Thadani C. J. -This is a second appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Gauhati, dated 3 5 50, by which he set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court which had decreed the plff. appellant's suit for ejectment with costs. [2] The plff. Bitwanath Eajanikanta Roy Choudhury (a firm! brought a suit to evict the defen­dant firm called Chunilal Karailal, alleging among other things that they required the premises bona fide for their own use and occupation. The defen­dants in their written statement denied that the plaintiffs required the premises in suit a godown, bona fide for their own use and occupation. [3] Upon the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: "1. Has this Court jurisdiction to try this suit? 2. Was there any valid notice for ejectment? 3. What amount is due to the plfl. on account of rent? 4. Are the defendants liable to be evicted as claimed by the plaintiffs? 5. To what relief, if any, are the patties entitled?" [4] As a result of its finding on the fourth issue, the trial Court decreed the -plaintiff's suit for ejectment with costs. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs required the pre­mises bona fide for their own use and occupation on the evidence of the plaintiffs and their witnes­ses who deposed that the plfls. who are commis­sion agents required the premises in suit for their own business purposes. The learned trial Judge points out that as against this evidence led by the plaintiffs there was the solitary statement of defendant 1 who alleged that the plaintiffs wanted to increase the rent for the premises and that they did not require the premises bona fide for their own use. The learned trial Judge referred to the evi3ence of Ramkumar Gupta P. W. 5, who had sent 12 wagon loads of goods to the plffs. for sale by them on commission, but on account of the shortage of space the goods had to be given to other merchants. The learned trial Judge rightly came to the conclusion that this diversion must have caused loss to the plffs. which could have been avoided if the plffs. had had the use of their own godown. [5] The lower appellate Court, while disagreeing with the conclusion of the trial Court that the plffs. The learned trial Judge rightly came to the conclusion that this diversion must have caused loss to the plffs. which could have been avoided if the plffs. had had the use of their own godown. [5] The lower appellate Court, while disagreeing with the conclusion of the trial Court that the plffs. required the premises bona fide for their own use, stated that the plffs. have 3 godowns; godown No. 3 alone was in the occupation of the defendants, the plaintiffs were unable to say how godown No. 1 was being used. But the learned ap­pellate Judge has not referred to the evidence of P. W. l who had stated that it was being used as the plaintiffs' Gadi Ghar. This statement has not been disbelieved by the lower appellate Court. All that the lower appellate Court has stated is this: "A plff, has to satisfy the Court that he honestly wants the house for his own use. The principle underlying is that the tenant in possession is not to be evicted to make room for another even at higher rent. Here the defen­dants allege that plaintiffs demanded higher rent, but that does not appear to be unreasonable Inasmuch as there has been general rise in the cost everywhere. That is, however a matter between the parties and does not call for any decision in this suit. From the mere obligation it is difficult to believe that plffs.' requirement is bona fide." The learned appellate Judge has also cot dis­believed the evidence of P. W. 5 who has stated that the plaintiffs bad to incur loss on account of their inability to store his goods for want of space. The trial Court accepted the evidence and the lower appellate Court has not said that it dis­believed this evidence. It is clearly an error of law if the first appellate Court reverses the judgment of the trial Court without disbelieving the evidence on which the finding of the trial Court is baaed. All that the lower appellate Court has said is that because the plaintiffs have another godown, the allegation of the plaintiffs that they require the godown in suit bona fide for their own use, is weak. All that the lower appellate Court has said is that because the plaintiffs have another godown, the allegation of the plaintiffs that they require the godown in suit bona fide for their own use, is weak. The learned Judge has, however, failed to appreciate that the plaintiffs must have some premises to use it as their Gadi Ghar, and godown No. 1, according to the evidence of the plain-tiffs' witness, was used by the plaintiffs as a Gadi Ghar. On the evidence which has not been dis­believed by the lower appellate Court, it seems to us that the only valid judgment which the lower appellate Court could pronounce on the issue of bona fide requirement was one of affirmance and not reversal. [6] Mr. Lahiri for the appellant also raised the question or the constitutional validity of the pro­viso to S. l (3) of the Assam Urban Areas Bent Control Act, 1946 and contended that the proviso being a piece of delegated