Judgment Ahmad, J. 1. This application in revision is against an order passed by Mr. Uma Shankar Prasad, Sessions Judge of Saran, upholding the order of Mr. Shree Krishna Prasad, Munsif Magis-" trate, Chapra, convicting the petitioner under Section 7 of the Essential Supplies Act, 1946 for having no proper account of the cloths in his stock and thereby contravening the conditions of the licence issued to him under the Bihar Cotton. Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1948. He has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one month and to a fine of Rs. 200/-, in default rigorous imprisonment for one month more. 2. The prosecution story, briefly stated, is that the petitioner held licence for dealing in cloths and had his shop in the town of Chapra. On 4-10-1950 in the afternoon, Mr. S.K. Ghatak, a Magistrate, along with Akhouri Himachal Prasad Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, checked the stock in the petitioners shop and verified the same with reference to the Stock Register. On checking, twenty-five pairs of saris were found to be in excess in the shop of the petitioner and were not found entered in the Stock Register. The defence of the petitioner has been that the said twenty-five pairs of saris were purchased by the Munib of the petitioner that very day from the firm of Tansuk Rai Baijnath, but no sooner than the Munib had brought the saris from the said firm, he received news of the sudden illness of his son and so he left the petitioners shop without entering the twenty-five pairs of saris in the Stock Register. The cash memo, in respect of the said sari was also with the petitioners Munib and as such it could not be produced at the time of the checking. His case further has been that V there could be no contravention of the conditions of the licence for mere non-entry in the Stock Register of the stock received soon after its receipt until the entries for the day had closed. And, in fact, the entries could not be closed till the close of the business for the day. His case further has been that V there could be no contravention of the conditions of the licence for mere non-entry in the Stock Register of the stock received soon after its receipt until the entries for the day had closed. And, in fact, the entries could not be closed till the close of the business for the day. So if the twenty-five pairs of saris purchased on that very day from the firm of Tansukh Rai Baijnath had not been entered in the Stock Register till the afternoon on that day, when the checking was made, it did not in law, constitute any contravention of the terms of the licence. The petitioner, in support of his defence, has examined his own Munib iis also the Munib of the firm of Tansukh Rai Baijnath and has produced the cash memo issued to the petitioner and its counterpart retained in the firm of Tansukh Rai Baijnath. The charge framed, against the petitioner at the trial was as follows: "That you, on or about 4-10-1950, at Chapra being a licensee under Bihar Cotton Cloth Control Order, 1948 contravened the provisions of the licence issued to you under the said Order, to wit, did not maintain your stock register correctly & thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act 24 of 1946 as amended by Act 52 of 1950 and within nty cognisance, and I hereby direct that you be tried by the said Court on the said charge." The prosecution examined two witnesses in support of the charge, P.W. 1 is Mr. S- K. Ghatak, the Magistrate who checked the stock in the petitioners shop. P. W. 2 is Akhouri, H. P. Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, who accompanied Mr. Ghatak at the time of checking. The petitioner has examined two witnesses in support of his defence. D.W. 1 is Basdeo Narayan, who is the Munib of the firm of Tansukh Rai Baijnath. D.W- 2 is the Munib of the petitioner in his cloth shop. 3. Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, has raised the following points. The petitioner has examined two witnesses in support of his defence. D.W. 1 is Basdeo Narayan, who is the Munib of the firm of Tansukh Rai Baijnath. D.W- 2 is the Munib of the petitioner in his cloth shop. 3. Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, has raised the following points. Firstly, that the prosecution having failed to prove that the balance struck on the previous day was wrong, and that the excess of twenty-five pairs of saris found in the shop was in stock from sometime before the day of checking, the defence set up by the petitioner should have been accepted, as there is nothing impossible in it, and more so for the reason that the best evidence that could have been secured by the petitioner in support of his defence had been placed before the Court. Secondly, that the terms cf licence issued to the petitioner do not contemplate that every purchase of a new stock, brought to the shop should be entered in the Stock Register the moment it is received there. Under the terms, the new stock can be entered and should be entered in the Stock Register till the time of the close of the business when the Stock Register is generally written and the balance is struck. 