Judgment Chatterji, J. 1. This is an appeal by the judgment-debtors from an appellate order of the learned Additional District Judge of Gaya, dismissing their objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The decree under execution is a money decree passed by the third Court of Additional Subordinate Judge, Gaya, on the 26th October 1944. On 8th October, 1947, the decree-holder filed an application for execution in the third Court of Subordinate Judge, Gaya. On this application the office submitted a note that the decree was passed not by the third Court of Subordinate Judge, but by the third Additional Court of Subordinate Judge. Against this office note the decree-holders pleader noted on the application- "The decree was not passed by A. Section J. III. It was passed by Additional Subordinate Judge which Court is not existing. Original Court was Sub-Judge III." The decree-holders pleader was thereupon asked to produce the certified copy of the decree. When the decree was produced, it became clear that the decree was passed, not by the third Court of Subordinate Judge, but by the third additional Court of Subordinate Judge. Accordingly, on 19th January, 1948, the application for execution was returned for presentation- to the proper Court. On the same day it was filed in the third additional Court of Subordinate Judge. It may be stated here that the suit had been originally filed in the third additional Court of Subordinate Judge and eventually disposed of by the latter Court. 3. The judgment-debtors filed an objection under Sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the decree was barred by limitation. The decree-holder, on the other hand, sought to save limitation by excluding the period from 8th October, 1947, to 19th January, 1948, under Sec.14 of- the Limitation Act. 4. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, third Court, upheld the judgment-debtors objection and dismissed the application for execution as time-barred. 5. On appeal, the learned Additional District Judge held that the decree-holder was entitled, under Sec.14 of the Limitation Act, to exclude the period from 8th October, 1947 to 19th January, 1948. He accordingly allowed the appeal and directed the execution to proceed. 6. Mr. 5. On appeal, the learned Additional District Judge held that the decree-holder was entitled, under Sec.14 of the Limitation Act, to exclude the period from 8th October, 1947 to 19th January, 1948. He accordingly allowed the appeal and directed the execution to proceed. 6. Mr. K.C. Sanyal on behalf of the judgment-debtors contends that the decree-holder is not entitled to the benefit of Sec.14 of the Limitation Act, because the application for execution filed in the third Court of Subordinate Judge was not prosecuted in good faith. Sec.14 (2) of the Limitation Act runs as follows: "In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature is unable to entertain it." "Good faith" is defined in Sec.2 (7) as follows: "Nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention." Mr. Sanyals contention is that when the office pointed out that the decree was passed, not by the third Court of the Subordinate Judge, but by the third additional Court of Subordinate Judge, which Court was then existing, the decree-holders pleader did not take the ordinary care to look at the decree, but tried instead to refute the office report and thus persisted in the mistake committed by him. On behalf of the decree-holder, it is pointed out that the heading in the decree reads "In the Court of Additional Subordinate Judge", which is misleading, because the number of the Court is not stated; and this apparently misled the decree-holders pleader. But the very opening line in the body of the decree shows that the suit came up for final disposal before the Additional Subordinate Judge, third Court. At the foot also there is the signature of Mr. Damodar Prasad, Additional Subordinate Judge, third, Court. If the decree-holders pleader referred only to the heading and did not care to- read the recitals in the decree, of which the very opening line is clear, it is not possible to hold that he acted with due care and attention. At the foot also there is the signature of Mr. Damodar Prasad, Additional Subordinate Judge, third, Court. If the decree-holders pleader referred only to the heading and did not care to- read the recitals in the decree, of which the very opening line is clear, it is not possible to hold that he acted with due care and attention. Consequently, he cannot be said to have acted in good faith. 7. On behalf of the decree-holder, it is con-; tended that he acted on the mistaken advice! of his pleader and, therefore, he should not be disentitled to the benefit of Sec.14. But if the pleader did not act in good faith, it is difficult to see how the decree-holder can claim the benefit of Sec.14. Presumably he must have shown the copy of the decree to the pleader,i and if the pleader without caring to read the! decree, advised him to file the application for execution in the third Court of Subordinate Judge, there was negligence on the part of the pleader and the decree-holder cannot take shelter under any mistaken advice. 8. In my view, therefore, the decree-holder! is not entitled, under Sec.14 of the Limitation Act, to exclude the period from 8th October to 19th January, 1948. 9. On behalf of the decree-holder, however. Mr. T.S. Sinha contends that even if the benefit of Sec.14 be not allowed, still the application for execution is within time. It is said that the third Court of Subordinate Judge was the Court in which the suit was originally filed and that Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application for execution. In support of this contention reliance is placed on Manogi Lal Sah V/s. Jog Sah, 13 Pat 5 and Chandmal V/s. Shiba Prasad Singh, 13 Pat 21. 