JUDGEMENT : DIXIT, J. This is an appeal from an order made by the Additional District Judge of Indore appointing a receiver of the mortgaged property in the plaintiff-respondents' suit to enforce four mortgages executed by the defendant- appellants in their favour. The mortgage-deeds were executed on four different dates during the period from 24-1-46 to 12-5-48 as security for the repayment of a total sum of Rs. one lac. By the terms of the mortgage-deeds, the mortgagees were entitled to retain possession until the repayment of the mortgage-money and to have the rent of the property paid towards the interest on the mortgages. After the execution of each of these mortgages the mortgagors themselves took the property on rent and undertook to realise the rents from the property and pay it regularly to the mortgagees towards the interest. The last 'Kirayenama' was executed on 12-5-48. By this rent-deed the mortgagors took the property on rent for a period of one year and agreed to pay regularly Rs. 750/- per month as rent to the mortgagees. 2. The plaintiffs instituted the suit on 20-10-49 for the recovery of Rs. 1,07,515/- which was then the amount due on the mortgages. On 22-1-51 the plaintiffs filed an application for the appointment of a receiver of the mortgaged property alleging that the mortgagors were not paying to them the rent recovered by them; that interest on the mortgage-debt had considerably accumulated; that the property had deteriorated in value; that the mortgagors were not effecting the necessary repairs to the mortgaged property and that they were also encumbering their other property by mortgaging it. In resisting the application, the defendants denied in a general way these allegations and said that the Court had no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver under O. 40, R. 1 in the case of a simple mortgage, that the mortgaged property had considerably increased in value, that the mortgagors were in possession of other property and that the application having been made nearly fourteen months after the institution of the suit was not 'bona fide'. 3. On behalf of the appellants, Mr. Pande challenges the order of the trial Court on two grounds. Firstly, he contends that in this suit based upon simple mortgages, the Court has no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver. 3. On behalf of the appellants, Mr. Pande challenges the order of the trial Court on two grounds. Firstly, he contends that in this suit based upon simple mortgages, the Court has no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver. Secondly, it is said that it is not just and convenient to appoint a receiver in the present case. In my opinion, both these contentions must be rejected. 4. On the first head, the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that after the expiry of the term of one year fixed by the last mortgage executed on 12-5-48 and by the termination of the period of tenancy fixed by the rent-deed executed on the same date, the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties ceased, and the mortgagees were not entitled to get possession of the mortgaged property. It is, therefore, said that the mortgagees have not a present right to remove the mortgagors from possession of the property and that in view of the provisions of O. 40, R. 1 (sub-r. 2), no receiver of the mortgaged property can be appointed. The contention therefore, of the learned Counsel for the appellants, that in a suit based upon simple mortgages, a receiver of the mortgaged property cannot be appointed, rests on the assumption that sub-r. (2) of O. 40, R. 1 is intended for the protection of any person in possession whether he is or is not a party to the suit. In support of this view Mr. Pande relies on a decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in 'ANANDILAL v. RAM SARUP', 58 All 949. In my opinion, sub-r. 2 of R. 1 of O. 40 is for the benefit of a person who is not a party to the suit and debars the Court from removing such a person from possession. Under sub-r. 1 of R. 1 of O. 40, the Court has power to appoint a receiver of "any" property where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient. This jurisdiction of the Court is limited by sub-r. 2 which says : "Nothing in this rule shall authorise the Court to remove from the possession and custody of property any person whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to remove." 5. This jurisdiction of the Court is limited by sub-r. 2 which says : "Nothing in this rule shall authorise the Court to remove from the possession and custody of property any person whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to remove." 5. Sub-r. 2 is thus by way of an exception and has the effect of limiting the operation of the main provision in sub-r. 1. Sub-r. 2 cannot be construed so as to totally destroy the power given to the Court under sub-r. 1. It is obvious that if sub-r. 2 of O. 41 R. 1 is construed as affording protection also to persons who are parties to the suit, the power of the Court to appoint a receiver would then be confined to the very rare cases where the property is 'in medio'. Such a construction would have the effect of almost nullifying Cl. (b) sub-r. 1 of O. 40, R. 1 and cannot be accepted. Again from the language itself of sub-r. 2, it follows that the rule takes away the power of the Court to remove from possession a person other than a party to the suit. This sub-rule speaks of the removal : "from the possession or custody of property any person whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to remove." The words "any person" have been used in contradistinction to the words "any party to the