Judgment Ahmad, J. 1. This is a reference under Sec.307, Criminal P. C., by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge of Muzaffarpur. He disagreed with the verdict of guilty of a majority of the jurors on the charge under Sec.380, Indian Penal Code, framed against the accused, and has, therefore, submitted the case to this Court to be dealt with according to law. The grounds given for the reference arc "that the verdict of the majority of the jury is against the weight of the evidence and circumstances and is perverse" and "that no reasonable body of men could return a verdict of guilty on the evidence and circumstances of the present case". 2. The accused Dwarka Sahi is the son of the accused Ganesh Sahi and all the three accused are the residents of village Birpur situated within the jurisdiction of police station Kanti in the neighbourhood of another village Boaria situated within the jurisdiction of another police station Baruraj. The prosecution has alleged that on 25-10-1949 at about .10 or 11 a.m. accused Ganesh Sahi committed theft of a gramaphone, accused Dwarka Sahi of a harmonium and accused Pashupati Sahi of a trunk containing a gold hasuli weighing seven to las, a pair of silver bajoos weighing 25 tolas, a wrist watch, some kurtas, one chadar and Rs. 722/- in cash from the outer room of one Rajdhari Singh of village Boaria. Before this occurrence on the same day the accused persons are also alleged to have committed offence under Sections 144, 447, 379 and 436, Indian Penal Code, at the place of one Chengan Raut, about one fourth of a mile from the house of Rajdhari Singh, It is said that Rajdhari Singh and his neighbour one Benaras Singh had gone to extinguish the fire in the house of the said Chengan Raut, and while they were still there they got information from one Munshi Raut that their houses too were being looted. So both of them ran at once along with Munshi Raut towards their houses and saw the alleged occurrence and thereafter a similar occurrence in the house of Benaras Singh. The matter was reported to the police at police station Baruraj and on an investigation one common chargesheet was submitted in respect of all the three occurrences. A common preliminary enquiry under Chap. The matter was reported to the police at police station Baruraj and on an investigation one common chargesheet was submitted in respect of all the three occurrences. A common preliminary enquiry under Chap. XVIII, Criminal P. C., was made in respect of all the three occurrences and in all 17 accused connected with the three occurrences were committed to the Court of Session to stand their trial for the offences charged against them. Thereafter the trial for each occurrence was held separately. It appears from the record that the case in relation to the occurrence at the house of Chengan Raut was tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, and it ended in acquittal. The case connected with the occurrence at the house of Benares Singh and the present case in connection with the occurrence at the house of Rajdhari Singh were both sent to the Court of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge. The first has already been disposed of. In that the jury gave a verdict of not guilty and the learned Assistant Sessions Judge in agreement with it ordered acquittal. In the second, out of which this reference arises, the jury gave a verdict of guilty by 3 : 2, as stated above. 3. The test laid down for referring the case to this Court under Sec.307, Criminal P. C., by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge is, no doubt, sound and correct. But the test, I am afraid, does not apply to the facts of the present case. In the case of Ramanugraha Singh V/s. Emperor, 73 Ind App 174, their Lordships, while dealing with the duties and powers of a High Court Judge in India upon a reference under Sec.307, Criminal P. C., have observed at p. 181 as follows : "Under Sub-section (1) of Sec.307 two conditions are required to justify a reference. The first, that the judge must disagree with the verdict of the jury, calls for no comment, since it is obviously the foundation for any reference. The second, that the judge must be clearly of opinion that it is necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case is important, and in their Lordships opinion provides a key to the interpretation of the section. The second, that the judge must be clearly of opinion that it is necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case is important, and in their Lordships opinion provides a key to the interpretation of the section. The legislature no doubt realized that the introduction of trial by jury in the Mufussil would be experimental, and might lead to miscarriages of justice through jurors, in their ignorance and inexperience, returning erroneous verdicts. Their Lordships think that the section was intended to guard against this danger, and not to enable the Sessions Judge and the High Court to deprive jurors, acting properly within their powers, of the right to determine the facts conferred on them by the Code. If the jury have reached a conclusion on the evidence which a reasonable body of men might reach, it is not necessary for the ends of justice that the Sessions Judge should refer the case to the High Court merely because he himself would have reached a different conclusion on the facts, since he is not the tribunal to determine the facts. He must go further than that and be of opinion that the verdict is one which no reasonable body of men could have reached on the evidence. The powers of the High Court in dealing with the reference are contained in Sub-section (3). It may exercise any of the powers which it might exercise on an appeal, and this includes the power to call fresh evidence conferred by Sec. 428. The Court must consider the whole case and give due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and jury, and then acquit or convict the accused. In their Lordships view the paramount consideration in the High Court must be whether the ends of justice require that the verdict of the jury should be set aside. In general, if the evidence is such that it can property support a verdict either of guilty or not guilty, according to the view taken of it by the trial Court, and if the jury take one view of the evidence and the judge thinks that they should have taken the other, the view of the jury must prevail, since they are the judges of fact. In such a case a reference is not justified, and it is only by