Thadani C. J. - This is a First Appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, Gauhati, dated 2312-1949 by which he dismissed the suit with no order as to costs. [2l The plaintiffs Messrs. Assam Supplies, Ltd, brought a suit against (l) the Governor. General -in Council (2) the Chief Administrative Officer of the Assam Railway, and (3) the General Manager of the Tezpur- Balipara Bail way claiming a sum of rupees nine thousand odd as compensation for non­delivery of 218 bags of Gram weighing 551 maunds 5 seers which had been dispatched under R. R. No. 983743 from a place called Goniana now in Pakistan to Tezpur in Assam. The plaintiffs ser­ved the Governor General of India through the General Manager of the Assam Railway and in due course brought a suit on 9-6-1948. [3] During the pendency of the suit 'the Dominion of India ' was substituted for 'the Governor. General in Council' and later' the Union of India' for 'the Dominion of India.' [4] The defence to She suit was (l) that the suit as framed was not maintainable in law, (a) that the suit is barred by limitation, (3) that the plaintiffs had no rights to sue, (4) that the Court bad no jurisdiction to try the suit, (5) that the statutory notices under S. 77, Railways Act and S 80, Civil P. C., were bad if they were Served at all, (6) that the alleged loss, if at all, occurred under circumstances over which the railway had no control, (7) that there was no negligence, carelessness or misconduct on the part of the railway or its servants. [5] On the pleading the trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the suit is bad for want of Court's juris­diction? (2) Whether that suit is bad for defective notices under S. 77, I B A, and S. 80 Civil P. C.? (3) Whether the loss is due defendants' negligence? (4) Whether the claim is barred? (5) Whether the defendants 2 and 3 are liable for the plaintiff s claim? (6) What relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to? [6] As a result of its findings on these issues the trial Court dismissed the suit. [7] Mr. Lahiri for the plaintiff appellants conceded that the suit against defendant 3 baa been properly dismissed. (5) Whether the defendants 2 and 3 are liable for the plaintiff s claim? (6) What relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to? [6] As a result of its findings on these issues the trial Court dismissed the suit. [7] Mr. Lahiri for the plaintiff appellants conceded that the suit against defendant 3 baa been properly dismissed. [8] As regards the question of the liability of defendant 2, it is common ground that it is not independently liable, independently of the Union of India. Indeed after the Indian Indepen­dence (Bights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947 where the facts of a case fall within the purview of cl. (b) of S. 8 (l), the rights and liabili­ties under the contract shall be the rights and liabilities of the Dominion of India. The question, therefore, of the liability of the Assam Railway independently of the Dominion of India does not arise. All that was required to be done when in­stituting the present suit was to make the Dominion of India a party and to state that as the case relates to a Railway, the Genera! Manager of the Assam Railway has been served with a notice under S. 80, Civil P C. In this view it is plain that no decree against the Assam Railway can be passed [9] The question remains as to the liability of the Union of India. It is not disputed that the contract was for the carriage of goods over more than one Railway, the Railway which would have delivered the consignment was the Assam Railway in the Union of India. The liability of a Railway-as a carrier is governed by S. 72, Indian Railways Act. In other words, the liability of the| Union of India is the same as the liability of a bailee under the Indian Contract Act in the absence of any risk note. It is an admitted position in this case that no risk note was executed in respect of the carriage of the goods. As a bailee the Union of India had to discharge the duties which are prescribed by the Indian Contract Act. It is an admitted position in this case that no risk note was executed in respect of the carriage of the goods. As a bailee the Union of India had to discharge the duties which are prescribed by the Indian Contract Act. After the Union of India had discharged its duties as a bailee, the question of negligence or misconduct might have arisen but until the Union of India had led evidence that it had discharged its duties as a bailee the question of misconduct or negligence did not arise. It is true that the Union of India was in a very unpleasant position in regard to the discharge of its duties as a bailee under the Indian Contract Act by reason of the fact that the Railway to which the goods were consigned for the purpose of carriage was in the first instance the North-Western Railway, in Pakistan. [10] It was contended by the learned Advocates for the respondents that the Union of India can­not be held liable for the acts and omissions of the North-Western Railway. The short answer •to the contention is that the position in regard to contracts which were made before the appointed day a ad which were not exclusive for the purposes of the Dominion of Pakistan, are to be deemed to have been made on behalf of the Dominion of India and the rights and liabilities arising out of such contracts which fall within $he purview of cl (b) of s. 8 (l) of the Indian Independence (Bights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947 shall be the rights and liabilities of the Dominion of India. How chose rights and liabilities are to be proved is not a matter for our considera­tion. If the rights and liabilities arising out of a contract statutorily involve certain duties which had to de performed under the Indian Contract Act read with S. 72, Indian Railways Act by the Union of India, then in the absence of evidence led by the Union of India that those duties were discharged, we think the position is that the Domi­nion of India