Judgment :- 1. The accused who is a goldsmith by profession and who is carrying on business at Trivandrum has brought this criminal revision petition against the decision of the learned Sessions Judge of Trivandrum in Crl. Appeal No. 16 of 1124. The learned judge has confirmed the conviction and sentence passed on the accused by the First Class Bench of Magistrates at Trivandrum and dismissed the appeal. 2. The accused was prosecuted under S.375 of the Trivandurm City Municipal Act (IV of 1116) read with S.295, Schedule IV, and S.384 of the same Act. The case against the accused was that he carried on his profession as a goldsmith in a building in the city of Trivandrum without obtaining a license for "beating metal" as required by Schedule IV of S.295 of the Act aforesaid. The accused admitted in the trial court that he was carrying on his profession as a goldsmith which involved "beating" of gold for making ornaments and other articles. He pleaded in both the courts below that for doing this business, no license was required, since the relevant clause of Schedule IV relied upon by the prosecution did not apply to his case. This contention did not find favour with both the courts below and therefore on the question of law as to whether a license is necessary in the circumstances of the present case, he has brought the criminal revision petition to this court. Since the question involved is one of importance affecting as it does both the Corporation of Trivandrum and a class of persons resident at Trivandrum who are carrying on business there, the case was directed to be posted before a Bench of two judges and it has thus come up before us for disposal. 3. The learned Sessions Judge has set for the facts clearly in his judgment. According to Cl. (1) of S.295 of the Trivandrum City Municipal Act, no place within the City limits shall be used for any purpose mentioned in Schedule IV without obtaining a license from the Commissioner of the Municipality. This Schedule contains a list of cases in which licenses must be obtained for using premises for particular purposes. In the present case, we are concerned with two of these purposes as given in S.295. The First is "Gold Refining". This Schedule contains a list of cases in which licenses must be obtained for using premises for particular purposes. In the present case, we are concerned with two of these purposes as given in S.295. The First is "Gold Refining". This is followed after a few items by the item "Metals-beating, breaking, hammering, casting, etc." 4. The lower appellate court has proceeded upon the basis of the meaning of the words 'beating metals' as given in Chamber's 20th Centuary Dictionary. But when words which are used in a statute have to be interpreted, to ascertain the sense in which they are used, legal dictionaries are more appropriate for reference. In Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. 2, 3rd Edition, at page 2207, it is explained that the word 'metal' does not include 'precious metals'. A similar explanation is given in Vol. 3, page 364 of Roland Burrows' Judicial Dictionary (Words and Phrases Judicially Defined). There is high judicial authority for this interpretation in the case of Casher v. Holmes (2 B & AD 592). That was a case in which the plaintiff sued the Commissioners of Arundel Port for recovering a sum of 9 750 in the following circumstances. In September 1899 His Majesty's frigate "Druid" arrived off Portsmouth with a quantity of gold and silver amounting in value of 9 273,091-8s. 5d: The plaintiff was employed by the captain of the vessel to convey the gold and silver from Portsmouth to London, and deliver it at the bullion office in the Bank of England, which was used by merchants as a place of deposit of precious metals. The plaintiff received the gold and silver on board a sloop belonging to him called the "Elizabeth" and conveyed it first to Portsmouth and from there to the Little Hamption Harbour in the Port of Arundel. When his sloop arrived there, he transhipped the cargo into barges for conveying the same to London by inland navigation. The Commissioners of Arundel Port demanded from him 9 78710s. Od. as dues payable to them on the cargo. The plaintiff resisted the demand. Thereupon the cargo was seized and detained by the Commissioners. To release it from detention, the plaintiff was obliged to pay the amount demanded by the Commissioners. He did this under protest and afterwards brought an action against the Commissioners to recover it from them. Od. as dues payable to them on the cargo. The plaintiff resisted the demand. Thereupon the cargo was seized and detained by the Commissioners. To release it from detention, the plaintiff was obliged to pay the amount demanded by the Commissioners. He did this under protest and afterwards brought an action against the Commissioners to recover it from them. The point urged on behalf of the Commissioners was that they had a right to charge 10d. for every 910 value of the cargo consisting of "all other metals not enumerated". The contention urged on behalf of the Commissioners was similar to what was urged in the courts below in the present case. It was argued on behalf of the Commissioners that gold and silver are clearly metals and, therefore they could not be excluded from the category of "all other metals" appearing in the statute which authorised, the Commissioners to levy a duty. But this contention was not accepted by the court. Lord Tentorden, C.J. stated as follows, in his judgment: "All other metals" in this Act of Parliament must be understood in their ordinary and popular sense; and in that sense they certainly do not include gold and silver. They are never spoken of in popular language as metals, but as the precious metals. That being so, the Commissioners were not entitled to demand 9 787.10s as dues payable on this cargo *II Littledale, J. stated as follows: "Undoubtedly, gold and silver are, strictly speaking metals; but as articles of commerce, they are never so spoken of as metals, but are described by name, or as the precious metals". A similar view was expressed by Parke, J. who said: "The word 'metal' taken in its ordinary sense, does not include the precious metals, and I am of opinion that that word must be understood in its ordinary sense in the schedule of this Act of Parliament * * * * Besides it is a good rule of construction that where a charge is to be imposed on the subject, it ought to be done in clear and unambiguous language, and as, at all events, it is not clear that gold and silver are included in the word 'metals' * * * * I should be of opinion that the plaintiff was not bound to pay this sum claimed by the Commissioners". This interpretation of the word 'metal' seems to us to be applicable to the word appearing in the relevant section of the statute in the present case, especially in view of the fact that there is specific mention made in an earlier item in the schedule to "gold" for refining which a license is necessary. Adopting this interpretation, the word 'metals' in the expression "beating of metals" for doing which a license is necessary under the Trivandrum City Municipal Act, will not include gold. In this view there is no necessity for the accused petitioner to apply for or obtain a license for practising his profession as goldsmith and he is not guilty under the provision of law mentioned in the judgments of the Courts below. The conviction and sentence shall, therefore, be set aside and the fine if collected from the petitioner shall be refunded to him. Allowed.