. Ayyar, he wrote what purported to be the judgment of the case and it was pronounced by Mr. A.S.P. Aiyar. It was held by a Bench of this Court that the judgment so pronounced was really a nullity. The learned Judges say: “We must hold that unless the Criminal Procedure Code expressly provides lor the pronouncement of the judgment by a Judge other than he who recorded the evidence, a succeeding Judge would have no power to do so.... It was held by a Bench of this Court that the judgment so pronounced was really a nullity. The learned Judges say: “We must hold that unless the Criminal Procedure Code expressly provides lor the pronouncement of the judgment by a Judge other than he who recorded the evidence, a succeeding Judge would have no power to do so.... We are therefore driven to conclude that the presiding officer referred to in section 367 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, in both cases means the presiding officer at the trial who is assumed in the section to have written and pronounced the judgment by still holding the same office.” We find that in the decision reported as Jogesh Chandra Roy v. Surendra Mohan Roy Chowdhury2, a Bench of the Calcutta High Court took the same view. The head-note of the case reads as follows: “A Judgment delivered by a Sessions Judge which was written by his predecessor after the latter has ceased to be a Sessions Judge of the District concerned, having under orders of transfer, made over charge previous to that date, is not a judgment as contemplated by the Criminal Procedure Code.” On the other side Mr. V.T. Rangaswami Aiyangar, the learned Public Prosecutor, has drawn our attention to a number of decisions and to those we refer briefly. The earliest of these is reported in Sankara Pillai, In re3. In that case the judgment was written by the Magistrate who heard the evidence. But he left the station before it was delivered. His successor in office read out his predecessor’s judgment and signed and dated it in open Court. A Bench of this Court held that the course was not illegal being of the view that under section 367, Criminal Procedure Code, it is not necessary that the presiding officer of the Court who wrote the judgment should be the same person as the presiding officer who is required to date, sign and pronounce it. We may point out that this case was considered by the learned Judges of he Calcutta High Court in Jogesh Chandra Roy v. Surendramohan Roy Chowdry2 and they distinctly stated that they were not prepared to follow it. The second case cited by the learned Public Prosecutor is reported in ChinnaSomayya, In re4, and is the decision of a single Judge. The second case cited by the learned Public Prosecutor is reported in ChinnaSomayya, In re4, and is the decision of a single Judge. He took the view that the trial of a criminal case is over as soon as a Magistrate has determined the issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused. “Mere pronouncement of the judgment is not part of the trial and there is no illegality or irregularity in a succeeding magistrate pronouncing a judgment written by his predecessor.” The third decision referred to was delivered by Govinda Menon, J., in Surya Rao v. Sathiraju5. That was a case under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code and what the learned Judge decided was that a proceeding under that section of the Code is not a trial, that an order issued by the Magistrate under sub-clause 6 of section 145 is not a judgment and that therefore the provisions of sections 366 and 367, Criminal Procedure Code, were not applicable to it; if at all, the only provision that would apply was section 350, Criminal Procedure Code. The last of the decisions referred to by the learned Public Prosecutor is reported in Mohamed Sattar v. Beharilal Jain1, where a Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that where one Magistrate had heard the entire evidence and arguments and had written a judgment which was pronounced by his successor, there was only an irregularity which is cured by section 537, Criminal Procedure Code. Now we notice that all the decisions cited by the learned Public Prosecutor relate to instances of judgments written by one Magistrate and pronounced by another Magistrate; they do not refer to judgments of Court of Sessions. So far as trials by Magistrate are concerned, section 350 (1), Criminal Procedure Code explicitly provides: "Whenever any Magistrate, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an inquiry or a trial, ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by another Magistrate who has and who exercise such jurisdiction, the Magistrate so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by his predecessor, or partly recorded by his predecessor and partly recorded by himself." Now, as explained by Horwill, J., in the Patan Alli Khan, in re,2 section 350 (1), Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to Sessions trials and there is no corresponding provision which can be invoked by Sessions Judges. The decisions cited by the learned Public Prosecutor are not therefore exactly in point; they involve an extension of the procedural rule enacted in section 350 (1), Criminal Procedure Code which is available only to Magistrates. We consider that the decisions in Patan Alli Khan In re2, is right and must be followed. This means that the judgment pronounced by Mr. Nambiar on behalf of Mr.H.A. Aiyar is a nullity. We therefore set aside the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant and direct that he is tried afresh according to law. V.S. ----- Conviction set aside. Retrial ordered.