Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal against a decree for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage. On 29.1.1103 Lekshmanaperumal Pillai, who was the owner of the two items of immovable properties described in the plaint, usufructarily mortgaged them to one Valampuri Chettiar for a consideration of 19000/- Fs. Defendant 1 is the son and heir of the mortgagee. Ext. H is a copy of the usufructuary mortgage. Nine years afterwards on 15.12.1112 Lekshmanaperumal Pillai sold the mortgaged properties together with four other items to one Vaidyalingom Pillai Subramonia Pillai for Rs. 300/-. Ext. C is that sale deed. Of the six items comprised therein five items including the two in the plaint belong to Agasteeswaram Taluq within the registration Sub-District of Nagercoil and they were all outstanding in the possession of mortgagees. The sixth item was a mango tree standing on S. No. 511 of Vanchiyoor Pakuthy in Trivandrum Taluq. Subramonia Pillai, the vendee under Ext. C sold his right thereunder to Kalyanasundaram Pillai Balasubramonia Pillai as per Ext. D dated 22.7.1117 for a consideration of Rs. 400/- and the latter in his turn sold the two plaint items to the plaintiff under Ext. E dated 5.10.1120. The consideration therefore was 28000/- Fs. of which 1900/- Fs. were reserved with the plaintiff to redeem the outstanding mortgage under Ext. H and the balance (9000 fanams) was paid in cash before the Sub-Registrar when the document was registered. On the strength of the title so obtained the plaintiff brought the present suit for redemption. It was resisted by Defendant 2 but the trial court gave the plaintiff a decree as prayed for in the plaint and Defendant 2 has hence brought this appeal. 2. We must now proceed to state what claim Defendant 2 had put forward with respect to the plaint properties and also indicate what defences he had raised to the suit. Lekshmanaperumal Pillai died in Kumbhom 1116 without leaving any children. He had left behind two widows Valliammal and Annalekshmi Ammal. The latter died in Edavom 1116 and the former as the sole surviving heir of Lekshmanaperumal Pillai executed a sale deed in favour of Defendant 2 in respect of 9 items of properties that belonged to Lekshmanaperumal Pillai and the two plaint items were included in that sale deed. This was on 11.4.1117 and the document evidencing the sale is Ext. XIII. This was on 11.4.1117 and the document evidencing the sale is Ext. XIII. It contains no reference to the sale Lekshmanaperumal Pillai had himself effected under Ext. C with respect to the two plaint properties and the other items comprised in that sale deed. Practically all the items comprised in Ext. XIII were outstanding under mortgages created by Lekshmanaperumal Pillai himself, and sufficient funds were left with Defendant 2, the vendee thereunder, to redeem the mortgage over the plaint items in favour of Valampuri Chettiar. Accordingly Defendant 2 brought a suit before the Nagercoil District Court against Defendant 1 in O.S. 4 of 1121 to redeem the said mortgage. The plaintiff's attempt to intervene in that suit was unsuccessful as Defendant 2 (the plaintiff there) resisted it and the court directed the plaintiff to have his remedy, if any, worked out in a fresh suit. On the same day as that order (Ext. III) was passed viz., 2.7.1121, the court also passed a decree in that suit permitting Defendant 2 to redeem the properties on payment of the mortgage money. The present suit was instituted three days afterwards on 5.7.1121 but Defendant 2 has since taken possession of the properties in execution of the redemption decree in his favour. According to Defendant 2 he has become the owner of the plaint properties and there is no subsisting mortgage over them. Ext. C, the sale deed Lekshmanaperumal Pillai executed with respect to the plaint and other properties, is stigmatised by him (Defendant 2) as a mere sham or pocket instrument, or in any event, as a document executed with a view to delay or defraud creditors. Its validity was challenged by him also on the ground that it has not been registered in accordance with the Travancore Registration Act 11 of 1087 and was, therefore, invalid and inoperative. 3. Regarding item 2 in the plaint Defendant 2 had raised a further contention. That contention was that Lekshmanaperumal Pillai himself had no alienable right over it when he executed Ext. C. Not long after he married his second wife, Lekshmanaperumal Pillai had made a gift of six items of properties to his first wife Valliammal and one of the items in that gift deed, Ext. A, dated 17.10.1089, is plaint item 2. Afterwards in 1093 Valliammal reconveyed plaint item 2 to Lekshmanaperumal Pillai, but according to Defendant 2 while under Ext. A, dated 17.10.1089, is plaint item 2. Afterwards in 1093 Valliammal reconveyed plaint item 2 to Lekshmanaperumal Pillai, but according to Defendant 2 while under Ext. A an absolute estate was conferred on Valliammal the reconveyance under Ext. B (13.8.1093) was only of life estate in favour of the husband. Defendant 2 would therefore have it that in any view Lekshmanaperumal Pillai had no alienable interest in item 2 and that the limited interest created under Ext. B automatically ended with his death. Valliammal was according to him the absolute owner of plaint item 2 when Ext. XIII was executed by her in his favour. The plaintiff's case on the other hand is that Ext. A conveyed only a life estate to Valliammal and that whatever interest she got under it over item 2 in the plaint she conveyed that interest to her husband. Which of these rival contentions is true or acceptable, we will consider in its appropriate place. 4. The various defences raised to the suit were all negatived by the learned trial judge and he passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff permitting him to redeem Defendant 2 by paying him the mortgage money. In lieu of mesne profits claimed by the plaintiff he was allowed six per cent interest on the mortgage money from the date notice of the deposit thereof was given to Defendant 2. The learned Advocate General who represented the appellant repeated in this court all the contentions his client had raised before the trial court and also objected that no interest should have been allowed to the plaintiff until after the date of the trial court's decree. The plaintiff respondent had preferred a memorandum of cross-objection claiming mesne profits in place of the interest awarded. The learned Advocate General after stating the facts of the case started his arguments with an objection that the form of the action brought by the plaintiff was wrong in that the suit ought to have been a title suit for recovery of possession, and not one for redemption, of the mortgage. The argument was that the mortgage had got extinguished when his client paid off the mortgagee and that in view of that event the plaintiff could only ask for possession and not redemption of a non-existent mortgage. The argument was that the mortgage had got extinguished when his client paid off the mortgagee and that in view of that event the plaintiff could only ask for possession and not redemption of a non-existent mortgage. Though the point was placed before us in the nature of a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the suit, we think it more appropriate to deal with it at a later stage. 5. We shall now proceed to discuss one by one the various oints raised before us, but before doing so we shall first mention them. They are:- (1) Whether Ext. C the sale deed is invalid and inoperative by reason of any defect regarding its registration; (ii) Whether the said document was a mere sham or pocket instrument, or in any event, whether it was invalid as a document executed to delay or defeat creditors; (iii) Whether Lekshmanaperumal Pillai had no alienable interest in plaint item 2; (iv) Whether the suit for redemption is misconceived and whether the action should have been for recovery of possession on the strength of the plaintiff's title and (v) Whether redemption should be allowed in favour of the plaint and if so, on what terms. 