Judgment Sarjoo Prosad, J. 1. These three appeals have been heard together because they arise substantially out of the same judgment of Mr. S. M. Karim, Subordinate Judge of Dhanbad. They arise out of a suit for dissolution of partnership and accounts and also for the appointment of a receiver to wind up the partnership business. First Appeal 61 of 1949 is by the defendants against that part of the judgment which directed accounts to be taken from them, whereas First Appeal 91 of 1949 is by the plaintiff against the portion of the judgment refusing his prayer for dissolution of the partnership, and Miscellaneous Appeal 342 of 1949 is also by the plaintiff against the order dated 13-9-1949 refusing to appoint a receiver. 2. The plaintiff under a registered lease got a settlement from the Kashipur Wards Estate for a term of 30 years of coal and coal mining rights with incidental surface rights in respect of a plot of land measuring about 92 bighas in mauza Kujama Pergana jharia. Under the lease in question the plaintiff carried on colliery business in the name and style of Keshavji Pitamber Kujama Colliery. It appears, however, that his circumstances became involved and suits for rent and royalty in respect of the colliery as also for realisation of other dues were instituted against the plaintiff. The plaintiff being in pressing need of money to save the colliery from sale in execution of the landlords decree in Title Suit No. 17 of 1943 and for obtaining a renewal of the lease entered into a partnership with the defendants. This partnership-deed is dated the 2nd oi September 1944, and is Ex. 2 in the case. The terms of this deed play an important part in the decision of the disputes involved in these appeals and will have to be dealt with in some detail later. Suffice it to say that under the deed in question the defendants agreed to advance to the plaintiff a capital sum of Rs. 1,36,000 under the terms and conditions embodied in the agreement and they were to be in sole charge of the management of the colliery. Suffice it to say that under the deed in question the defendants agreed to advance to the plaintiff a capital sum of Rs. 1,36,000 under the terms and conditions embodied in the agreement and they were to be in sole charge of the management of the colliery. The period of the agreement was to last for 71/2 years commencing from the 1st of June 1944, because the defendants had been already put in possession of the colliery business by virtue of a prior agreement between the parties on the 31st of May 1944, and this period of 74 years could be extended in case the defendants were not able to realise meanwhile the capital sum advanced from the income of the colliery business. It may be also stated that the plaintiff was entitled to a half share in the profits of the partnership business, whereas the defendants, who were the other two partners, were entitled to one-fourth each, and the further agreement was that out of the plaintiffs share of the profits the defendants would be entitled to appropriate 75 per cent thereof towards the satisfaction of the amount advanced by them and to pay the rest of the 25 per cent to the plaintiff. 3. The plaintiffs case is that the entire sum advanced by the defendants had been fully repaid and satisfied out of the three-fourth of the plaintiffs half share of the profits. He claimed that the actual profit earned from the colliery business was much more than what had been shown by the defendants and there were false and fraudulent entries in the account books. He, therefore, alleged various irregularities in the keeping of the accounts and in the conduct of the business. Numerous such details have been given in the plaint but fortunately most of these have not been seriously pressed either before this Court or before the Court below. The most important allegation, however, is that the defendants have failed to pay the income-tax due in respect of the business on account of which there is an apprehension of the plaintiff being harassed. The plaintiff further averred that in the circumstances he had lost confidence in the defendants and that it was not possible for him to carry on the business in partnership with them. He has, therefore, claimed dissolution of partnership and accounts as stated above. 4. The plaintiff further averred that in the circumstances he had lost confidence in the defendants and that it was not possible for him to carry on the business in partnership with them. He has, therefore, claimed dissolution of partnership and accounts as stated above. 4. It may be observed that this suit was filed on the 8th of October 1947, when in fact the period of 71/2 years for which the partnership agreement was to last in any event had not run out. In fact the period has not yet run out commencing as it did on the 1st of June 1944. The plaintiff, therefore, must make out a very strong case for dissolution of the partnership before any relief could be granted in violation of the terms of the agreement at least in respect of this period for which the defendants were entitled to remain in charge of the management of the colliery and the business according to the terms of the deed. The original plaintiff Keshavji Pitamber died after the institution of the suit and in his place his son and heir has been substituted. 