accepting: their view that the High Court can give due weight to the opinion of the jury. If, however, the High Court considers that on the evidence no reasonable body of men would have reached the conclusion arrived at by the jury, then the reference was justified and the ends of justice require that the verdict be disregarded. Their Lordships would, however, observe that the test of reasonableness on the part of the jury may not be conclusive in every case. It is possible to suppose a case in which the verdict was justified on the evidence placed before the jury, but in the light of further evidence placed before the High Court the verdict is shown to be wrong. In such a case the ends of justice would require the verdict to be set aside though the jury had not acted unreasonably." It is, therefore, manifest that if on the evidence two opinions are reasonably possible the jury is within its own powers to accept either of them. The opinion thus given by the Jury on facts is final and not susceptible to any challenge by the Judge. It is as a general rule only under one circumstance that the Judge can object to the finality of the opinion given by the jury and that is when the opinion given by the jury is such as no reasonable body of men can hold it. In other words, this occasion will arise only when on the evidence one inference alone is reasonably possible and any other inference is beyond the realm of reason. If in such a case the jury does not adhere to that one opinion but reaches some other, the Judge for the ends of justice has got power not to accept it as final and to submit the case to the High Court for being dealt with according to law. No doubt the ends of justice as laid down in the section itself is the determining factor in making a reference but the rule of "the ends of justice" is to be applied on the principle of reasonableness on the part of the jury. No doubt the ends of justice as laid down in the section itself is the determining factor in making a reference but the rule of "the ends of justice" is to be applied on the principle of reasonableness on the part of the jury. If the opinion given by the jury is not reasonable in the sense as stated above, the law will take it as inconsistent with ends of justice, and will I take away the finality given under the section to the opinion of the jury leaving the Judge free to submit the case to the High Court to be dealt with according to law. But so long as the opinion is not unreasonable within the meaning, as stated above, the question of the requirement of ends of justice giving the power to the Judge not to take the opinion as final does not arise. Their Lordships, however, have laid down one exception to the general test of reasonableness on the part of the jury. That exception arises when some additional evidence is taken by the High Court. In that case even if the opinion of the jury is reasonable on the evidence presented to it, it may become unreasonable in the light of the additional evidence taken in the High Court, though the same was not before the jury when it was called upon to give the opinion. Perhaps this exception is based on the consideration that if the additional evidence taken in the High Court were before the jury that would have negatived the reasonableness of the opinion given by the jury in the absence of that additional evidence and as such the opinion would be held as perverse and inconsistent with the ends of justice In this case there was no question of taking any additional evidence nor any additional evidence has been taken in the High Court. Therefore, the exception, referred to above, to I the rule of the test of reasonableness does not come into play in this case. Therefore, the exception, referred to above, to I the rule of the test of reasonableness does not come into play in this case. We are thus in this case concerned with general rule of the test of reasonableness alone and if the reference is consistent with the test, that is, if the onion given by the jury is perverse, and that upon the evidence no reasonable body of men could have reached the conclusion arrived at by the jury, then alone the reference will be justified:- otherwise, due weight to the opinion of the jury should be given, by accepting the same. 4 The learned Assistant Sessions Judge " has, in support of his conclusions as to the perversity of the opinion, relied on seven circumstances. The first is the discrepancies in the two statements made by the informant in the first information report and in the Court, or what may be called, the contradictions in the statement of the informant or the complainant as compared with his earlier statement made in the first information report. The second is the fact of enmity that has been found to exist between the accused persons and the witnesses appearing for the prosecution against the accused persons. The third circumstance is about the identification of interest of the prosecution witnesses among their own selves and also " with the complainant and as to the non-examination of the neighbors said to be residing near about the house of the complainant or of the female inmates of the house where theft is said to have been committed. The fourth is in relation to a few improbabilities noticed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge in the evidence of the witnesses. The fifth is in relation to the fact whether the properties said to have been the subject-matter of theft could have been possessed by Rajdhari as the possession of the same by him has not been proved conclusively or that the best evidence has not been f given in support of the claim of possession by him. The sixth is the contradiction in the statements of other prosecution witnesses as com-pared with their statements recorded earlier or inter se between their own statements in the Court of sessions. The last circumstance referred to is about motive. The sixth is the contradiction in the statements of other prosecution witnesses as com-pared with their statements recorded earlier or inter se between their own statements in the Court of sessions. The last circumstance referred to is about motive. The motive alleged by the prosecution in the case is that the complainants Rajdhari Singh and Benaras had gone to the place of Chengan Raut in order to extinguish the fire in his house and that act of assistance given by these two persons to Chengan Raut enraged and provoked the accused to commit theft in the house of the com- plain ants. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge thinks that as the case of Chengan has ended in acquittal, the motive alleged by the prosecution in the present case disappears and, therefore, that is also a circumstance against the probabilities of the truth of the prosecution story. 5. On analysis it is difficult to hold that any of the circumstances referred to above and relied upon by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge for arriving at the conclusion that the finding given by the jury in favour of the guilt of the accused persons is perverse, is such as would leave no room for any reasonable body of men to hold that the accused persons are not guilty. The first circumstance may affect the weight of the evidence given in Court on oath by the complainants. The second may equally shake their impartiality as against the accused persons in the matter of giving evidence and, in effect, this also may affect the weight of their evidence. The third is to the effect that the witnesses are persons connected with the complainants and therefore may be biassed. This likewise may affect the veracity of the witnesses or the weight of their statement. In the case already referred to above, their Lordships have observed : "The charge that witnesses are biased always affords a legitimate ground of criticism of their evidence, and often for rejecting it in the absence of corroboration. It was essentially a matter for the jury to decide whether they would accept the evidence of interested witnesses." The fourth circumstance is based on some improbabilities in the light of general experience. It was essentially a matter for the jury to decide whether they would accept the evidence of interested witnesses." The fourth circumstance is based on some improbabilities in the light of general experience. Those probabilities may weigh heavier in favour of the opinion held by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge but they are not of such a character as to make the opinion of the jury as one which can be held by no reasonable body of men. The jury considered those improbabilities and on their consideration came to the conclusion, which it could, that in spite of those improbabilities the facts alleged against the accused persons were true. The improbabilities in the circumstances of a case are after all questions of fact. It is for the jury to consider the case in the light of those improbabilities. Those improbabilities may no doubt in some cases assume a character which may not leave scope for the jury as reasonable body of persons to ignore them or to give an opinion in opposition to it. In those cases the opinion given by the jury in opposition to the improbability may be said to be perverse. In this case hone of the improbabilities is of that character. The fifth circumstance is likewise based on the question of quantum of evidence given in the case in support of the possession of the articles said to have been stolen. If there was some evidence, though not sufficient to the satisfaction of the Judge but sufficient to the satisfaction of the jury, I think the jury was within its powers to accept or reject the same, in order to come to its own opinion. The sixth circumstance is as to the contradictions noticed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge in the evidence of the witnesses either inter se between their own statements or as against their statements recorded earlier. This again is a question of veracity and credibility of the witnesses. It was for the jury to weigh their evidence in order to accept or reject their statements. The seventh and the last circumstance, I am afraid, has got very little weight to support the view that the opinion given by the jury was perverse. The motive, after all, is not an element essential to prove the guilt in a criminal trial. It is a factor to be taken along with other circumstances. The seventh and the last circumstance, I am afraid, has got very little weight to support the view that the opinion given by the jury was perverse. The motive, after all, is not an element essential to prove the guilt in a criminal trial. It is a factor to be taken along with other circumstances. It was for the jury to weigh and take it into consideration. If in spite of it the jury on the evidence could come to the opinion given by it, it cannot be said that in the absence of the motive the opinion cannot be said to be reasonable in the light of the test laid down above. 6 I may further point out that all the points stated above, which have influenced the learned Assistant Sessions Judge in coming to the conclusion that the verdict is perverse, were placed by him before the jury in his address to them. Each of these points was, in fact, elaborately and exhaustively brought to the notice of the jury. The jury must have, therefore, weighed them and on the consideration of all those facts, must have come to the conclusion which they have expressed in their verdict. 7. The circumstances pointed out by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge may lead to the conclusion that the opinion as given out by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge in its charge to the jury and as accepted by the other two jurors was more reasonable and probable than the one given by the three jurors. That, I am afraid, does not give the power either to the Judge or to this Court on reference to ignore the opinion given by the majority of the jury as the jurors are acting properly within their powers to determine the fact and that cannot be a ground for holding that the opinion of the majority is perverse. It may be said to be perverse, as I have already said, only when the opinion given by the three jurors is one which can be held by no reasonable body of men. That, I think, cannot be said in the circumstances of the case under consideration. 8. I, therefore, hold that the reference is riot justified and the opinion of the jury should be accepted. That, I think, cannot be said in the circumstances of the case under consideration. 8. I, therefore, hold that the reference is riot justified and the opinion of the jury should be accepted. Accordingly, I sentence the accused persons to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months each and also sentence them to pay a fine of Rs. 50.00 each in defalut to undergo a further period of rigorous imprisonment for 15 days each. Out of the fine, if realised, a sum of Rs. 100.00 shall be paid to the complainant Rajdhari Singh as compensation under Section 545, Criminal P. C. Shearer, J. 9 I agree.