6. The first point raises an important question regarding the law of registration of documents relating to immovable properties. Ext. C was registered at the office of the Sub-Registrar, Trivandrum. The first five items wee admittedly not within that registration Sub-District. The sixth item, as mentioned earlier, was a mango tree on a Trivandrum property alleged to belong to Lekshmanaperumal Pillai. The appellant's case with regard to the registration of this document is that a mango tree on a Trivandrum property was fraudulently inserted with a view to evade the provisions of the Registration Act that the registration is hence invalid and the document inoperative. S. 20 of the Travancore Registration Act (a provision which corresponds to S. 28 of the Indian Registration Act) enacts as follows: "Save as in this part otherwise provided, every non-testamentary document relating to immovable property mentioned in Ss. 10 and 11, shall be presented for registration in the office of a Sub-Registrar within whose Sub-District the whole or any portion of the property to which such instrument relates is situate." 7. Admittedly the sale deed Ext. 10 and 11, shall be presented for registration in the office of a Sub-Registrar within whose Sub-District the whole or any portion of the property to which such instrument relates is situate." 7. Admittedly the sale deed Ext. C was compulsorily registerable and the learned Advocate General argued that its registration at the office of the Sub-Registrar, Trivandrum, was invalid for two reasons. The first reason given was that a standing mango tree did not constitute immoveable property as that term is defined in or understood by, the Registration Act and that its inclusion therefore, assuming its existence to be real did not confer jurisdiction on the Sub-Registrar at Trivandrum to register the sale deed in question. Secondly, it was stated that granting for the sake of the argument that a standing mango tree was not moveable but immoveable property under the Registration Act, it was really "fictitious" property in the sense that expression is used in the Privy Council cases (A.I.R. 1914 P.C. 67 = 41 I.A. 110; A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 8 = 48 I.A. 127; A.I.R. 1934 P.C.157 = 61 I.A. 286 and A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 91 = 63 I.A. 169) bearing on the concerned point regarding registration. It was contended that Lekshmanaperumal Pillai had no right or title to the Trivandrum property mentioned in the document, that there was no such mango tree in existence and that in any view the parties never intended the mango tree mentioned to form one of the items of the transfer. Incidentally it was also mentioned that the view taken by the Travancore High Court in the Full Bench Decision in 32 T.L.R. 258 required reconsideration in the light of the above mentioned Privy Council decisions. Mr. T.S. Krishnamurthi Iyer, the learned Counsel for the respondent, besides strenuously opposing these arguments made a new approach to the question by invoking the aid of S. 23 of the Travancore Registration Act (corresponding to S. 30 of the Registration Act in India) and contended that whether the sixth item vi., the mango tree on the Trivandrum property is treated as included in the deed or not the registration was valid. If this contention be sound an enquiry as to whether the mango tree forms moveable or immoveable property or whether its inclusion was fraudulently made in order that it might do duty for a property situated in Trivandrum would seem to us to be a thoroughly irrelevant and purposeless enquiry. We shall therefore first direct our attention to consider how for the provision in S. 23 would lead as to hold that Ext. C is a validly registered document. S. 23 of the Travancore Registration Act is in these terms: "The Sub-Registrar at the Head-Quarters of a District may receive and register any document referred to in S. 20, without regard to the situation, in any part of Travancore, of the property to which the document relates." Its counterpart in the Indian Registration Act viz., S. 30 runs as follows: "[1] Any Register may in his discretion receive and register any document which might be registered by any Sub-Registrar subordinate to him. [2] The Registrar of a District including a Presidency Town may receive and register any document referred to in S. 29 without regard to the situation in any part of the State of the property to which the document relates." 8. Admittedly the Sub-Registrar at Trivandrum was Sub-Registrar at the head-quarters of the registration district of Trivandrum and he was therefore competent to receive and register any document referred to in S. 20 without regard to the situation, in any part of Travancore, of the property to which the document relates. Prima facie Ext. C has therefore to be held to be validly registered even ignoring altogether item 6 thereof as a property included in it. An argument was however raised before us that there was nothing to show that in registering Ext. C the Sub-Registrar of Trivandrum exercised the discretion vested in him under S. 23. On the other hand it was pointed out that the Sub-Registrar registered the document because there was a Trivandrum property included in it and that hence no occasion arose for him to apply his mind to invoke the wider jurisdiction conferred on him under S. 23. In other words the argument was that Ext. C was registered under S. 20 and not under S. 23. 9. In other words the argument was that Ext. C was registered under S. 20 and not under S. 23. 9. The point raised by the learned Advocate General is one that has received consideration in reported decisions and we shall first refer to a decision of Sir George Rankin, C.J, (C.C. Ghose, J. concurring) reported in Nilabjabarani v. Nandarani A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 478. In that case it was held that having regard to S. 87 of the Indian Registration Act, (a provision corresponding to S. 81 of the Travancore Registration Act) the fact that the Registrar did not state that he was acting as Registrar pursuant to discretion under S. 30 did not make the registration invalid and ineffective. 10. In view of the importance of the question and in view of the fact that Sir George Rankin's decision has since been accepted by the Calcutta High Court as an authoritative exposition of the law bearing on the point we think it appropriate to incorporate here the best part of the judgment in that case: "In this case, the defendant appeals from a decree, whereby a certain kabala has been set aside. It appears that the consideration and bona fides of the document were attacked unsuccessfully before both the Courts below; but, in the end, the plaintiff succeeded in getting a decree, setting aside the kabala on the ground that the registration thereof under the Registration Act has been invalid. It seems that, at Berhampore, there was a Sadar Sub-Registrar, whose office has been amalgamated with that of the office of the Registrar, and there is another Sub-Registrar at Berhampore, who is under the same Registrar, but in a different Sub-District. There were 33 plots in this document and the first plot was in the jurisdiction of the Sadar Sub-Registrar, whose office was amalgamated with that of the Registrar of the District. Upon evidence it has been held that this plot has no real existence and the other plots, being really situated within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar of Berhampore, that is to say, not the Sadar Sub-Registrar but the other one, and, it having been registered by the Sadar Sub-Registrar, the document is said to be invalidly registered and ineffective. Upon evidence it has been held that this plot has no real existence and the other plots, being really situated within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar of Berhampore, that is to say, not the Sadar Sub-Registrar but the other one, and, it having been registered by the Sadar Sub-Registrar, the document is said to be invalidly registered and