5. The defendants have filed a joint written statement. Their defence in substance is mat having regard to the terms of the partnership deed dated the 2nd of September 1944, the suit is wholly premature and is fit to be dismissed. They pleaded that but for their help to the plaintiff in taking over the business and in advancing the capital amount the plaintiff would have been completely ruined, and the said advance is secured over the partnership assets and the defendants are entitled to continue in charge of the management until the capital advanced by them had been completely satisfied and which, according to them was still outstanding. They stated that the plaintiff was at first keen and willing to register the agreement in question but later having received the advance he refused to do so until the defendants adopted the procedure for compulsory registration. They stated that the plaintiff was at first keen and willing to register the agreement in question but later having received the advance he refused to do so until the defendants adopted the procedure for compulsory registration. They have further averred that by their hard labour and capital they effected various improvements and development in the colliery and made the coal business a lucrative and profitable concern, and it is on that account that the business had been yielding a good profit, and the plaintiff while pocketing his share of the profits of the business has been creating various obstructions in the management of the same in order to force the defendants to give up the partnership. They deny the charges levelled by the plaintiff against the defendants and they state that the account, books and all the records of the business have been regularly and correctly maintained in ordinary course and even inspected and scrutinised by the plaintiff. The profits of the business are calculated and distributed amongst the partners and their accounts are adjusted after each Diwali and the adjustments are not only entered in the, account books but signed by the plaintiff and the defendants. They, therefore, deny that there has been any case of misfeasance or mismanagement on their part as stated by the plaintiff. They, therefore, urge that in view of the terms of partnership and in consideration of all the circumstances the partnership could not be legally and equitably dissolved in any case earlier than the expiry of the period given in the lease and no grounds whatsoever have been made out for claiming dissolution. 6. it would thus appear from the above pleadings that the case for dissolution of partnership rests upon the alleged prejudicial conduct of the defendants and also upon the general ground that it would be just and equitable having regard to the circumstances of the case to direct dissolution of the partnership. The learned Subordinate Judge, as I have already observed, refused the plaintiffs prayer for dissolution of the partnership and for appointment of a receiver. The learned Subordinate Judge, as I have already observed, refused the plaintiffs prayer for dissolution of the partnership and for appointment of a receiver. He has, however, out the defendants to certain terms in regard to the payment of income-tax due in respect of the business and has also directed accounting to be made by the appointment of a Commissioner, It is this direction as to payment of income-tax which has been the most serious bone of contention in these appeals before us; otherwise Mr. S. N. putt, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has fairly conceded that there is really no other substantial ground of misfeasance or malfeasance on the part of the defendants. In other words, there is no other ground of prejudicial conduct. Indeed there could not be apparently any such ground because as it will appear later the business was being run by the defendants on sound lines and it has been earning huge profits to the advantage of both parties to the partnership agreement. 7. The main points, therefore, which have been canvassed before us are (1) whether the defendants were under the terms of the agreement liable to pay the income-tax due; (2) whether the defendants did make any deliberate default in such payment; and (3) whether in the circumstances it would be just and equitable to order dissolution on account of this alleged non-payment of income-tax. On a review of the materials placed before us I have no doubt that the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge refusing the prayer for Dissolution of partnership and the appointment of a receiver is perfectly justified, and, in my opinion, the directions given by him are more than adequate for the protection of the plaintiffs interest in the partnership even assuming that his interest was under any apprehension of jeopardy. 8. As the whole question turns upon this alleged non-payment of income-tax or the liability to pay the same, the relevant facts bearing on the point may be stated at this stage. Before the data of the institution of the suit it is the common case of the parties that the amount of income-tax had been paid by the partners themselves, and there was no other income-tax assessed i:ill after the date of the institution of the suit. Before the data of the institution of the suit it is the common case of the parties that the amount of income-tax had been paid by the partners themselves, and there was no other income-tax assessed i:ill after the date of the institution of the suit. Therefore, this could not be any ground for dissolution of partnership on the date when the suit was filed. Mr. S. N. Dutt on behalf of the plaintiff has, however, contended that it was open to the Court to take into consideration subsequent events in order to mould its decree in the light of those events to do complete and substantial justice between the parties. On behalf of the defendants Mr. R. S. Chatterji urges that the question of dissolution should be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit, and if the plaintiff was unable to make out any ground in support of his claim for dissolution of partnership at the date