suit" and thus a distinction is made between a person who is a party to the suit and a person who is not a party to the suit. The words mean that the person in possession cannot be removed whom none of the parties to the suit have a present right to remove. I am fortified in the view I am taking of sub-r. 2 of R. 1 of O. 40 by numerous decisions of various High Courts. A reference may be made to, 'MT. SUKHARANIABAI v. LAXMIKANTRAO GANPATRAO', AIR 1942 Nag 1; 'DAMODAR MORESHWAR v. RADHABAI DAMODAR' ILR 1939 Bom 82; 'BANWARI LAL v. BALDEO SAH', AIR 1942 Pat 240; 'GOBIND SINGH v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK, LTD', AIR 1935 Lah 17; 'VITHILINGA PANDARASANNADHI v. ALAGAPPA MANIAGARAR', AIR 1932 Mad 193 ; 'MA HNIN YEIK v. K.A.R.K. CHETTYAR FIRM' AIR 1939 Rang 321 and 'SATGUR PRASAD v. HAR KISHAN DAS', AIR 1945 Oudh 25. The Allahabad High Court, no doubt, took a different view in 'ANANDI LAL v. RAM SARUP', 58 All 949, but that view does not appear to me to be in consonance with the language used in O. 40, R. 1. The decision of the Allahabad High Court has been dissented from by other High Courts. A later Full Bench case, 'MT. TULSHA DEVI v. SHAH CHIRONJU LAL', AIR 1943 All 1 , doubted the correctness of the decision in 58 All 949' and recommended an amendment of sub-r. 2 of O. 40, Rule 1. The Sub-rule has now been amended in Allahabad so as to make it clear that a party to the suit is not included in the words "any person". In view of these and other decisions which were cited at the bar, I think it is scarcely open to the appellants to contend that the words "any person" in sub-r. 2 are wide enough to include also persons who are parties to the suit and that, therefore, in a simple mortgage, the Court is not competent to appoint a receiver of the mortgaged property. The objection, therefore, that the learned Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver in the plaintiff's suit must be overruled. Upon the question whether in this particular case, the learned Additional District Judge was right in appointing a receiver, Counsel for the appellant argued that the fact that interest was in arrear by itself was not sufficient to justify the appointment of a receiver and that the lower Court should have, for that purpose, held an inquiry to determine whether the non-payment of rent and the consequent accumulation of interest was wilful on the part of the mortgagors or due to circumstances over which they had no control, and whether the mortgaged property was more than sufficient to cover the mortgage-debt. It was also said that under one of the terms of the mortgage executed on 12-5-48 and by an agreement executed on the same date varying the terms of previous mortgages, the mortgagees were only entitled to get a yearly instalment of Rs. 5,000/- without possession of the property or the rents thereof. Under O. 40, R. 1 a Court has power to appoint a receiver of any property "where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient". 5,000/- without possession of the property or the rents thereof. Under O. 40, R. 1 a Court has power to appoint a receiver of any property "where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient". This rule confers a discretion on the Court in the matter of the appointment of a receiver and the only restriction on this discretionary power of the Court is that put by the words "just and convenient'. In 'EDWARDS and CO. v. PICARD', 1909 2 KB 903, the words "just and convenient" have been construed as meaning that "it is practicable and the interests of justice require it". To my mind, the question whether it is just and convenient in a mortgage-suit to appoint a receiver must necessarily be determined with due regard to the rights of the parties under the mortgage transaction and the circumstances of the case. In determining the question, it must be borne in mind that the appointment of a receiver is essentially on equitable grounds and the object of equity in appointing a receiver to take charge of a mortgaged property, is to protect the security. The appointment of a receiver is not intended to affect the rights of the mortgagor and the mortgagee. Nor has it that effect. In England the Courts of Equity normally appoint a receiver in a mortgage suit where interest is in arrear and whether or not the property appears to be of sufficient value to cover the mortgage-debt and interest and whether or not the right of the mortgagee to obtain a personal decree against the mortgagor subsists or has been lost. The reason for the appointment of a receiver in such circumstances is mainly this, that but for the time taken in the proceedings in the Court before the sale of the property takes place, the mortgagee would have received the proceeds of the sale on the day on which he had filed the suit. The Court has, no doubt, the power to refuse to appoint a receiver even when the interest payable under the mortgage is in arrear if some special reasons exist, e.g., when the interest has been in arrear from a very short period, or when a mortgagee has refused to accept it even when tendered. Those principles were followed by a Division Bench of the Rangoon High Court in 'ALLY RAMZAN v. MESSRS. Those principles were followed by a Division Bench of the Rangoon High Court in 'ALLY RAMZAN v. MESSRS. BALTHAZAR and SON LTD.', AIR 1936 Rang 290 and an order of the appointment of a receiver in a suit on the basis of a mortgage created by a deposit of title deeds was upheld on the ground that the mortgagee possessed substantive rights to the rents and profits of the property and that the interest on the mortgage-debt was in arrear. This decision was considered by a Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in 'AIR 1939 Ran 321' and it was observed that it went too far in saying that in a simple mortgage-suit when interest is in arrear, the Court will normally appoint a receiver. The learned Judges constituting the Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court also said that the governing words of O. 40, R. 1 are whether it is just and convenient and in deciding whether a receiver should be appointed, due weight must be given to all relevant considerations and that the fact that interest on the mortgage debt is in arrear can only be one of the factors in deciding whether a receiver should be appointed. In 'ILR (1939) Bom 82', a receiver in the case of a simple mortgage was appointed because interest on the mortgage debt and rents and taxes of the mortgaged-property were in arrears. Beaumont, C.J., reserved his opinion on the question whether interest being in arrear by itself would have been sufficient for the appointment of a receiver. One may feel doubt as to whether the circumstance that interest is in arrear, is by itself conclusive in appointing a receiver in a simple mortgage suit and I express no opinion in the point but I feel where, as in the present case, by the terms of the mortgage deed the mortgagees were entitled to retain possession until the payment of the mortgage money and were also entitled to have the rents paid towards the satisfaction of the interest and where the mortgagors by taking the property on rent as tenants and by omitting to realise the rents from the sub-tenants or having realised, by omitting to pay it to the mortgagees, (sic) it cannot seriously be maintained that it is not just and convenient to appoint a receiver of the mortgaged property. Here, the appellants, nowhere, say that they have regularly paid interest or rent to the mortgagees, or that the interest in arrears is insignificant or that the mortgagees have been realising the rents themselves from the sub-tenants. The appellants also admit in their reply to the petition for the appointment of a receiver that they have effected mortgages on their other property. It is obvious that by the continued omission of the mortgagors to pay the interest on the mortgage debt or to allow the mortgagees to realise rent, the mortgage-security is in the danger of being rendered proportionately inadequate. In these circumstances, I do not understand the purpose of the inquiry which the appellants contend should have been held by the lower Court before appointing a receiver. The contention that under one of the conditions of the mortgage-deed and agreement executed on 12-5-48, the mortgagees were entitled to a yearly instalment of Rs. 5,000/- only, may, without prejudicing the trial of the issue raised in the suit on this question, be disposed of by saying that I do not read the condition as in any way affecting the right of the mortgagees to retain possession of the property until the repayment of the mortgage-money and to have the rents of the property paid towards the interest. In my opinion, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and to the mortgage-contract made between the parties themselves, the appellants, by their failure to realise, or having realised to pay, the rents of the property, to which the mortgagees were entitled under the mortgage deed, and thus by allowing the interest to accumulate for many years, have been pursuing a course of conduct which cannot be said to be fair or equitable. The Court below was, in my view, fully justified in appointing a receiver of the mortgaged property. 6. The Court below was, in my view, fully justified in appointing a receiver of the mortgaged property. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellants attacked the order of the lower Court also on the grounds that it is vague and does not give any indication of the duties and powers of the receiver when it says that he shall exercise "all such powers which are necessary for the realisation and management of the suit property", that the direction in the order about the remuneration of the receiver is equally vague, and that the person appointed as the receiver was not selected with the approval of the parties and that no security has been taken from the receiver. There is no substance in any of these objections. It is clear from the application for the appointment of the receiver and the order of the Court that the receiver has been appointed for the purpose of realising the rents and profits accruing from the property, and taking possession of the property and the rents and profits thereof until it is decided who is entitled thereto. The order of the lower Court states that the receiver will be paid remuneration "on percentage basis to be determined later on." The amount of Rs. 200/- which the plaintiffs have been directed to deposit for the remuneration of the receiver is clearly provisional and intended to be adjusted in the total amount of remuneration the receiver would get on the basis yet to be determined. In the matter of the selection of a person as the receiver or taking security from him, the Court has unfettered discretion. The Court is not obliged to appoint a person of the choice of the parties as the receiver and has the discretion to appoint a receiver without asking him to furnish security. If the appellants think that the person selected should not have been appointed as the receiver or that he should be asked to give security, they are not precluded from putting these objections in the trial Court. 7. For the above reasons, I would dismiss this appeal with costs. 8. MEHTA, J. I entirely agree with my learned brother Dixit, J. Application dismissed.