ineffective. As to that the question which arises has reference to the provisions of S. 30, Registration Act, that any Registrar may, in his discretion, receive and register any document which might be registered by any Sub-Registrar subordinate to him; and it may be pointed out that, in this case, the Courts have come to the conclusion that, because the Sadar Sub-Registrar has not stated that he was acting as Registrar pursuant to a discretion under S. 30, the fact that he was entitled to act as Registrar does not make the registration valid. It appears to me that this contention is not really supported by authority. In the well-known case of Balji Nath Tewari v. Sheo Sahay [1891] 18 Cal. 556 [F.B.] the main question was whether the property had been substantially misdescribed. Sir Comer Petheram, C.J., who took the view that the misdescription was not material, considered the question whether the registration by the officer, who was the Sub-Registrar and the Registrar was not good in the circumstances. He pointed out that by S. 51 one set of books only should be kept when the two offices had been amalgamated and that the registering officer. "acts precisely in the same way if he registers a document in his discretion as Registrar as he would do if he registered it as Sub-Registrar." Consequently, in the case before him the document was registered in an office and in a set of books which had been constituted and provided for registration of documents of this kind and, in those circumstances, the learned Chief Justice refused to hold the registration to be void. Again, in the case of Jogeswar Narain Singh v. Rai Radha Rawn [1905] 3 C.L.J. 165 it was contended that the Sub-Registrar ought to have stated plainly in the registration endorsement that he registered the bond in the capacity of Registrar and reference was made to the case of Balji Nath Tewari to which I have referred. Again, in the case of Jogeswar Narain Singh v. Rai Radha Rawn [1905] 3 C.L.J. 165 it was contended that the Sub-Registrar ought to have stated plainly in the registration endorsement that he registered the bond in the capacity of Registrar and reference was made to the case of Balji Nath Tewari to which I have referred. The comment made is that there was no expression of opinion by the Full Bench to support the contention that the Sub-Registrar ought to have stated plainly that he was discharging one of the Registrar's functions. But, in that case, having regard to the fee charged, it was held that the Sub-Registrar was acting under S. 30. Upon the whole, it appears to me, in view of S. 87, Registration Act, that this instrument, which has been found to be an instrument for consideration, is not shown to be invalid. The Registration Act has to be strictly construed; but there is a point at which it is unnecessary to multiply technicalities. In my judgment, in this case, the registration may beheld to be valid." We may state here that we have not committed to notice that a contrary view was expressed earlier by Mookerjee and Chotzner, JJ. in Kedar Nath Das v. Bidhu Bhushan Guha A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 348. There the facts were similar and the learned judges preferred to follow the view Piggot and Ghose, JJ., gave expression to in (1891) I.L.R. 18 Cal. 556 F.B.) than to the view Petheram, C.J. took in that case and which Sir George Rankin followed in A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 478. The decision now mentioned is not referred to in the latter case. 11. The decision in A.I.R 1931 Cal. 478 was followed in two later cases and in view of the discordant note struck earlier in A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 348 we think it proper to refer to the two later cases also in some detail. The first of them is reported in Premuskh. Mangal Chand (1936-37) 41 C.W.N. 854. The case was first decided on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court by Ameer Ali, J. Issue 3 in the case was: "Is the mortgage of 26th November, 1932, invalid for want of proper registration, on the ground that the inclusion of the Calcutta property was in fraud of the law of registration?" The scope of the provisions in Ss. 28, 30 and 87 came up for consideration and having regard to the fat that the fee leviable for registration under S. 28 alone and not the higher fee due under S. 30 was paid it was contended for the defendant that the officer concerned had not invoked his wider powers. The learned judge did not accept the contention and in repelling it observed: "It is suggested that the procedure under Ss. 28 and 30 are different and that this document was registered under S. 28. There is however nothing to establish this and having regard to the fact that Calcutta property or no Calcutta property, the Registrar had jurisdiction to register the document, in my view the point in issue No. 3 must fail." This view was affirmed on appeal by Costello and Panckridge, JJ. The former said: "In my opinion, however, the facts of this case are of no importance whatever upon the pure question of registration, because I have come to the conclusion that the learned judge was quite right in taking the view that whether there was Calcutta property or no Calcutta property comprised in the mortgage, the Registrar of Assurance of Calcutta, in registering the document, must be taken to have acted within the four corners of the authority conferred upon him by the provisions of S. 30 of the Registration Act 1908. There is no necessity for us to endeavour to ascertain whether he acted under the powers conferred on him by Sub-s. [1] or under the powers conferred on him by Sub-s. [2].11 12. The learned judge then refers to the decision in A.I.R 1931 Cal. 478 and after quoting a large part of Sir George Rankin's Judgment in that case wound up the discussion thus by referring to S. 87: "Even if therefore, it was the case that the Registrar of Assurance, Calcutta, ought to have charged a larger fee than he actually did nevertheless by the saving provisions of S. 87 of the Registration Act, the registration would still hold good. I am of opinion, therefore, that on the question of registration the decision arrived at by the learned judge was right." What the other learned Judge, Panckridge, J. said on this point was: "It is admitted, however, that on the face of it he had such power under S. 30, Sub-s. [2]. I am of opinion, therefore, that on the question of registration the decision arrived at by the learned judge was right." What the other learned Judge, Panckridge, J. said on this point was: "It is admitted, however, that on the face of it he had such power under S. 30, Sub-s. [2]. If he had the power to register, and did in fact register, there was to my mind effective registration, and it is quite immaterial under what particular provision of the statute he purported to act or thought he was acting." In view of the decision the learned judges arrived at as above it became unnecessary in that case to presume the enquiry whether the Calcutta property included in the suit mortgage was really fictitious in the sense of Privy Council decisions. 