of his filing the suit, the Court should refuse the prayer. Sec. 44 of the Partnership Act lays down the grounds for dissolution of partnership. Clause (g) of the section states that a partnership could be dissolved when the Court considers it just and equitable to do so. That being so, it may be open to a Court of law even to take into consideration the events subsequent to the date of the Suit for the purpose of giving its decision. The words "just and equitable" are wide in their amplitude and do not prevent the Court from taking into consideration subsequent factors. It would be however too much to assume that the suit of the plaintiff although it has failed on the ground substantially alleged in the plaint should now succeed upon this new ground alone, namely, the ground of non-payment of income-tax after the date of the suit. In my opinion, it would be unjust and inequitable to direct dissolution of the partnership on this ground which again is of an ephemeral character as I shall hereafter show. This would be sufficient to dispose of the appeals of the plaintiff in regard to his claim for dissolution of partnership. In my opinion, it would be unjust and inequitable to direct dissolution of the partnership on this ground which again is of an ephemeral character as I shall hereafter show. This would be sufficient to dispose of the appeals of the plaintiff in regard to his claim for dissolution of partnership. The defendants appeal however raises the question of the liability to pay the income-tax due and I will proceed to examine the materials bearing on the question in so far as they are germane to the points under consideration. 9. The plaintiffs case is that the liability to pay the income-tax due was upon the firm as such and not upon the partners, and, therefore, it was the duty of the defendants to have the firm assessed as a partnership firm and pay the income-tax so assessed out of the profits thereof. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the income-tax was not to be paid by the firm but it was to be paid by the partners and the assessment of income-tax had to be made upon the profits of the partners and not upon the profits of the firm as such. There was nothing to show in the agreement that the income-tax was payable by the partnership itself; on the contrary, they contend that the conduct of the parties both before and after the agreement showed that the income-tax was to be paid by the partners individually. They point out that during the assessment year 1945-46 the partnership had been registered and the partners of the firm, namely, the plaintiff and the defendants had been assessed to income-tax on their individual incomes both from the partnership as also from other sources, and it was the plaintiff who subsequently resiled from that position and refused to apply for the registration of the firm. The result was that there was a tremendous difference in the amount of the income-tax assessed. The assessment of the income-tax upon the profits of the firm as such was far in excess of the assessment which would otherwise have been made if the partners were assessed on their individual income, and it would be opposed to the objects of the partnership to throw such a burden upon the partnership business to the entire detriment of the defendants. They accordingly contend that it was due to the conduct of the plaintiff in refusing to apply for registration of the partnership that the firm was heavily assessed and the income-tax fell due during the pendency of the suit, and the plaintiff, could not take advantage of his own wrong in asking for dissolution of partnership on that account. 10. It has been noticed that the defendants came in possession of the colliery and the partnership business on the 1st of June 1944, under a prior agreement between the parties. This agreement is Ex. 1 and is dated the 31st of May 1944. The plaintiff was the first party and the defendants were the second party to the agreement. It recited that for the better interest of the property and that of the parties concerned the management of the colliery with its coal business was to be absolutely conducted and carried on by the second party for the first two years in consultation with the first party and thereafter by rotation the management would be in the hands of the first party and it would thus go on changing hands between the two it further provided that in the interest of the parties and for the safety of the property the parties should pay respectively all such royalty, commissions together with all other public rates and public taxes, etc. In pursuance of this agreement the defendants came in possession of the business. This was soon followed by the registered partnership deed, dated the 2nd of September 1944, and the period in the deed was to run from the 1st of June 1944, the defendants being already in possession of the business. The firm was duly registered under the Income-tax Act and assessment was made on the profits of the business for the period 1945-46 on the income of the partners and not upon the income of the business itself. For the assessment year 1946-47 and for other subsequent years, namely, 1947-48 and 1948-49 the partners were not assessed but the firm was itself assessed as such because it appears that Keshavji Pitamber, the plaintiff, refused to sign the application under Section 26 (A) of the Income- tax Act on account of certain differences with the other partners. For the assessment year 1946-47 and for other subsequent years, namely, 1947-48 and 1948-49 the partners were not assessed but the firm was itself assessed as such because it appears that Keshavji Pitamber, the plaintiff, refused to sign the application