legislation was ultra vires the state legislature and the Constitution of India and had therefore ceased to be in operation at a time when the decree in the suit was passed by the trial Court. In support of his contention Mr. Lahiri relied upon the judgment of the Federal Court in Jatindranath Gupta v. Pro-vines of Bihar, A. I. R. (36) 1949 p. c. 175 and Badal Bose v. The Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal, 53 cal. w. N. 728 and two ofcher cases reported in /. K. Gas Plant Manufactur­ing Go., Bampur Ltd. v. Emperor, 52 cal. W. N. P. B. 25 and Krishna Chandra v. Sushila Mitra, A.I.R. (38) 1951 Orissa 105 (P.B.). In Jatindranath Gupta's case, the proviso to S 1 (3) of Bihar Main, tenancy of Public Order Act, 1947 (v [5] of 1947) was in question. [7] The proviso was in these terms : "Provided that the Provincial Government may, by notification, on a resolution passed by the Bihar Legisla­tive Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council, direct that this Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification." The majority decision in Jatindranath's case, (A. I. K. (36) 1949 P. C. 175) was that the proviso was ultra vires. Belying upon the observations of their Lordships of the Federal Court in that case, Mr. Belying upon the observations of their Lordships of the Federal Court in that case, Mr. Lahiri invited us to declare ultra vires the proviso to S. 3 of the Assam Urban Areas Bent Control Act, 1946. [8] Apparently the decision of the Federal Court in Jatindranath v. Province of Bihar, (A I R. (36) 1949 P. c. 175), created some difficulty, which resulted in the President of India making a special reference under Art. 143, Constitution of India for the opinion of the Supreme Court on the points stated in the special reference. The reason for the reference was stated to be the deci­sion of the Federal Court of India in Jatindranath v. Province of Bihar, A. I. R. (36) 1949 P. c. 175. [9] In expressing their opinion in regard to the points raised by the special reference, their Lordships of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider exhaustively the question of delegated legislation and the principles enunciated by their Lordships in their judgment, in my humble view, seem to doubt the correctness of the decision of I, the Federal Court in Jatindranath v. Province of Bihar, A. I. R. (36) 1949 p. c. 175. Moreover, the Federal Court in Jatindranath Gupta's case had before it for consideration the proviso to S. 1 (3) of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act of 1947. The Federal Court declined to deal with that proviso in parts, namely, (i) that which dealt with the extension of the Act for a further period of one year, (2) that which permitted such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification. The question of modifications in the proviso before us does not arise. [10] It would appear from the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the reference 'made under Art. 143, Constitution of India that the Advocate General of Bihar had apparently conceded that the proviso contained in S. 1 (3), Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act of 1947, namely, ''such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification" Was ultra vires the State Legislature. It may well be that as their Lordships of the Federal Court declined to split the proviso in the Bihar Act and that the concession made by the Advocate General of Bihar was regarded as sufficient for the purposes of declaring the whole of the proviso in the Bihar Act as ultra vires. [11] Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in their answer to the reference made under Art. 143, Constitution of India have referred to the princi­ples which have guided them in disposing of the reference. Patanjali Sastri J., (now Ag. C. J.,) has referred to the principle laid down in a passage from an American authority-a principle which was adopted by the Advocate-General of India. The principle is in these terms: "The true distinction is between the delegation of, power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring autho­rity or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done, to the latter no valid objection can be made." [12] The preamble to the Assam Urban Areas Bent Control Act of 1946, which indicates the policy of the legislature is in these terms: "Whereas it is expedient to restrict temporarily the Increase of rents of houses situated within the limits of urban areas in Assam and whereas the previous sanction . of the Governor under S. 299 (3), Government of India Act, 1935, has been obtained to introduce this Bill; it is hereby enacted as follows : " In pursuance of the policy to restrict temporarily the increase of rent of houses, the Assam Legis­lature proceeded to enact the Assam Urban Areas Bent Control Act of 1946 within the limits of the then Government of India Act, 1935. As I under­stand the judgment of the Supreme Court In re Art. 143, Constitution of India, and Delhi Laws Act (1912) etc., A. I. R. (38) 1951 S. 0.832, it means this,-A legislature has power to enact a law dele-k gating a power or powers to an outside agency- power