13. The next case to be referred to in this connection is the decision in Chandi Prosad v. Krishikesh Shaha A.I.R. 1946 Cal. 465. There again the document was registered at Calcutta while the bulk of properties to which the document related lay outside the city of Calcutta. A Calcutta property was also included in it. The question arose whether the Calcutta property included in the document was real or fictitious and whether its inclusion was not to evade or defraud the provisions of the Registration Act. The relevant sections (Ss. 28, 30 & 87) of the Indian Registration Act were all considered and it was held that where the law permitted registration of a document in the intended jurisdiction independent of the inclusion of any item of property in it, it could not be said that the parties intended by such inclusion of commit a fraud on the law of registration. Biswas and Chakravartti, JJ. who heard the case have referred in their judgments to all the Privy Council cases dealing with the question. It is highly instructive and also interesting to notice how the learned judges repelled the appellant's argument that the case before them was governed by the Privy Council decisions, Biswas, J. said: "Mr. Sannyal has tried to invoke the authority of these decisions in support of his argument in the present case. The initial difficulty with which he is faced is that the foundation for a case of fraud on the law of registration is altogether wanting. Sannyal has tried to invoke the authority of these decisions in support of his argument in the present case. The initial difficulty with which he is faced is that the foundation for a case of fraud on the law of registration is altogether wanting. In all the cases which were before the judicial Committee, it was assumed or found that the document in question could not be registered in the particular district or sub-district where it had been actually registered except for the fact that some property was included in it which was supposed to lie within that district or sub-district: in other words, the basic assumption of these judgments was that a particular property was included in the document because the document could not otherwise be registered at a particular place. Where, however, the law permits the registration of a document in the intended jurisdiction, independent of the inclusion of any item of property in it, it is difficult to see how it can be said that the parties intended by such inclusion to commit a fraud on the law of registration. In the case before us, the mortgage deed comprised two properties which were situated in Bhowanipur, which was within the jurisdiction of the Alipore Sub-Registry. Item 3 of property was a Calcutta property. It is said that because of the inclusion of this item 3 of property in the mortgage deed it was possible to get it registered by the Registrar of Assurances in Calcutta, S. 30, Registration Act, however, shows that the Registrar of Presidency Town may receive and register any document referred to in S. 28, without regard to the situation in any part of British India of the property to which the document relates." Chakravartti, J. dealt with the question more elaborately and the relevant portion of the judgment is as follows: "I would go further and say that even if we were to suppose that the parties, while not intending that the property at Shyam Square Lane should form part of the security in a real sense, yet included it in the deed under the mistaken notion that no registration could otherwise be had in Calcutta, the position would not, in my view be different. The intended fraud would not be a fraud in fact, for the law of registration is what is contained in the Registration Act and not what someone erroneously supposes it to be. What the Judicial Committee laid down is that if the parties, by including in a deed an item of property with which they were not really dealing obtained its registration at a particular place where it could not otherwise have been registered, there is a fraud on the law of registration and "no registration obtained by means thereof can be valid." In the case I have assumed, registration would not be obtained by means of fraud, but it would be obtained lawfully, by reason of the fact that the registering officer happened to be the Registrar of Calcutta and the Registration Act happened to contain amongst its provisions S. 30[2]. It is, however, not necessary to pursue this point further, because, as I have said, there is no evidence of fraud and I am unable to see why an unnecessary fraud should be inferred merely from the circumstance that the property is one of a somewhat inconsequential character. But it was contended that the registration in the present case was not made under S. 30[2], but under S. 28, as would appear from the notes made on the deed of the fees levied. This argument, in my view, proceeds on a total misconception of the scope and effect of the two sections. S. 28 of the Act lays down the general rule that every document shall be presented for registration in the office of the Sub-Registrar within whose Sub-District the whole or some portion of the portion to which such document relates is situated. S. 30 confers some special powers on District Registrars and Registrars of Presidency Town who are empowered to register any document relating to property in British India, irrespective of where such property may be situated. The two sections do not provide for two different modes of registration and do not warrant the view that if an officer, especially empowered under S. 30[2], registers a deed comprising property no part of which is situated within his own registration district, such registration shall be valid only if the registration is impliedly or in substance under S. 30[2], and shall be invalid if the registration is under S. 28. As far as I understand the Act, there is no such thing as registration under one section rather than under another. It is true that the Registration Manual provides for additional fees to be levied in cases where a District Registrar or the Registrar of Presidency Town registers a document comprising property, no part of which is situated within his registration district. But that requirement has nothing whatever to do with his jurisdiction to register a deed and it cannot be supposed that when such an officer registers a deed on receipt of the lower fee, he somehow contracts into a Sub-Registrar and exceeds his authority if he exercise the large powers. The authority conferred by S. 30[2] is absolute and in my view it is in no way affected by the Registrar charging the lower fee chargeable in cases where some part of the property is situate within his jurisdiction. The levying of a lower fee may be an irregularity and, if it is an irregularity, it may be curable under S. 87 of the Act. But it is a complete mistake to suppose that the matter has any bearing whatever on the jurisdiction of the Registrar to make the registration in such circumstances. The matter may be looked at from another point of view to which I have already referred, although somewhat indirectly. The point which we are considering is whether the registration was valid. Under the law it is equally valid, whether the questioned property is treated as included in the deed or not. In such circumstances, any enquiry as to whether the property was an essential factor, going into the making of the transaction, or was introduced simply in order that it might do duty for a piece of property situated in Calcutta, seems to me to be an utterly irrelevant purposeless enquiry. Even without the addition of this particular property, the deed might be validly registered where it was. But it was contended that such too was the position in 41 I.A. 110, where also the deed was registered in Calcutta and yet the Judicial Committee held that since the only property shown as situated in Calcutta had no existence, the registration was void. But it was contended that such too was the position in 41 I.A. 110, where also the deed was registered in Calcutta and yet the Judicial Committee held that since the only property shown as situated in Calcutta had no existence, the registration was void. With reference to that decision, it may be pointed out that the office who registered the deed is referred to in the judgment as the Sub-Registrar and it is quite plain that Their Lordships were not dealing with the position of a Registrar of a Presidency Town upon whom special powers have been conferred under S. 30[2] of the Act. It was pointed out to us that the deed was registered in the year 1895 and by a Notification dated 1892, the local Government had amalgamated the offices of the Sub-Registrar of Calcutta and the Registrar. However, that may be, it is perfectly clear that even if the Sub-Registrar of Calcutta was, at the relevant time, also the Registrar, that matter was not brought to the notice of Their Lordships and they proceeded on the basis that the deed could not have been registered in Calcutta unless some property situated in Calcutta and forming a real part of the transaction was included in the deed. That decision, in my opinion, cannot be regarded as negativing a view which Their Lordships never considered. My conclusion, therefore, is that where, as here, the registration was by an officer vested with special powers under S. 30[2], the existence of some property within the registration district of that officer is immaterial and accordingly no intention to commit a fraud on the law of registration could be inferred from the mere fact that some property of an inconsequential character, or even not intended to form a real part of the security, was included in the deed. Nor can there be a fraud on the law of registration if such an item of property is deliberately included for, by such inclusion jurisdiction is not conferred and the registration also, in my view, cannot be held to be void, because the document happens to comprise some property of such character." 