under Section 26 (A) of the Income- tax Act on account of certain differences with the other partners. The assessment order for 1946-47 is dated the 30th of April 1948, which is after the institution of the suit and so are the other orders of assessment in the subsequent years (vide Exs. 4, 4-a and 4-b.) The result of the plaintiffs refusal to get the firm registered has been a marked difference in the assessment. This fact is not disputed by the plaintiff but he says that he was not bound to have the firm registered and to mitigate the burden of the partnership firm to his own detriment. On behalf of the parties reliance has been placed on paragraph 11 of the partnership deed which provides that the second party, namely the defendants shall duly and regularly pay to the landlords rents, royalties and commissions and other dues payable to them, and that they shall also punctually and regularly pay all the public demands, taxes and cesses due and payable "in respect of the colliery" and all such payments will be debited to the partnership accounts. The plaintiff says that the word tax also refers to in come-tax which is payable in respect of the profits of the business where as the defendants contend that the taxes referred to in paragraph 11 are the taxes payable in respect of the colliery, that is, taxes in the nature of water-board tax, chaukidari tax and such other taxes which are payable on account of the colliery itself and which have nothing to do with the profits of the business. In my opinion, this contention of the defendants appears to be correct. I am strengthened in this view by a decision of this Court in Nilkantha Narain Singh V/s. Niharan Chandra, AIR (9) 1922 Pat 75 and that of the Privy Council in Bengal Coal Co. V/s. Sri Janardan Kishore Lal Singh, 65 Ind App 354: AIR (25) 1938 P C 243, where the word "taxes" with reference to mines has been similarly construed. 11. V/s. Sri Janardan Kishore Lal Singh, 65 Ind App 354: AIR (25) 1938 P C 243, where the word "taxes" with reference to mines has been similarly construed. 11. But were it held that there was any ambiguity in the document, this ambiguity is clarified by the conduct of the parties themselves. The further provisions of the agreement indicate that the partnership accounts were to be adjusted and settled at the end of every six months. It also shows that at the time of adjustment the monthly amount paid to the plaintiff was to be debited towards his share of the profits and the profits were to be divided according to their respective shares. It is well contended that this could be done only on the principle that the profits were to be calculated independently of the income-tax payable. Income-tax is never a part of the profits. Besides, it was evidently to the advantage of all the partners of the business that the income-tax should not be assessed upon the partnership as such. It has been already shown that the income-tax for the assessment year 1945-46 was assessed on the individual income of the partners and not upon the partnership business. In April 1946, there was an adjustment of accounts from October 1944 to October 1945. This adjustment has been signed by all the parties and it shows a profit of about Rs. 91,000 and add, without any deduction for income-tax. Besides, the defendants have produced a number of receipts to show that the plaintiff had been taking his share of the profits almost from month to month without any question of deduction of the income-tax. The defendants further submit that they had gone on sending the accounts to the plaintiff but the plaintiff himself refused to sign the accounts on one pretext or another without any fault of the defendants. This is borne out by some of the letters of the plaintiff himself: Ex. 3 (b), dated 3-8-1946 and Ex. A-23, dated 17-5-1947. Ex. 3 (b) indicates that the defendants sent a statement of accounts on 12-5-1946, regarding the profits and loss of the period 5-11-1945 to 30-4-1946. This related to a period subsequent to the one for which there had been already an adjustment of accounts signed by the parties. 3 (b), dated 3-8-1946 and Ex. A-23, dated 17-5-1947. Ex. 3 (b) indicates that the defendants sent a statement of accounts on 12-5-1946, regarding the profits and loss of the period 5-11-1945 to 30-4-1946. This related to a period subsequent to the one for which there had been already an adjustment of accounts signed by the parties. The son of the plaintiff tried to explain that the adjustment had not been signed by the plaintiff after due consideration of the accounts; but that explanation has been rightly disbelieved by the learned Subordinate Judge. Ex. 3 (b), further shows that the plaintiff claimed the share of the profits, Rs. 7,500 out of the total profits of Rs. 60,000, without any refer ence to the income-tax payable in respect of the said profits. All these factors very clearly indicate that the intention of the parties was that the in come-tax could not be paid on the profits of the business as such but on the individual profits of the partners. This conclusion inevitably follows from the conduct of the parties both before and subsequent to the agreement in question and the plaintiff himself had been realising the share of the profits without waiting for and irrespective of the payment of income-tax. Even if the agreement of partnership were silent on the point of the liability to pay the income-tax due Section 92 of the Evidence Act did not prevent the defendants from proving that the intention was that the tax should be paid on the individual profits of the partners and not on the profits of the business: see Haridas Ranchordas V/s. Mercantile Bank of India, 47 Ind App 17. As I have said, the word