or powers other than the power to enact a law. As I under­stand the judgment of the Supreme Court In re Art. 143, Constitution of India, and Delhi Laws Act (1912) etc., A. I. R. (38) 1951 S. 0.832, it means this,-A legislature has power to enact a law dele-k gating a power or powers to an outside agency- power or powers other than the power to enact a law. In the present case, all that the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act of 1946 does is to confer by the proviso to S. 1 (8), power upon the Provincial Government merely to extend the operation of the Act beyond a year. In my opinion, such a power cannot be regarded as delegated power to legislate; it is a power subsidiary to the enforcement of the Act which has been duly enacted by the legislature. [13] It is true that the High Courts of Calcutta and Orissa have interpreted the observations of Kania C. J. in the case of Jatindranath v. Province of Bihar, A. I. K (36) 1949 F. 0. 175 on the first part of the proviso to S. l (3), Bihar Main­tenance of Public Order Act of 1946, as meaning that the proviso amounts to delegated legislation. But the High Courts of Calcutta and Orissa took that view before the judgment of the Supreme Court was given in the reference made under Art. 143 of the Constitution of India, A. I. R. (38) 1951 S, 0. 332, in my opinion the proviso to S. 1 (3), Assam Urban Areas Bent Control Act is not a piece of delegated legislation and is, therefore, intra vires. It was not disputed by Mr. Lahiri that the operation of the Assam Urban Areas Bent Control Act of 1946 was extended in accord­ance with S. 1 (3), and that the extension was in force at a time when the trial Court gave its decision in the case. The issue as to bona fide requirement was, therefore, properly dealt with under the appropriate section of the Assam Urban Areas Bent Control Act of 1946, as extended. [14] The result, in view of our judgment that the premises were bona fide required by the plain­tiffs for their own occupation, is that the appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored with costs throughout. [15] Deka J.-I agree. [14] The result, in view of our judgment that the premises were bona fide required by the plain­tiffs for their own occupation, is that the appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored with costs throughout. [15] Deka J.-I agree. [16] Ram Labhaya J.-I agree to the order proposed by my Lord the Chief Justice. I wish to add a few words on the important question whether the authority contained in Act III [3] of 1946 permitting Government of Assam to extend Act III [3] of 1916 up to a maximum period of 2 years amounted to such delegation of legislative power which was not within its competence and as such the subsequent extensions of the operation of the Act for another two years in succession were void and invalid. [17] The question that arises in this case is extremely narrow in its scope. The legislature enacted the law. It laid down the policy and the principle and provided for necessary rules of conduct in relation to the subject-matter of legisla­tion. The legislation was limited in duration to one year. It was necessitated by an extraordi­nary situation: the circumstances were unusual. The executive Government was given the autho­rity to extend the operation of the Act to any period up to two years if the conditions which created the need for the legislation continued to exist. No legislative function was left to execu­tive. All that was left to the executive Government was to determine whether continuance of the unusual conditions justified further extension of the duration of the Act within the limits set by the legislature. [18] The Supreme Court of India has consi­dered the question of the delegation of legislative powers in all its bearings in A. I. R. (38) 1951 S. o. 332. The question arose out of a reference made by the President of India. The reference raised the question whether S. 7 of Delhi Laws Act and S. 2, Ajmere-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act and s. 2, Part 0 States (Laws) Act were ultra vires the legislature. The existing case law bear­ing on the point has been considered exhaus­tively. The question has also been examined from the view point of constitutional theory. The reference raised the question whether S. 7 of Delhi Laws Act and S. 2, Ajmere-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act and s. 2, Part 0 States (Laws) Act were ultra vires the legislature. The existing case law bear­ing on the point has been considered exhaus­tively. The question has also been examined from the view point of constitutional theory. Two propositions on which all the learned Judges were agreed may be stated as follows: (1) A legislature not so absolutely sovereign as the British Parliament invested with authority to make law on defined subjects under a writ­ten constitution, must normally discharge its primary legislative function itself and not through others. It must not abdicate or efface itself. It has no power to create a parallel legislature with concurrent jurisdiction. (2) A legislature, as part of its legislative functions, can confer power to make