4. Clause 2 of the Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control), Order, 1948 reads: "A register of daily transaction in the form below shall be correctly maintained by wholesale and retail dealers separately for (a) dhoties and saris by numbers, (b) cloth normally sold by yardage in yards and that by weight in pounds, (c) other materials sold, chaddars, towels, etc., by numbers for each kind and (d) yarn By counts in weight." There is a proviso also attached to the clause, but we are, however, not concerned with that proviso in this case. This clause speaks of a register of daily transactions. According to the ordinary meaning, it means that the transaction of each day shall be entered in it and, naturally, from the point of view of convenience and correctness this register showing the transaction of the day can be filled up only at the close of the transaction for that day. This clause speaks of a register of daily transactions. According to the ordinary meaning, it means that the transaction of each day shall be entered in it and, naturally, from the point of view of convenience and correctness this register showing the transaction of the day can be filled up only at the close of the transaction for that day. Neither the terms of the clause require that the register should be filled up from minute to minute and hour to hour, or as soon as a new stock is brought into the shop, nor does the general practice or rule of convenience prevalent in the business world support the idea that it should be filled up from minute to minute or hour to hour, or as soon as the stock is brought into the shop. The two registers exhibited in the case and containing the entries for a number of months also prove that the practice in the shop had always been to make one total entry of all the purchases of one class of cloth made during a particular day and not to enter different entries in the column of that day for the different purchases made during that day. It implies, therefore, that the different lots of cloth of One class brought into the shop on a particular day were lumped together and entered as one purchase and this must have been done at the close of the transactions for the particular day. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has, in support of the general practice prevalent in the business world regarding the entry of purchase and sale in the Stock Register, relied on two cases. The first case !s that of Deputy Commissioner of Bara Banki V/s. Bam Parshad, 23 Ind App 254. The relevant passage relied upon is at page 260, where their Lordships, dealing with the provisions of Sec.34 of the Indian Evidence Act, have observed: "But on the authority of a decision of the Bombay High Court in Munchershaw Bezonji V/s. New Dhurumsly Section and W. Co., 4 Bom 576, it held that the entries were not relevant under Sec.34 of the Indian Evidence Act, the book not being regularly kept in the course of business within the meaning of that section. In the case referred to the learned Judge held that the words in Sec.34 books of account regularly kept in the course of business mean books entered up from day to day, or from hour to hour, as transactions take place. Their Lordships are unable to approve of this decision. It gives a much too limited meaning to Sec.34. If it were correct, merchants bankers books regularly kept would in many cases be excluded from being used ^s corroborative evidence. The time of making the entries may all act the value of them, but should not, if not made from day to day or from hour to hour, make them entirely irrelevant." Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh, relying on this passage, contends that this authority is strongly in support of his contention that in the business world the entries are made in the books not necessarily from hour to hour, as transactions take place, or even from day to day. But as in this case Clause 2 requires that it must be done from day to day, at best, it can mean that the entry should be made in Stock Register at the close of the day and not necessarily from hour to hour. Therefore, if the defence version is accepted that the twenty-five pairs of saris had been purchased on the day when the checking was made, the mere fact that the purchase had not been entered in the Siock Register till the time of checking, that is, sometime in the afternoon, it cannot, in law, create any liability for contravening the terms of Clause 2 of the said Order. Prom the language of the clause, as well as on the ground of general practice prevalent in the business world, as proved in this case by the entries in the Stock Register itself, the implication of Clause 2 is that the Stock Register should be filled up from day to day and not from hour to hour. Meredith, J., in the case of Ramesh-war Lal V/s. Emperor, AIR (35) 1948 Pat 356 observed : "The shop-keeper is not expected to keep his books entered up to the minute. The ordinary course of business will be to write up the books once daily. In the circumstances it does not appear to me that any non-compliance with the terms of the licence was established." 5. The ordinary course of business will be to write up the books once daily. In the circumstances it does not appear to me that any non-compliance with the terms of the licence was established." 