tax mentioned in the document did not refer to income-tax but to taxes payable "in respect of the colliery." Income-tax is in the nature of a personal tax payable on account of the profits of the business and any ambiguity in the document is removed by the evidence relating to the conduct of the parties even after the agreement. In fact the term of the document for adjustment of accounts at least every six months and the monthly realisation of profits by the plaintiff himself ail point to the same conclusion, and, therefore, even apart from the agreement it was open to the defendants to show that the liability to pay the income-tax was upon the partners individually and not upon the business as such. Such an inference is also in consonance with the provisions of Section 9 of the Partnership Act. The section requires that partners are bound to carry on the business of the firm to the greatest common advantage. Admittedly it would not be to the common advantage of the partners to have the profits of the business assessed as such because the assessment has thereby greatly increased, and it would be evidently to the prejudice of the defendants who are the other partners to increase the burden of their liability. The common ad vantage of the partners, therefore, required that the income-tax should be payable upon the profits of individual partners and not upon the profits of the business as a whole. I, therefore, accept the contention of the defendants that the liability to pay the income-tax was not upon the defendants, and the whole trouble has arisen because the plain tiff after the first year of assessment, namely, for 1945-46, refused to sign the application along with the defendants for getting the firm registered as a result of which the assessment in subsequent years has increased and there was default in payment. 12. The learned Subordinate Judge in dealing with the matter did not go into the question as to the liability for the payment of income-tax. He found that income-tax had not been paid subsequent to the date of the suit, and it was necessary that the said tax should be paid in order to save the property from sale. He found that the defendants had filed appeals against the assessment and the appeals were still pending and a certificate had been taken out against the colliery for realisation of the income-tax dues. He also found that the defendants had given assurance in writing that they would not allow any portion of the colliery to be sold and that they would pay up the demand. He also found that the defendants had given assurance in writing that they would not allow any portion of the colliery to be sold and that they would pay up the demand. This assurance was not considered sufficient by the learned subordinate Judge who directed in the first instance that the entire amount of income-tax due including the penalty should be paid within a few months from the date of his judgment. He further directed that the amount in question would be adjusted out of the profits in accordance with the respective shares of the parties. At a later stage an application was made by the plaintiff for the appointment of a receiver on the ground that the defendant had failed to comply with this order of the learned Subordinate Judge. It may be observed that the defendants made a fruitless attempt to obtain extension of time from the High Court which was also refused. The learned Subordinate Judge in disposing of the application which is the subject-matter of M. A. 342 of 1949, said that considering all the circumstances the appointment of a receiver was not called for but gave certain directions to the defendants in order to ensure that the partnership properties were adequately protected, and the funds and profits were not misappropriated or misapplied. These directions have not been seriously questioned by the defendants. They have even before this Court given an assurance that they are prepared to pay the income-tax due. In fact they have shown that they have already paid a sum of about Rs. 55,000, and they have come to some arrangement with the department under which they have been allowed to pay the income-tax due at the rate of Rs. 5,000 a month. All this shows that the defendants are anxious and serious about making the payment in order to safeguard the colliery business. 55,000, and they have come to some arrangement with the department under which they have been allowed to pay the income-tax due at the rate of Rs. 5,000 a month. All this shows that the defendants are anxious and serious about making the payment in order to safeguard the colliery business. They, however, contend that the liability to pay the income-tax being upon the partners the excess of tax assessed should be regarded as the liability of the plaintiff alone and the accounting should be on the basis as if the partners were separately liable for the payment of income-tax in respect of their individual share of the profits and any excess amount paid should be debited to the share of the plaintiff and should be treated as a capital amount advanced by the defendants bearing interest under the terms of the agreement. I am not prepared to concede to the argument of the defendants that the amount of income-tax paid by the defendants should be treated as a capital advance bearing interest. I must, however, accept the other part of the contention, namely that the income-tax for the purpose of accounting should be calculated on the basis that it was payable in respect of the individual profits of the partners and any excess amount assessed which came to be paid by the defendants on account of the conduct of the plaintiff in refusing to get the firm registered should be debited to the share