10. In the First case 13 Pat 5, the decree sought to be executed was passed by the Court of the Additional Munsif of Chapra on the 21st February, 1921. The decree was eventually confirmed by the High Court on second appeal on the 23rd December, 1924. Within three years from the date of the High Court decree an application for execution was filed in the Court of the first Munsif at Chapra which was eventually dismissed by that Court on 14th April, 1928. On 19th March, 1931, a fresh application for execution was filed in the Court of Additional Munsif. Within three years from the date of the High Court decree an application for execution was filed in the Court of the first Munsif at Chapra which was eventually dismissed by that Court on 14th April, 1928. On 19th March, 1931, a fresh application for execution was filed in the Court of Additional Munsif. Objection was taken that the execution was barred by limitation. The first two Courts upheld this objection on the ground that the previous execution case was filed in a Court which had no jurisdiction to entertain it as at that time a Court of Additional Munsif was in existence. The High Court, however, held that the previous application for execution was made in accordance with law and. therefore, the subsequent application was not time-barred. Saunders, J. with whom Cqurtney-Terrel C. J. agreed said: "The civil Court in each District as provided by Sec.3 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. are (1) the Court of the District Judge; (2) the Court of the Addu tional Judge; (3) the Court of the Subordinate Judge and (4) the Court of the Munsif. The Court of an additional Munsif is a Court of the Munsif. From time to time an extra Munsif is deputed to a District to try such suits as may be made over to him by the District Judge by general or special order. The Court of an additional Munsif who may happen to be sent to a District in a particular year is not necessarily the same Court as the Court of the additional Munsif deputed to the same area in other years. For the purpose of execution of the decree which the additional Munsif pronounced his Court was the Court of the first Munsif for he was then trying suits appertaining to the area which was comprised in the territorial jurisdiction of the latter Court." Apparently Saunders J. proceeded on the as-sumpaion that the Court of Additional Munsif which was in existence at the time the previous application for execution was filed in the Court of the first Munsif was not the same Court of Additional Munsif which had passed the decree. In the present case, there is no suggestion that the third additional Court of Subordinate Judge, which was in existence when the application for execution was filed in the third court of Subordinate Judge on the 8th October, 1947, was not the same Additional Court of Subordinate Judge which has passed the decree. 11. * * * 12. * * * 13. * * * 14. In the second case 13 Pat 21, the decree under execution was passed on appeal arising out of a suit instituted in 1911 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Manbhum sitting at Purula in October, 1917, a Subordinate Judges Court at Dhanbad in the District of Manbhum was established under Sec.13 (1) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act (Act XII (12) of 1887), the local limits of the executive subdivision of Dhanbad being fixed as the local limits of his jurisdiction. By a simultaneous notification under Sec.13 (1) of the same Act, the local limits of the executive subdivision of Dhanbad also ceased to be included in the local limits of the Subordinate Judge of Purulia. In February, 1931, the decree-holder applied for execution in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Purulia, praying for attachment and sale of land situated in the subdivision of Purulia. The judgment-debtor resisted the execution on the ground that the proper Court in which to institute an execution case was that of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Dhanbad. This objection was overruled by the High Court. Courtney Terrell C. J. with whom Saunders J. agreed said: "But the decree-holders had always and still have the right to apply as of course to the Court which passed the decree for its execution even if it be in respect of property outside the territorial jurisdiction of such Court and even if execution by such Court can be no more than execution by transmission to another Court. Such an application can be entertained by such a Court and if made within time would save limitation." Thus, it appears that the application for execution was marie in the Court which had passed the decree. The learned C. J., however, referred to the provisions of Sec.3 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, and observed that under that section "no such Court as that of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Dhanbad exists". 15. The learned C. J., however, referred to the provisions of Sec.3 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, and observed that under that section "no such Court as that of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Dhanbad exists". 15. Though the facts of the above cases are distinguishable from those of the present, Mr. Sinha on behalf of the decree-holder strongly relies on the interpretation put by their Lordships on Sec.3 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. Sec.3 of the Act runs as follows: "There shall be the following classes of Civil Courts under this Act, namely: 1. The Court of the District Judge; 2. The Court of the Additional Judge; 3. The Court of the Subordinate Judge; and 4. The Court of the Munsif." Clearly this section divides civil Courts into four classes. In other words, there are only four classes of Civil Courts as specified therein. But when it refers to "the Court of the Subordinate Judge" as a class, it does not follow that at any particular place there can be only one Court of the Subordinate Judge. 16. Sec. 4 provides: "The Provincial Government may alter the number of District Judges, Subordinate Judges and Munsifs now fixed." Sec.13 (1) provides: "The Provincial Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix and alter the local limits of the jurisdiction of any Civil Court under this Act." Sec.13 (2) contemplates that "the same local jurisdiction" may be assigned to two or more Subordinate Judges. It is, therefore, clear that the Provincial Government may appoint two or more Subordinate Judges at any particular place and the Court of each of them will be a civil Court under class (3) of Section A and the Provincial Government may also fix the local limits of the jurisdiction of each of these Courts. It will be opposed to the very policy and scheme of the Act to hold that in one particular place there can be only one Court of the Subordinate Judge. 