5. The next point contended on behalf of the defence is that the twenty-five pairs of saris had been purchased on that very day and they were not a part of the stock coming in the shop from before. There is no evidence on the side of the prosecution that this extra stock of twenty-five pairs of saris was present even on the previous day. From the mere presence of these extra saris, the prosecution has inferred that it must have been present there from before. There is nothing on the record to prove that the balance struck in the Stock Register on the previous day was not true and consistent with the stock present in the shop. No doubt, there may be a presumption.that these twenty-five pairs of saris found in the shop must be a part of the stock which was in the shop from before. The presumption is, however, rebuttable. In this case, I think, the defence has sufficiently explained the presence of these extra twenty-five pairs of saris in the shop on that day. The explanation given by the defence is not in any way improbable and much less impossible. The defence witnesses examined on behalf of the petitioner state on oath in support of the purchase. The voucher given to the Munib of the petitioner and its counterpart from the firm of Tansukh Rai Baijnath have been produced in corroboration of their oral evidence. I think, the best that could be done by the petitioner to prove his explanation has been done in this case, and he has discharged the onus put upon him under Section 106, Evidence Act. The learned Sessions Judge has discarded the counterfoil on the ground that the three leaves of the counterfoil were found torn. In fact, on inspection, I found that only one leaf is missing. The two which are said to be missing-are counterfoils issued to customers. This fact may be a ground for suspicion against the genuineness of the counterfoil. But the prosecution would have been well advised to give a chance to the Munib of -the Firm of Tansukh Rai Baijnath to explain this fact. The two which are said to be missing-are counterfoils issued to customers. This fact may be a ground for suspicion against the genuineness of the counterfoil. But the prosecution would have been well advised to give a chance to the Munib of -the Firm of Tansukh Rai Baijnath to explain this fact. It woud be rather unfair to draw an inference from certain irregularity found in the counterfoil, without giving a chance to the person who maintains it, to explain the same. Even if it is taken as a ground of suspicion and for that reason it is said that the petitioner has failed to prove his defence, I think that the matter does not rest there. The rule of law: "that whilst the prosecution must prote the guilt of the accused there is no such burden laid on the accused to prove his innocence and it is sufficient for him to raise a doubt to his guilt; he is not bound to satisfy the jury of his innocence" (as laid down in the case of Woolming-ton V/s. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1935) AC 4G2) is in no way inconsistent with the law in British India," as held in the case of Emperor V/s. U. Damapala, AIR (24) 1937 Ran 83, Roberts, C. J., has further observed therein, "By Sec.105, Evidence Act, when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden ci proving that fact is upon him. The burden of proof referred to here is that of introducing evidence merely and the phrase is used in the same sense as in Sec.105. The burden of proof referred to here is that of introducing evidence merely and the phrase is used in the same sense as in Sec.105. Sec.108 does not cast any burden on an accused person to prove that no crime was committed by proving facts specially within his knowledge, nor does it warrant the conclusion that if anything is unexplained which the Court thinks the accused could explain he ought therefore to be found guilty."^ Dunkley, J., in that very case observed: "The burden is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and if upon a review of all the materials on the record there appears a reasonable doubt as to whether the case falls within any exception, the prosecution has failed to discharge that burden, and the accused must be acquitted, or convicted only of the minor offence, as the case may be." I think, in this case the prosecution has not at least proved that the explanation given by the defence regarding the purchase of the twenty-five pairs of saris on the day of checking was false, or that the excess stock of tweney-five pairs of saris was not purchased on that day. In such circumstance, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt and the explanation cannot be thrown out as not even worth consideration. I hold the explanation given by the petitioner is sufficient to discharge the onus laid on him under Sec.106, Evidence Act, and to account for the excess of twenty-five pairs of saris found in his shop on the day of checking. The mere non-entry of this purchase in the Stock-Register during the business hours before the close of the day, as already held by me, docs not amount to any contravention of the terms of the licence. 6 Therefore, the charge against the petitioner has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The application is accordingly allowed and tile con viction and sentence passed against him are set aside and the rule is made absoute.