14. In the case before us there is no evidence that the Trivandrum property was a non-existent one or that it did not belong to Lekshmanaperumal Pillai. In the case before us there is no evidence that the Trivandrum property was a non-existent one or that it did not belong to Lekshmanaperumal Pillai. No doubt the appellant averred in his written statement facts relevant to bring the registration of Ext. C within the mischief contemplated by the Privy Council decisions. No attempt was however made to prove those averments. Anyhow in view of the circumstance that it was a Sub-Registrar at the Head-quarters of a District who registered the document and that he could have validly done it, without regard to the situation of the property to which the document related to in any part of Travancore, we cannot persuade overselves to hold that the registration was invalid. The special duties enjoined on a Sub-Registrar by S. 59 of the Travancore Registration Act (which does the duties of Ss. 64 and 65 of the Indian Registration Act) make sufficient safeguards for all matters of publicity which it is the object of registration to afford. In this view of the law we consider it unnecessary to deal with the question whether a mango tree would constitute moveable or immoveable property under the Registration Act and whether its inclusion in Ext. C was fraudulent and to evade the law of registration. The first point argued by the appellant's learned Counsel has therefore to be decided against the appellant and we so decide. 15. Before proceeding to the next point it has to be mentioned that Ext. D, the sale deed Subramania Pillai executed in favour of Balasubramonia Pillai, was also registered at the office of the Sub-Registrar, Trivandrum. The first five items in Ext. C which are all in Agasteeswaran Taluk are included in Ext. D as well and for the sixth item some other mango tree on a different survey number of Chengazhasseri Pakuthy of the Trivandrum Taluk is seen included in it. There is no allegation or proof that the said item of property in Ext. D is fictitious; however what we have said with respect to Ext. C applies equally to Ext. D and we cannot therefore find that there is any infirmity attaching to its registration either. 16. The first part of the second point is whether Ext. C is a mere sham or pocket instrument. D is fictitious; however what we have said with respect to Ext. C applies equally to Ext. D and we cannot therefore find that there is any infirmity attaching to its registration either. 16. The first part of the second point is whether Ext. C is a mere sham or pocket instrument. The first thing we have to mention in this connection is that the appellant's case that the document is sham or that it was executed with a view to defraud creditors is based on purely conjectural considerations. Paragraph 8 of the written statement sets out that the appellant became aware of the existence of Ext. C only when he was filing the written statement. It cannot be that he did not know of it at least when the present plaintiff attempted to intervene in O.S. 4 of 1121. Paragraph 8 of the written statement then proceeds to state that it is an invalid document brought into existence nominally for a very low consideration with a view to defeat creditors. It is difficult to comprehend exactly what all defences were sought to be included in that one sentence. Issue 3 in the case reads: "Is the sale deed by Lakshmanaperumal Pillai valid and real? Or, was it only a sham and nominal affair, and intended to defraud creditors? The two concepts envisaged by the issue have to be kept separate. The lower court has found that it was not a sham document and that it was also not brought into existence with a view to defeat or delay creditors. As mentioned earlier the line of defence reflected by this issue is founded on mere surmises. 17. There are no doubt some suspicious circumstances about it. The document was produced for registration by the executant Lekshamanaperumal Pillai and he himself got it back from the Sub-Registrar's office. The five substantial items included in it were all outstanding in the possession of mortgagees. Still the document recites that they were in the possession of the executant and that he was transferring their possession to the vendee. No mention is made of the outstanding mortgages, much less provision is made for their discharge. In view, however, of the facts and circumstances, we shall presently refer to, we are not inclined to assign much weight to these facts. No mention is made of the outstanding mortgages, much less provision is made for their discharge. In view, however, of the facts and circumstances, we shall presently refer to, we are not inclined to assign much weight to these facts. The suggestion that the non-mention of the encumbrances was with a view to save stamp and registration fees appears to us to be not without force. Ext. D shows that Subramania Pillai the vendor thereunder handed over the original of Ext. C to the vendee Balasubramania Pillai. In Ext. E the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, the recital with reference to Ext. C is that it will be given to him whenever he requires it. The plaintiff was not taking a sale with respect to all the items included in Ext. C or D. The original of Ext. C was produced before the lower court on 3.7.1124 when the defence sought to make a point out of its nonproduction. It is seen the plaintiff got it from Balasubramania Pillai for production in Court. While Balasubramania Pillai was examined in the case as P.W. 3 the appellant did not seek to obtain any information as to where the original of Ext. C was. Besides these facts we have also to take into account that though Lekshmanaperumal Pillai lived for very nearly four years after the execution of Ext. C he took no step whatever to have it cancelled. He had left behind two widows and neither of them took any step to get Ext. C declared invalid. The present suit was brought nearly four years after the senior widow who survived the junior died. No reversioner has taken any step to have Ext. C declared invalid, though as a matter of fact we find so early as 1119 the reversioners had brought a suit to set aside certain alienations effected by the widow. 