of the plaintiff. This principle would continue to govern the parties even if in subsequent years the plaintiff refuses to get the firm registered. The directions of the learned Subordinate Judge, therefore, will have to be modified to that extent and the accounting will have to proceed upon this basis. (13) I have already held that the plaintiff has not established any case for dissolution of the partnership or for the appointment of a receiver. It is to be remembered that it is not a partnership at will. It is a partnership for a term of years under which by the agreement of the parties the defendants have been placed in the sole charge of the management of the business. The evidence shows that the defendants have been running the business on appropriate lines and have made it a profitable concern. It is a partnership for a term of years under which by the agreement of the parties the defendants have been placed in the sole charge of the management of the business. The evidence shows that the defendants have been running the business on appropriate lines and have made it a profitable concern. The mere fact that the plaintiff has been trying to resile from the agreement and is creating obstructions in the way of the defendants in managing the colliery cannot be any ground for dissolution of partnership. The Court will not interfere at the suit of a partner who is himself guilty of misconduct. As Lord Romsly pointed out in Harrison V/s. Tennant, (1856) 21 Beay 482: "No party is entitled to act improperly and then to say that the conduct of the partners and their feelings towards each other are such that the partnership can no longer be continued, and certainly this Court would not allow any person so to act and thus to take advantage of his own wrong." The learned Subordinate Judge in this case had ample justification for holding that from the very beginning the plaintiffs attitude had been hostile. He refused to honour the agreement by making-false allegations that he had not executed the deed and that his signature was obtained by fraud on blank papers. He refused to get the agreement registered until the defendants took recourse to compulsory registration, and this he did after the defendants had advanced a sum of Rs. 1,36,000 to him. The plaintiffs financial condition at the time was highly involved and his property including the coal lands and the colliery in suit were about to be sold and the lease was about to expire and there was really no chance of its renewal. It was at this critical juncture that the defendants came to his aid and advanced the sum of money mentioned above and took up the management and working of the colliery in partnership business which under the defendants management became a thriving and profitable concern. Even immediately after the agreement there are various letters to indicate that the plaintiff went on putting obstructions in the management of the colliery by the defendants; for instance, Ex. A-1, dated 18-9-1944, Ex. A, dated 20-1-1944 and Ex. A-2, dated 6-11-1944 and various other letters as pointed out by the learned Subordinate Judge. Even immediately after the agreement there are various letters to indicate that the plaintiff went on putting obstructions in the management of the colliery by the defendants; for instance, Ex. A-1, dated 18-9-1944, Ex. A, dated 20-1-1944 and Ex. A-2, dated 6-11-1944 and various other letters as pointed out by the learned Subordinate Judge. The Court below therefore held that: "the entire conduct of the plaintiff from the very beginning shows that he wants to get the partnership abrogated. His keenness has increased because now he finds that the colliery is in a flourishing condition and he has been feeling very much when he sees that half the profits is going to the defendants." I have no doubt that this finding of the learned Subordinate Judge is correct and the plaintiff has not established his case for dissolution of partnership or for appointment of a receiver. 13. xxxxx 14. The learned Subordinate Judge has, however, directed accounts to be taken from the defendants by a Commissioner appointed for the purpose. The defendants concede "that they could not resist the prayer for accounting. They, however, pointed out that the last adjustment of accounts between the parties made on the 26th of April 1946, as shown by Ex. C should not be reopened. This contention has been accepted by the learned Subordinate Judge. It appears that the Commissioner deputed to examine the accounts has submitted a long report. For the present I am not concerned with the findings of the Commissioner which will have to be examined by the learned Subordinate Judge himself. The learned Subordinate Judge appears to have been under the impression that there had been some breach of agreement made by the defendants in not sending the copies of the accounts though such a breach by itself was not a sufficient ground for the dissolution of partnership. Even here I am not convinced that there has been any real breach. I have shown that admittedly even after the adjustment of accounts the defendants did send statements of accounts to the plaintiffs but the plaintiff refused to accept them, I am not, therefore, very certain that there was any useful purpose served in passing a preliminary decree for accounts; out the defendants not having raised any objection to the same the preliminary decree for accounts must stand. There are, however, certain items of accounting in regard to which the parties challenged the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge. The plaintiff did not press his objections relating to taking of pucca receipts from the lessors for payment of rents, royalties and commissions. He has also not pressed his allegation in regard to the defendants working against the mining rules & in an unskillful manner thereby damaging the mines. It also appears from the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge that plaintiffs objection regarding the refusal of the defendants to agree to arbitration was also given up. The matter in any case is concluded toy the decision of this Court on the point, though a faint endeavour was made to press the objection again before this Court. