Judgment Ramaswami, J. 1. The question to be determined in this appeal is whether the respondent is entitled to a decree declaring his title and for recovery of possession of plot No. 558, Khata No. 53, located in village Ghatway. 2. The material facts are that in the year 1940 the landlord obtained a decree for rent with respect to plot No. 558 Khata No. 23 and p.ot No. 602, Khata No. 28, for which there was a joint jama. On the 16th June 1943, the defendants purchased plot No. 558 by a registered kebala from the recorded tenants. On the 13th of November, 1943, the landlord applied for the execution of the rent decree but he failed to implead the defendants in the execution case. In April 1944 plots 558 and 602 were sold in execution of the decree and purchased by the plaintiff who obtained delivery of posssssion in due course. As the defendants forcibly harvested the paddy, the plaintiff brought the suit for declaration of his title and recovery of possession of plot No. 558 which the defendants alleged to have purchased. The main ground of defence was that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree since the defendants had purchased the plot from the recorded tenants and since the defendants had not been impleaded in the execution case. 3. Both the lower Courts granted the plaintiffs decree mainly on the grounds that the kebala executed in favour of the defendants was not genuine or operative. 4. In support of this appeal Mr. Guneshwar Prasad argued in the first place, that the lower Courts have committed substantial error of procedure in holding that the kebala executed in favour of the defendants was not genuine since there was no allegation to this effect in the plaint and no issue was also framed. It is true that the: finding is upon an issue of fact but since there is no evidence to support this finding, it is open to the High Court to interfere with it in second appeal. It may be mentioned at the outset that the vendor has not been made a party to the suit nor has he been examined as a witness to state that no consideration was paid. It may be mentioned at the outset that the vendor has not been made a party to the suit nor has he been examined as a witness to state that no consideration was paid. The lower Courts have remarked that since there was no proof that consideration was paid it must be held that the kebala was a sham transaction and not operative. As I have already remarked that there is no reliable evidence on the record to prove that consideration was not paid and in view of the fact that the defendants are at present in possession, it is difficult to hold that the kebala executed in favour of the defendants was not genuine or operative. It is impossible to accept the finding of the lower appellate Court on this point. 5. On behalf of the respondent, Mr. R.S. Chatterji contended that even if the kebala was genuine and operative, the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree since the doctrine of lis pen dens, as enacted in Sec. 52 of the T. P. Act, would apply. In my opinion, this argument is wholly untenable. Sec. 52 of the T. P. Act is to the following effect: "During the pendency in any Court having authority in British India, or established beyond the limits of British India by the Governor General in Council, of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immoveable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or orders which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and oa such terms as it may impose." It is manifest that a suit for rent is primarily a suit for money and is not a suit in which "any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question". It is true that Sec. 65 of the Bihar Tenancy Act makes re at a first charge on the holding but no such charge is created until in any event before the decree is passed in the suit. It is true that Sec. 65 of the Bihar Tenancy Act makes re at a first charge on the holding but no such charge is created until in any event before the decree is passed in the suit. It is of the essence of the rule of lis pendens that, in order to captain the protection of the rule, the property must be directly and specifically in question in the suit. A suit for rent can hardly be regarded as a claim to charge some specific property. To make a lis pendens notice to a purchaser of an estate, the question in the suit must relate specifically to the estate and not merely to the money secured on it. In the case of In re Barneds Banking Co; Ex parte Thorton, (1887) 2 Ch 171 at p 178 Lord Justice Cairns said: "Then the lis pendens being a technical expression well known, it seems to me to be perfectly clear that it always implied a claim of right, or a claim to charge some specific property." This view is also supported by Jaynal Abedin V/s. Hyderali Khan, 55 Cal 701 in which it was observed that the general doctrine of lis pendens did not apply to a case where property was conveyed to a third party pending a suii for rent in respect of that property, there being no dispute with regard to the that to the property as between the plaintiff and the defendants. The argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent on this part of the case must, therefore, fail. 6. In this context it is important to remember that a rent decree is in no sense a mortgage decree and the charge referred to in Sec. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not such a Charge as is denned ay S- 100 of the T. P. Act. In Kesho Prasad V/s. Paranjota Koer1, 6 Pat L J 354 a landlord obtained two rent decrees against the tenant and first executed one decree by sale of the holding without notifying that the sale was subject to the other decrees and purchased the holding himself. In Kesho Prasad V/s. Paranjota Koer1, 6 Pat L J 354 a landlord obtained two rent decrees against the tenant and first executed one decree by sale of the holding without notifying that the sale was subject to the other decrees and purchased the holding himself. It was held by the Division Bench that the rent decree was not a mortgage decree and did not compel the landlord to proceed against the holding and that the landlord was not debarred from executing the other decree against the remaining properties of the tenant. 