ORDER H. S. KAMATH, PRESIDENT. - This purports to be an appeal against a five-word "order" of the Sales Tax Commissioner : "Your request cannot be granted". This was the reply that the appellants, who separately own each a printing concern at Amravati, got to a representation which they had jointly made to the Commissioner on 15th November, 1949. In this representation, they raised certain questions regarding their liability to be registered as dealers, recapitulating their efforts to obtain a decision on this question, ever since the commencement of the Act. It has been suggested that this was an application made under Section 19 of the Act. There is no specific mention of this section in the representation, but the Commissioner's record shows that at the hearing granted to the appellants' counsel, the latter did urge that it should be so treated. Reading the representation as a whole, we see no objection to accepting the suggestion made. To understand the "order" passed or the reply given by the Commissioner, we have once again to turn to his record. In arguing the case of the appellants before the Commissioner, their learned counsel, who has represented them in the proceedings before the Board also, made a final request that "in view of the previous decision the two applicants should not be required to pay the tax for the period between 21st July, 1947, and 12th September, 1948". It is this request that was turned down by the Commissioner in his "order" against which this appeal has been filed. 2. The first question that arises is whether an appeal lies against any "order" passed by the Commissioner in proceedings before him under Section 19 of the Act. Section 19, which has been deleted by a recent amendment, read as follows :- "19. 2. The first question that arises is whether an appeal lies against any "order" passed by the Commissioner in proceedings before him under Section 19 of the Act. Section 19, which has been deleted by a recent amendment, read as follows :- "19. If any question arises otherwise than in a proceeding before a Court whether for the purposes of this Act, - (a) any person or firm or any branch or department of any firm is a dealer, or (b) any transaction is a sale or contract, or (c) any dealer is liable to registration, or (d) any goods purchased by a registered dealer are covered by his certificate of registration, or (e) any tax is payable in respect of any sale or contract, or (f) any goods or classes of goods should be specified in the certificate of registration of any dealer under sub-section (3) of Section 8, the Commissioner shall determine such question after affording the party concerned an opportunity to be heard : * * *" The jurisdiction which this section gave to the Commissioner to "determine" certain questions was "otherwise than in a proceeding before a Court". The word "Court" has admittedly not been defined anywhere in the Act and the expression can, therefore, only mean "otherwise than in judicial or quasi judicial proceedings". Now appeal is a judicial process and cannot be available in respect of proceedings which are not judicial and not even quasi judicial. There is another way also of looking at this question. The outcome of proceedings under Section 19, notwithstanding that it way have been termed an "order", is not an "order" in the strict sense. The essential characteristic of an order is its binding nature, - in that the parties to the proceedings which have led to the order cannot get away from it, so long as it has not been set aside by a superior authority. Notwithstanding the use of the word "determine" in the section, the Commissioner passes no "order" in the sense indicated, in that his conclusions and observations are not binding on the parties before him, who are free to accept or reject them. That they may be doing so at their risk in relation to future judicial proceedings does not alter the fact that the proceedings under Section 19 do not and cannot end in an order in its acceptable sense. That they may be doing so at their risk in relation to future judicial proceedings does not alter the fact that the proceedings under Section 19 do not and cannot end in an order in its acceptable sense. The learned counsel for the State urged that the Commissioner's jurisdiction under Section 19 is merely consultative and advisory as was held to be that of the High Court under Section 21 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act (corresponding to Section 23 of our Act) by the Supreme Court in Seth Premchand Satramdas v. The State of Bihar ([1950] 1 S.T.C. 313). As far as we can see, the analogy is only partly applicable. The High Court's position under Section 23 of our Act is very much stronger, in that the decision which it gives on the points of law referred to it are binding on the Board of Revenue, which is required to take further proceedings in the case, consistent with the High Court's decision. 3. We have no doubt, therefore, that no appeal lies against the order by which the appellants feel aggrieved. They are, however, not without a remedy in regard to their grievances. But that remedy will be available only when they are assessed to taxation; at that stage it is open to them to advance all the numerous arguments which have been put forward on their behalf by their learned counsel. We may, however, say that most of them have been disposed of in the Board's order in the case of Rajasthan Printing and Litho Works v. The State (D.B.A. No. 11/XXXIII - 7 of 1951 since reported at page 62 supra). The only additional point urged in this case is that a contract for the supply of printed goods is not a contract such as is referred to in the clause "including a transfer of property in goods made in the course of the execution of a contract" contained in the definition of "sale" in Section 2(g) of the Act. This contention is of course correct, in view of Section 2(b) of the Act. But "sale", as defined in Section 2(g) is very much wider than "a transfer of property in goods made in the course of execution of a contract". This is only one type of transfer of property that comes within the definition of "sale". There are other types too. But "sale", as defined in Section 2(g) is very much wider than "a transfer of property in goods made in the course of execution of a contract". This is only one type of transfer of property that comes within the definition of "sale". There are other types too. In fact, "sale" means "any transfer of property in goods"; and the Board has already held that when a printer executes his customer's order, himself providing the paper and other materials required for executing the order and delivers the printed goods, there is a transfer of property or sale within the meaning of the main clause of the definition of "sale" contained in Section 2(g). The execution of the order is undoubtedly in pursuance of a contract; but the contract is not one answering to the definition contained in Section 2(b), but a contract of sale as ordinarily understood (vide Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act). 4. In the result, the appeal so-called is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.