rules and regula­tions for carrying the enactment into operation and it has power to lay down the policy and principles providing the rule of conduct and it may further provide that on certain date or facts being found and ascertained by an execu­tive authority, the operation of the Act may be extended to certain areas, or may be brought into force on such determination. This is described as conditional legislation. [19] There is a difference of opinion on the question as to whether delegation of legislative authority beyond the limits laid down in propo­sition (2) above can be authorised by the legisla­ture. According to Fazl Ali J., there are only two checks in this country on the power of legislature to delegate, this being its good sense and the principle that it should not cross the line beyond which delegation amounts to abdication and self-effacement. While according to the view of the learned Chief Justice, the true test in res­pect of abdication or effacement ought to be whether in conferring the power to the delegate the legislature, in the words used to confer the power, retained its control, or whether the deci­sion of the delegate derives sanction from the act of the delegate or has it got the sanction from what the legislature has enacted and decided? According to this view, the true test of effacement is not that the authority which confers the power on the subordinate body should not be able to withdraw the power. According to this view, the true test of effacement is not that the authority which confers the power on the subordinate body should not be able to withdraw the power. Besides, abdication need not necessarily amount to a complete effacement is may be partial or complete. [20] The case before us presents no difficulty as in this case, delegation of legislative authority if any which is within the limits which are recognised were by the minority view. The minority view as expressed by the learned Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is to the following effect. When in respect of a subject in the legislative list, the legislature says that it shall not legislate on that subject but would leave it to somebody else to legislate on it, it should amount to abdication or effacement. If full powers to do anything and everything which the legislature can do are conferred on the sub-ordinate authority, although the legislature has power to control the action of the subordinate authority, by recalling such power or by repeal­ing the Acts passed by the subordinate authority, the power conferred by the instrument amounts to an abdication or effacement of the legislature conferring such power.' The power of delegation in the sense of the legislature conferring power, on either the executive Government or another authority, "to lay down the policy underlying a rule of conduct" is not permitted. But even according to this view, a legislature can confer power to make rules and regulations for carrying the enactment into operation and effect. It has also the power to provide that on certain data or facts being found and ascertained by an exe­cutive authority, the operation of the Act may be extended to certain areas or may be brought into force on such determination. When the legislature adopts such a course, it is said to legislate conditionally. Even if the proposition laid down in this view which is most favourable to the effect is applied, there cannot be any man­ner of doubt that the proviso to S. 3, Assam Rent Control Act of 1946, falls within the limits 'within which legislature may legitimately dele­gate its authority. Here the legislature framed the entire Act. It fully discharged its legisla­tive function. It laid down the policy and the principles and provide! for the necessary rules of conduct. Here the legislature framed the entire Act. It fully discharged its legisla­tive function. It laid down the policy and the principles and provide! for the necessary rules of conduct. All that it left to the executive autho­rity was to extend the operation of the Act up to a certain period if it thought necessary. The continuance of the legislative measure beyond the duration fixed in the Act itself was left to the determination of the executive if it found that the existing conditions justified the continu­ance of the Act for any extended period. Accord­ing to the majority view, it may be safely said that by enacting the proviso to S. a, the legisla­ture did not abdicate its functions nor did it efface itself. No parallel legislature has been created. The executive authority was not given any power-to modify the provisions of the Act- It could merely extend the duration of the Act for a fixed duration in the manner laid down in the proviso. This is perfectly legitimate according to alt shades of opinion' expressed in the latest decision from the Supreme Court. The proviso therefore, was not ultra vires the legislature and the noti­fications which were issued by the executive Government were perfectly valid and binding. In this view of the matter, the Courts below were justified in considering the question whether the plaintiff bona fide required the godown for his own use. Appeal allowed.