18. Furthermore we find subramania Pillai and his vendee Balasubramania Pillai dealt with the properties included under Exts. C and d as if they are full owners thereof. Balasubramania Pillai who purchased Subramania Pillai's rights under Ext. C is examined as P.W. 3 and he states that he paid valuable consideration for the sale deed in his favour. The consideration mentioned is Rs. 400/- of which Rs. 350/- were paid previously and the balance of Rs. 50/- was paid before the Sub-Registrar who registered the document. Balasubramania Pillai who purchased Subramania Pillai's rights under Ext. C is examined as P.W. 3 and he states that he paid valuable consideration for the sale deed in his favour. The consideration mentioned is Rs. 400/- of which Rs. 350/- were paid previously and the balance of Rs. 50/- was paid before the Sub-Registrar who registered the document. Before the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff Balasubramania Pillai had first sold item 5 in Exts. C and D to P.W.1 under Ext. K dated 7.10.1117. The vendee thereunder was in possession of the property under a mortgage executed by Lekshmanaperumal Pillai on 20.8.1111 (Ext. J) and by the sale evidenced by Ext. K he became the full owner of that item. Lekshmanaperumal Pillai had mortgaged item 3 in Ext. C and D as per Ext. L dated 16.6.1100, and the legal heir of the mortgagee thereunder sold that right to one Mytheen Kannu under Ext. H dated 7.2.1116. Balasubramania Pillai sold that item to the wife of P.W. 2 on 5.8.1119 under Ext. N and two days later as per Ext. O Mytheen Kannu released his mortgage right in favour of the vendee under Ext. N. We therefore find that of the five substantial items in Exts. C and D before the plaintiff purchased items 1 and 2, other people had acquired title to two other items (3 and 5) under documents executed by Balasubramania Pillai. As for item 3 a point was sought to be made that Lekshmanaperumal Pillai had no title to it when he dealt with it under Ext. C. Though that point is immaterial for the purpose of this case it would appear that the position is not well-founded. Though he had once lost title to it he would seem to have got it back under Ext. AG dated 31.11.1096 some seven years before Ext. C was executed. What is material for our present purpose is that both Subramania Pillai and Balasubramania Pillai had dealt with the properties they got respectively under Exts. C and D on the basis those documents evidenced real and valid transactions and not mere sham or nominal documents. We therefore concur fully in the view expressed by the learned judge in the court below that Ext. C was not sham but a valid and operative document. 19. C and D on the basis those documents evidenced real and valid transactions and not mere sham or nominal documents. We therefore concur fully in the view expressed by the learned judge in the court below that Ext. C was not sham but a valid and operative document. 19. Next we have to deal with the second part of point 2 which happens to be the second part of issue 3 as well. A large many of the circumstances we have adverted to in connection with the first part of the question must go a long way in repelling this contention as well. In the evidence the appellant gave in the case there is not a whisper even that Ext. C was executed with a view to delay or defraud creditors. It was true that on the date of Ext. C a good part of Lekshmanaperumal Pillai's properties were outstanding in the possession of mortgagees and it may well be that he was not in a position to redeem them. But the only other debt which we have been made aware of is a decree debt in favour of the present appellant himself and that same only to Rs.300/- or thereabouts. It is seen that appellant himself was a debtor to Lekshmanaperumal Pillai in a larger amount and the liability Lekshmanaperumal Pillai owed to the appellant was what he incurred in a fiduciary capacity. The learned judge in the court below has in discussing this question said: "That Lekshmanaperumal Pillai had sufficient items of property in thanathu possession has not been seriously disputed. It is seen that he had 16 cents in S. No. 1679, 45 cents in S. No. 4226, 39 cents in S. No. 1679, 91 cents in S. Nos. 496 and 1810 and 3 houses in S. No. 1679. He obtained a decree in O.S. 12 of 1112 (it was filed in 1112). This fact is evident from the testimony of P.Ws. 2 and 3. Hence it is rather baseless to contend that his idea was to screen the properties from the creditors". The appellant's learned Counsel was not able to show that the above statement of the learned judge was not borne out by the evidence on record. In these circumstances we cannot help agreeing with the lower court's conclusion that Lekshmanaperumal Pillai did not execute Ext. C with a view to delay or defeat creditors. The appellant's learned Counsel was not able to show that the above statement of the learned judge was not borne out by the evidence on record. In these circumstances we cannot help agreeing with the lower court's conclusion that Lekshmanaperumal Pillai did not execute Ext. C with a view to delay or defeat creditors. The curious part of it is, even in Ext. XIII, the sale deed which the appellant took from the widow some six days before her death, no mention at all is made of Ext. C, much less of any circumstance to impugn or invalidate it. 20. There is also another aspect to this branch of the case. Assuming the document was executed to defeat or delay creditors as between the parties thereto the document was valid and it must remain valid for all times. Lekshmanaperumal Pillai could not have impugned it on the ground that he executed it to defeat or delay creditors. That bar is not one personal to the executant alone. It would extend to all those who claimed the properties through him as also to persons claiming under such persons. In other words both Valli Ammal and her alienee the present appellant were equally precluded from challenging the validity of Ext. C on the ground now under consideration. 21. Having found that Ext. C to be a valid and operative document we have next to examine whether Lekshmanaperumal Pillai had on its date no alienable interest over item 2 in the plaint. This is the third point arising for decision in the appeal. We have mentioned that originally this property belonged to Lekshmanaperumal Pillai, that he had executed a gift deed (Ext. A) with respect to it and other properties in favour of his first wife Valli Ammal and that she had subsequently reconveyed this item to the donor himself as per Ext. B. The question for our decision is what was the nature of the interest Lekshmanaperumal Pillai conveyed to Valli Ammal under Ext. A and what right or interest did the reconveyance confer on Lekshmanaperumal Pillai. The argument on this part of the case covered a very wide range and our attention was invited to cases beginning from Mohammed Shaumsool v. Shewukram (1874) 2 I.A. 7 and ending with the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court of India in Ram Gopal v. Nand Lal (1951) 64 L.W. (Madras) 547. 22. The argument on this part of the case covered a very wide range and our attention was invited to cases beginning from Mohammed Shaumsool v. Shewukram (1874) 2 I.A. 7 and ending with the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court of India in Ram Gopal v. Nand Lal (1951) 64 L.W. (Madras) 547. 22. To us the language of Ext. A appears to be plain and unambiguous and reading it as a whole we are unable to construe it as anything more than a maintenance grant in favour of the wife. There are no sufficient dispositive words in it to create an estate of inheritance. On the other hand it states that as the properties mentioned in it were given to the donee by way of inam (gift) they shall be enjoyed by her for her life-time without subjecting the same to any alienation. The dispositive words and the limitation attached to the grant occur in one and the same sentence. It is not a case where after creating an absolute estate of inheritance a repugnant clause is introduced. The sentence has to be taken as one and indivisible and a limited grant alone was intended to be conveyed thereunder. The word inam does not necessarily indicate an absolute grant. It has to be understood with reference to the context and the accompanying words. In the preamble to the document it is stated that as he has taken a second wife, as he had no children by the donee and as the latter was always dutiful to him he thinks it appropriate that he should make a grant or a gift to her for the purpose mentioned viz., her maintenance. It purports to make a provision for the wife's maintenance in consonance with what would be her rights under the general principles of Hindu law. Of the cases brought to our notice the language of this gift deed resembles the language of the gift in Surayya v. Bala Gangadhara A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 3 where the son was making a provision for his widowed mother