17. The Act, no doubt, does not provide for Additional Subordinate Judges, but it was obviously unnecessary. At any particular place there may be two or more permanent Courts of the Subordinate Judge. At the same place there may also be two or more temporary Courts of the Subordinate Judge, usually presided over by officiating Subordinate Judges. 17. The Act, no doubt, does not provide for Additional Subordinate Judges, but it was obviously unnecessary. At any particular place there may be two or more permanent Courts of the Subordinate Judge. At the same place there may also be two or more temporary Courts of the Subordinate Judge, usually presided over by officiating Subordinate Judges. These temporary Courts are called Courts of Additional Subordinate Judges, but truly speaking, they are Additional Courts of the Subordinate Judge In ordinary parlance, we speak of first Subordinate Judge, Second Subordinate Judge and so forth, but really speaking by these expressions we mean the first Court of Subordinate Judge, the second Court of Sub-ordinance Judge and so forth. Similarly, by the Additional Subordinate Judge is meant the Additional Court of Subordinate judge. The Addiional Court of Subordinate Judge is unquestionably a civil Court and it must come under case (3) of Sec.3 of the said Civil Courts Act of 1987. 18. The position with regard to "the Court of Additional Judge", referred to in class (2) of Sec.3, is different. The appointment of Additional Judges is specifically provided for in Section 8 of the Act. They are to "discharge any of the functions of a District Judge which the District Judge may assign to them". By Section 9 of the Act "the District Judge shall have administrative control over all the Civil Courts under this Act within the local limits of his jurisdiction." According to the scheme of the Act, the District Judge is the administrative head of all the Civil Courts in his District. Necessarily, the Additional Judge is subject to his administrative control. For obvious reasons, the Court of the District Judge and the Court of the Additional Judge could not be brought under the same class. Consequently the Court of the Additional Judge had to be put under class (2). As between the Court of the Subordinate Judge and the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, there is no such practical difference as would necessitate separate classification for these Courts. The Additional Subordinate Judge is neither subject to the administrative control of the Subordinate Judge, nor does he discharge any of the functions of a Subordinate Judge which the Subordinate Judge may assign to him. For all practical purposes, the position of the Additional Subordinate Judge is the same as that of the Subordinate Judge. 19. The Additional Subordinate Judge is neither subject to the administrative control of the Subordinate Judge, nor does he discharge any of the functions of a Subordinate Judge which the Subordinate Judge may assign to him. For all practical purposes, the position of the Additional Subordinate Judge is the same as that of the Subordinate Judge. 19. With all respect to the learned Judges who decided both the aforesaid cases, I cannot help observing that the classification of civil Courts made in Section 3 of the said Act hardly seems relevant in considering the provisions o£ the Civil P. C. for the purpose of deciding the question as to which Court is the proper Court to entertain an application for execution. 20. Now Sec.38 of the Civil P. C. clearly lays down: "A decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it, or by the Court to which it is sent for execution." The words are clear enough and in view of this provision it is impossible to hold that any other Court is competent to execute the decree. Sec.37 of the Civil P. C. defines the expression "Court which passed a decree" as follows: "The expression Court which passed a decree* or words to that effect, shall, in relation to the execution of decrees, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject of context, be deemed to include: (a) Where the decree to be executed has been passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the Court of first instance, and (b) Where the Court of first instance has ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute it, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree was passed was instituted at the time of making the application for the execution of the decree, would have jurisdiction to try such suit." Order 21, R. 10 then provides: "Where the holder of a decree desires to execute it, he shall apply to the Court which passed the decree or to the officer (if any) appointed in this behalf, or if the decree has been sent under the provisions hereinbefore contained to another Court then to such Court or to the proper officer thereof." In the face of these provisions, it is difficult to hold that the third Court of the Subordinate Judge was the proper Court to entertain the application for execution filed on 8th October, 1947. 21 If, according to the decree-holders contention, that Court was the proper Court to entertain the application for execution, then its order dated 19th January, 1948, returning the application for presentation to the proper Court was obviously wrong and the decree-holder should have, therefore, preferred an appeal or revision against that order. But not having done so it is not open to them now to contend that that order was wrong. 22. In my opinion, the application for execution filed on the 19th January, 1948, is time-barred. 23. I would accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the learned Additional District Judge and dismiss the application for execution as time-barred. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs. Lakshmikanta Jha, J. 24 I agree.