would be liable for the breach of the contract without going into the question of •misconduct or negligence. [11] It is from this point of view that we pro­pose to deal with the judgment of the trial Court. [11] It is from this point of view that we pro­pose to deal with the judgment of the trial Court. [12] On the issue of notice (issue No 2) the finding of the trial Court is against the defendants and we think rightly. The provisions of S. 80, Civil P. C. hive been observed by reason of the fact that a notice was served on the General Manager of the Assam Railway. [13] It was contended by the learned Advocate for the defendants that under S. 80, Indian Rail­ways Act, the Railway which can be sued is the Railway upon which the goods were booked or the Railway upon which the loss of the goods occur­red; the North- Western Railway has not been sued and it is cot proved that the loss occurred on the Assam Railway; the question, therefore, of the liability of the Union of India does not arise. This contention might have prevailed if the Indian Independence (Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947, was not in force. By virtue of the terms of cl. (b) of s. 8 (l) of this order it seems to us that notwithstanding the fact that the North-Western Railway, in this case was not sued and that not with standing the fact that it is not proved that the goods were lost on the Assam Railway, we think the Union of India took upon itself the rights and liabilities under the contract and as we have observed these rights and liabili­ties involved the performance of certain statutory duties, evidence as to which was to be led by the Union of India and which it has failed to do. [14] The 3rd issue decided by the trial Court relates to the question of limitation with reference to Art. 31, Limitation Act. In this connection Mr. Das for the respondents for the first time in this Court attempted to question the legality of the substitution of the name of the Dominion of India m place of the Governor-General in-Council without considering the question of limitation. We declined to permit it to be raised before us for the first time. [I5] So far as the question of the applicability of Art 31, Limitation Act, is concerned, we think the Subordinate Judge was right in deciding against the defendants. As the trial Court rightly points out, the goods were booked on 26-4-1947. We declined to permit it to be raised before us for the first time. [I5] So far as the question of the applicability of Art 31, Limitation Act, is concerned, we think the Subordinate Judge was right in deciding against the defendants. As the trial Court rightly points out, the goods were booked on 26-4-1947. Under Art. 31 the period of limitation is a year from the time when the goods ought to have been delivered. The plaintiff was entitled to another 2 months for the purpose of notice under S. 80, Civil P. C. If 14 months are counted from 26-4-1947, the suit could have been brought on 26-6-1948, and & it would have been within time; the suit was actually tiled on 9-6-1948. [16] The first issue involves the question of the territorial jurisdiction of the trial Court. We think that in considering this issue the learned trial Court has not correctly appreciated the position. It appears to think that the question of jurisdiction was to be decided with reference to S. 20, Civil P. C. Section 20, Civil P. C., has no application to the facts of this case. What applies to the facts is S. 13, Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act (Act XII [12] of 1887) Mr. Das for the defendants conceded that the trial Judge Mr. Hazarika was the only Subordinate Judge for the whole of the Lower Assam Districts which ' constitute the local limits of the jurisdiction of the District Court in the Lower Assam Districts. This concession made by Mr, Das is sufficient for the purpose of holding that Mr. Hazarika who tried the case at Gauhati instead of at Tezpur, had jurisdiction to try the suit. In this view it is not necessary to refer to sub-s. (3) of s. 13, Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act 1837 which lays down that : ''A decree or order passed by the Subordinate Judge or Munsiff shall not be invalid by reason only of the ease in which it was made having arisen wholly or in part in place beyond the local area if that place is within the local limits fixed by the (Provincial Government) under sub s. (1)". Undoubtedly by virtue of the notification issued under sub s. (l) of S 13 Mr. Undoubtedly by virtue of the notification issued under sub s. (l) of S 13 Mr. Hazarika who tried the case at Gauhati, had jurisdiction to try the case at Tezpur and vice versa. The fact that he had not try the case at Tezpur but at Gauhati would not make the judgment or decree invalid for that reason. [17] We have already dealt with issue Nos. 4 and 5 while dealing with the question of the rights and liabilities of the Dominion of India by Virtue of cl. (b) of S. 8 (l), Indian Independence {Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947. So far as the conclusion of the trial Court relates to the liability of defendants 2 and 3 there is nothing to be said against it but so far as the conclusion relates to the liability of defendant 1 we are un­able to sustain it. Accordingly we reverse the judgment and decree of the trial Court in so far as it dismisses the suit against defendant 1. Having regard to the fact that defendant 1 did not lead evidence to discharge its statutory duties in accordance with the Contract; Act real with S. 72, Railways Act, defendant 1 must be held liable. We set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court in so far as it relates to defendant 1 and decree the salt against defendant 1 with costs throughout. The plaintiffs will, however, pay the costs of defendant 3 throughout. [18] It is ordered in accordance with S. 82, Civil P. C., that defendant 1 do pay the decretal amount within three months from the date of this order. [19] The rule is discharged. [20] Deka J.- I agree. Rule discharged.