and the relevant extract from the gift deed occuring on page 6 of the report is more or less in the same terms as the relevant words of Ext. A in this case. It is however unnecessary to minutely scan the words of Ext. A as in our opinion the reconveyance under Ext. A in this case. It is however unnecessary to minutely scan the words of Ext. A as in our opinion the reconveyance under Ext. B has been of whatever interest Valli Ammal got under Ext. A. No doubt is states that Ext. A was only a maintenance grant but words to the effect that the husband should enjoy the property absolutely also occur in it. We do not for a moment attach any importance as to the sense in which the parties are seen to have interpreted Ext. A in the deed of reconveyance but reading the latter document as a whole and giving the words employed there, their plain and ordinary meaning it is impossible to hold that it was intended that any right over this property should inhere in Valli Ammal thereafter. In fact that reading of Ext. B is in itself sufficient for the decision that when Ext. C was executed Lekshmanaperumal Pillai was the absolute owner of the property. Assuming the appellant's interpretation that Ext. A created an estate of inheritance the effect of Ext. B was to nullify it completely. Lekshmanaperumal Pillai was therefore the absolute owner of the two plaint items both when he created the mortgage sought to be redeemed here and when he transferred those two items together with other properties to Subramonia Pillai as per Ext. C. 23. Now we come to the point whether the plaintiff's suit should have been for recovery of the properties on the basis of his title as owner. When Valli Ammal executed Ext. XIII in favour of the appellant she had absolutely no title to the properties Lekshmanaperumal Pillai had sold under Ext. C and she had hence nothing to convey to the appellant with respect to these properties. The appellant's position therefore is no more than that of an intruder between the mortgagee and the true owner of the equity of redemption over the mortgaged properties. Decided cases go to the extent of saying that a person in the position of the appellant will not be entitled to the benefit of the equitable doctrine of subrogation. The Madras decision in Pichaiyappa v. Govindaraju A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 110 and the discussion on page 565 of Mulla's Transfer of Property Act (3rd Edn.1949), can with advantage be referred to in this connection. The Madras decision in Pichaiyappa v. Govindaraju A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 110 and the discussion on page 565 of Mulla's Transfer of Property Act (3rd Edn.1949), can with advantage be referred to in this connection. The Madras case is referred in Mulla's text book as an illustration of the proposition that if the purchase is invalid, the purchaser is a volunteer and there is no right of subrogation. The facts of the case as stated in Mulla's Commentries would show that the present is a case on all fours with that case. This is how the facts of the Madras case are set out on page 565 of the said book: "A mortgages property to B in 1912 and then sells the equity of redemption to C in 1918. After A's death his widow in 1920 purports to sell the property to D who retains part of the consideration and pays off B's mortgage. D had acquired no interest in the property by his professed purchase from A's widow. His payment was that of a volunteer and he was not subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee". In this view of the law the plaintiff could very well have brought a suit for recovery of possession without offering to pay any mortgage money to the appellant. That however is not the form of action chosen and we are only concerned with the question whether not having chosen that higher remedy the lesser relief asked for has to be denied to the plaintiff. 24. It looked to us rather strange that the appellant should raise this argument. In a case where a person in his position redeems the mortgaged properties and continued in possession for a period of twelve years or more a plausible defence of adverse possession may be open to such a person and if it succeeds the plaintiff may have to be nonsuited. Where the redemption suit is however instituted even before the appellant took possession of the mortgaged properties pursuant to the decree in his favour, the argument cannot, as far as we can see, be of any avail. Whatever that be we have to examine how far a suit for redemption can be held to be not maintainable on the ground urged by the learned Advocate General that the redemption effected by the appellant and extinguished the mortgage altogether. 25. Whatever that be we have to examine how far a suit for redemption can be held to be not maintainable on the ground urged by the learned Advocate General that the redemption effected by the appellant and extinguished the mortgage altogether. 25. On our reading of the facts of the case we have said that the appellant was a mere intruder between the mortgagee and the plaintiff, the true owner of the equity of redemption. It is only when there is a fusion of the interests of the mortgagee and the mortgagor in one and the same person that there can be an extinguishment of mortgage. When the appellant has derived no interest in the mortgaged properties in virtue of the sale by the widow the appellant's payment of the mortgage money cannot extinguish the mortgage. If his action in paying up the mortgage money was bona fide he became at best subrogated to the position of the mortgagee. In this case the plaintiff did not choose to set up a case that the appellant was not entitled to the right of subrogation, and by not stretch of imagination can it be held that the appellant's position is anything higher than that of a mortgagee as to entitle him to defeat the mortgagor's claim for redemption. The principle referred to above as to extinguishment was recognised in a similar case reported in Kelu v. Chekkara Cheppan A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 451. There a person took a release of a mortgage right assuming that he was the karnavan of the tarwad which had granted the mortgage. Two bodies of persons claimed to be members of that tarwad and there were rival karnavans also. The release of the mortgage was taken by one of the rival claimants for karnavanship and afterwards when the other karnavan brought a suit to redeem the mortgagee against the mortgagee and the karnavan who had taken the release, it was found that the plaintiff was the real karnavan and that he was therefore entitled to a decree for redemption. In repelling the argument as to extinguishment of the mortgage by the release taken by rival karnavan Beasley, C.J. and Horwill, J. who heard the case: "When a person who is not a mortgagor, under a mistake claim, pays off a mortgage debt, he cannot extinguish it, for he has no right to do so. In repelling the argument as to extinguishment of the mortgage by the release taken by rival karnavan Beasley, C.J. and Horwill, J. who heard the case: "When a person who is not a mortgagor, under a mistake claim, pays off a mortgage debt, he cannot extinguish it, for he has no right to do so. The only person who can extinguish a mortgage is the person who is entitled to redeem that mortgage and merge the mortgage in his own rights of mortgagor or mortgagee. Whatever therefore might have been the intention of defendant 1, he did not in fact extinguish the mortgage and was entitled, if he paid off the mortgage in the bona fide belief that he was entitled to do so, to subrogation of the mortgagee's rights." A redemption was held to be admissible under the circumstances of that case and for our part we are unable to apply a different rule in this case where the plaintiff does not seek to raise the question of the appellant's bona fides at all, but offers to pay him the money he had deposited in court pursuant to the decree in his favour in O.S. 4 of 1121. The case in 1937 Mad. 451 was an appeal from the decision of Wadsworth, J. reported in Veetil Kelu v. Chakkara Chappan A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 308 and the appellate decision reversed the decision of Wadsworth, J. The leaned Advocate General invited our attention to the decision in Bijaji Bhadur v. Parmeshwari Ram A.I.R. 1924 All. 834 which Wadsworth, J. followed. That case was also decided by a Single Judge and in view of the Division Bench ruling in A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 451 we do not feel called upon to comment much on those decisions. Those decisions only say that a person who redeems a mortgage on the erroneous assumption of the powers of the mortgagor cannot be regarded as a transferee of the mortgagee. In these cases the question was one of adverse possession and as mentioned earlier there is no scope for that plea in the present suit. The present suit was brought even before the appellant took possession of the mortgaged properties. 