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff, however, assailed the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge in regard to some of the items. 15. Firstly, he urged that allowance had been granted by the defendants to their relatives and a highly paid Engineer had been appointed. The objection relates to the appointment of one Mr. Bhupendra Kumar Bose (D.W. 1) a mining Engineer and a first class certificated colliery Manager. The Engineer appears to be a highly experienced and qualified person having been the President of the Indian Mines Managers Association and a member of the Advisory Committee of Coal Mines Stowing Board and a Regional Coal Controller for Bengal and Bihar till 1947. This man was appointed a consulting mining Engineer by the defendants for a period of lour months only at Rs. 500 a month. His evidence shows that in view of the bad condition of the old working of the mines (presumably by the plaintiff previous to the defendants having taken charge) the advice of an expert was necessary and he was consulted as such. It is true that he was also employed by Giridhari Lal Sunda, defendant No. 1, for his own colliery during the period that he was employed as the consulting Engineer of the Kujama Colliery. But, as the learned Subordinate Judge has rightly held this by itself is no ground for holding that he did not work for the Kujama Colliery. After all the remuneration paid to him is quite reasonable and verges on the side of moderation. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with this part of the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge. After all the remuneration paid to him is quite reasonable and verges on the side of moderation. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with this part of the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge. The other objection relates to the employment of one Vithaldas Mehta about whom it is alleged that he was a cousin of defendant No. 2, and therefore any payment made to him although as an employee, should be considered to be a payment made to the defendants. The defendant No. 2, has challenged this relationship and the allegation of the plaintiff on the point, and he says that Vithaldas Mehta had been employed for the better working of the colliery and his services were necessary. The defendants naturally when they took over the colliery in their hands should be given some amount of latitude in selecting the personnel of their employees on whom they could rely for the efficient working of the colliery. The plaintiffs allegation on the point is not sufficiently established and the learned Subordinate Judge was therefore correct in accepting the case of the defendants, it is further contended that the firm of Messrs Heemat Lal & Co., through whom the defendants sold coal really belonged to defendant No. 2 and that any commission paid to the firm should enure to the benefit of all the parties. The defendants have denied this and have stated that they sold coal not only through this Company but through others as well, and the learned Subordinate Judge in view of the insufficiency of the materials was justified in not accepting the case of the plaintiff in this connection. The plaintiffs contention therefore in regard to these items of objection has rightly failed before the learned Subordinate Judge and cannot be entertained by this Court either. 16. Another point which has been stressed by the plaintiff on the question of accounting is in regard to a sum of Rs. 40,000 and odd debited on account of loss suffered in connection with the speculations on the stock exchange. It must be conceded that a speculation of this character was not a part of the partnership business and ordinarily the loss sustained thereby could not be debited to the partnership account. 40,000 and odd debited on account of loss suffered in connection with the speculations on the stock exchange. It must be conceded that a speculation of this character was not a part of the partnership business and ordinarily the loss sustained thereby could not be debited to the partnership account. It appears however from the evidence that this speculation was carried on by the defendants with the consent of the plaintiff who had paid them a sum of Rs. 15,000 under two cheques. This amount was credited in the books of the partnership and was intended to be for the purpose of speculation in the share market. The plaintiff has tried to explain that this was an advance for the expenses of the colliery. In view of the other materials this explanation is quite unreliable. Even plaintiffs letters do not show that the share transaction was entered into without his consent. On the contrary, they suggest that the speculation in the share market was with his consent and agreement: vide Exs. 3-a and 3-b. What is more is that this matter is concluded by the adjustment of accounts, Ex. C. The repudiation of this adjustment in evidence by the plaintiff is not supported by the record. The letters suggest that the plaintiff had checked and understood the accounts before signing the same. I have no doubt in my mind that the plaintiffs statement that the adjustment was signed without fully understanding the account is quite false. Exs. C and C-2 are the entries regarding the share transactions covered by the said adjustment of accounts. These materials therefore convincingly prove that the speculation on the stock exchange was carried on with the consent and agreement of all the parties concerned including the plaintiff although the transactions did not properly form part of the partnership business. Regard being had to these facts it is now too late for the plaintiff to contend that the loss sustained in the speculation should not be debited to the accounts of the partnership and in my opinion the learned Subordinate Judge was right in his decision on that point also. 17. It seems to me, however, that there is much substance in the objection of the defendants in regard to certain items relating to the accounts. 