7. The problem to be examined in the present case is whether the plaintiff obtained a valid title to the plot in dispute by a purchase in proceedings of the execution of the rent decree in which the defendants were not impleaded. It is not controverted in the present case that the decree obtained by the landlord was a valid rent decree but it is argued on behalf of the appellants that under the Bengal Tenancy Act the right to bring the tenure or holding to sale in execution of a rent decree is dependent on the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant at the time. Applying this principle it is contended that at the date of the execution in the present case the original tenant had lost his interest with respect to plot No. 558, Khata No. 53, and since the defendants, who made the purchase, were not made a party to the execution case, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and consequently the plot in dispute could not be validly sold at the execution sale. In my opinion, this argument is well founded and must succeed. In Arthur Henrey Forbes V/s. Bahadur Singly, 41 Ind App., 91 the question at issue was whether the person who had his interest as the landlord before the institution of the suit for rent could bring the tenure to sale in execution of the decree and Judicial Committee answered the question in the negative. The right to proceed to sale is conferred by Sec. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act; and Mr. The right to proceed to sale is conferred by Sec. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act; and Mr. Ameer Aii, who pronounced the opinion at the Judicial Committee, stated at page 101: "To acquire the right which the section gives not only the person obtaining the decree must be the landlord at the time, but the person seeking to execute it by sale of the tenure must have the landlords interest vested in him. In other words, the right to bring the tenure or holding, as the case may be, to sale exists so long as the relationship of landlord and tenant exists." In a latter case, Krishnapada Chatterji V/s. Mana-dasunciari Ghosh, 69 Cal 1202, the landlord ceases to be landlord after obtaining a decree and before putting it into execution and a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the same principle will apply as the decree could not be enforced by sale of the holding in the execution case. Applying the ratio of these two cases it is obvious that the plaintiff had not obtained a valid it to plot No. 5a8, Khata No. 53, which had been sold to the defendants by the judgment-debtor before the commencement of the execution case. 8. There is another aspect of the case which ought to be dealt with. Under the Bihar Tenancy Act a holding cannot be brought to sale in execution of a rent decree without the tenancy being represented by any one having an interest in it. It is true that Sec. 65 of the Act provides that the holding will be liable to sale in execution but that cannot be supposed to mean that the landlord may proceed against the holding irrespective of whether the holding is duly represented or not. In the present case the defendants have purchased plot No. 558 of holding No. 53 on the 16th June, 1943, and the endorsement on the kebalas further shows that the landlords fee had been duly paid at the time when document was registered. In the present case the defendants have purchased plot No. 558 of holding No. 53 on the 16th June, 1943, and the endorsement on the kebalas further shows that the landlords fee had been duly paid at the time when document was registered. Sec.26(2) of the Bihar Tenancy Act enacts: "Every transfer of an occupancy holding or a portion thereof, together with the right of occupancy therein, by sale, exchange or gift and every bequest of such holding or portion, together with the right of occupancy therein, shall be made in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as a permanent tenure in respect of registration and the payment of landlords registration fee." Under Sec.12(1) of the Act of a transfer of a permanent tenure by sale..... can be made by a registered instrument; and under Sec.12(2) a registering officer shall not register any instrument purporting or operating to transfer by sale, gift, exchange or usufructuary mortgage a permanent tenure unless there is paid to him -- a process fee of the required amount and a fee (hereinafter called the landlords registration fee) together with the costs necessary for the transmission of the landlords registration fee to the landlord. In this context reference may be made to Prabhabati V/s. Lalji, AIR (31) 1944 Pat 252 in which a Division Bench of this Court on construction of Sections 12 and 13 of the Bihar Tenancy Act held that upon a voluntary sale being registered the transfer of the permanent tenure was complete and the title in the property transferred passed to the transferee, even though the landlords fee was not paid as required by Sections 12 and 13. The learned Judges of the Bench further held that any proceedings for rent after the completion of the transfer must be against the transferee and any decree for rent obtained against the transferor after the transfer cannot affect the interest of the transferee in the tenure. 9 It is, therefore, manifest in the present case that after the kebala was registered and the landlords fee was paid, the transfer was complete and the title in the property transferred passed to defendants. It follows that the defendants ought to have been made parties in the proceedings for execution of the decree. 9 It is, therefore, manifest in the present case that after the kebala was registered and the landlords fee was paid, the transfer was complete and the title in the property transferred passed to defendants. It follows that the defendants ought to have been made parties in the proceedings for execution of the decree. But since it is admitted that they were not represented in the execution proceedings, the plaintiff cannot obtain a decree declaring his title to the plot in suit. 10. For these reasons I would set aside the decree of both the lower Courts and order that the suit brought by the plaintiff should be dismissed. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs throughout. Rai, J. 11 I agree.