26. In these cases the question was one of adverse possession and as mentioned earlier there is no scope for that plea in the present suit. The present suit was brought even before the appellant took possession of the mortgaged properties. 26. Apart from the fact that there is no extinguishment of the mortgage, it has also to be borne in mind that when the plaintiff sought to intervene in the prior litigation he was asked to seek his remedy in a fresh suit. That order happened to be passed on the opposition raised by the appellant. The plaintiff's object in seeking to intervene there was to ask for a redemption decree in his favour and to be told that an event which happened after he instituted this suit should debar him from obtaining that relief is something which we cannot accede to. Nor can the appellant be permitted to take inconsistent positions in the two suits. There is therefore no merit in the argument that the plaintiff misconceived his remedy in bringing the present suit for redemption. 27. This brings us to the last point in the case. Our discussion so far has made it clear that in our opinion the lower court's decision granting redemption in favour of the plaintiff has to be affirmed. The plaintiff has offered to pay the mortgage money and in fact paid that into court. The dispute between the parties as to the terms of the redemption is only regarding the claim for those mesne profits. The lower court allowed the plaintiff to receive interest at 6 per cent in lieu of mesne profits. Interest is to run from the date the appellant had notice of the deposit of the mortgage money in Court. The Court has not however specified what that date is. Both sides have complained against the lower court's decision on this part of the case. The plaintiff's complaint is that he should have been allowed mesne profits at the rate claimed by him while according to the appellant even interest should not have been allowed until after lower court passed its decree. 28. The suit was instituted on 5.7.1121 and the plaintiff applied for a chellan to deposit the mortgage money along with the filing of the plaint. The deposit was also soon made. 28. The suit was instituted on 5.7.1121 and the plaintiff applied for a chellan to deposit the mortgage money along with the filing of the plaint. The deposit was also soon made. That was followed by an application for the appointment of a receiver (15.7.1121) and on notices being given to the appellant about the deposit as also of the application for the appointment of a receiver the latter notice was accepted while the former was returned as refused (30.7.1121). The lower Court rejected the application for the appointment of a receiver but on appeal the High Court appointed the Official Receiver of Nagercoil as interim receiver and that officer, who forthwith took possession of the mortgaged properties, continued in possession thereof till 16.6.1122 when pursuant to the order dismissing the plaintiff's civil miscellaneous appeal the appellant took possession of them through court. We cannot agree with the learned Advocate General's argument that there was no proper tender of the mortgage money to the appellant. He was aware of it at least when the receiver petition was heard and disposed of by the trial court, if not earlier when he is said to have refused to accept the notice issued to him from the court regarding the deposit. The appellant could be paid the mortgage money only if he had paid it to the mortgagee and we cannot therefore find anything wrong in the plaintiff stating in his plaint that as between the mortgagee and the present appellant the mortgage money he paid into the Court should be disbursed to the party rightly entitled to it. As mentioned the appellant obtained delivery of the properties on 16.6.1122 after being fully aware that he was at liberty to draw the mortgage money from Court in case he was so minded. We cannot therefore find any justification to refuse to grant mesne profits to the plaintiff from that date viz., 16.6.1122. As for the period anterior to it our decision is that the plaintiff is not entitled to get anything more than what the receiver had realised by way of rent. The trial court dismissed the application for the appointment of a receiver on 16.8.1121 and the High Court's interim order was on 20.8.1121. The receiver took possession of the properties immediately afterwards and remained in possession till 16.6.1122. The trial court dismissed the application for the appointment of a receiver on 16.8.1121 and the High Court's interim order was on 20.8.1121. The receiver took possession of the properties immediately afterwards and remained in possession till 16.6.1122. Whatever money the receiver had collected or was bound to collect will go to the plaintiff. If the lower court has already disbursed it to the appellant it will be recalled or an amount sufficient to cover it will be deducted from the mortgage money in court deposit. If the receiver has yet not paid into the Court all the amounts due by or from him the plaintiff will take appropriate steps to bring all such amounts to court for payment out to him. 29. Next we have to deal with the rate of mesne profits. On the pleadings in the case there is no scope for any argument on this question. The plaintiff stated in paragraph 15 of the plaint that the properties would fetch annually profits to the tune of 25 kottas of paddy and the present appellant in paragraph 25 of his written statement admitted in clear terms that the plaintiff's estimate of the profits was correct. At the Bar this admission was really overlooked. The attempt the Advocate General made was to reduce the rate of the profits to 16 3/4 kottas per year as held in O.S. 4 of 1121. There the present appellant as plaintiff had claimed 25 kottas annually against which the defendant (the mortgagee) stated that the annual profits would not exceed 16 3/4 kottas. There was no evidence in the case as to what profits the properties would yield and the court rested its decision on the defendant's admission. The position is different here. Besides, it is also seen that the Official Receiver had leased out these properties for an annual rent of 25 kottas of paddy. In these circumstances we can not find any justification to reduce the plaintiff's claim for mesne profits at the rate of 25 kottas of paddy a year and we hold that from 16.6.1122 until the plaintiff gets possession of the mortgaged properties he will be entitled to mesne profits at that rate. Price of paddy will be according to the controlled rates in force in each of the relevant years. For the period anterior to 16.6.1122 provision has been made in the preceding paragraph. 30. Price of paddy will be according to the controlled rates in force in each of the relevant years. For the period anterior to 16.6.1122 provision has been made in the preceding paragraph. 30. The Memorandum of Objection preferred by the plaintiff will stand disposed of as indicated above. 31. Subject to the modifications mentioned above we affirm the lower court's decision and dismiss the appeal with costs. There will be no order for costs on the Memorandum of Cross-objection. Dismissed.