17. It seems to me, however, that there is much substance in the objection of the defendants in regard to certain items relating to the accounts. I have already observed that so far as the payment of income-tax is concerned, the accounting should be on the footing that the tax was payable by the partners individually and any sum that may be found to have been paid in excess to save the business should be debited to the share of the plaintiff. There are, however, two other matters with regard to which I think the learned Subordinate Judge appears to have gone wrong. One is in regard to the cost of running a car being met out of the partnership funds. The learned Subordinate Judge has justly held that a car was required for the colliery purposes. He however thinks that as the car was being used even for the defendants private purposes therefore the entire cost of upkeep and running of the car must be paid by the defendants, it may be accepted that the car was being used by the defendants even for their private purposes although defendant No. 2 has denied it. But at the same time it should be borne in mind that the cost of running the car which is claimed on account of the partnership is not an unreasonable cost and therefore the learned Subordinate Judge should not have held that the entire cost of running and upkeep of the car should be borne by the defendants. The evidence of the defendants on the point show that the Kujama Colliery is at some distance about 7 miles from Dhanbad and the Railway Station and having regard to the circumstances of the case it does not appear that the amount spent over petrol for running the car is in any manner excessive or unreasonable. In my opinion therefore the defendants were justified in incurring this expenditure on account of the partnership business for which an allowance should be made in their favour. The other item is in regard to the payment of costs to the Commissioner. On this point the learned Subordinate Judge has directed that the cost which will be borne by the plaintiff over the appointment of a Commissioner for the purpose of accounting will be recoverable from the defendants. The other item is in regard to the payment of costs to the Commissioner. On this point the learned Subordinate Judge has directed that the cost which will be borne by the plaintiff over the appointment of a Commissioner for the purpose of accounting will be recoverable from the defendants. I do not see why the defendants should be made liable to pay the cost of the Commissioner. The evidence shows that up to July 1947 the defendants went on sending statements of accounts to the plaintiff. It is true that thereafter copies of accounts were not sent because of disputes between the parties and filing of the suit but for this the plaintiff himself is entirely to blame. There is nothing to show that the defendants prevented the plaintiff from inspecting the accounts. The Commissioners cost should therefore be borne by plaintiff alone. In my opinion the decree for accounting is in itself of doubtful utility because the substantial allegations made by the plaintiff in the plaint have not found support in evidence. But since there has been no objection to this part of the decree, I have not considered it necessary to interfere with it. Of course it would be for the learned Subordinate Judge to decide on the merits of the Commissioners report itself in regard to the liabilities of the parties. 18. The result is that the plaintiffs appeals are dismissed but the appeal of the defendants is allowed and the directions of the learned Subordinate Judge in regard to accounting are modified to the extent indicated above. The defendants will be entitled to their costs of this Court in all the three appeals. 19. I must observe that the paper-books of these appeals have been unduly encumbered because some of the documents have been repeatedly typed in the paper-boobs on the different appeals; for instance, the judgment itself which covers 36 pages or more has been typed in all the three appeals. Similarly, the partnership agreement has been repeatedly typed in the different paper-books. All this volume could have been reduced and the unnecessary expenditure saved if in the preparation of the paper-book there had been a proper coordination between the Counsel of the parties. I must also observe that the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge though slightly lengthy is careful and painstaking and shows clarity of thought and expression. All this volume could have been reduced and the unnecessary expenditure saved if in the preparation of the paper-book there had been a proper coordination between the Counsel of the parties. I must also observe that the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge though slightly lengthy is careful and painstaking and shows clarity of thought and expression. Jamuar, J. 20 I agree.